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PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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CONTENTS

PAGE

Thirty Years of the PRC..... 1

Falsification of World History..... 28

Defeat of Japanese Militarists on Halhin-Gol (Commemorating the Fortieth Anniversary of the Events on Halhin-Gol)
(V. A. Sudets)..... 54

International Aspects of Siberian Development
(V. A. Aleksandrov)..... 81

China and Western Europe
(S. G. Yurkov)..... 114

From Anti-Imperialism to Alliance with Imperialism and Reaction
(A. G. Kruchinin)..... 133

Japan in the Seventies: Exacerbation of Internal Political Struggle
(V. N. Khlynov)..... 154

Beijing's Expansionist Policy Line
(Ngo Thanh Diong)..... 172

Maoism and the Fate of Socialism in China
(V. F. Feoktistov)..... 181

Maoists and Chiang Kai-shek: Agreement of Policies
(A. M. Ledovskiy)..... 196

CONTENTS (Continued) Page

Some New Developments in Chinese Literature
(A. N. Zhelokhovtsev)..... 209

Japanese Film--Past and Present*
(M. G. Dolya)..... 224

Twice Condemned (Commemorating the Fiftieth Anniversary of Peng Bai's Death)
(M. A. Suturin)..... 225

Ye Ting, Builder of the Revolutionary Army
(M. F. Yur'yev)..... 232

New Journal on Topics in Orientology
(V. A. Vasil'yev)..... 243

Western Sinologists on Modern Chinese Literature
(V. F. Sorokin)..... 249

China in the Strategy of American Imperialism
(B. K. Otradnov)..... 256

Dual Stand
(A. M. Malukhin)..... 263

Monograph on Problems in Cultural Tradition
(Ye. A. Serebryakov)..... 269

Tenth Science Conference on Historiography and Source Studies in the History of Asian and African Countries
(B. N. Mel'nichenko)..... 275

International Science Symposium..... 277

Eleventh Youth Conference on Problems of the Far East..... 279

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THIRTY YEARS OF THE PRC

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[Text] It has been 30 years since the People's Republic of China appeared on the map. The Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all progressive mankind heartily welcomed the triumph of the people's revolution in China. The Chinese people's struggle for freedom and independence was close to the heart of the Soviet people, who had done a great deal to help the industrious Chinese people finally gain an opportunity to build a happy life.

On 1 October 1949, at a festive mass-meeting in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, the founding of the People's Republic of China was proclaimed. The next day, the PRC was recognized by the Soviet Union, which established diplomatic relations with it. Soon afterwards, the PRC was recognized by all popular-democratic countries in Europe and Asia. The victory of the Chinese revolution was of great international significance. It strengthened the socialist world and dealt a blow to the colonial system of imperialism. This victory marked the beginning of a new era in the centuries-long history of the Chinese people. It established the necessary preconditions for guaranteed national independence, China's transition to the socialist course of development, radical improvement in the living conditions of the working masses and the transformation of a backward agrarian country into an economically developed state with modern industry, agriculture and culture. An essential condition for China's development was the combination of the CCP's correct policy and the mobilization of all the Chinese people's labor and material resources with the desire for alliance with the socialist world, with the Soviet Union, from which the PRC could and did obtain all-round assistance, whose lack of precedent was noted in China itself and abroad.

The existence of the socialist world and the active internationalist position of the countries of this world virtually excluded the possibility that the PRC would have to face the serious problem of breaking through a ring of hostile encirclement.

The consolidation of the PRC's international position was also fostered by the successes of the national liberation movement, which led to the collapse of imperialism's colonial system after World War II. In 1950

and 1951, India, Indonesia, Burma and Pakistan established diplomatic relations with the PRC, and other young states subsequently followed their example.

A definite contribution to the consolidation of the international position of the new China was the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, concluded on 14 February 1950. The treaty between the USSR and the PRC was signed at a time when the Chinese people urgently needed assistance and support to defend their revolutionary gains and solve difficult problems in economic and cultural construction.

In accordance with the treaty, the Soviet Union firmly and consistently defended PRC interests in the world arena from the very beginning, effectively assisting the young people's republic to repulse all attempts at intervention in its affairs by imperialist forces and to establish the necessary conditions for broad-scale socioeconomic development in the nation.

The economic assistance and commercial shipments received by China from the USSR and other socialist countries were intended precisely for the construction of socialism, the safeguarding of the PRC's economic independence and its equal participation in lively economic interaction within the socialist world.

The PRC's unification and cooperation with the socialist world constituted the deciding factor in the reinforcement of the new China's international position and largely predetermined the stability of the people's government by aiding in the establishment of the necessary conditions for a transition to broad-scale socialist construction according to plan within just 3 years after the founding of the PRC.

Beginning of Socialist Construction

Political and socioeconomic measures of historic significance were carried out in the first 3 years of the PRC's existence. The national economy, which had been ravaged by many years of war and predatory management by imperialists and the bourgeois-landowning upper echelon, was restored. Agrarian reform put an end to feudal domination in rural China and paved the way for the collectivization of agriculture. A new machinery of state was built up, and counterrevolution was stifled. The classes of landowners and grand comprador bourgeoisie were completely liquidated.

The working class gained more authority, organization and political influence in Chinese society. The main reason for this was the PRC's extensive cooperation with the Soviet Union and other fraternal countries.

The peasantry also experienced great changes. The laboring peasants became the owners of plowland and the leading rural force. They supported the measures of the people's government and were essentially its main basis of social and political support.

Therefore, within a relatively short period of time (1949-1952), the main general democratic objectives had been attained and certain political and economic conditions had been established for the reconstruction of the nation on a socialist basis. It was obvious and indisputable to China's friends that the difficulties of building a new society, connected with the economic, sociopolitical and cultural underdevelopment of the country, could all be successfully overcome through the revolutionary efforts of the Chinese people and the fraternal assistance of the people of the USSR and other socialist countries.

In December 1953, the CCP Central Committee ratified a policy-planning document entitled "Struggle for the Mobilization of all Forces to Turn Our Nation Into a Great Socialist State," which thoroughly elucidated party general line for the period of transition--that is, the socialist goals of the CCP and the means of their attainment.

The industrialization of the country, the creation of a new and socialist industry, was set forth as the primary objective.

After the successful completion of the agrarian reform, the gradual transformation of rural areas "on the basis of social principles" was to be the objective in agriculture.

The CCP general line envisaged, "over a relatively long period of time..., the transformation of trade and industrial enterprises controlled by private capital, so as to ultimately eradicate the system of capitalist private ownership of the means of production." The state's first step in the socialist transformation of these enterprises was to be "the redirection of private capital into the channels of state capitalism with the aid of state supervision and management of capitalism, to be achieved through the establishment of contacts and cooperation between the state economy and the capitalist economy."

"We must instill the people of our nation," the document stressed, "with an awareness that the assistance received by our country from the Soviet Union and the nations of popular democracy, the powerful unity of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism and peace-loving people throughout the world, as well as the successful development of the struggle to defend world peace represent an immutable condition for the triumph of socialist construction in our nation."

The CCP Central Committee document attached great significance to the reinforcement of the party's leading role, its political, ideological and organizational consolidation, the study of Marxist-Leninist theory by party cadres, the development of intra-party democracy and, in particular, a system of collective leadership and the reinforcement of party discipline and party unity; it stated that "unnecessary, excessive emphasis on the outstanding role of any individual must never be permitted."

The scientific approach to the problems of China's socialist development was primarily reflected in the document's emphasis on the inevitability of a long period of transition in China (approximately three 5-year periods) and on sequential development according to plan.

In September 1954, the First National People's Congress (NPC) met in Beijing and adopted the first democratic constitution in China's history. As the basic law of the state, it legally reinforced the cardinal premises of CCP general line in the transition period. This was a constitution of the socialist type. It proclaimed the socioeconomic rights of citizens, their political freedom and their obligations. And although the material guarantees of socioeconomic rights were still mainly in the planning stage, the very fact that they had been included in the constitution was of great historic significance. The unconditional observance and implementation of the first constitution of the PRC would have made it an excellent legal basis for the gradual development of socialist democracy in China.

The first five-year plan for the development of the PRC national economy during the 1953-1957 period also served the purpose of firmly establishing China in a socialist course of development and carrying out the party's general line. The first five-year plan was regarded as the initial stage in the construction of the bases of socialism. The plan envisaged 694 industrial construction projects, the main ones being 156 huge enterprises, built with Soviet assistance.

The development of industry and the accomplishment of socialist reforms in the economy in the first years of the five-year plan completely confirmed the accuracy of the basic premises of the general line and the five-year plan and proved that the Chinese workers, under the guidance of the communist party, could carry out the tasks involved in socialist construction according to plan. Experience confirmed the belief that China would require a fairly long period of time for industrialization and the construction of socialism. The general underdevelopment of the economy, particularly agriculture, with its minimal possibilities for accumulation, was having its effect. It took time, tremendous effort on the part of the entire population and intense work by the party and its leadership in the implementation of the scientifically substantiated course of socioeconomic development to overcome agricultural underdevelopment. A great deal depended on the degree to which the influence of Marxist-Leninist forces could be strengthened in the CCP.

In the mid-1950's, however, conditions within the CCP were seriously complicated. The group led by Mao Zedong became noticeably more active in the party leadership and attempted to force the party to renounce its general line and replace its socialist goal with a nationalist one--the transformation of the PRC into "the greatest power in the world."

In 1955 and 1956 Mao Zedong began to persistently imply that the transition to socialism could be accomplished without the establishment of the proper material and technical base and even set the objective of

"constructing socialism" in China by 1959. "It is quite probable," Mao Zedong declaimed, "that the nation will become socialist, but not industrial..., but should the peasants be forced to wait? This would be intolerable. Socialization of the peasants will not interfere with industrialization."

Many private statements made by Mao Zedong, particularly his speech "On the Ten Most Important Relationships" at an extended meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in April 1956, revealed his true goals: to denigrate the experience in socialist construction in the Soviet Union, to discredit the theory of scientific communism and to impose a petty bourgeois, nationalistic and voluntaristic course of socioeconomic development on the party and the coming Eighth CCP Congress.

Mao Zedong tried to use the economic successes, achieved as a result of the general line of 1953, as a means of pursuing his own goals.

In 1955 an abundant harvest was reaped, and in 1956 the harvest of the main food crops and the herd of livestock were even slightly greater. It was at that time that agriculture in China was turned into a totally cooperative sector in just 8 or 9 months at Mao's insistence, without any serious changes in the developmental level of its production base. The Maoists began to unscrupulously exploit the traditional egalitarian feelings of the peasantry.

The accelerated reform of capitalist industry was also instituted for the same purpose, although neither external nor internal circumstances called for such extraordinary measures. In November 1955, the CCP Central Committee Politburo adopted a decision on the total reform of private industry and trade. It envisaged the immediate transfer of all private enterprises to the direct control of the state, the payment of capitalists 5 percent a year on their capital for 7 years for the means of production that belonged to them (actually, the payments only stopped in 1966 and were then resumed in 1979) and the offer of high-paying jobs to capitalists.

By June 1956, the "reforms" had been completed throughout China.

In this way, the original plan for socialist reforms, calculated for three 5-year periods and in line with the actual capabilities of the nation, was flagrantly discarded by the Maoists. Making use of the authority of the party and the people's government, methods of administrative coercion, psychological pressure, ideological and political speculation and repression, Mao Zedong and his group were able to perform a chaotic job of property "reform," equipped with neither the proper material and technical base nor the necessary personnel. The lack of preparation for these "reforms," although they were externally totally "successful," had results that were far from favorable for China's further progression toward socialism.

The negative effects of this adventuristic policy on the state of China's economy weakened the position of the Mao Zedong group just before the Eighth CCP Congress. Besides this, the preparations for the congress were made under the influence of the creative decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, which were of great significance for the entire international communist movement and were inauspicious for the ideology and policy of the Maoists. In spite of the Maoists' original intension to conduct the eighth congress under the motto of struggle against "rightist leanings"--that is, against internationalist forces in the party, which opposed Mao Zedong's "special" course--the work of the congress took a totally different direction.

The Eighth CCP Congress (September 1956) reflected the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist, internationalist current in the CCP leadership against the petty bourgeois nationalist forces represented by Mao Zedong and his supporters. The main feature of the congress was the preponderance of Marxist-Leninist forces in the CCP ranks.

By the time of its eighth congress, the CCP was a mass political party with around 11 million members and candidates for membership, in which the worker segment had grown to 14 percent of total party membership, although the party was still primarily a peasant organization (69 percent). It was this predominance of non-proletarian strata that led to the development of petty bourgeois nationalist tendencies in the CCP, which represented a serious danger for the party.

Congress decisions were drafted on the basis of the summarization of accumulated experience and an analysis of the successes and errors of the first period of socialist construction. The successful fulfillment of assignments in the first five-year plan strengthened and developed socialist relations in urban and rural areas and laid a material basis for the subsequent industrialization of the country. Furthermore, the failure of Mao Zedong's attempts at an artificially imposed economic upsurge (1955-1956) confirmed the need for proportional national economic development according to plan--that is, the need for a scientific approach to the tasks of socialist construction.

The congress confirmed the accuracy of the party general line of 1953. The aim of "the gradual completion of socialist reforms in agriculture, cottage industry and capitalist industry and trade and the gradual industrialization of the nation" was included in the new charter as one of the main policy-planning provisions.

The congress set forth an extensive program for the economic development of the PRC in the second five-year plan (1958-1962), envisaging the completion of socialist reforms and the creation of the necessary conditions for the attainment, in the third five-year plan (1963-1967), of the CCP general line objective of turning China into a socialist industrial-agrarian state.

The congress reaffirmed the foreign policy line of the PRC, based on the need to strengthen the unity and friendship of the nations of the socialist community and to fight for peaceful coexistence against the imperialist policy of aggression and war. The accountability report of the CCP Central Committee to the Eighth Congress stated: "The events of recent years have demonstrated that the great alliance between China and the Soviet Union is an important stronghold of peace in the Far East and in the entire world. The Soviet Union has done a tremendous amount to promote the cause of socialist construction in our nation." The party and people of China were urged to continue strengthening and developing unity and friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. "The further consolidation and reinforcement of this unity and friendship," the report of the CCP Central Committee said, "will be our most important international duty and the basis of our nation's foreign policy."

When questions of party life and party construction were discussed, attention was focused on the existence of dangerous non-proletarian trends in the CCP. The chief danger was still the pressure exerted by pety bourgeois elements. The political report of the CCP Central Committee said the following about this: "In our nation, the petty bourgeois constituted a majority. The feelings of this class are constantly exerting influence and pressure on us; the bourgeoisie is also exerting uninterrupted influence on us in various fields. The party must constantly perform indoctrinational work with its members to keep bourgeois and petty bourgeois ideology from endangering the political irreproachability of our party." The congress deleted the statement about the "Thought of Mao Zedong" as the ideological basis of the party from the CCP Charter. The CCP Charter adopted at the Eighth Congress stated: "The Chinese Communist Party will be guided in its activity by Marxism-Leninism. Only Marxism-Leninism can correctly explain the natural tendencies of social development and accurately point out ways of building socialism and communism."

The historic significance of the Eighth CCP Congress consisted primarily in its adoption of a program for the construction of socialism in China and the transformation of this country into a leading industrial-agrarian power. The socialist construction program of the Eighth CCP Congress was essentially compiled in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism. The congress repulsed the attempts of Mao Zedong and his supporters to discard the party general line in the transition period. Its decisions reinforced the plan to construct socialism in close alliance with the entire socialist world.

The transition to the construction of socialist bases in the PRC in 1953-1957 was accompanied by the further consolidation of China's international position.

The objective role of the PRC as part of the socialist camp in the struggle against imperialist aggression in the Far East and Southeast Asia contributed to the elevation of the new Chinese State's international

prestige. The invitation of a PRC delegation to participate in the Geneva conference of 1954 and the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian heads of state in the spring of 1955 was vivid confirmation of the PRC's prestige in the international arena and evidence of the impending collapse of the imperialist policy of isolating the PRC in the nonsocialist world.

The consolidation of the PRC's international position allowed it to take a more active stand on questions connected with the general confrontation between the socialist world and imperialism. China welcomed the founding of the defensive Warsaw Pact Organization in May 1955 and officially declared its willingness to join the fraternal countries in repulsing imperialist aggression in Europe.

Acting within the framework of the general strategy of the socialist countries in the international arena, the PRC set forth initiatives of its own in the interest of world peace during the years of the first five-year plan and invariably supported all similar initiatives by the socialist and other peace-loving states. It actively supported the idea of replacing military blocs with systems of collective security and made an effort, along with the other socialist countries, to normalize relations with developed capitalist countries, particularly Japan and the United States, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

After the Bandung conference, the PRC began to develop relations with the Afro-Asian countries more intensively, contributed to their further convergence with the socialist world and aided in consolidating the unity of the chief revolutionary forces of the present era in a struggle against imperialism and for peace.

The process by which the socialist bases of PRC foreign policy took shape was unquestionably a sphere of fierce struggle between two lines in the CCP. Nonetheless, by the end of the 1953-1957 period, this process was mainly influenced by the preponderance of forces within the CCP which defended the principles of proletarian internationalism and strove to implement them.

Noting the primary significance of Chinese convergence with the fraternal countries, the first NPC maintained in its documents that it was precisely these countries that were "the Chinese people's closest friends." In the documents of this first NPC session and the Eighth CCP Congress, the foreign policy line of the PRC was reflected not only in the declaration of socialist principles, but also in the definitions of the nation's stand, stemming from these principles, on various aspects of practical policy in the international arena.

The fact that the worldwide socialist system emerged from the postwar stage of the struggle against imperialism even stronger and more united, and that the prestige of the PRC as a constructive, peace-loving, active and staunch anti-imperialist force had been considerably enhanced, created

a favorable external atmosphere for the Chinese people's attainment of the objectives of socialist construction. Speaking at an all-China conference of the CCP in March 1955, Mao Zedong had to admit that "current international conditions are favorable" for the construction of socialism in the PRC.

During the years of the first five-year plan in the PRC, there were virtually no large and important industrial construction projects that were not directly or indirectly connected with the cooperation and assistance of the socialist countries, particularly the USSR. Suffice it to say that our nation alone gave the Chinese side, virtually for free, more than 1,400 plans for large industrial enterprises and over 24,000 (that is, 2.5 times as many as to all the other countries of the socialist system) complete sets of scientific and technical documents of various types, the cost of which is estimated at many billions of dollars. The socialist countries were more than the only accessible source of progressive technical and scientific experience for the PRC; they were also a wide-open source. Thousands of Soviet specialists and hundreds of specialists from the other fraternal countries worked for years in People's China, passing their experience on to Chinese cadres. This experience took material form in new branches of modern industry (including the defense industry, in which the 100 base enterprises were either built or were supposed to be built with all-round material and technical assistance from the Soviet Union), in the system of planned national economic management, in the network of new scientific research institutes, in the fundamental reorganization of higher education and so forth.

Projects completed in China just with direct Soviet participation numbered more than 250 large industrial enterprises, as well as individual shops and other important national economic facilities. Li Fuchun, member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo and vice premier of the State Council, said at that time: "It is our belief, and this is a firm belief, that the enterprises designed and built in our nation with the aid of the Soviet Union truly represent all the most modern and all the best of Soviet experience. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, not only in terms of volume, but also in terms of their level of modern progressive technology."

The European socialist countries contributed greatly to the industrialization of the PRC and the establishment of an integral industrial system in China. Around 85 enterprises in the PRC were completely built (and 10 were partially constructed) with the aid of this group of countries, and so were 172 individual shops and assemblies.

The period of the first five-year plan, which was distinguished by extremely intensive, all-round cooperation between the PRC and the fraternal countries, still represents the period of truly profound and all-encompassing modernization in its 30-year history.

As a result of the selfless labor of Chinese workers and the all-round assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the main objectives of the first five-year plan were attained. By the end of 1956, the production growth indicators stipulated for the end of the five-year plan had already been achieved in the main branches of industry. The gross industrial and agricultural product of the PRC increased 68 percent over the total 5-year period (1953-1957).

The startup of operations in many new industrial enterprises and the enlargement of existing enterprises began to change China's appearance: New branches of industry were born (the aircraft, automotive and tractor industries, a modern machine tool industry and others), enterprises were opened for the manufacture of complex equipment for electrical power engineering, metallurgy and mining, and enterprises were built for the smelting of high-quality steel and nonferrous metals.

Assignments envisaged in the plan for the augmentation of production capacities in industry were mainly overfulfilled. During the years of the five-year plan, the value of the gross industrial product increased 2.28-fold, production of the means of production increased 3.1-fold and the output of consumer goods increased 1.8-fold. During the same period, the output of steel rose from 1.4 million tons in 1952 to 5.4 million, with a corresponding rise from 66.5 million tons to 130 million for the output of coal, from 7.3 billion kilowatt-hours to 19.3 billion in the output of electricity, from 13,700 to 28,000 metal-cutting tools, from 3.8 billion meters to 5.1 billion meters of cotton fabric, and so forth.

By the end of the five-year plan, socioeconomic reforms had virtually been completed in agriculture and cottage industry. By the end of 1957, agricultural production cooperatives took in 98 percent of all peasant plots. Cottage industry cooperatives were joined by around 6 million craftsmen (approximately 90 percent).

The years of the first five-year plan were a time of uninterrupted growth in agricultural production. The yield of grain crops in the PRC was 174.8 million tons in 1955, 182.5 million in 1956 and 185 million in 1957 as compared to the 1952 figure of 154.4 million tons. Over the 5 years, the gross agricultural product increased by 25 percent in cost terms. The yield of grain crops increased by 31 million tons (20 percent). And this occurred at a time when state capital investments in agriculture and forestry, as well as in irrigation, amounted to just over 4 billion yuan--that is, 7.6 percent of all capital investments. This was obviously inadequate for a substantial rise in agricultural production.

During the same period, intensive methods were used to reform capitalist enterprises by turning private capitalist forms of ownership of the means of production into various forms of joint state-private ownership with a subsequent transition to total state ownership.

The completion of most reforms in agriculture, cottage industry and the sphere of capitalist enterprise made significant changes in the socioeconomic structure of the nation. These changes can be described briefly with the following data: The proportion accounted for by the state sector in national income rose from 19 percent in 1952 to 33 percent in 1957, the share of the cooperative sector rose from 1.5 to 56 percent and the share of the joint state-private sector rose from 0.7 to 8 percent, while the proportion accounted for by individually owned farms decreased from 72 to 3 percent and the share of the capitalist sector decreased from 7 to less than 0.1 percent. In this way, the public sector had become the leading force in the national economy by the end of the first five-year plan.

The defense capability of the PRC became much stronger during these years. With the aid of the USSR and other socialist countries, China was able to laid the foundations for a modern defense industry within an exceptionable short period of time through the efficient combination of economic and military objectives. It is important to note that the unprecedented growth of China's defense might was accompanied not only by a decrease in relative state expenditures on defense in the national budget, but also by a slight absolute decrease. Between 1953 and 1957, defense expenditures decreased from 5.68 billion yuan to 5.51 billion, and their share of the state budget decreased from 26.4 percent to 19 percent.

Although the results of the first five-year plan were positive on the whole, there were several significant negative factors. First of all, it should be noted that the developmental level of productive forces in the nation, despite the high growth rates of the 1953-1957 period, was still too low. The general economic backwardness of agriculture seriously slowed down industrialization. The shortage of agricultural raw materials impeded the fulfillment of plan assignments concerning the output of the major products of the food industry and light industry, including the underfulfillment of plans for the production of cotton fabric, cotton thread and cigarettes by almost 10 percent and the underfulfillment of plans for the production of vegetable oil and sugar by 20 percent or more.

The low developmental level of productive forces, the weak economic ties between individual regions and branches of the national economy, the difficult demographic situation and the urgency of the food problem, as well as problems connected with accumulation as a whole, were real difficulties that demanded immediate resolution. At the same time, there was the real possibility of resolving them by means of scientifically organized socialist construction.

The PRC's successes in socioeconomic development in its first 8 years (1949-1957) were due to the fact that the CCP, which was leading the nation, essentially adhered to the principles of Marxism-Leninism in those years, paid attention to the general tendencies of socialist construction in relation to the specific conditions of China, moved in the

same direction as the nations of the socialist community and maintained close contact with the international communist movement and, in particular, with the CPSU.

As for the foreign policy views and actions of the PRC during the years of the first five-year plan, they were unquestionably consistent, in general, with the CCP aim of constructing socialism. The PRC, just as other countries in the socialist system, fought for peace, democracy and socialism in the international arena. These years conclusively proved that the total group of objective internal and external conditions favored effective socialist construction in the PRC.

The substantial success of socialist construction in the PRC during the years of the first five-year plan is a historical fact. It is also a fact that close and all-round cooperation with the fraternal countries served as a reliable guarantee of the Chinese people's constant advancement along the course of social progress and genuine national independence, which would have been impossible outside this system of international relations of a new type--relations of cooperation, mutual assistance, friendship, peoples and socialist internationalism.

The years of the first five-year plan in the 30-year history of the PRC were a period when the powerful transforming strength of scientific communism was vividly revealed. These years proved that the Chinese people's choice of a socialist course of development was the only correct one.

The Lost Decades

Today the official Chinese press openly admits: "For 10 years, between 1956 and 1966, the work of construction in our nation encountered many obstacles and suffered many blows, and during the next 10 years, between 1966 and 1976, it encountered serious subversive activity...and was stopped, as a result of which a serious crisis arose in the economic and political life of our nation. For this reason, the main objectives set forth at the Eighth Party Congress were not attained during these 20 years: (LISHI YANJIU, 1979, No 4).

In this way, two decades were lost. How much more time will the Chinese people require to rid themselves of the policy of Maoism and overcome the burdensome consequences of the more than 20-year regime of Mao Zedong and his closest associates? It will not be easy or simple to escape the severe sociopolitical and economic crisis engendered in the PRC by the policy of the "Great Leap Forward," the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," and the militaristic great-power course of Mao Zedong and his successors. The destruction they have caused and the obstacles they have set up to impede the Chinese people's progression toward socialism were too massive, both in the material and in the ideological spheres.

Let us return to the events of the time when Maoism was first established as PRC state policy and judge the extent of the harm inflicted on the Chinese people by the Maoists.

In the beginning of 1958, Mao Zedong and his supporters, who did not agree with the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress, began to insist on their fundamental revision. They declared that the control figures for the second five-year plan were too low. Mao Zedong asserted that China, adhering to a "special course," could pass up the USSR and the United States within 7-10 years and become a world power.*

Camouflaging his own plans to turn China into a militaristic power, Mao Zedong proposed a new general line--"to strain every nerve and to charge ahead in the construction of socialism according to the principle of bigger, faster, better and cheaper." The new Maoist line essentially signified renunciation of the general line of socialist construction in China, adopted by the CCP Central Committee in 1953 and approved by the first session of the Eighth CCP Congress in 1956. In May 1958, Mao and his group forced the party to hold a second session of the Eighth Congress, where they were able to establish their own line. The central topic of discussion at this session was the question of the speed and content of social reforms and economic development. The Maoists proposed a voluntaristic course of socialist construction "ahead of schedule" and insisted on the "supper-speedy" development of industry and agriculture.

This decision was contrary to the views of the members of the CCP leadership who opposed "avant-gardism" and had a clear understanding of China's actual capabilities. This position was reflected in Liu Shaoqi's report at the first session of the Eighth CCP Congress. He stressed that the rates of China's development should be progressive, but "should also be stable and reliable, so as not to deviate from the correct proportions in economic development and not to create an excessively heavy burden for the people." Mao Zedong and his followers, however, imposed the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" on the nation. This policy essentially consisted in a sharp increase in live unskilled labor, the heightened intensification of labor and the extensive use of coercive methods to increase the production of grain and steel, which, according to Mao, could create the necessary conditions for speedy economic growth and, above all, the rapid growth of China's military-industrial potential, including missiles and thermonuclear weapons.

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* In June 1958, speaking at a strictly confidential meeting of the CCP Central Committee Military Council, Mao Zedong informed the military leadership of his secret plans to establish the kind of modern defense industry that would guarantee China, by the end of the 1960's, "control" over the Pacific and readiness to "land in Japan, the Philippines and San Francisco"--or, in other words, a defense industry that would make it possible for China to wage a struggle for world supremacy.

The transformation of China into a strong military power would necessitate, in Mao Zedong's opinion, a "new" method for the socioeconomic and political organization of society in China. Its principles--that is, the principles of "barracks communism"--were set forth by Mao Zedong in August 1958 at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in Beidaihe.

Along with the universal egalitarianism, another characteristic feature of the Maoist grand plan was reliance on coercive methods and on the overall militarization of Chinese society. Mao Zedong recommended a "combination of Marx and Qin Shihuang"--that is, he recommended the method of action employed by the founder of the first Chinese centralized empire, whose name has become a symbol of despotism in China.

The imposition of a militarized regime on the party and the entire Chinese population and the policy aimed at the creation of a militaristic power were accomplished in the disguise of the noisy propaganda campaign of the "Three Red Banners"--the new Maoist "general line," the "Great Leap Forward" and the "people's communes."

The Maoists were lavish with ridiculous promises to build communism within 3 years and give the workers eternal happiness. The socialist aims of the Chinese communists and all workers and their desire to accelerate the process of socialist development and overcome the economic underdevelopment of the nation were widely exploited by the Maoists for their own nationalist purposes.

In numerous statements by Mao Zedong and confidential party documents of that time, the "Three Red Banners" policy was directly contrasted to the theory of Marxism-Leninism and the practice of socialist construction in the USSR and the other socialist countries. Mao Zedong frankly admitted: "We are doing exactly the opposite of what is being done in the Soviet Union," using absolutely "different methods of socialist construction." Through the fault of the Chinese side, Soviet specialists were put in a position which made it impossible for them to continue working in the PRC. In connection with this, the Soviet Government had to announce in July 1960 that it was recalling the Soviet specialists from China.

The liquidation of unified state planning, the decentralization of industrial augmentation and the disorientation of administrative cadres on the central and local levels resulted in chaos and confusion throughout the PRC national economy. Economic disorganization was exacerbated by the mass campaign initiated by Mao Zedong in September-December 1958 for the smelting of steel by primitive methods, which took more than 90 million people out of the sphere of productive labor. Around 80 million tons of coal and 40 million tons of iron ore were wasted on the production of steel that was actually useless. Direct losses were estimated at billions of yuan, and the abundant harvest of 1958 was not completely gathered.

In August 1958, the CCP leadership decreed, at Mao Zedong's initiative, a nationwide transfer from agricultural production cooperatives to people's communes. Within a few months, 740,000 cooperatives became 26,000 communes. This "communization" was accompanied by mass brutality and the flagrant violation of the socialist principles of agricultural organization. Total collectivization was carried out in the communes: All subsidiary plots were confiscated from the peasants, along with their livestock and poultry and even their personal household items: pots, pans, small agricultural implements and so forth. Compulsory "free" (that is, involving no money) collective meals were instituted. Maoism's propagandists bragged that there were no hungry people left in China. In reality, however, since almost half of the harvest was confiscated fro accumulation, administrative expenses and so forth, which was precisely what the Maoists intended, the free meals actually provided the peasants with starvation rations without any kind of additional monetary payment. Moreover, within 3 months of these free meals in the communes, all stocks of food and even part of the seed stock had been depleted.

The workers and peasants, who had been deprived of all financial incentives to work, had been forced into a depersonalizing and equalizing situation ruled by barrack-room discipline, and had been compelled to work as intensively as possible for many months with no days off, reached the verge of physical exhaustion by the end of the first year of the "Great Leap Forward." Industrial accidents took on massive dimensions and were often fatal.

The increasing dissatisfaction of party cadres with Mao Zedong's political line was revealed at a conference of top-level party administrative cadres in July 1959 and the Eighth CCP Central Committee Plenum following the conference, in August.

Pointedly criticizing remarks about the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" and its principal author--Mao Zedong--were included in a letter by Peng Dehuai, member of the Politburo and minister of defense, which was written to Mao Zedong on 14 July 1959 and was distributed to conference participants, as well as in letters and statements by Zhang Wentian, alternate member of the Politburo and deputy minister of foreign affairs; Huang Kecheng, PLA [People's Liberation Army] chief of General Staff; and Zhou Xiaozhou, first secretary of the Hunan Province CCP Committee. Peng Dehuai associated the nature of the "Great Leap Forward" policy with the petty bourgeois revolutionism and great-power hegemonistic aims of Mao and his supporters.

When Mao Zedong and his followers encountered the increasingly critical attitudes within the party toward the "Great Leap Forward" policy, they took several steps to break up the opposition, isolate their most resolute critics and stifle dissatisfaction. Mao overtly threatened plenum participants. He announced that if his policy line and he himself continued to be criticized, he would resort to extremes--to military coup. "I will go

out into the countryside and lead the peasants in an overthrow of the government," he threatened plenum participants. "If the liberation army will not follow me, I will seek Red Army support. But in my opinion, the People's Liberation Army will follow my lead."

Under the pressure of Mao Zedong, the Eighth Plenum adopted a decision "on the anti-party group headed by Peng Dehuai," which was published in abridged form only 8 years later, in August 1967. The plenum resolved to remove Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, Huang Kecheng and Zhou Xiaozhou from government office, although they would formally remain members of party administrative bodies. Later, all of them were suppressed. Lin Biao, who had recently been elected fifth deputy to the chairman of the CCP Central Committee, Mao Zedong, was appointed to take Peng Dehuai's place as minister of defense. After the plenum, an extensive party purge was conducted under the banner of struggle against "rightist leanings," and stronger repressive actions were taken against dissenters, particularly in the form of mass exile to rural areas for "labor re-education."

The basic line of the "Three Red Banners" did not undergo any significant changes. The first session of the Second NPC, held in April 1959, approved national economic plan indicators for 1959, which envisaged the continuation of the "Great Leap Forward" policy. Nonetheless, in accordance with a CCP Central Committee recommendation, the session relieved Mao Zedong of his duties as chairman of the PRC, which attested to the decline of his influence in the CCP under the pressure of mounting opposition. Liu Sahoqi was elected PRC chairman.

The entire national economy suffered as a result of the adventuristic "Great Leap Forward" policy. It upset the fulfillment of the second five-year plan. By 1962, industrial production had fallen to almost half the 1960 level. The yield of grain decreased to 150 million tons in 1960--that is, it fell below the 1952 level while the population increased by almost 100 million. National income and budget revenues decreased sharply. Hunger became a problem in virtually every part of the nation in 1960-1961.

The "Great Leap Forward" led the PRC into a severe economic, social and political crisis. It did not solve all of the "painful" problems of national development, but, on the contrary, sharply exacerbated them: the problem of industrialization and the eradication of disparities in industry, the problem of agricultural modernization and the elimination of the danger of hunger and malnutrition, the problem of enhancing the well-being of the broad working masses and the problem of finding means and methods of carrying out a genuine cultural revolution.

The consequences of the "leap" were equally serious in the ideological and political spheres. The collapse of the illusions connected with the idea of the "Great Leap Forward" gave rise to mass mistrust of the directives of the party leadership, apathy, vague dissatisfaction and resistance.

Reports sent to the CCP Central Committee by local officials and the reports of commune inspection commisions attested to a disturbing situation, to the mass dissatisfaction of the peasants with the commune routine and to the initial signs of this kind of dissatisfaction in the army as well. At a Politburo conference held in February-March 1959, Mao Zedong even said that "several hundred million peasants and leaders of small brigades have united to oppose party committees" and that "the people are restless, the army is restless." Profound dissatisfaction also seized other classes and segments of the population: the working class and the intelligentsia.

The "leap" exacerbated the problems of ethnic minorities in the PRC, as the policy of the intensive reform of social relations and property relations was being conducted in national regions in 1958 and 1959, without any consideration for specific conditions, and national cadres were being replaced by Chinese on the pretext of a struggle against "local nationalism." In March 1959 an armed rebellion took place in Tibet, as a result of which the local Tibetan Government was dissolved on orders from Beijing and replaced by PLA military control. According to official Chinese data, there were 20,000 people in the partisan brigades of the Tibetan "rebels." Regular PLA units also fought prolonged battles against "rebels" in other provinces of southwest China in 1959-1960.

The policy of the "Great Leap Forward" and "communization" ended in complete failure. The results were economic chaos, hunger, the sharp exacerbation of internal political conditions and the deterioriation of PRC positions in the international arena. Maoism suffered an ideological crisis, and the prestige of Mao Zedong and his "thought" began to decline in China and abroad.

At the beginning of the 1960's, under the influence of criticism and dissatisfaction among party members and the public, a policy was adopted, called the course of "regulating, strengthening, supplementing and elevating" the national economy. Measures to eradicate the consequences of the "Great Leap Forward" were listed in the decisions of the Ninth CCP Central Committee Plenum (January 1961). The plenum decided that, from 1961 on, the entire nation should concentrate its efforts on the reinforcement of the agricultural front and on unswerving adherence to the belief that "agriculture is the basis of the national economy and industry is the leading force."

The plenum decisions served as the basis for several large-scale economic measures: The people's communes were reorganized, capital construction was sharply reduced, the mass equipping of small-scale primitive enterprises was curtailed, some industrial enterprises and projects were temporarily or permanently closed, and many enterprises that had previously manufactured industrial equipment were reorganized for the production of agricultural implements and daily household necessities. The working class decreased sharply in size. In 1961 and 1962, more than 20 million

people were moved out of the cities and resettled in rural areas by administrative order. The principle of payment according to labor was partially restored to stimulate labor productivity and the improvement of product quality. Peasants recovered their plots and household property and were allowed to raise hogs and poultry.

At the cost of tremendous effort and expenditure, at the end of 1962--the last year of the second five-year plan, which had been wrecked by the "Great Leap Forward"--the PRC succeeded in just putting an end to the recession in production.

The deterioration of conditions in the PRC in 1961 and 1962 and the dissatisfaction of cadres with the policy of purges and repression influenced Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders who had previously supported Mao Zedong. In a speech at the festivities commemorating the 40th anniversary of the CCP's founding (30 June 1961), Liu Shaoqi expressed the view that CCP policy prior to the "Great Leap Forward" had been based on the tenets of Marx and Lenin, while the "Great Leap Forward" course was directly connected with the name of Mao Zedong. In January 1962, Liu Shaoqi said, at an extended working meeting convened by him for top-level cadres in the CCP Central Committee (attended by 7,000), that the "current difficulties are 30 percent due to natural calamities, and 70 percent due to errors."

Under the pressure of the mounting dissatisfaction of communists at the conference, Mao Zedong had to openly admit his involvement in the serious errors committed in previous years.

Statements containing veiled criticism of the "thought" and policy of Mao Zedong were heard more frequently among cadres on the local level and even in the center. The slightly veiled critical remarks in the press by prominent economist Sun Yefang, writer Shao Quanlin, famous writer, historian and Deputy Chairman of the Beijing People's Committee Wu Han and Beijing CCP City Committee Secretaries Deng Tuo and Laio Mosha had quite perceptible repercussions in the nation.

The majority of party and economic leaders, headed by Liu Shaoqi, tried to resurrect the experiment in socialist construction of the first five-year plan, which had been reinforced in the decisions of the Eighth CCP Congress. On the intra-party level, they essentially demanded the elimination of the influence of Mao Zedong's followers in the party leadership, who "did not keep promises" and "do not deserve to be trusted," as well as the rehabilitation of the opponents of the "Great Leap Forward," who were repressed after the Eighth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (August 1959). But the opposition to the Maoist leadership's adventuristic policy did not acquire an organized character in CCP ranks. The opposition was unable to win the support of the majority of CCP cadres and rank-and-file party members.

At the same time, the wave of dissatisfaction and critical comments that had seized party organizations, and the appearance of new tendencies in the development of intra-party life and in economic policy led Mao Zedong and his group to the conclusion that the further development of these processes could directly threaten their position in the party and in the nation. By 1965, the administrative bodies of the PRC and CCP had virtually split into two groups, or two centers, with relations between the two becoming more and more strained.

Mao Zedong was actively training the army for a struggle against opposition forces. In May 1965, military ranks were abolished in the PLA, and this increased the officer corps' dependence on the CCP Central Committee Military Council and on Lin Biao. Statements about the army as the "main support of the dictatorship of the proletariat" and as the "most obedient tool of the dictatorship" began to appear with increasing frequency in the Chinese press from 1965 on.

In the second half of 1965, the struggle in the PRC leadership over fundamental domestic policy issues became more intense in connection with the need to draft a long-range plan for economic development, since the renunciation of construction according to plan in 1958 had impeded national economic growth for 7 years. The struggle within the Chinese leadership over important foreign policy issues also became more intense in connection with several serious failures of Mao Zedong's foreign policy actions in the international arena and heightened U.S. aggression in Vietnam. Part of the Chinese leadership, headed by Liu Shaoqi, went against Mao Zedong's wishes and insisted on united action with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and communist parties, particularly in the struggle against American aggression in Vietnam.

In the fear that the development of the intra-party struggle would lead to the consolidation of opposition forces, Mao Zedong and his supporters began to carry out a political coup and gave it the code name of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The essential purpose of this coup was to eliminate Mao Zedong's political opponents, destroy the people's democratic political system and establish a military-bureaucratic dictatorship, which was expected to reinforce the Maoist political course and secure the means for turning China into a military power and implementing hegemonistic great-power foreign policy.

As a result of the "Cultural Revolution," which was led by Mao Zedong personally, many prominent party activists and military leaders and numerous cadres were repressed, the overwhelming majority of CCP Central Committee members were expelled, regional Central Committee bureaus and provincial, city and district party committees were dissolved, the activities of all civilian party organizations were curtailed, and organs of people's power, trade unions, the Komsomol and other public organizations were eradicated throughout the nation.

The "Cultural Revolution" inflicted heavy losses on the entire national economy, particularly industrial production and transportation. The industrial product in 1967 was 15-20 percent lower than the 1966 figure. The 1966 production level was not restored until 1969. The grain yield in 1967 and 1968 remained on approximately the same level, as a result of which there was less grain per capita in 1968 (considering the demographic factor) than in 1957.

These were the results of the economic and sociopolitical devastation of the country with which the Mao Zedong group approached the Ninth Party Congress.

The Ninth CCP Congress, which was convened in April 1969 when the basic requirements of the CCP Charter were being violated, legitimized the political coup that had been accomplished by means of the "Cultural Revolution" and, on the basis of the Trotskyist theory of "permanent revolution" concerning the impossibility of socialism's triumph "without a victorious world revolution," essentially removed the question of socialist construction in China from the agenda. Anti-Sovietism was elevated to the status of state foreign policy in the PRC.

The Ninth Congress essentially represented the constituent congress of a new party--anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist both in its ideology and organizational principles and in all of its policies.

The establishment of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship during the course of the "Cultural Revolution" and afterward was accompanied by the reinforcement and growth of the repressive system and the widespread use of repressive and terrorist methods against the opponents of the Maoist regime, and even against the population at large. During the period of "Cultural Revolution" and subsequent political campaigns, millions of people were exterminated and tens of millions were subjected to various repressive measures.

The "Great Leap Forward" and the "Cultural Revolution" undermined the fulfillment of the second five-year plan and the 12-year program for agricultural development in the PRC, which envisaged, in particular, an increase in grain production to 360-375 million tons in 1967.

The "Cultural Revolution" led to the disorganization of the system of economic control. The party administrative system was destroyed and the activity of the State Council, ministries and departments was largely paralyzed. The organs of the military-bureaucratic regime, which were set up in place of them, could not deal effectively with the situation even by means of military control over production and distribution. The institution of coercive forms of labor organization and the maintenance of the beggarly standard of living for the workers considerably diminished their enthusiasm for work. Military appropriations, however, rose annually, amounting to more than 40 percent of all budget expenditures.

The system for the training of skilled experts and rank-and-file workers for the PRC national economy, who had been in short supply even before the "Cultural Revolution," was completely disrupted. The "Cultural Revolution" kept China from acquiring millions of new highly skilled and skilled specialists. The majority of scientists, engineers, technicians and rank-and-file workers on the lowest and middle levels were the victims of repressive actions. The process of the eradication of illiteracy was disrupted. The overwhelming majority of school-age children had no opportunity to attend school.

The Chinese militarism of the present day took shape during the course of the "Cultural Revolution." In its present form, this militarism represents a reactionary system, which is expected to employ the tactics of military coercion and brutality in the interest of the security of the nation's political leadership and to create favorable internal conditions for the accomplishment of great-power intrigues in the international arena.

The destruction of the political system that had been created as a result of the victory of the people's revolution led to serious violations of the economic laws and principles of socialist management, deformed the economic bases that had been laid in the first decade of the PRC's existence and threatened the socialist gains of the Chinese workers.

As a result of the destruction of the people's democratic political system, the struggle for power by various nationalist groups became a characteristic feature of the sociopolitical situation in China. Under the conditions of the crisis in Maoist theories of national development, the struggle for power by various groups reflected the instability and abnormality of the Maoist political regime as a whole.

Graphic evidence of the instability of the military bureacuratic dictatorship was provided by the "September crisis" of 1971, when Lin Biao and several other top leaders were expelled from the political arena. Beijing public propaganda remained silent for a long time about the "September events." It was not until the Tenth CCP Congress (August 1973) that the Chinese leadership presented its official version of how the "counter-revolutionary conspiracy" that had allegedly been engineered by the "anti-party Lin Biao group" had been defeated.

An analysis of political developments in the nation testifies that although there was common adherence to a great-power nationalist course, the Beijing leadership fell into disagreement at that time as a result of conflicts over several problems connected with the specific means and methods of consolidating the regime and establishing its political system, courses of socioeconomic development, personal policy and foreign policy aims.

The most important of these were Beijing's foreign policy problems. There is abundant serious evidence of a connection between the "September events" and a dramatic turnabout in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations.

At the Second Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (August 1970), the news of long-ago secret negotiations with Washington, conducted by Chinese representatives on the orders of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, was first made public, and preparations for a radical reversal in national foreign policy in the direction of rapprochement with the United States were announced.

The seeking of alliances with imperialist circles and the designation of the Soviet Union as enemy number one by the PRC leadership, in spite of the fact that the Chinese laboring public and their army had previously been indoctrinated in the anti-imperialist spirit, aroused bewilderment and covert dissatisfaction in the military. Resistance was encountered in the high command of the PLA. The expulsion of Lin Biao and his supporters was accompanied by a new wave of terror and a shakeup in the party and army leadership.

In order to stabilize the situation, the Tenth CCP Congress was held in secrecy in August 1973. The congress as a whole confirmed the strategic course of the Chinese leadership in the areas of domestic and foreign policy, which had been set forth in general terms at the preceding party congress in 1969.

The Tenth Congress was marked by an air of apology and praise for the "Cultural Revolution." Moreover, in the new CCP Charter adopted at this congress, it is called "a great political revolution...which will be carried out many times." This description of the "Cultural Revolution" served as evidence of the stronger position of the CCP leaders who had come to power during the time of the "Cultural Revolution."

The Tenth CCP Congress, just as the previous one, ignored pressing problems in China's socioeconomic and cultural development. It limited itself to the simple reiteration of some of Mao Zedong's previous directives, which had been recorded in the documents of the Ninth Congress: the "Three Red Banners" policy (the "Great Leap Forward," the "people's communes" and the "construction of socialism according to the principle of bigger, faster, better and cheaper"), "agriculture is the basis of the national economy, and industry is its leading force," "self-reliance," "putting proletarian policy in a position of command" and others. These and similar directives were united under the general title of "preparations for war and natural calamities."

The revision of the CCP Charter also served the purpose of reinforcing the antisocialist platform of the Maoist political course. The new party charter did not differ in principle from the charter adopted at the Ninth CCP Congress in terms of policy-planning statements. The main objective was still the perpetuation of the "thought" of Mao Zedong as the theoretical basis of the party, and the reinforcement of basic aspects of Maoist policy as the CCP's long-range policy-planning directives.

The new nationwide political and ideological campaign for "criticism of Lin Biao and Confucious," launched after the Tenth Congress, was essentially a throwback to the "Cultural Revolution," which had been carried

out within the framework of the established Maoist regime. The campaign, which was launched at the beginning of 1974, was accompanied by the intensive formation of militia detachments--the minbing (the Maoists' own branch of storm troopers) and the organization of mass demonstrations by workers, peasants, soldiers and students with demands for continued "revolution in the superstructure," "in defense of the Cultural Revolution."

The criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius took place in an atmosphere of ideological and political struggle by the Maoist leadership to consolidate the new regime, implement its political line, effect Maoism's continued and all-round infiltration of the public consciousness and to take action against all malcontents and dissidents in the party, the army and the state power structure, who had been branded the "followers of Lin Biao and Confucius."

With the aid of the new campaign, the Jiang Qing group hoped to occupy a dominant position in the party and state power structure and in the army even in Mao Zedong's lifetime. We can assume that this fit in with Mao Zedong's own plans, as he relied on this group in the leadership, which was the most orthodox in its adherence to Maoism and, therefore, the most capable of carrying on the "thought" and directives of Mao after his death. Other political campaigns, launched in the last years of Mao's life, also served the purpose of consolidating the position of Mao Zedong's orthodox followers in the upper echelon of national leadership. These campaigns also served as a reflection of the increasingly fierce struggle by various Maoist groups for power.

The line of severing friendly ties with the USSR and other socialist countries began to be conducted with increasing determination in PRC foreign policy at the end of the 1950's. On China's own initiative, scientific and technical cooperation and cultural contacts were curtailed and the volume of trade between the USSR and the PRC was dramatically reduced. The number of border incidents provoked by the Chinese side rose. The Maoists made claims on the territory of the Soviet Union other countries. The great-power, nationalist nature of the policy of the PRC leadership became increasingly apparent. Feelings of hostility toward the Soviet people were instilled in the Chinese population.

The Chinese leaders tried to urge the international communist movement to renounce the theories worked out at Moscow conferences of communist and workers parties in 1957 and 1960 in regard to the nature of the present era, the struggle against the ideology and practice of the cult of personality, the means and methods of revolutionary struggle and the nature of communications between the main forces of the worldwide revolutionary process.

Actions hostile to the Soviet Union were committed during the "Cultural Revolution," reaching their extreme in the excesses of the Red Guards on the territory of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing (1967) and the large-scale

anti-Soviet armed provocations on the Sino-Soviet border in March and August 1969.

From the beginning of the 1970's on, the PRC placed more and more emphasis on rapprochement with imperialist and reactionary forces.

Stating his views on the qualitative changes in PRC foreign policy, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee said the following at the Moscow Conference of Communist and Workers Parties in 1969: "Beijing's actual behavior in the international arena is convincing us more and more that Chinese foreign policy has actually severed all ties with proletarian internationalism and has lost its class socialist content.... The facts indicate that the Chinese leadership only talks about struggle against imperialism while assisting it either directly or indirectly by its actions."

Attempts to Escape Crisis by Means of an Alliance with Imperialism

When Mao Zedong died on 9 September 1976, he left the country in a state of profound socioeconomic and political crisis. The national economy of the PRC, as the present Chinese leadership acknowledged, was on the "verge of catastrophe" by the end of 1976. The output of major industrial products had been reduced sharply. Per capita grain production hardly reached the 1955 level. It was officially declared that the nation was approximately 20 years behind in its material and technical development. On the whole, these economic difficulties still exist, and production output, due to continuous population growth (958 million), is not increasing, and is still declining in some respects. The problem of providing the population with work, food and clothing is still extraordinarily acute. In May 1979, Vice Premier Li Xiannian of the State Council had to admit that there were 20 million unemployed individuals in the PRC, that "there is not enough food in the nation..., there has been no real change in the public standard of living.... There is not enough edible grain--100 million people in the country do not have enough to eat."

The Chinese press unanimously asserts that the political regime which existed under Mao Zedong was also a "feudal fascist dictatorship" (RENMIN RIBAO, 16 April 1979).

One of the main reasons for the perpetuation of the extremely low standard of living is the excessive weight of military expenditures. The PRC, which occupies approximately the hundredth place in the world in terms of per capita national product, is one of the leaders when it comes to military expenditures. This correlation between the scales of unsolved social and economic problems and the concentration of existing national resources on military preparations, which are illogical from the standpoint of the interests of the broad working masses and which are still absorbing more than 40 percent of the state budget.

Another sign of the critical state of the Maoist regime is the continuous power struggle involving various groups on the highest level of leadership.

Finally, an important symptom of social crisis can be seen in the mounting dissatisfaction of the popular masses with the policy of Mao Zedong and his followers, which was reflected in the April riots of 1976 and other demonstrations.

An analysis of the situation in China suggests that the prestige of Maoism is declining, and not only among administrative cadres, but also in the depths of Chinese society. Large segments of the Chinese population are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the conditions that were cultivated by Mao Zedong and have been preserved in the main by the current CCP leaders.

Therefore, on the practical and theoretical levels, Maoism is experiencing a profound crisis, and the realization of the "Helmsman's" great-Han strategic plans is becoming an impossibility. The struggle for supreme authority in the nation has become even more intense in the Maoist leadership of the PRC, and disagreements have arisen in regard to the means and methods of implementing Maoist strategy. In October 1976, a group of Mao Zedong's most devoted followers were divested of all their authority. These were Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan, who had defended Mao's postulates: "Politics is the commanding force," "the provision of people in production with financial incentives will lead to the restoration of capitalism," "self-reliance" and others. After they had been divested of their authority, these followers of Mao were called the "gang of four" and were blamed for the state of crisis in the nation and for the violence and brutality committed at the time of the Cultural Revolution.

The new leadership, which was headed by Hua Guofeng, who had become chairman of the CCP Central Committee and premier of the PRC State Council, and which also included the rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping (divested of his authority for the second time on Mao Zedong's personal orders after the events of 5 April 1976 in Tiananmen Square), declared itself Mao Zedong's heir.

The advancement of economic objectives to the foreground and the encouragement of financial incentives in the national economy obviously contradicted the "Thought" of Mao and thereby undermined his authority. This forced the present leadership to resort to the falsification of Maoism by asserting that these tenets were present in the "thought" of Mao but had been distorted by the "gang of four." This forced retreat in domestic policy, however, did not affect the Maoist foreign policy line; in fact, PRC foreign policy acquired absolutely overt antisocialist aims. Alliance with imperialism and the creation of a worldwide anti-Soviet front became the main foreign policy goals. The 11th CCP Congress (August 1977) and the first session of the Third NPC convened on the basis of congress

decisions (February 1978) reiterated the policy of the Maoist great-Han course. Mao Zedong's anti-Marxist theory of the "three worlds" constituted the basis of PRC foreign policy.

Singling out anti-Sovietism as the chief aim of PRC foreign policy, Hua Guofeng quoted Mao Zedong at the congress and asserted that the United States now occupies a "defensive" position and that only the "other great power"--the USSR--carries a threat and, consequently, is "enemy number one."

The critical state of the economy and the attempts to reassure the population by means of promises to improve national welfare made it necessary for the present PRC leadership to set forth an obviously unrealistic program for turning China into the world's leading nation with the aid of the "four modernizations" (industry, agriculture, the army, science and technology). The need for economic modernization is objectively unavoidable for China, but the present CCP leadership is still striving to make use of this for the augmentation of military potential and the establishment of a material base for the attainment of hegemonistic goals.

The Chinese leaders are also ignoring the fact that there are hundreds of millions of people in the nation who cannot even find a job and that the nation must first put internal resources to work. They have put all their strength into applying for loans, running into the millions, for "super-industrialization" and for the purchase of costly modern weapons. Just a few months later, the PRC Government had to admit, under the influence of mounting public opposition to this adventuristic course, that these plans were unrealistic, and had to cancel many orders for foreign equipment, even though, as information indicates, this does not apply to purchases of weapons.

Realizing that China would not have the money to repay these costly loans (7 percent) in the near future and that it does not have the technical personnel to master the use of the new equipment, the Chinese leadership passed a law which gave foreign capital wide access to the nation. The direct participation of Western and Japanese capital in the PRC economy carries the threat of bourgeois rebirth and a PRC merger with the capitalist system.

All of this is facing the Chinese people with the dangerous prospect of completely losing all the gains of the people's democratic revolution.

The progressive world public has no doubt that although present-day China is still economically weak, it represents a dangerous instigator of world war. Beijing's aggression against socialist Vietnam graphically illustrated this. The Beijing aggressors flagrantly and unceremoniously trampled upon the elementary standards of international law, showed total disregard for the basic provisions of the UN Charter and tried to introduce a theory into the practice of international relations, in accordance with which they could "punish" other states if their politics did not meet Beijing's requirements.

Beijing's aggression against Vietnam has far-reaching international implications. It was an action consented to in advance by the American side. Besides this, it exposed a policy, permeated with the spirit of arrogance and great-Han chauvinism, of the flagrant pressuring of neighboring countries. Apparently, the aggression against Vietnam was also a unique way of repaying reactionary forces in the West for services rendered to Beijing.

The socialist countries, the international workers and national liberation movement and all peace-loving forces are struggling for the consolidation of peace and international security. As a result of their tireless activity, tremendous changes have taken place in the international situation, reflected in the fact that detente has become the dominant tendency in international relations today. Mankind is now facing many difficult and pressing problems. It is the noble goal of all progressive social movements to guarantee the further improvement of the international political climate, make the process of detente irreversible and strengthen the cause of peace and social progress. Progressive forces throughout the world, primarily the nations of the socialist community, are sparing no effort to attain this goal.

Speaking in the capital of Kirgiziya on 15 August, K. U. Chernenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, stressed the following: "While we reject the policy of the Chinese leadership, which is aiding in the escalation of tension, we are nonetheless prepared, as the 25th Congress of our party announced, to base our relations with China on the principles of peaceful coexistence."

There is no question that the People's Republic of China, as one of the world's largest powers and as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, could contribute greatly to the consolidation of peace. Activity by the PRC in this area and its active participation in the resolution of the cardinal problems of the present day and in the establishment of friendly cooperation between all countries and all peoples could only be applauded.

The socialist countries completely sympathize with the Chinese people's legitimate desire to put an end to backwardness and construct a truly socialist state. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, said the following in this connection: "We firmly believe that China can achieve true national rebirth and guaranteed socialist development not through struggle against the USSR and the other socialist countries, against the entire communist movement, but through alliance and fraternal cooperation with them."

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FALSIFIERS OF WORLD HISTORY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 24-44

[Round table discussion organized by journal editors]

[Text] A campaign for the review--but actually the falsification--of world history has been going on in the PRC for several years. It is being conducted by the Maoist leadership according to a precisely outlined political plan and pursues a completely definite goal--to establish historical and theoretical "grounds" for China's great-Han, hegemonistic expansion. Only the historical facts and events that "justify" the great-power plans of the Maoists are used in this campaign and, moreover, these facts and events are given a deliberate false interpretation. Therefore, the campaign launched in the PRC for the falsification of world history is a reflection and a result of the general expansionist policy of the Maoist leadership.

Some aspects of Beijing's campaign for the review of world history were the subject of a discussion in the journal editorial office, attended by Academicians A. L. Narochnitskiy and A. P. Okladnikov, Corresponding Members of the USSR Academy of Science P. A. Zhilin, M. A. Sladkovskiy and Doctor of Historical Sciences V. N. Vinogradov, as well as scientists from the socialist countries--S. Bira (Mongolia), Doa Dhui Tung (SRV), I. Ishzhamts (Mongolia), D. Kosev (Bulgaria) and R. Slawinski (Poland).

Question: It is widely known that one of the central aims of the Maoist "review" of history is the falsification of Russian history. What specific forms is this taking?

Answer: Works by Maoist "experts" on the history of our nation invariably set forth the thesis, borrowed from Western anti-Soviet literature, of the "degeneration" of the USSR and its continuation of tsarist foreign policy, and stir up hatred for the Soviet Union.

The Maoist falsifiers divide the history of pre-revolutionary Russia into the period of the autocratic, feudal multinational monarchy (from the 16th century to 1861) and the capitalist period, including its imperialist stage. The popular masses and progressive forces in society are ignored by the Maoists. The history of Russia is reduced in their works to a history of the territorial conquests of tsarism, which is depicted as the only aggressive force and stronghold of reaction in Europe and Asia throughout its existence. They completely ignore the revolutionary movement in Russia, the working class, Leninism and the Great October Socialist Revolution.

In their descriptions of Russia's role in Europe in the 17th through 19th centuries, the Beijing falsifiers use only the theme of "conquest" in an attempt to reduce the entire content of our nation's history to this. They have borrowed extensively from every type of hostile lie leveled against Russia by the Western powers in the 18th and 19th centuries. In particular, the policy of Peter I and, in general, all Russian foreign policy in the 18th and 19th centuries in Europe and Asia are elucidated according to a known forgery--the forged "last will and testament" of Peter the Great. This forgery, which implies that Russia planned to seize all of Europe and gain world supremacy, is widely used to justify the wars against Russia under Napoleon I, the Crimean War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 and World War I. Soviet historians have quite conclusively proved in their works that this will is a forgery. The attempts of the Chinese falsifiers of history to examine all Russian foreign policy from the standpoint of this forgery lead to the most flagrant distortions of historical fact.

By means of the distortion of history and a perverted interpretation of events, the Maoist falsifiers are striving to set the people of other countries against our people, particularly those with whom the Russian people have long been linked by traditional bonds of friendship and solidarity in the struggle against external aggressors and oppressors. In particular, they have falsely interpreted Russia's relations with the Balkan and Transcaucasian people by denying the objectively progressive (in spite of tsarism's reactionary nature) role played by Russia in the liberation of these people from Ottoman and Iranian oppression.

Contrary to the obvious facts, the Maoist authors deny that Georgia, the Azerbaijani khanates and Kazakhstan voluntarily became part of Russia, that Russia saved Armenia from Ottoman genocide and that other non-Russians, including many ethnic groups in Siberia and Central Asia, received something of objective progressive value when they became part of Russia. Spiteful and ignorant statements of this kind are made for the purpose of producing pseudoscientific arguments in favor of the plans to isolate, dismember and dissolve the Soviet Union, which are now being openly declared by the present leaders of China.

The description of the ancient history of our nation in contemporary Chinese historical studies clearly reveals a quite definite tendency to begin the history of Russia with the Moscow principality, depicting all other territories, with the exception of the Tver' principality, as objects of "unjust seizure," thereby severing the thread of continuity between ancient Kievan Rus' and the subsequent development of the Russian State with its center in Moscow.

The attempts to set forth scientifically unsound arguments as proof of the thesis of the "Soviet colonial empire" and of the territory of Russia as a mechanical conglomerate of lands and peoples, conquered at different times and having no organic relationship to one another, and to depict all of this as the accidental and unfair accumulation of arbitrary "seizures" by the Russian tsars, are characteristic of today's Maoist falsifiers of history.

An example of this was provided in the discussion of Kievan Rus' at a symposium organized by the Anhui Pedagogical Institute and attended by experts from other higher academic institutions. A report on the symposium in GUANGMING RIBAO on 22 December 1977 noted that its participants had disagreed with the "traditional interpretation," according to which the Russian nationality and state date back to the ancient East Slavs, and denied the existence of any bond of continuity connecting Kievan Rus' with modern Russia. Soviet scholars were accused of fabricating the theory that Kievan Rus' united the East Slavs and was the cradle of the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian nationalities. Reiterating the unscientific lies of bourgeois nationalist Ukrainian authors and displaying total ignorance in the area of our nation's history, symposium participants alleged that the three separate nationalities--Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian--had already taken shape in the 7th and 8th centuries, completely denying not only their common origin, but also the existence of any kind of relationship or community between them, and described these fraternal Slavic groups as eternal enemies.

All of these arguments, which falsify the history of our homeland, reveal a desire to invent theories that will cause different nationalities in the Soviet Union to conflict with one another, and an attempt to modernize and utilize, in the PRC's own interests, the decrepit nationalist foreign, particularly emigre, studies, primarily the nationalist "historical outline" of M. S. Grushevskiy. All of these actions by the Maoists are supposed to substantiate the thesis concerning the existence of some kind of imaginary ethnic conflicts within the Soviet Union, which are supposedly giving rise to confrontation and friction between different Soviet nationalities. But Soviet reality, the fraternal solidarity of the nationalities in the USSR, and the flourishing of their culture, national in form and socialist in content, within the context of a new international historic human community--the Soviet population--vividly illustrate the groundlessness of the Maoist falsifiers' plans.

Question: How do the Maoists interpret the history of the border between Russia and China and the history of Soviet-Chinese relations?

Answer: The Maoist falsifiers are taking great pains to distort the history of relations between Russia and China. They completely repudiate Lenin's teachings concerning national self-determination as a basis for the settlement of territorial disputes in the modern era, misrepresent the history of border regions in both countries and distort Lenin's definition of the unjust treaties between the capitalist countries and China by calling all articles pertaining to territorial matters in Russo-Chinese treaties "unjust" and alleging that they were once repudiated by Lenin.

In fact, however, V. I. Lenin never even considered the need to change or review the Russian-Chinese border and did not consider the treaties defining the border to be "unjust." While V. I. Lenin was still alive, the Soviet Government announced that the only agreements to be annulled would be those sanctioning the annexation of foreign lands and pertaining to "spheres of influence" in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Not one border treaty was mentioned in this connection, although the Soviet Government renounced its consular jurisdiction and unfair commercial privileges.

The Maoist falsifiers of history are not only reviving the Guomindang (which were, incidentally, relatively limited) claims of the 1930's and early 1940's to some Central Asian territories in the USSR, but are also voicing absolutely groundless demands for the return of 1,575,000 square kilometers of supposedly "lost" territory, into which Chinese conquerors, merchants and tribute collectors sometimes ventured, but more frequently did not even venture, in antiquity and the middle ages. The Chinese falsifiers are suggesting that they have inheritance rights to the conquests of the Bogdokhans--that is, they are completely departing from Marxist-Leninist principles for the settlement of territorial questions.

In view of the fact that the boundary between our nation and China was delineated before the revolution, over a period of more than 250 years, the Maoist falsifiers are devoting special attention to the distortion of the entire history of Russia's relations with China. They have published numerous newspaper and magazine articles, as well as pseudoscientific "studies," on questions pertaining to the history of Russian foreign policy in the Far East. Two volumes have already been published, for example, of the four-volume "History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression in China," in which the policy of the Chinese Bogdokhans is overtly idealized. The entire history of Russia is interpreted as a process of territorial usurpation, and the internal processes of the development of the Russian State and the colonization and development of vast expanses in Siberia and the Far East are completely ignored. Unsound arguments are used to refute the completely obvious facts, corroborated in historical documents, which testify that the territories annexed by tsarist Russia were not inhabited by Chinese and did not belong to China.

The Maoists are not even trying to conceal their openly nationalistic, tendentious approach to the evaluation of the policies of the Russian tsars and the Chinese Bogdokhans. Rejecting objective class judgments, they idealize the aggressive policy of Qing China, which was an aggressive feudal empire. Episodic appearances by Bogdokhan detachments or tax collectors in any particular area are declared, without any kind of justification, by the Maoists to be proof that these areas belonged to China. They make use of fragmentary data about military expeditions and the collection of tribute in the cis-Amur zone in the 13th through early 15th centuries and say nothing about the immutable facts that testify that these territories were not under Chinese sovereignty and were not inhabited by Chinese in the mid-17th century.

Soviet historians and experts on international affairs proved long ago that the Chinese falsifiers are brazenly distorting the essence of Russia's inegalitarian treaties with China. As a result of a historical process spanning many centuries, Russia became China's neighbor in the Far East, and later along the vast extent of the present land boundary between the two countries. It is absurd to ignore this historical process and to call the territorial articles of the treaties of the 17th through 19th centuries inegalitarian simply because they do not please the present Chinese leadership. On the other hand, it is an established fact that the treaty which was signed in Nerchinsk in 1689 and which seized the left bank of the Amur away from Russia, was concluded as a result of military pressure and blackmail on the part of Qing China.

A more thorough analysis of the many centuries of distinctive features in the development of international relations in East Asia is important for a correct understanding of the history of Russia's relations with China. In particular, for the more accurate assessment of the total groundlessness of Qing China's claims to dominion and sovereignty over many adjacent territories, it should be borne in mind that this nation was isolated from all other large states for an extremely long period of time, during which it was surrounded by weak and fragmented khanates, kingdoms, principalities and sultanates, and its neighbors were a number of deserted and sparsely populated areas, belonging neither to China nor to other states. As a result of this, territorial relations and the history of boundaries in East Asia were not the same as in Western Europe, with its more closely interconnected states, immediately adjacent to one another.

For this reason, the question of China's boundaries was not clarified for centuries. Only the boundaries of China proper, particularly along the Great Wall of China, were definite, and even these were not precisely delineated in all areas, particularly the northwest and south. As for outside territories, their contours and dimensions changed frequently. Isolated raids on neighboring territories for the purpose of robbery were groundlessly referred to by local authorites and the government as justification for the inclusion of these territories in the Ming and Qing empires and the holdings of previous dynasties. The appearance of a

representative group with a merchant's caravan and the exchange of gifts were interpreted as the collection of tribute, and the territory involved was listed among the tributaries and vassals of the ruling Chinese dynasty, although these were absolutely independent tribes and principalities.

The arguments used by the Maoists display clear traces of the ancient official Chinese doctrine, according to which China was supposedly the center of the earth and could exercise supreme suzerainty over all other states and nationalities. Arguments of this kind were used by them to substantiate the thesis that many neighboring territories belong to China, including some where there were never any permanent Chinese military guards or Qing authorities and where tribute was never collected by the Chinese.

The settlement of Siberia was not the result of tsarist expansion, but the result of the taming of an uninhabitble region by Russian working people. In this way, Russia differed from the Western European states, which were represented in Asia only by warships, garrisons in isolated forts in conquered coastal points, officials and missionaries, who appeared on China's shores as early as the beginning of the 16th century. The elucidation of the taming of Siberia by Russian working people is one of the important achievements of Soviet historians.

One significant aspect of the Maoist falsifications of Russian history is the exaggeration of its role and "weight" in the colonial policy of the capitalist powers in Asia. Whereas Chinese historians of the 1950's and even the early 1960's focused their attention on the colonial aggression of England, France and the United States, which were the initiators and prime movers of the colonial enslavement of China, Maoist falsifiers of the last 10-15 years have concentrated more and more only on Russia, in an attempt to depict it as an enemy--and, what is more, the chief enemy--of China and the Chinese people. They have ignored all the evidence that Russia did not start the opium wars, did not conclude unfair treaties with China, did not engage in the export of coolies from China, did not use religious missions and missionary activity to enslave China and did not bring opium into China. Karl Marx wrote that Russia had an absolutely special relationship with the Chinese empire because it had maintained a liturgical mission there for a long time and it did not conduct maritime trade; it was for this reason that the antipathy, which the Chinese have felt for all foreigners who have invaded their nation from the seas since time immemorial, did not extend to the Russians.[1]

In numerous studies, Soviet scholars have proved the total lack of basis for the allegations of Russia's pronounced hostility toward China and have revealed the long-standing tradition of friendly relations between our nation and China on the vast expanses of the boundary separating them.

1. See K. Marx and F. Engels, "Works," vol XII, pp 158-159, 685-689.

Question: What are the main directions being taken by Maoist falsifications of Soviet history?

Answer: Between the time of the revolutionary victory of 1949 and the beginning of the 1960's, historical works published in the PRC presented an essentially correct description of the historic role of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the construction of socialism in the USSR. Afer this, there was increasing criticism of the historical experience and policies of the Soviet Union, and in 1962 the CCP's special line in the international communist and workers movement and in the contemporary revolutionary process was loudly proclaimed.

Since that time, a campaign of attacks on the Soviet Union has been waged in Chinese historical literature. In particular, these attacks have been leveled at the thesis concerning the evolution of the proletarian dicatorship into a state governed by all the people and the rejection of the premise of "continuously mounting class struggle under socialism." Groundless assertions were made in regard to the USSR's transformation into a "revisionist state." Chinese historians borrowed elements of Trotskyite and other foreign anticommunist literature, including the thesis concerning the creation of a "new bourgeois class" in the USSR in the form of a technocracy, and the Trotskyite ideas of the "degeneration of the socialist order" and the "restoration of capitalism in the USSR" were developed and used widely. The term "state capitalism" began to be used in reference to the Soviet economy. This also displayed the tendency to borrow and implement the slanderous anti-Soviet lies of Western Trostkyites and Social Democratic Sovietology.

Since the end of the 1960's, Maoist historical and political literature has contained more flagrant attacks on the party and Soviet leadership in the USSR, including the shameless comparison of the Soviet system to fascism. Can there be any doubt that these attacks are primarily serving the purpose of diverting public attention in the PRC away from the Chinese people's difficult life and inferior status?

Particularly rabid attacks by the Maoist falsifiers are being leveled at the mature socialist system in the USSR, its theoretical concept and its positive experience. The new Soviet Constitution was first ignored and then subjected to flagrant attacks. Rumors were spread that it aroused dissatisfaction in our people and that the proposals submitted to the Constitutional Commission were not given any consideration. Naturally, this is nothing more than an attempt to confuse the Chinese people and divert their attention away from their oppressed status and beggarly existence.

In recent years, the Soviet economic system has been described as concentrated "state-monopolistic capitalism" in many Chinese historical and economic works. They ignore the absence of private ownership of the means of production, the socialist nature of the Soviet economic system and the economic strategy and social policy of the CPSU.

Articles in the Chinese press took on an even more pronounced anti-Soviet nature during and after the festivities commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. One of the main directions taken by Maoist falsifications of the Soviet period of our nation's history is the flagrant distortion of the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union in Chinese historical and political literature and the press, and attempts to substantiate completely groundless claims to Soviet territory.

Signs of a return to the Bogdokhan and bourgeois-nationalist Guomindang theories concerning the return of "lost territories" were already evident in the PRC in the 1950's. History textbooks and maps, depicting these territories as part of China, were published. In the 1960's, this kind of propaganda was intensified and began to be associated with the expectation of a new world war, during the course of which, the Maoist leaders hoped, China would become the leading country in the world.

At the time of the "Cultural Revolution," the Soviet Union was pronounced "enemy number one." As we know, in 1977 and 1978 the Chinese press, including scientific journals, openly proposed a wordlwide counterrevolutionary alliance of all states and peoples against the USSR, with Beijing heading the alliance. Many articles published at that time suggested that if war with the USSR should break out, all of the people of Europe, Asia, Africa and America should rise up against the Soviet Union.

In recent years, there has been increased propaganda of the idea that the USSR is supposedly struggling for world supremacy and is carrying on the colonial policy of tsarist Russia. More intensive attempts are being made to discredit the worldwide socialist community; articles are being published which state that economic integration with the USSR is not beneficial to the CEMA countries, while the historical experience of mutually beneficial cooperation by CEMA members on the basis of socialist internationalism is being ignored or distorted.

Beijing propaganda is spreading fables about "Soviet colonialism" and absurd stories about the oppression of the national republics in the USSR. These incendiary remarks are being made for the purpose of creating conflict between the Russian people and other ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, and to destroy and dismember an indestructible new international historic community--the Soviet people. Various kinds of false predictions are being made about the alleged exacerbation of ethnic and class conflicts in the USSR; these greatly resemble the writings of various types of renegades, the so-called dissidents who are so popular in the West. Furthermore, Chinese propaganda does not hesitate to stoop to the most flagrant lies and misinformation.

In recent years, the Chinese falsifiers of history have propounded a theory about the three stages of contemporary history in SHIJIE LISHI, the journal of the PRC Academy of Social Sciences. This theory is intended to misrepresent the role played by our nation in contemporary world history.

The 1917-1949 period--that is, the period between the Great October Socialist Revolution and the history of the revolution in China--is called the first stage of contemporary history--the period of initial confrontation between socialism and capitalism. Here, an attempt is made to belittle the role of the Great October Socialist Revolution and exaggerate the significance of the revolutionary victory in China. The successes of the USSR and other socialist countries are ignored, and the thesis is set forth that a second stage of contemporary history took place between 1949 and the beginning of the 1960's, during which socialist forces began to prevail over imperialist forces. The third stage--the period since the early 1960's--is regarded as a period distinguished by the existence and struggle of three worlds, which allegedly took the place of the existence and struggle of two camps--socialist and imperialist--after the "degeneration of the USSR." This thesis is obviously intended to camouflage contemporary China's metamorphosis into a reserve of imperialism, and then its ally, into the most dangerous source of a new war. This theory is connected with the denial of the existence of a worldwide socialist system at the present time.

Question: How do contemporary Chinese historians interpret the Soviet victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan in World War II?

Answer: We should first discuss the basic features of Maoist falsifications of the history of the world war.

First of all, the Maoist falsifiers are distorting the causes and the date of the beginning of World War II.

It is a well-known fact that World War II began on 1 September 1939 when fascist Germany invaded Poland. But now, almost 40 years later, Beijing "researchers" have made a sensational "discovery" and have announced that World War II did not begin on 1 September 1939, and not in Poland, but on 7 July 1937 in China. This was exactly the news reported by GUANGMING RIBAO in July 1978, when it published an article by Wang Zhende and Hou Chende "On the Beginning of World War II," which contains appeals for a revision of the "common belief" and a "restoration of the true image" of World War II. What is this "true image," according to the authors? They state the following in the article: 1) World War II began in China; 2) the Chinese front, and not the Soviet-German front, was the main front of struggle against the aggressors; 3) it was China, and not the Soviet Union, that "defended world democracy and civilization" against the fascist barbarians, as it was "in the very forefront of the main front" of the antifascist struggle.

Let us take a look at the authors' arguments. In reference to the date of the beginning of World War II, they write: "The incident at the Marco Polo Bridge near Luguoqiao on 7 July 1937 marked the beginning of a large-scale invasion of China by imperialist Japan. This led to the formation of a broad Chinese front of combat against fascism, which immediately marked the official start of World War II."

What happened that day at the Marco Polo Bridge on Yunding River near Beijing? A Japanese company began night maneuvers in this region on the evening of 7 July 1937. The Japanese were fired at by Chinese subunits building up defensive positions here. The commander of the Japanese company, after discovering the "absence of one soldier," ordered his men to open fire on the Chinese. The crossfire continued until morning. The battle near the Marco Polo Bridge, where Chinese patriots successfully repulsed the attacks of Japanese troops, lasted almost until the end of July.

It is true that the Japanese militarists took advantage of this incident to begin more intensive combat, which lasted for many years in China. Japanese troops invaded China's central provinces. But this was just the next stage of the armed struggle, and nothing more. After the incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, not one "third" power with an interest in China declared war on Japan, as did occur in the case of Poland. The Japanese-Chinese war did not turn into a world war.

In discussing the main cause of World War II, the abovementioned Chinese historians state that when Japan invaded China, it "also invaded spheres of influence of imperialist states--England, France and America--and this signified that an imperialist war for hegemony had begun." But the reduction of the causes of World War II to a mere struggle for "spheres of influence" signifies a lack of understanding of the complexity and distinctive characteristics of this war.

The second world war, in contrast to the first, was not waged simply for the repartition of the world. The fascist group, headed by Hitler's Germany, wanted to gain control over the world and to enslave, and even exterminate, entire races. It is also important to remember that World War II ripened and broke out in a new set of historical circumstances, in the new era of world history that had begun with the Great October Socialist Revolution, an era in which the basic conflict has always been the conflict between socialism and capitalism. For this reason, the militaristic designs of both imperialist groups were engineered and carried out on a ideological, class, anti-Soviet basis.

As for the Japanese-Chinese conflicts and the conflicts between Japan and the Western imperialist powers "over China," they were not deciding factors, they were not the immediate causes of the world war. It is common knowledge that the United States, England and France not only failed to prevent Japanese aggression in China, but also, guided by anti-Soviet aims, assisted Japan in every way possible, in the hope of establishing a bridghead for war against the USSR with Japanese assistance.

The Maoist falsifiers are taking every opportunity to denigrate the role of the Soviet-German front and the Soviet Union and exaggerate the role of the Japanese-Chinese front and China in World War II.

In the abovementioned article in GUANGMING RIBAO, the authors assert that when the theater of hostilities took shape in China (July 1937), it became a "part of World War II," and China found itself "in the very forefront of the main front of the antifascist struggle, the struggle to defend world democracy and civilization." In connection with this allegation, the actual role of the "Chinese front" in World War II and China's contribution to the general victory over the fascist aggressors must be clarified.

In any discussion of the "main front" of the war--or, in other words, the "main theater of hostilities"--we must remember that during the course of the battles between the two opposing groups of states, two main theaters of war took shape--the European (Western) and Asian (Eastern), each of which took in several zones of combat. The main role in World War II, right up to the defeat of Hitler's Germany in May 1945, was played by the European theater, and the main role in this theater was played by the Soviet-German front, where the greatest battles of World War II took place and where the outcome of the war was decided, not only with respect to Hitler's Germany, but also its allies and the aggressive fascist bloc as a whole.

The Asian theater of war was of secondary importance as it was only an adjunct to the European theater, since Japan, which was operating in this theater, was assigned an auxiliary role in the global strategy of the fascist coalition. The "Chinese front" did not play the main or deciding role among all zones of combat, or even among all zones of combat in Asia. In fact, Chinese troops did not conduct a single large strategic operation during the entire war in China.

From the very beginning of the formation of the "regular" front in China, the Guomindang Army, which constituted the basis of the troops opposing the Japanese invaders, did not initiate a single large-scale offensive operation. And after Hitler's Germany had attacked the Soviet Union and the German fascist army had won its first victories, the Guomindang troops fell into a state of extraordinary passivity. This was the situation right up to the victory of the Soviet troops in one of the deciding battles of World War II and one of the largest--the battle of Kursk. After fascist Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, national liberation forces in China, particularly the 8th Army, also noticeably curtailed their activity in the enemy's rear and lines of communication. The Chinese leaders had only one thought in mind at that time, they planned to wait in Yanan and gather their strength for a struggle for power at the appropriate moment.

The Soviet people and our historians give the Chinese people credit for their many years of heroic struggle against the Japanese aggressors and highly command China for its contribution to the antifascist struggle and for the sacrifices it made during the course of this struggle. Nonetheless, the Chinese front was unique, both in terms of the intensity of combat and in terms of the aims of combat operations.

History tells us that the Chinese theater of hostilities was not only not the "forefront of the main front of the antifascist struggle," but also that it was not even the main front in the struggle against Japan. Without outside intervention, China could not have liberated itself, no matter what kind of fabrications Beijing is inventing now.

It is common knowledge that it was precisely around our nation, which played the deciding role in the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, that all forces opposing fascism rallied, that the Soviet Union, heading the just, liberating war against imperialist aggression, took on most of the burden of the struggle against the main striking force of the aggressive bloc--fascist Germany--and that the path of fascist aggression was closed off on Soviet land. It was here that the main forces of the fascist conquerors were decimated, and it was here that most of the military equipment and weapons of the aggressors were destroyed by fire and other means. It was precisely the Soviet Union and its armed forces that carried out the liberating mission and brought the struggle to a victorious end. As a result, mankind was saved from fascist enslavement.

The Soviet Union not only played the deciding role in the liberation of several European countries, but also definitely assisted the Chinese and other people of Asia to rout the Japanese invaders. The situation in China, even during the concluding stage of World War II, when the scarlet flag of victory was already waving over Berlin, did not promise the rapid eviction of the Japanese from the country through Chinese efforts alone. The United States and Great Britain did not expect to settle scores with the Japanese quickly either. Only the entry of the USSR into the war against Japan immediately changed the entire situation in the Far East theater of war and brought the end of the war closer.

Chinese historians are using every means at their disposal to belittle the significance of Soviet assistance to the Chinese people during World War II. In connection with this, several historical facts should be borne in mind. When the Japanese Army, armed to the teeth, launched the invasion of China in 1937, Guomindang forces and CCP troops were in a difficult position. Poorly armed and poorly trained, they could not stand up to the aggressor and had to retreat.

In this time of difficulty for China, the Soviet Union gave it a great deal of diplomatic and military support. On 21 August 1937, a Soviet-Chinese nonaggression pact was signed at the suggestion of the USSR. At the Soviet Union's insistence, the League of Nations expressed moral support for China and condemned Japanese aggression. The Soviet Government took immediate measures to help China with deliveries of weapons, ammunition and fuel. The first 225 planes had already been delivered to China by November 1937. In 1938, the Soviet Union extended China two loans of 15 million dollars each and sent it aircraft, tanks, weapons and ammunition on credit. Military advisers came to China from the USSR and took an active part in the organization of the Chinese people's armed struggle against the Japanese invaders.

Soviet military assistance was continued in subsequent years. On 16 June 1939, an agreement was signed on trade between the USSR and China. The Soviet Government increased its shipments of weapons, military equipment, ammunition and fuel. At the beginning of 1941, in spite of the mounting threat posed to our nation by fascist Germany, the Soviet Government sent China 200 bombers and fighter planes. All of this allowed the Chinese leaders, including the CCP leadership, to reinforce their armed forces and wage a more vigorous struggle against Japanese aggression.

At the end of the war, the Soviet command turned over large quantities of weapons and military equipment, seized by the Soviet Army in Manchuria during the rout of Japan's Kwantung Army, to the PLA at the request of the CCP. This made it possible to rearm PLA troops and form and equip new units and regiments. And it was precisely the PLA regiments that were formed in Manchuria with Soviet assistance that played the deciding role in the civil war in China (1946-1949), which ended with the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union, in spite of the tremendous difficulties connected with postwar reconstruction, took effective steps to reinforce the people's democratic region of Manchuria, which came into being as a result of the defeat of Japan's Kwantung Army. It was this Manchurian revolutionary base that became the strategic bridghead, with the aid of which CCP troops were able to launch an offensive against Chiang Kai-shek's forces and their imperialist patrons and ultimately liberate the entire nation.

These facts are now completely ignored or falsified in China.

By refashioning history to their own specifications and flagrantly perverting it in the interests of China's current anti-Soviet policy, Maoist historians and propagandists are trying to force the Chinese people, particularly youth, to forget everything connected with the Soviet people's selfless assistance in the Chinese struggle for freedom and independence.

Question: Why are Maoist historians trying to falsify the history of World War II and alter it according to Beijing's specifications?

Answer: The Maoists are particularly zealous in revising the results of World War II and instigating a new war. By 1964, Mao Zedong was already objecting to the postwar territorial status quo in Europe, to the Oder-Neisse border, and appealing for the "revision" of this border. Not long ago, Vice Chairman Li Xiannian of the PRC State Council spoke with a delegation of Japanese businessmen and agitated for the realization of Japanese territorial claims on the USSR. This revanchist idea, advocating a "replay of the war" on the basis of a new coalition, has been persistently propagandized by Mao's successors.

The Maoists have stated the inevitability of a new, third world war. They allege that "each generation must have its own war" and that it has already been more than 30 years since World War II and the time has come to

start World War III. The present Beijing leaders, by preaching the theory of the inevitability of war, are striving to bring it closer and to establish a united front of imperialist states against the USSR. In essence, the adventure against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was an attempt to provoke a new world war.

By falsifying the events of World War II and denigrating the decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the achievement of victory, Beijing politicians and ideologists, in an alliance with world reactionary forces, are striving to undermine the international prestige gained by the Soviet people and their armed forces as a result of the victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, to arouse discord in the community of socialist nations and to ideologically justify preparations for a new world war against the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

Question: What position do such fields of history as archaeology occupy in the Maoist falsifications of history?

Answer: In China, particular significance has always been attached to archaeology and archaeological monuments. Even in the Song era, this science was already attracting the attention of prominent scholars of the feudal age. Ancient texts and coins and bronze artifacts and weapons were studied carefully. Special catalogs were already being published at that time of bronze vessels of the Yin and Zhou eras and bronze swords and daggers, particularly those with inscriptions. In this sense, Chinese archaeology preceded the birth of European archaeological science. However, although the early development of archaeological science in China and its significant discoveries of the feudal era must be considered, the specific features of Chinese archaeology should also be taken into account.

The interest in material artifacts of ancient and medieval China had a broad ideological basis and a definite philosophical and political outlook. Its class basis was the ideology of the dominant classes in Chinese feudal society, which were striving to preserve and reinforce class traditions inherited from the slave-holding society and strengthen the dominant position of the feudal bureaucracy, the upper political echelon, over the lower social strata--the peasantry. The heightened interest in ancient culture also reflected the traditional chauvinist desire to contrast everything that was Chinese to everything that was not Chinese. China was depicted as the only center and source of all human culture. The "Middle Kingdom" was contrasted to the rest of the world--the "barbarian" world, doomed to eternal cultural, political and economic dependence on China. It was on this basis that Chinese ideological and political hegemonism originated and developed for centuries, taking the form of a pronounced interest in archaeology as a "national" science.

The political purpose of Chinese archaeological works unavoidably led to various types of falsification in the interest of "substantiating" certain political ideas and goals. This was the case, for example, in the history of the bronze tripods that were found "by accident" in Huanghe, on which

"historical" texts were discovered that allegedly dated back to the beginning of Chinese history. The tendency to falsify historical monuments subsequently became a permanent one in Chinese archaeology.

A definite departure from these old traditions in Chinese history and archaeology took place after the formation of the PRC under the influence of Marxism-Leninism and of Soviet archaeology. The influence of progressive representatives of Western archaeology was also felt.

This progressive influence was blocked when the Maoists seized power and Maoist ideology was established. Archaeology in China completely turned into a tool of ideological struggle, poisoned by chauvinism, and became an instrument of the hegemonistic aggressive policy of the Maoists, aimed primarily against the Soviet Union, against Marxism-Leninism, against the Leninist theory of national relations and against the Leninist theory of world history.

Chinese archaeologists engaged in more vigorous digging in regions directly adjacent to the Soviet border, and began their digs precisely where Maoist armed provocations had taken place. An example of this is the region near Lake Damansk, where, as Chinese newspapers reported, digs were conducted for the unconcealed political purpose of "substantiating" the seizure of territories that had been Russian since time immemorial. The aggressive intentions and anti-Sovietism of Chinese archaeologists are attested to by their pseudoscientific activity in regions bordering on the Mongolian People's Republic and in Inner Mongolia.

As for general matters in archaeology, they are settled on the basis of the Maoist insistence on the exceptional nature of the Hans and their culture. All works on Chinese history, beginning with the paleolithic age, are subordinated to this belief. In the early 1960's, Chinese archaeologists were already trying to substantiate allegations that Sinanthropus was man's most ancient ancestor and that China, consequently, was the birthplace of mankind. This attempt rested on unsubstantiated statements about the exceptional age and uniqueness of Sinanthropus, on the one hand, and on the tendentious interpretation, concealment or falsification of the place of Pithecanthropus and Australopithecus in mankind's history, as well as several well-known and universally accepted facts, on the other. Nationalist tendencies in the interpretation of the Sinanthropus question became more pronounced in the 1970's, when the Maoists objected to the results of Soviet studies proving that the territory of Mongolia and the Soviet Far East were included in the particular part of the Asian continent where the most ancient people lived and their culture developed.

In an attempt to prove the exceptional age of Sinanthropus at any cost by misrepresenting the concrete historical ties between paleolithic China and other paleolithic cultures and by depicting China as the only center of ancient culture, from which culture spread to other parts of the world, Chinese archaeologists are propagandizing the thesis of China's supremacy in the world and they are serving the hegemonistic purposes of the Beijing

leaders. The thesis of the exceptional nature and extraordinary age of the Chinese culture and its superiority to the culture of the "barbarian" races is one of the arguments used by Maoist historians to justify China's territorial conquests in the past and substantiate the "legitimacy" of the present Beijing leadership's territorial claims on neighboring countries.

Question: Many historians have noted that China's traditional lack of interest in the history of people far removed from the sphere of China's immediate concerns is now being replaced by pronounced interest in some of them. What forms is this taking?

Answer: In recent years, much more attention has been paid in China to the history of countries in Central and Southeast Europe. This "interest," however, is extremely onesided: It focuses mainly on the relations between these states and Russia. The attention of the Maoist "historians" is only attracted by one feature, and far from the main one, in Russia's relations with the Balkan and Central European people, namely the policy of the tsarist government in this region. The Maoists see this as a pretext for yet another attempt to create a rift in the socialist community and to poison the relations between the USSR and the European socialist countries with the poison of past offenses, most of them imaginary. For the sake of this, the Maoists, in betrayal of the principles of Marxist historical analysis, are slanderously implying that the Soviet Union is carrying on pre-revolutionary Russia's foreign policy.

One example of this is the collection entitled "Criticism of the Historical Views of the Soviet Revisionists," published in 1977 in Beijing. This collection includes a section called "A Reply to the Soviet Revisionists' Absurd Theory About the So-Called Liberating Role of Russia." In this section, the Beijing historians try to "expose" Soviet historical science, which, as they write, on the orders of the "new tsars--the Soviet revisionists--is taking every opportunity to distort and falsify history, to praise and glorify the aggressive policy of the old Russian tsars" and to preach "various absurd theories for the purpose of justifying aggression and expansion." The Beijing historians simultaneously present a "new explanation" of the Balkan people's liberation struggle against the Ottoman yoke and teach them the kind of conclusions they should draw from the lessons of their own history.

What is, according to Beijing historians, the "absurd theory" of Soviet historical science with respect to Russia's Balkan policy in the 18th century and, in particular, in the 19th? For several generations, the Beijing historians assert, the Russian tsars constantly strove to seize the Balkan countries by force, concealing their "barbarian aggression and expansion" under slogans about "liberating the people" and about "assisting Slavic brothers."

Russia's policy in the Balkans, its attitude toward the national liberation movement of the Balkan people and its role in their liberation from the Ottoman yoke constitutes a vast and serious topic. It was and is the

object of research not only by Soviet historians, but also by Bulgarian, Yugoslavian, Romanian, Greek and Western historians. It has been the subject of many works, in which abundant facts have been used as a basis for the thorough examination of Russia's policy in the Balkans, the attitude of the people oppressed by the Ottoman empire toward the Russo-Turkish wars, their significance in the liberation of these people and so forth. But none of this interests the Beijing historians. They are not interested in how the Balkan people lived under the Turkish yoke, what they thought of Russia and what they felt about its Balkan policy. In order to "destroy" the "absurd theory" about Russia's liberating role, the Beijing historians have chosen "appropriate" quotations from the works of Marx and Engels.

As we know Marx and Engels thoroughly studied the Ottoman empire, the liberation movement of the people under the Ottoman yoke and the conflicts and battles of the great powers, particularly Russia, England and France, for influence in the Balkans. As early as the mid-19th century, just before the Crimean war, Marx and Engels revealed, with amazing accuracy, the reasons for the headlong disintegration of the Turkish military feudal system despite all of the efforts of the Western states, which had an interest in its existence.

In choosing selections from the works of Marx and Engels, the Beijing historians select only those which "work" with their invented theory of Russia's "hegemonistic ambitions" in Southeast Europe. They have "omitted" Marx' and Engels' important evaluations of Russia's Balkan policy and their conclusions about the attitude of the Balkan people toward this policy. As we know, while Marx and Engels exposed the reactionary policy of tsarism, they also indicated the hopes placed by the oppressed Balkan people in Russia's liberating mission and its role in their liberation and the restoration of independent government.

Using the same method of selecting "necessary" quotations, the Beijing historians are flagrantly distorting the evaluations made by Soviet historians of tsarist Russia's policy in the Balkans in the 18th and 19th century and its role in the liberation movement of the people of European Turkey. Any conscientious reader can easily see, even in the most cursory examination of the Soviet works cited by Beijing historians, that they do not praise tsarism and its policy in the least. In accordance with historical truth, Soviet historians objectively describe the positive rule of Russian policy in the liberation movement of the Balkan people and Russia's assistance in their liberation from the foreign yoke and in the restoration of their governments. In spite of the reactionary essence of tsarism and its aggressive foreign policy, Russia objectively gave the Balkan people support and decisive assistance in their liberation from the Turkish yoke.

But the Beijing historians say nothing about this accurate description of tsarism and its policy in Soviet historical literature; they select isolated remarks by Soviet historians about the role of Russian policy in

the Balkans and in the liberation movement of the Balkan people and, on the basis of a few isolated quotations of this type, accuse the Soviet historians of being revisionists and of singing "hymns of praise" to the Russian tsars.

Soviet historians have never closed their eyes to the reactionary essence of tsarism's foreign policy. It would be a scandalous violation of the principles of Marxist analysis, however, to lose sight of the total group of events in the Balkans in all their depth, their contradictory nature and their dialectical unity. From this standpoint, it is indisputable that the Balkan people relied on the cooperation and assistance of the Russian people at a crucial point in their history, the era of national liberation and state construction. This page of history cannot be erased from human memory. The commercial, speculative political purpose of the historical works now being published in China is self-evident. The Maoists are committing a dual falsification for malicious purposes: In the first place, they are squeezing historical events into their invented framework of Russia's "eternal" aspiration to hegemony; in the second place, they are equating the policy of old Russia to the policy of the Soviet Union.

Question: The Beijing falsifiers are also distorting the history of Russo-Polish relations. How and why is this being done?

Answer: Since 1976, various publications on the history of Poland have appeared in China. They generally deal with a specific aspect of Polish history and, naturally, meet the requirements of Maoist propaganda. These publications are supposed to play a specific accessory role in relation to the total group of Maoist views on past and present world history.

In 1976, for example, Chen Renjian's study, entitled "The Liberation Struggle of the Polish People in the 19th Century Against Russia," was published. This publication deliberately reduced the entire issue to only one of the three annexed portions of Poland. In this publication, as in many others, the role of Prussia and Austria in the division of Poland is only mentioned in passing while the actions of tsarist Russia are given a prominent place in the discussion. Nothing is said about the Polish revolutionary's alliance with the Russian democrats, and later with the Russian workers' movement. On the other hand, tsarist Russia's territorial acquisitions resulting from the division of Poland are described in detail.

Chen Renjian discusses the Polish uprisings of 1846, 1848 and 1863, focusing attention on the last of these. The author underscores Engels' high evaluation of the program of this rebellion. But the reader is not given the impression that the Beijing historian wishes to reminisce about the Polish people's outburst of heroism or analyze the nature of the stated purpose of the rebellion. The description of historic events and the reproduced excerpts from revolutionary and rebel songs represent only the canvas into which the main thread of caustic anti-Russian propaganda is

tightly woven. The economic underdevelopment of Russia and its annexed portion of Poland is pointedly contrasted to conditions in regions annexed by other states. The author constantly implies that the national uprising of 1863 dealt a blow to the main reserve forces of European reaction. References to the opinions of the founders of Marxism in regard to the international significance of this uprising are not made for the purpose of proving the genuine importance of the 1863 rebellion, but for the purpose of stressing the negative role played by tsarist Russia in Europe.

These tendentiously selected facts and opinions are supposed to bring the reader to the conclusions desired by the Maoists. The final section of this characteristic brochure is entitled "The Great Significance of the Struggle of the Polish People's Resistance Movement Against Russia and for Independence." The author does not believe that this struggle was significant because it preserved the Polish people's national consciousness at a time when Poland did not exist on the political map of Europe. He feels that this significance stems primarily from the fact that this struggle took place in Central Europe, a territory of great strategic importance. But this is not all. Chen Renjian draws a strange conclusion from all this--it would seem that the history of this 19th-century struggle confirms the accuracy of Mao Zedong's thesis about the paper tiger, as this struggle by the Polish people in the 19th century led to great "upheavals," even though it ended in defeat.

Furthermore, as if this were not enough, the author disregards even the semblance of logic when he moves on to his next thesis, which he constructs from his fragmented description of Polish history and which represents an overt attack on the USSR: He states, without beating around the bush, that the USSR "has an even bigger appetite" and that it "constitutes an even greater threat to the people of Europe and the entire world than tsarist Russia." Here the Maoist historian reveals the true purpose of his examination of the Polish people's 19th-century struggle: This is an attempt to insinuate his thesis about the Soviet threat that is supposedly endangering Europe. Although the author is unable to specify the precise content or location of the present "struggle of the Eastern Europeans, including the Poles..., against the new tsars," he alleges that it "will ultimately be crowned with success." By these undignified means, the Chinese reader is led to believe that this struggle is actually taking place, and the reference to Polish history is supposed to lend this allegation credibility. This tendentious use of a fragment of Polish history serves to "substantiate" the hegemonistic goals of the Chinese leadership. It is completely obvious that it has nothing in common with common knowledge about Polish history or with the methodology of history.

The above example of a work which aspires to the status of a historical study is far from the only example of this approach to world history, and, in this case, to Polish history. In 1978 RENMIN RIBAO published a series of articles on the history of Europe, intended for the general reading public. The same method was used in these articles--tendentiously selected

examples from world history were used for a purpose having nothing in common with historical science or the theory of Marxism-Leninism. On 21 January 1978, RENMIN RIBAO published an article by Li Yuanming, entitled "A Historical Example of the Analysis by Marx and Engels of Political Forces in Europe." The author of this article, juggling quotations from the works of the founders of Marxism in regard to the role of tsarist Russia in Europe in the 19th century, tries to give a scientific appearance to the Maoist "theory of three worlds." Li Yuanming tries to prove that the arbitrary Maoist distribution of individual countries among the "three worlds" does not contradict class analysis, that there is a precedent for this in the classic Marxist works, and that it even represents a development of these works.

This article presents a set of "examples" of Russia's aggressive behavior in its relations with Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries, "reinforced" by statements by the founders of Marxism. All of this serves, according to the Maoist historian's plan, to substantiate the thesis of the imaginary Soviet threat to Europe and the consequent need to encourage Western Europe and Japan to fight against "superpowers"--that is, against the USSR. In this way, by artificially projecting situations from the past into our time, the Maoists are trying to ruin the Soviet Union's reputation and to "substantiate"--or, more precisely, to justify--the reversal in PRC foreign policy in regard to Western Europe and Japan and the line of cooperation with American imperialism. By using the antihistorical method of "projecting" political situations from the past into our day, the Maoists are trying to convince the reader that the anti-Soviet policy of Mao Zedong and the present PRC leadership allegedly stems from the consistent development of historical events and that there is a precedent for this particular analysis of political forces in Europe. And for the Chinese reader, as we know, a historical precedent is, by tradition and by Chinese custom, of truly great significance. This ruse is set in motion to somehow "legalize" the present change in PRC foreign policy. Therefore, this is a double falsification: It is not only a falsification of history by means of the projection of judgments concerning facts and events of the past into another era, but also an attempt to deceive the citizens of China by implying that the "theory of three worlds" does not contradict Marxism-Leninism, that it is consistent with it and represents its continuation and development.

Question: In an attempt to conceal the aggressive purpose of their attack on socialist Vietnam, the Beijing hegemonists are completely distorting the history of Sino-Vietnamese relations, suggesting that China was exercising the prerogative of an "older brother" by "punishing" Vietnam. What was Beijing's actual stand on the Vietnamese issue during the Vietnamese people's long years of struggle for freedom and independence?

Answer: Since the time when the Beijing leaders embarked on the path of expansionism and great-power hegemonism, the betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, the socialist community and the world revolutionary movement and increasingly close association with imperialism and international reaction, they

have made every effort to draw Vietnam into their reactionary orbit and, now that they have realized the futility of these attempts, they are trying to undermine the friendly relations between the two countries, shamelessly resorting to any means and methods. The blame for the destruction of the Vietnamese-Chinese friendship, however, has been assigned to Vietnam by Beijing.

Let us look at some of the main events so that we can determine the truth about the relationship between Vietnam and China.

In 1954, after 9 years of resistance to the French colonizers' second act of aggression, the Dienbienphu victory and the conclusion of the Geneva agreements, the Vietnamese people liberated the half of Vietnamese territory that lay north of the 17th parallel. The North took the path of socialism and the South had to continue the people's democratic revolution.

Soon afterward, American imperialism replaced French colonialism and seized South Vietnam. For a long time, it tried to divide the nation and to turn South Vietnam into a U.S. military base and colony of the new type. The South Vietnamese people had no alternative but struggle for their liberation. At that time, the Chinese leaders advised the DRV to "go into hiding for a long time and await the proper moment" and not rise up in an armed struggle. They tried to impede the construction of North Vietnam's armed forces and forced democratic Vietnam to refuse to give armed support to the South Vietnamese people's struggle. In Laos they pressured the Pathet Lao to join the armed forces of the right-wing government and simultaneously took every opportunity to isolate Laos from Vietnam.

In 1963, the leaders of the CCP proposed that the Vietnam Workers' Party convene a conference of 11 parties (the CCP, the Korean Workers' Party, the Vietnam Workers' Party, the People's Party of Laos, the People's and Workers' Party of Kampuchea, the Communist Party of Thailand, the Communist Party of Burma, the Communist Party of Malaysia, the Communist Party of Indonesia, the Japan Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor) for the purpose of setting up a bloc to be headed by the Maoists and directed against the Soviet Union, the socialist countries and other communist parties. The Vietnam Workers' Party did not approve of this suggestion and objected to the division of the international communist movement.

At the height of the American aggression, China demanded that Vietnam reject Soviet assistance, making its own assistance conditional upon this. But Vietnam took a firm stand of solidarity with all the socialist countries and refused to comply with the Maoist demand. When the United States began to bomb North Vietnam (August 1964) and extended the war in the South to the entire country, the Chinese leaders announced: "If you do not touch me, I will not touch you" and "China will not go to war outside its boundaries." These declarations actually encouraged American imperialism to continue the aggression against Vietnam.

In 1966, Vietnam proposed the creation of a world front in support of the Vietnamese struggle for national freedom, which would be directed against the United States and would include the Soviet Union and China. But China rejected this proposal. After this, the Beijing leaders began to create various difficulties in shipments passing through Chinese territory to Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. When China assisted Vietnam and Laos in the construction of strategic roads, it was actually trying to establish control over these regions.

Throughout 1966-1969, the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" was going on in China under the personal guidance of Mao Zedong. Vietnam did not support this campaign because it was well aware that the main content of the "Cultural Revolution" was a struggle for power between various factions, for the dissolution of the communist party and the government system and so forth. At that time, the Chinese embassy in Hanoi made up groups of Chinese emigrants to promote a "cultural revolution" in the capital of Vietnam and in several provinces, directed against the line of the party and government. The DRV had to take decisive measures to protect its sovereignty.

The Chinese leaders, headed by Mao Zedong, opposed the Paris peace talks, threatening to cut off aid and sever all relations with Vietnam. They had an interest in the further devastation of Vietnam by the United States and in the continuation of the war, which would make Vietnam completely dependent on China and would give the Chinese leaders the chance to use the Vietnam card in its game with the United States.

In 1971-1972, when the Paris talks between Vietnam and the United States entered their final stage, China hastily held out its hand to the United States. In 1971 the Chinese leaders received Kissinger in Beijing, and at the beginning of 1972 they received Nixon. In a joint communique, the United States and the PRC agreed that if the PRC would "contribute" in stabilizing the situation in South Vietnam (that is, if it would not assist in the overthrow of the puppet Thieu regime), the United States would withdraw its troops from Vietnam and establish good relations with China.

After Nixon's trip to China, the White House took brutal steps to destroy North Vietnam: The port of Haiphong and the Vietnamese coastline were blockaded, and B-52 bombers ravaged Hanoi, Haiphong and many other cities for 12 days at the end of December 1972, inflicting heavy losses on Vietnam. But the United States suffered a defeat. The American Government had to sign the Paris treaty of 27 January 1973 and promise to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam.

After the Paris agreement had been signed, China immediately cut off all military aid to Vietnam. Beijing was also in no hurry to fulfill previous economic agreements.

In 1974, China seized Vietnam's Paracel Islands by force with U.S. approval and made claims on the Isle of Spratly. Since that time, it has openly created tension on the Vietnamese-Chinese border. The Chinese leadership also exerted pressure on Vietnam to discourage any resistance to the Thieu regime.

All of this clearly shows that the Chinese leaders' motives for assisting the Vietnamese revolution have not at all been as selfless as they have implied. On the contrary, throughout the Vietnamese people's struggle against American imperialism and for national freedom, the Chinese leaders were working on insidious plans, associating themselves more and more closely with the American aggressors with each day and committing filthy actions against Vietnam.

Immediately after 30 April 1975, the Beijing leaders used the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to seize the Vietnamese islands of Tho Tiu and Fu Quoc by force. At that same time, on orders from Beijing, reactionary Vietnamese of Chinese origin began to provoke disturbances and sabotage socialist reforms in South Vietnam. On 30 April 1977, the reactionary clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, with the direct assistance of Beijing, ordered large military units to launch a sudden attack on Vietnamese regions located along the border with Kampuchea, killing thousands of Vietnamese and destroying their homes, orchards and fields.

In March 1978, coordinating its actions with the course of the Kampuchean-Vietnamese border war, the Chinese side began to organize the illegal mass resettlement of Chinese emigrants from Vietnam to China and then cynically accused Vietnam of "discrimination, repression and eviction of the huaqiao," cutting off all aid on this pretext, recalling specialists and closing three Vietnamese consulates in China. The Chinese side unilaterally canceled agreements on hundreds of construction projects that had been concluded with Vietnam prior to 1975.

On 17 February 1979, Beijing launched an aggressive war against Vietnam, using an army of 600,000, more than 500 tanks and armored vehicles and more than 700 aircraft of various types. After experiencing a strong counterattack by the Vietnamese Army and people, supported and aided by the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, and after encountering the pronounced condemnation of the world public, Beijing had to withdraw part of its troops, but only after it had looted a portion of Vietnamese territory and killed many Vietnamese civilians.

The Chinese leaders are distorting history in every way possible, declaring that "Vietnam invaded Kampuchea," "Vietnam is conducting a policy of regional hegemonism" and "Vietnam is committing military provocations and seizing Chinese territory" and that, consequently, China "had to respond in the interest of self-defense" and had to "punish Vietnam" and "teach Vietnam a lesson." These lies are supposed to mislead the world public and conceal the expansionist essence of Beijing policy from public opinion.

The facts, however, indicate that the Vietnamese people completely repulsed the aggression of American imperialism, defended the freedom and independence of their native land and created a united socialist fatherland, which has now become the object of overt military pressure on the part of Beijing. The policy of aggression that is now being conducted by the Chinese leaders is a consequence of the fact that a united socialist Vietnam is adhering to a peaceful and sovereign course in the international arena, aimed at egalitarian cooperation with all countries, a course which completely deprives Beijing of all hope of turning the SRV into an obedient tool for the implementation of the Maoists' hegemonist plans in Southeast Asia.

Question: As we know, the so-called theory of the "united Chinese nationality" now occupies a prominent place in contemporary Maoist "studies." What is the essence of this theory and how does it "fit in" with the political practices of the present Chinese leadership, particularly Beijing's course in relations with Mongolia?

Answer: In brief, the theory of the "united Chinese nationality" is the belief that only one nationality--the "Chinese"--has existed in China for many thousands of years, and that all other ethnic groups are only "branches" of this nationality. Far-reaching political conclusions are based on this allegation. The theory of the "united Chinese nationality" is widely used by Maoist historians as proof of the "legality" of the present Chinese leadership's territorial claims on neighboring countries. The Maoists regard the annexation of the Mongolian People's Republic as an essential condition for the establishment of great-Han hegemonism in Asia.

The Maoists' intensively propagandized theory of the "united Chinese nationality" and the "eternal harmony and fraternity" between the separate ethnic groups inhabiting China today is not a new discovery. Chiang Kai-shek, for example, who always took a stand of great-Han nationalism and racism, adhered passionately to this theory. The unscientific and anti-Marxist essense of this theory, which has been taken up by the Maoists, consists in an attempt to prove that the Chinese nationality, which took shape "over the last 5,000 years" and was supposedly monolithic and united since time immemorial, was not based on material means of production or the tools of labor which determined the division of labor, but ethnic racial similarity and cultural communication. It is common knowledge, however, that the economic activities and entire lifestyle of the northern nomadic people differed fundamentally from the conditions of the Hans, whose economic activity was based on farming and related crafts. As a result, relations between China and neighboring nomadic people were not determined at all by their ethnic and racial similarities or differences, in spite of what Maoist historians might say, but by the method of physical production and material needs. It was precisely this that was the cause of the constant struggle between China and its northern neighbors in antiquity and the Middle Ages. The assertions of Maoist historians that relations between China and ethnic groups which now live on Chinese territory but had their own sovereign states in the past, were always "friendly" and "harmonious"

are totally contrary to historical fact. The people of Mongolia, Dzungaria, East Turkestan and Tibet waged a constant national liberation struggle against the aggression of Qing China. These facts are now being denied and censured in Beijing. The theory of the "eternal unity of the Chinese nationality" actually deprives non-Han ethnic groups of their uniqueness and their national history, denies their centuries of struggle to preserve their independence and belittles their culture, language and traditions. It is intended to assert the dominant position of the Hans. This theory, according to the plans of the Maoist leadership, should also provide "ideological" grounds for their present great-Han, hegemonistic foreign policy. In the political practices of the current Maoist leadership of the PRC, the theory of the "united Chinese nationality" and the "harmony and fraternety" of the ethnic groups inhabiting China and all other groups that are ethnically related to China, represents the major foreign policy instrument substantiating territorial claims on the PRC's neighboring countries.

The national liberation struggle of the Mongolian people has old and glorious traditions. It began in the first half of the 17th century, when the hordes of the Manchurian conquerors invaded Inner Mongolia. In 1636, they subjugated Inner Mongolia. The Manchurian conquest deprived the Mongolians of their national government and subjected them to oppression and exploitation on the part of the Qing Government, Chinese merchants and Chinese money-lenders. Throughout the almost three centuries of domination by Qing China, the Mongolian people repeatedly rose up in battle. The struggle of the Mongolian people for national liberation led to the overthrow of Manchurian domination in Outer Mongolia in 1911 and ended with the victory of the people's revolution in 1921. Now the Maoists are trying, in their own great-Han interests, to strip the revolution of 1921 of its clearly defined anti-Chinese, national liberation content.

Just like Chiang Kai-shek's forces, the Maoists planned to make the sovereign Mongolian People's Republic part of China. For example, as early as 1936, Mao Zedong said in a conversation with American journalist E. Snow, that Mongolia would automatically become part of China after the victory of the Chinese revolution. Mao Zedong repeatedly made claims on the MPR later as well. Maoist historical science is now expected to "corroborate" these claims and give them scientific "grounds" by distorting the past history of the Mongolian people, their ethnogenesis, their relations with Qing China and so forth. For example, a book entitled "A Brief Study of the Vestiges of the Ancient Material Culture in Inner Mongolia," published in Huh-Hoto in 1976, presented archaeological data to substantiate the allegation that Mongolian tribes were always an integral part of the Chinese nationality. This obviously false and essentially provocative allegation is serving the Maoists as a basis for far-reaching political conclusions. The Maoist ambition to annex the MPR is clearly reflected in another book as well--"A Short History of Tsarist Russia's Aggression in China." This publication constantly implies that Outer Mongolia was "always part of China" and asserts: "As soon as the Xinghai revolution

broke out, the government of tsarist Russia urged a handful of Mongolian princes to declare the 'independence of Outer Mongolia' in December 1911." All of these assertions represent a conglomerate of malicious lies, which are intended to direct the reader's train of thought in the direction desired by the Maoists. Mongolia was not part of China proper; its territory was not inhabited by Chinese in antiquity, but by proto-Mongol, ancient Turkic and other tribes; and during the period of Manchurian domination, Mongolia was under Qing control and was far from part of China. In 1911, it was not the tsarist government that inspired the uprising of the Mongolian feudal lords against Chinese sovereignty over Mongolia; it was the Mongolian people who, acting of their own volition, rose up in battle against the Manchurian-Chinese yoke to win independence.

Beijing is trying to distort not only the past history of the Mongolian people, but also their present history as well. In their "aggressive propaganda" against the MPR, the Maoists are denying the significance of the Mongolian experience in non-capitalist development, are slandering its achievements and are attacking the premise of the gradual convergence of the nations in the socialist community in the interests of national economic progress and the equalization of social developmental levels. This also reflects the great-Han, great-power essence of Beijing politics.

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DEFEAT OF JAPANESE MILITARISTS ON HALHIN-GOL (COMMEMORATING THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE EVENTS ON HALHIN-GOL)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 45-64

[Article by V. A. Sudets, marshall of aviation, hero of the Soviet Union and hero of the Mongolian People's Republic]

[Text] In September of this year, it will be 40 years since the end of the joint Soviet-Mongolian combat operations on the eastern border of the MPR, in the region of Halhin-Gol River, and 40 years since the utter defeat of the Japanese militaristic troops that had attacked the Mongolian People's Republic.

Imperialist circles in Japan had been planning to seize Mongolia for a long time, regarding it as an important beachhead for their expansion on the Asian continent, and later for the achievement of world supremacy. In 1927, General Tanaka, then prime minister, wrote the following in a memorandum submitted to the Japanese emperor:

"According to Meiji directives, our first step was to be the conquest of Formosa, and our second--the annexation of Korea. Now a third step must be taken, ending in the conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia and China. When this has been accomplished, the rest of Asia, including the South Sea islands, will be at our feet."[1]

In this memorandum, Tanaka also reported that the leaders of England, France and Italy would not object, under certain conditions, to Japanese expansion into Manchuria and Mongolia.

Even during the civil war in Russia, when East Siberia was occupied, the Japanese tried to take over the territory of Mongolia and turn it into one of their own colonies--the "Great Mongolian State," stretching from Baykal to Tibet and from Manchuria to East Turkestan. This plan was discussed in 1919 at the so-called all-Mongol conference in Chita, engineered by Japan and attended by 15 of Semenov's White Guardsmen and Japanese agents. In October 1920, with the aid of Japanese protege Baron Ungern, an associate of Ataman Semenov, White Guard troops invaded Mongolia from the region of Dauria. After seizing military and political power, he set up an anti-people, so-called autonomous government and restored the authority of the Bogdo-gegen.

The Mongolian people had to fight against White Guard gangs as well as Chinese invaders. This struggle was led by Mongolian revolutionaries, headed by national hero and leader of the Mongolian people D. Suhe-Bator and his comrade H. Choibalsan.

The Mongolian revolutionaries made a historic decision to send a delegation to Soviet Russia to establish contact with the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), the Soviet Government and the Comintern and request them to assist the Mongolian people in their liberation struggle. In the summer of 1920, a delegation of Mongolian revolutionaries, including D. Suhe-Bator, H. Choibalsan and other comrades, arrived in Irkutsk. The delegations sent the government of the RSFSR an official letter, setting forth its political platform and asking for assistance in the revolutionary liberation struggle of the Mongolian people. Members of the delegation met with party and Soviet leaders of the RSFSR and DVR [Far East Republic], members of the Far East Secretariat of the Comintern Executive Committee, Red Army leaders and the workers of Siberia. They became acquainted with the ideas and achievements of the October Revolution and the inspiring example of the struggle and work of party, soviet and military organs to defend the October conquests.

During their stay in Soviet Russia, at a conference held in September 1920 in Irkutsk, the Mongolian revolutionaries decided to make immediate preparations for the creation of a people's party in Mongolia, which would lead the people's struggle for liberation from foreign invaders and feudal princes.

At the end of November, the delegation of Mongolian revolutionaries returned from Soviet Russia. Under the supervision of D. Suhe-Bator, H. Choibalsan and other members of the delegation, who came to the region of Troitskosavsk, energetic work was conducted among the people to prepare for an armed uprising, to organize partisan detachments in the nation's northern regions and to convene a constituent congress of the Mongolian People's Party (MPP).

On the eve of the decisive battles for the liberation of Mongolia, on 1 March 1921, the first, constituent congress of the MPP was called to order in Troitskosavsk. The congress approved the report of the delegation that had gone to Soviet Russia, adopted a party program entitled "The Appeal of the People's Party to the People of Outer Mongolia" and elected its Central Committee.

The party program set forth the main objective of winning national independence and establishing a people's government. The congress resolved to conduct all-round preparations for an armed uprising and to establish a headquarters for the people's partisan troops. Suhe-Bator was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces and war minister, and H. Choibalsan was appointed deputy commander-in-chief. A decision was also made to invite a Comintern representative for liaision with the MPP Central Committee.

Preparations for the armed uprising were discussed at a session of the MPP Central Committee on 6 March 1921. The committee held an extended conference on 13 March in Troitskosavsk for representatives of the party, partisan detachments and the workers--herdsmen--in border regions. A Provisional Revolutionary People's Government of Mongolia was formed at this conference and was given the responsibility of supervising the creation of armed forces, the preparation for the armed uprising and the uprising itself, of achieving Mongolia's liberation from foreign and other aggressors and of convening a People's Great Hural to adopt a constitution and elect a permanent People's Government of Mongolia, "capable of defending the public interest and developing the culture of the Mongolian people."[2]

By the beginning of 1921, national and social conflict had been sharply exacerbated in Mongolia. There were two types of occupation forces in the country--Chinese militarists and Russian White Guardsmen. Ungern's occupation troops and other White Guard gangs, which were being supported by the Japanese militarists, were just as savage as the Chinese militarists in some parts of the country, where they robbed and killed the civilian population.

Displaying an inflexible desire for joint struggle against a common enemy, the Provisional People's Government of Mongolia addressed the Soviet Government on 16 March 1921 with a persistent request for immediate assistance in the form of energetic measures to put an end to the excesses and piracy of the White Guardsmen in Mongolia.[3]

On 15 March 1921, in accordance with a decision of the MPP Central Committee, D. Suhe-Bator issued an ultimatum to the Chinese invaders: He told them to laid down their weapons and surrender the city of Maimachen (Kyakhta, now Altan-Bulak) to the revolutionary troops. The Chinese command did not accept the ultimatum. On 18 March 1921, a battle began between Mongolian partisan troops and Chinese occupation forces. A cavalry detachment led by D. Suhe-Bator defeated the large superior force of the Chinese militarists and took control of Maimachen. This date is celebrated in the MPR as the day of the founding of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MPRA).

The liberation of Kyakhta led to the eviction of the Chinese occupation forces from Mongolia, marked the beginning of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal people's revolution of 1921 and established the necessary conditions for joint struggle with Red Army troops against a common enemy--Ungern's forces and other White Guard gangs.

The MPP Central Committee and the Provisional People's Government, which arrived in Kyakhta from Troitskosavsk on 19 March, addressed the Mongolian people, lamas and princes with a manifesto, declaring the transfer of authority to the workers and appealing for an armed struggle against the foreign invaders and White Guardsmen. A similar letter was sent to the Bogdo-gegen Government in Urga.

After the eastern half of the nation and the city of Urga had been taken, Ungern's troops began to march toward the north in April 1921, toward Troitskosavsk, Verkhneudinsk (Ulan-Ude) and Irkutsk. This advance was part of the Japanese militarists' far-reaching plan for a new offensive on the territory of the DVR and Soviet Russia. In May 1921, for example, the Japanese organized a rebellion and a seizure of power by local counter-revolutionary forces in Khabarovsk, Ussuriysk and other cities in the Far East.[4]

In connection with the tense situation, on 10 April 1921 the Provisional People's Government requested the Red Army command for military assistance.

On 16 June, there was a meeting of the Politburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee in Moscow, attended by V. I. Lenin, at which time a decision was made, in accordance with a report by Red Army Commander-in-Chief S. S. Kamenev and in response to the request of the Provisional People's Government, to send Red Army troops into Mongolia for joint action with the MPRA for the purpose of routing the White Guard gangs of Ungern and his stooges.

In the second half of June, the Soviet command, in conjunction with the leaders of the People's Army, began to prepare for an operation to liberate the Mongolian capital, the city of Urga. The MPP Central Committee, the MPRA command and the Soviet command conducted a great deal of political, agitation and explanatory work among the troops and the population of the nation's northern regions. The MPP Central Committee, the Provisional Government and the Red Army command addressed appeals to the public, calling upon the people to fight against the White Guardsmen and explaining the Red Army's international liberating role in the struggle of the Mongolian people.

Soviet-Mongolian troops launched an offensive to liberate the Mongolian North on 28 June 1921, after the joint session of the MPP Central Committee, the Provisional People's Government and the Soviet command. After a march of more than 400 kilometers, interspersed with battles, in 10 days, the cavalry detachments of the People's Army and Red Army units liberated the city of Urga on 6 July.

Two days later, members of the MPP Central Committee and Provisional People's Government arrived in Urga along with the main forces of the Red Army and MPRA. On 11 July 1921, a permanent People's Government of Mongolia was established here. The same day, in the central square of the capital, D. Suhe-Bator solemnly spoke to the Mongolian people on behalf of the People's Government, proclaiming the independence of Mongolia and the creation of a people's government.

The liberation of Urga and the northern regions of Mongolia did not mean that the fight against the White Guards was over. After the liberation of Urga, the Mongolian People's Government requested the Soviet Government

to leave Red Army troops in Mongolia until all of Ungern's forces and other White Guard gangs had been completely driven out of the country. The Mongolian Government's request was granted. On 18 July, Red Army troops began to fight Ungern's troops, who had united with Rezukhin's White Guard brigade, near Uhai-Guna-Hure (on Selenga River, northwest of Urga).

When Ungern, who had supplemented his own troops with the detachments of feudal princes, learned that the main Soviet forces were in the Urga region, he broke through the Van-Kuren zone at the beginning of August 1921 to Soviet territory, near Lake Gusinoye, occupied the city of Novo-Selenginsk on 3 August and continued to advance on Verkhneudisnk, hoping to stir up a Cossack rebellion and to organize a joint operation with the White Guard units of Ataman Semenov and the Japanese intervention troops to attack the rear of the Soviet forces operating in Mongolia. When the gangs of Ungern and Rezukhin fell under attack by the troops of the 5th Cavalry Division, the 104th and 105th rifle brigades of the 35th Divison, which had returned from Mongolia by this time after liberating Urga, and by the troops of the 5th Army and Shchetinkin's partisan detachment from the north, they had to retreat to Mongolia. These defeats in battle caused White Guard ranks to disintegrate. In August, Rezukhin was killed by his own soldiers while Ungern only saved his own life by fleeing. On 22 August 1921, a Mongolian detachment from Ungern's troops turned Ungern over to intelligence agents from the 35th Cavalry Company of K. K. Rokossovskiy near the Orkhon River.

At the suggestion of V. I. Lenin, the Politburo of the RKP(b) Central Committee decided on 29 August 1921 to try Ungern for the counterrevolutionary crimes he had committed against the Soviet and Mongolian people. The Siberian division of the RSFSR Supreme Tribunal investigated the case of Ungern and his followers in open hearings on 15 September 1921 in Novonikolayevsk (now Novosibirsk), established his criminal connections with Japanese occupation troops and Chinese militarists and sentenced him to death by firing squad. This was the inglorious end of the counter-revolutionary career of Ungern, the cruel enemy of the Soviet and Mongolian people and hired mercenary of Japanese imperialism.

For their courage and bravery in the joint struggle of our people against foreign intervention, the White Guard and internal counterrevolution, outstanding leaders of the Mongolian People's Army and Government, Suhe-Bator, Choibalsan, Hatan-Bator, Maksarjab and others, were awarded the Order of the Red Banner by the Soviet Government in 1922.

By the end of 1924, after the remnants of the White Guard bands had been routed, most of the Red Army troops were recalled to Soviet Russia. At the request of the Mongolian People's Government, some Soviet troops remained in the country in view of the unstable international situation and the danger of the invasion of Urga by White Guardsmen from Manchuria.

The combat cooperation of the Soviet and Mongolian people had passed historic tests with honors. Cooperation between the working class of Soviet Russia, the DVR and the Mongolian herdsmen was organized and inspired by the fraternal parties--the RKP(b) and the MPP.

After the defeat and eviction of foreign intervention troops, White Guardsmen of various leanings and counterrevolutionary gangs, and after the establishment of a revolutionary people's government, political power was transferred in full to the people.

The Mongolian people's revolution of 1921 was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, popular revolution in terms of its objectives and its nature. It marked the beginning of a new era in the history of the Mongolian people.

The people's revolution in Mongolia was part of the world revolutionary process. Under the direct influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution and with the fraternal assistance of the Soviet people and their Red Army, Mongolia dropped out of the colonial system of imperialism and joined a new world--the socialist world.

The People's Government of Mongolia was faced by many tasks, mainly the task of defending and reinforcing revolutionary gains, putting an end to age-old underdevelopment and achieving the economic and cultural reconstruction of the nation.

In October 1921, a Mongolian governmental delegation was sent to Moscow, with D. Suhe-Bator as one of its members. The historic meeting of the Mongolian delegation with V. I. Lenin took place on 5 November. In a lengthy conversation with the delegation, V. I. Lenin expressed his views on the international and internal situation of Mongolia, on the difficulties facing the Mongolian people's party and government and on the prospects for the development of backward Mongolia into a socialist state, bypassing the stage of capitalist development.

An agreement establishing friendly relations between Soviet Russia and Mongolia, the need for which was stressed by V. I. Lenin, was signed at that time and was of tremendous significance. This was the first time in Mongolian history that a fair agreement had been concluded with a foreign power, marking the beginning of political, economic and cultural cooperation between two fraternal parties and peoples.

Within a short time after the founding of the People's Government and the declaration of Mongolian independence, revolutionary reforms were carried out, which turned the age-old dreams of the Mongolian herdsmen into reality.

As early as March 1921, the Provisional People's Government had already passed a law which canceled the property rights of princes and divested all of the princes who had fought against the people's revolution of their authority. In January 1922, the right to own slaves was abolished, and

in March 1923 a law was passed to democratize local authority, cancel the hereditary authority of princes over their subjects and made all positions of authority elected offices.

After the death of the Bogdo-gegen in June 1924, the monarchy was liquidated and the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) was founded.

In August 1924, at its third congress, the Mongolian People's Party was renamed the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). The congress declared a policy of socialist development, bypassing the stage of capitalist development, with the fraternal assistance of the Soviet socialist state. The congress dealt a crushing blow to right-wing deviationists, Japanese agents, who were trying to direct national development into capitalist channels and organized and armed counterrevolutionary rebellion.

In November 1924, the First People's Great Hural was convened in Ulaanbataar and ratified the first Constitution of the Mongolian People's Republic.

At the suggestion of the Soviet Government, Soviet troops were withdrawn from Mongolia in view of the stronger political and economic position and defense capability of the MPR by the end of 1924. The MPR Government and the Mongolian herdsmen exchanged fond farewells with the Red Army troops who had rendered invaluable assistance to the Mongolian people at a time when they were menaced by foreign enslavement and were fighting to establish a people's government. A message from the MPR Government to the leaders of the Soviet State said that the people and government of the republic firmly believed that the Soviet Union and its Red Army would help them again if Mongolian security should be threatened in the future.

The period of relative calm was comparatively short. At the beginning of the 1930's, militaristic Japan resumed its armed provocations against the young republic.

By the second half of the 1930's, the international situation was extremely complex in the Far East, threatening the peace. The fascist aggressors--Hitler's Germany, fascist Italy and imperialist Japan--signed an "anti-Comintern" pact in 1936 and formed an aggressive military and political alliance aimed at preparations for a major war to turn the USSR into their colony.

As a result of the permissiveness and direct support of ruling government circles in England, the United States and France and the internal strife in ruling Guomindang circles, the Japanese militarists were able to accomplish the occupation of Manchuria in 1931-1932 and create the puppet state of Manchukuo on this territory in 1932. The state was headed by "emperor" Pu-Yi, the last scion of the Chinese Qing dynasty. While the Japanese militarists were preparing for aggressive actions against the Soviet Union and Mongolia and conducting their aggressive war in China, they turned Japanese-occupied Manchuria into their main military, economic

and strategic beachhead for attacks on the USSR and MPR. At the end of 1934, in connection with the direct threat of Japanese invas a Soviet-Mongolian agreement was concluded at the suggestion of the MPR Government, aimed at mutual assistance and support in the event of the threatened or actual military invasion of the MPR or USSR by any other third country.

The Japanese in Manchuria were hoping to rob the MPR of the strategically important Tamtsak-Bulak region, the so-called eastern salient. A joint commission was set up on the initiative of the MPR Government, which was joined to settle the matter peacefully. At a session of this commission on 4 July 1935, representatives of Japan and the puppet Manchukuo Government impudently demanded that military inspectors be authorized to enter Mongolia and that a Japanese telegraph line be constructed. These demands were rejected by the Mongolian side. At the end of 1935 and in the spring of 1936, the Japanese militarists organized a series of armed violations of the Mongolian border near Halhin-Sum and in other regions, but these were repulsed by Mongolian troops.

The Presidium of the MPRP Central Committee and the MPR Government took steps to strengthen national defense capacity. On 23 January 1936, the MPR Government requested the Soviet Government for military assistance. On 1 February 1936, the Soviet Government, true to its duties as a partner and ally, complied with this request and sent Red Army troops to Mongolia, which were combined to make up the LVII Special Corps by the end of 1937.

On 21 February 1936, the USSR People's Commissariat on Foreign Affairs, sent a message to Japanese Ambassador Ota in Moscow, stating that the increasingly frequent conflicts on the border between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo represented yet another threat to peace in the Far East and were seriously disturbing the Soviet Government. On 1 March, the press published an announcement by the Soviet Government, cautioning the government of Japan against armed provocations on the Mongolian-Manchurian border.

In spite of these warnings, the provocations of the Japanese militarists did not stop. At the beginning of March 1936 the Japanese organized a provocation at Lake Buir-Nur. A Japanese company, made up of the 1st Guard Tokyo Imperial Infantry Division, supported by tanks and artillery, attacked a border outpost near Bulun-Deres. As a result of the courage of Mongolian border troops and the ingenuity of Colonel D. Demberel, commander of a Mongolian Air Force squadron, the Japanese were properly repulsed. For their heroic feats, border guard Gongor and Colonel Demberel were the first to win the title of Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic, established in 1936 by the MPR Government.

In the middle of March, Japanese samurais invaded MPR territory before dawn in the region of the same border outpost, near the southern half of Lake Buir-Nur. A reinforced regiment of infantry on motor vehicles with artillery, a tank battalion and an antiaircraft company supported by several

planes, intended to quickly move on to Tamtsak-Bulak, to defeat the 6th Cavalry Division of the MPRA with an assault from the west and to gain control over the territory of the Tamtsak-Bulak salient. This provocation also failed. At the request of the MPR Government, a protocol on mutual assistance was signed by the USSR and MPR in Ulaanbataar on 12 March 1936, envisaging mutual assistance of every type, including military, in the event of the threatened invasion of the USSR or MPR by a third state.[5]

Mongolia occupied an important place in the Japanese militarists' expansionist plans. In 1936, General Itagaki, chief of staff of the Kuangtung Army (Japanese war minister after January 1939), said the following in a conversation with Japanese Ambassador Arita in China: The MPR "is extremely important from the standpoint of Japanese-Manchurian influence today, because it represents the defensive flank of the Siberian railroad, which connects the Soviet territories in the Far East and in Europe. If Outer Mongolia is attached to Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territories in the Far East will be in an extremely difficult position and it will be possible to destroy the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East without military action. For this reason, the army's goal should be the extension of Japanese-Manchurian supremacy to Outer Mongolia by any means at its disposal."[6]

In the middle of 1937, the MPR Government and the Soviet command in Ulaanbataar learned that the Japanese militarists were preparing for a large-scale invasion of Mongolian territory in September 1937 and a simultaneous counterrevolutionary uprising in the nation. Their plans, however, were frustrated by the governments of the USSR and MPR.

In 1935-1937, three antitank brigades and an air force aviation group consisting of three separate squadrons were transferred to MPR territory. The Soviet troops were headed by L. Ya. Vayner, chief adviser to the MPRA commander-in-chief, and the aviation group was headed by V. A. Sudets. The antitank equipment, planes and troops of the MPRA were considerably strengthened.

The Kuangtung Army turned out to be incapable of opposing the large contingent of Soviet-Mongolian troops at that time, and the Japanese counterrevolutionary agents in the MPR were routed.

While the Kuangtung Army was still preparing for the occupation of Manchuria, operational plans were drawn up: "Hei"--for the conquest of China; and "Otsu"--for an attack on the USSR. The "Otsu" plan envisaged the occupation of the Soviet coastal region.

The plan for war against the USSR was clarified and expanded for 1938-1939 by the Japanese general staff. Primorskiy Kray was to be seized first, and Khabarovsk and all of Amurskaya Oblast were to be conquered subsequently. An invasion of Mongolia was being planned at the same time.[7]

In 1937 the Japanese Army launched hostilities against China, but its Kuangtung Army, with its greater combat potential, remained in Manchuria, near the Soviet and Mongolian borders. This considerably simplified the Chinese people's struggle against occupation troops.

At the end of July 1938, the Japanese militarists, taking advantage of the tense situation in Europe in connection with fascist Germany's preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia, decided to speed up the attack on the USSR and MPR and organized a large-scale armed invasion of Primorskiy Kray, near Lake Khasan.

After suffering a severe defeat in 2 weeks of battle against the troops of the Far Eastern Front, led by Marshall of the Soviet Union V. K. Blyukher, the intervention troops were driven out of Soviet territory, with great losses, by 11 August. The Japanese Government had to request the government of the USSR to cease hostilities and start negotiating for peace.[8]

The armed Japanese invasion near Lake Khasan was not a border incident. It was planned by the general staff and sanctioned by the government and the emperor of Japan.

The defeat of the Japanese militarists near Lake Khasan demonstrated the military strength of the Soviet nation to the entire world. The Japanese Army's first major defeat in the Far East was also a serious warning to Western imperialist aggressors, particularly the fascist regimes of Germany and Italy.

In the fall of 1938, after the defeat near Lake Khasan, the Japanese general staff began to draw up a plan for war against the USSR under the code name "Operation No 8." The plan was worked out in two variants. Variant "A" envisaged the main strike against Primorskiy Kray, while variant "B" specified a strike through MPR territory into the Trans-Baykal zone. Energetic preparations began in the spring of 1939 for aggression against the MPR and USSR (according to variant "B"). By the middle of 1939, the Kuangtung Army numbered 350,000. The army had more than 1,000 guns, 385 tanks and 355 planes. Besides this, the Japanese had 60,000 soldiers and officers, 264 guns, 34 tanks and 90 planes in Korea.[9] These aggressive forces were a serious threat to the security of Mongolia and the USSR.

Armed provocations on the Mongolian border became more frequent again after January 1939. During the first three and a half months, the Japanese committed more than 30 border violations.

For the invasion of the MPR, the Japanese chose a territorial protrusion in the east of Mongolia, northeast of Tamtsak-Bulak. They first planned to seize locations with commanding heights on the right bank of Halhin-Gol River, with the state border only 20 kilometers to the east of this. They then planned to conquer all of Tamtsak-Bulak and smash the troops defending it, and if this should prove successful, to then occupy the Soviet Trans-Baykal and the Trans-Siberian Railway from Manchuria to Baykal.

The section chosen for frontal assault was around 75 kilometers in length, with a maximum depth of 20 kilometers. The Halhin-Gol River was 40-130 meters wide at this point, and up to 2.5 meters deep in some spots. During the rainy season, the river level, width and current fluctuated sharply. The river valley was a deep depression of 2-3 kilometers in width, with swampy banks and meadows covered with sparse shrubbery in some locations. The right bank was steep, with slopes of up 30 degrees. The east bank of the river and the entire region between this bank and the Manchurian border were considerably higher than the west bank, with extremely broken terrain, a desolate and arid zone with steep sand dunes up to 50 meters high, valleys up to 40 meters deep and numerous ravines. Along the west bank of the river, a desolate, arid plateau stretched many kilometers inland, with minor gently sloping elevations covered with sparse shrubbery.

Approximately in the middle of the section chosen by the Japanese for the invasion, a small stream, the Haylasten-Gol, of up to 10 meters wide and up to 1 meter deep, with a narrow, swampy and steep-sloped valley, falls into the Halhin-Gol River from the east.

The use of tanks, armored vehicles and motor transport would have been extremely difficult on the right bank of Halhin-Gol, and even absolutely impossible in some sections.

Preparations for the attack on the MPR became noticeably more active in the middle of January 1939, when a series of armed attacks on the MPR's border outposts was launched by Japanese and puppet Bargut troops. Japanese military reconnaissance planes flew deep into Mongolian territory on numerous occasions.

The general staff of the Japanese Army had prepared topographic maps of this region in advance, distorting the actual boundary line of the MPR border. Kuangtung Army staff, company and unit officers conducted reconnaissance near the border and on MPR border territory.

In March 1939, General Ishihara and a group of top-ranking officers completed an inspection tour of Manchuria for the purpose of checking the combat ability of Kuangtung Army troops and the Bargut troops of Prince Devan.

The military provocations engineered by Japanese troops on MPR territory were camouflaged by a noisy provocative campaign in Japanese and Manchukuo newspapers, aimed at the MPR and USSR. Mongolian border troops were accused of violating the Manchukuo border and attacking Manchurian outposts.

Units of the 12th Japanese Aviation Group, with up to 120 fighting planes, most of them destroyers of a new design--I-97--were based at the Haylar and Tsitsikar air fields. All of these units had select flight personnel with combat experience in China, where they had already encountered Soviet volunteer pilots, who were helping the Chinese people in their fight against the Japanese invaders.

In response to Japan's aggressive actions, the Soviet Government made another official announcement in the beginning of 1939: "The border of the Mongolian People's Republic...will be defended by us just as resolutely as our own property."

By the spring of 1939, the most able troops and aviation of the Kuangtung Army were concentrated not far from the eastern border of the MPR: Five infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade of the 4th Japanese Army and up to three cavalry Bargut divisions of Prince Devan in the Kalgan sector; two Japanese infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade and two Manchurian cavalry regiments in the Haylar sector. All troops were equipped with personnel and weapons according to wartime requirements.

The troops of the Japanese 23d Infantry Division and some regiments of the Bargut Cavalry were moved to the border region near Halhin-Gol River. This group was headed by the commander of the 23d Division, Lieutenant-General Kamatsubara.

The main group of Soviet troops of the LVII Special Corps of MPRA troops and Soviet and Mongolian aviation were 400-500 kilometers west of Halhin-Gol in the region of Bain-Tumen (the city of Choibalsan) and Undurhan. By the spring of 1939, the LVII Special Corps consisted of the 36th Motorized Rifle Division, the 11th Tank Division, the 7th, 8th and 9th Motorized Armored and 6th Tank brigades and other (engineering, communications) units of special troops.

All types of supplies for Soviet troops were delivered by motor vehicle along dirt roads from the Trans-Baykal (Borzya Station) over a distance of more than 300 kilometers, and it was more than 750 kilometers to Halhin-Gol River. This later created great difficulties in the transfer of troops and in their provision with all types of supplies.

The area chosen by the Japanese for the invasion of the MPR on the right bank of Halhin-Gol River, southeast of Lake Buir-Nur, gave them considerable advantages. They had two railroads not far from the river: the Tsitsikar-Halayr-Manchuria Station (the former Chinese Eastern Railroad) at a distance of 125 kilometers, and the Solun'-Halun-Arshan-Handogai (to Ganzhur) at a distance of 50 kilometers--as well as two dirt roads from Haylar.

On 4 May, a Bargut deserter, who had crossed over to a Mongolian border outpost, reported that the Japanese had resettled all of the previous inhabitants of the parts of Barga bordering on the MPR deeper into Manchuria in April, and that they were planning to attack the MPR in the next few days. Up to this time, the Japanese had been conducting large-scale operations in these regions to construct fortifications and to set up modern air fields. For "guaranteed secrecy," the Japanese carefully guarded the Barguts working there, and then shot them when the work had been completed.

Between 8 and 26 May, Japanese and Manchurian troops conducted reconnaissance by starting battles on the right and left banks of Halhin-Gol River and its tributary, the Haylasten-Gol, invading MPR territory with subunits and regiments supported by tanks and aviation.

The Soviet military leadership learned of the plans for a large-scale Japanese invasion of the Halhin-Gol region a few weeks before the beginning of the battles. In connection with this, and in view of the continuous provocations engineered by Japanese troops on the eastern border of the MPR, some units of the LVII Special Corps were sent to the assistance of MPRA border troops in accordance with the protocol of 1936 on mutual assistance in the Tamtsak-Bulak zone.

On 11 May, a detachment of Japanese in motor vehicles invaded the territory of the MPR along the north bank of the Haylasten-Gol River. On 12 May, the Japanese sent an infantry regiment into the battle and, with air support, forced the small MPRA unit of border guards to retreat, and approached Halhin-Gol River. Advancing reinforcements sent the violators back to the Manchurian border with severe losses.

On 14 May, a Japanese-Manchurian cavalry detachment violated the border, moved 20 kilometers into the MPR and took the Dungur-Obo elevation on the left bank of the Haylasten-Gol. On 14 May, the Japanese began active air combat, with Mongolian border troops as the target.

To assist the border guards, a rifle and cannon battalion, an engineering company and a 76-milimeter gun battery of the 11th Tank Brigade of the LVII Corps were sent from Tamtsak-Bulak to the right bank of the Halhin-Gol on 17 May. The 6th Cavalry Division of the MPRA was also transferred there with a division of armored vehicles. By the evening of 22 May, Soviet-Mongolian troops had crossed the Halhin-Gol and had pushed the invaders back to the MPR border.

This was the beginning of an undeclared war, which was inflicted on the MPR and USSR by the Japanese militarists and lasted more than 4 months.

By 27 May, the Japanese had concentrated sizable forces near the MPR border in the region of Nomon-Han and Lake Uzur-Nur. The Japanese group had 2.5 times as much infantry as the Soviet-Mongolian troops, 3.5 times as much cavalry, 2 times as much antitank artillery and 1.3 times as many guns. Soviet-Mongolian troops had the advantage of 1.5 times as much field artillery and 5-6 times as many armored vehicles.

At dawn on 28 May, after two of our air fields had been bombed, as well as a bridge built by engineers of the 11th Tank Brigade and the positions of Soviet-Mongolian troops on the west bank of the Halhin-Gol, the Japanese took the offensive. They planned to attack the flanks of the Soviet-Mongolian forces to advance to the bridge, encircle these forces and smash them on the right bank of the Halhin-Gol.

During the course of fierce battles on 28 and 29 May, which lasted day and night, the enemy was evicted from the MPR after enemy fatalities alone amounted to more than 400 soldiers and officers.

On 5 June 1939, on orders from the USSR People's Commissariat for Defense, Division Commander[11] G. K. Zhukov arrived at the headquarters of the LVII Special Corps in Tamtsak-Bulak, and began to command the corps the very next day. Zhukov reported the details of the situation to Moscow and proposed that the beachhead on the right bank of the Halhin-Gol be held firm and that a counterattack be simultaneously organized from inland areas. Zhukov also informed the people's defense commissar that the LVII Special Corps would not have enough strength if the Japanese were to simultaneously launch armed invasions in other regions and from other directions. K. Ye. Voroshilov, the USSR people's commissar of defense, approved of the plan and the additional reinforcement of the corps.

Throughout June, the enemy did not engage in active combat on land. According to intelligence reports, the Kuangtung Army headquarters was preparing for a new large-scale military venture in the region of Halhin-Gol.

At the beginning of June, a group of Soviet pilots, with experience in air battles in Spain and China, came to Mongolia from Moscow. They included 17 heroes of the Soviet Union, headed by Red Army Deputy Air Force Commander and Corps Commander Ya. V. Smushkevich, who had fought as a volunteer in Republican Spain in 1937 as senior aviation adviser and had headed a group of Soviet volunteer pilots there.

By 22 June 1939, our destroyer planes were concentrated on front line air fields and were separately conducting reconnaissance. The pilots who had arrived from Moscow were distributed among the combat units of our destroyer aviation and conducted flight training and air battle exercises throughout the month of June.

The second half of June was marked by particularly fierce air battles. The air battle of 22 June in the Halhin-Gol region, which lasted more than 2.5 hours, was unprecedented in the history of aviation. It was a battle between 95 Soviet and 120 Japanese planes. The enemy lost more than 30 planes, and Soviet aviation lost 14 planes and 11 pilots. This was the first major victory of our fighters over the select flight personnel of the fighter aviation of the Japanese Air Force, flying planes of the latest design.

On 24 June, Soviet pilots shot down 16 Japanese fighter planes in two air battles, losing only 2 of their own planes.

On 26 June, a fierce air battle between 60 Japanese and 50 Soviet fighter planes took place over Lake Buir-Nur, bordering on Manchuria. After a 2-hour battle, the Japanese had lost 10 planes and the Soviet pilots had

lost 3. In this battle, Major S. I. Gritsevets, hero of the Soviet Union, performed an unparalleled feat. During the battle, the plane of the commander of the 70th Fighter Regiment, Major V. M. Zabaluyev, caught fire, and Zabaluyev parachuted out of the burning plane and landed on Manchurian territory. Gritsevets made a landing and flew his wounded commander out in his single-seated fighter before the very eyes of the Japanese. For his successful combat actions during the Halhin-Gol operations and for his heroic feat, he was the first in the USSR to be awarded the title of Twice Hero of the Soviet Union.[12]

As a result of the severe air battle losses, General Morigi, Japanese Air Force commander, issued an order on 22 June which later fell into the hands of our command. He ordered a sudden attack to destroy the planes of the enemy on air fields near Tamtsak-Bulak, Bain-Tumen and Lake Bain-Burdu-Nur.

Early in the morning of 27 June, a group of Japanese planes--23 bombers and around 70 fighters--attacked the air field of the 22d Fighter Regiment in the Tamtsak-Bulak region. Due to a faulty warning system, the regiment went into battle unorganized. Five Japanese planes were shot down, and our losses amounted to three planes and two pilots. Major G. P. Kravchenko, hero of the Soviet Union and regimental commander, did not return to the air field after the battle. In pursuit of a Japanese plane, he shot it down over Manchuria and, having used up all of his fuel in the battle, made a forced landing 60 kilometers away from the air field. He returned after a 3-day walk through desolate territory with no food or water.

A second group of close to 70 Japanese fighters attacked the air field of the 70th Fighter Regiment the same morning. The line of communications to observation posts had been wrecked by saboteurs, and our pilots had to take off under enemy fire. The regiment lost 14 planes in the air and 2 on the ground.

The increased activity of Japanese aviation in the second half of June to achieve air supremacy indicated that the Japanese were preparing for a large-scale operation against Soviet-Mongolian troops.

By the beginning of July, enemy troops numbered as many as 38,000 soldiers and officers, 160 machine guns, 186 light and heavy guns, 124 antitank guns, 135 tanks and 10 armored cars. Japanese air support consisted of more than 200 planes.

The enemy was superior to the Soviet-Mongolian troops in terms of manpower, had 2.5 times as much artillery and 6 times as many antitank guns. But we had more than 3 times as many tanks and armored cars.

At 2100 hours on 2 July, the Japanese began artillery preparation and followed this up with a night attack by tanks and infantry from the hill of Nomun-Han, along the north bank of the Haylasten-Gol River.

The enemy's main strike was delivered by the right flank--the main grouping of Lieutenant-General Kobayashi, who had been ordered to approach Halhin-Gol River in secret, forced it and launch an attach to the south along the left bank of Halhin-Gol from the region of Bain-Tsagan Mountain, cutting off the Soviet-Mongolian troops' line of withdrawal from the right bank. (It was not until the morning of 3 July that the Soviet-Mongolian command learned of the approach of this group and the assault crossing of the Halhin-Gol River.)

A second group, commanded by Lieutenant-General Yasuoka, protected the advance of the Kobayashi group with its right flank on 1 and 2 July and ensured the concentration of the group near the crossing site. Assuming the offensive on 2 July, it began a quick advance to outflank and encircle the Soviet-Mongolian troops on the right bank of Halhin-Gol, to drive them to the river, and then to join General Kobayashi's main group in the annihilation of these troops.

On 3 July, after a covert advance on vehicles to Halhin-Gol and a pontoon crossing, the group approached Bain-Tsagan Mountain at 1000 hours. After pushing the advance patrol of the 6th MPRA Cavalry Division to the northwest, the Japanese continued their rapid advance to the south, along the west bank of the Halhin-Gol.

Commander G. K. Zhukov of the LVII Corps, who had received a report on the morning of 3 July on the arrival of a large enemy grouping on the left bank of the river near Bain-Tsagan Mountain, decided to strike at this group with reserve troops from Tamtsak-Bulak. The 11th Tank Brigade of Brigade Commander M. P. Yakovlev was ordered to strike at the enemy without waiting for the 7th Motorized Armored Brigade of Major A. L. Lesovyy and the 24th Motorized Rifle Regiment of Major I. I. Fed uninskiy.

The first to deliver a mass strike at the Japanese troops and crossing were Soviet bombers, involved in battle for the first time during the armed conflict on the Halhin-Gol River. On 3-5 July, they attacked Japanese troops in this region a few more times. During battles on 3-5 July, the enemy left thousands of dead on the battlefield, more than 50 tanks and large quantities of military equipment and ammunition.[13]

The main role in this skirmish was played by the 11th Tank and 7th Motorized Armored brigades, the Armored Battalion of the 8th MPRA Cavalry Division, and the artillery and aviation which reliably covered the battle site, successfully routed approaching reserves and destroyed 45 enemy planes in air battles.

The crushing defeat in the Bain-Tsagan battle created confusion in the Kuangtung Army and in Japanese Government circles.

After this failure, the Japanese command decided to repeat the attack against Soviet-Mongolian troops on the east bank of the Halhin-Gol without any further attempts to cross to the left bank of the river. In the night

of 7 July, the Japanese resumed their brutal attacks, which went on day and night until 13 July. Our aviation also put up a fierce fight in that time. On 8 July our pilots shot down 21 enemy planes, losing 2 of their own. On 10 July, 70 of our fighter planes took Japanese troops on the right bank of the river by storm. Around 100 enemy fighter planes engaged in an air battle with them. Another 30 Soviet fighters were sent to the battle site. Up to 200 planes were simultaneously engaged in this fierce air battle. The Japanese lost 11 planes and the Soviet side lost 1.

Later, on 21 July, the Japanese, after receiving new experienced pilots as reinforcements, tried to deliver a mass strike against our air fields, using 150 fighter planes. Around 150 Soviet fighters were simultaneously in the air. In the persistent battles, the victory belonged to the Soviet pilots, who shot down 12 planes and lost 5 of their own.

After a 10-day interval following the dawn of 23 July, the Japanese, having made up for their losses and reinforced their troop dispositions on the right bank of the Halhin-Gol, passed over to the offensive. After failing and suffering heavy losses, the enemy attacks ceased and the Japanese took the defensive.

During these days of heavy fighting, Soviet-Mongolian forces on the right bank were considerably inferior to the enemy in terms of personnel, particularly infantry. The outstanding courage of all personnel, however, made it possible for Soviet and Mongolian troops to defend the right bank beachhead. An important contribution to this achievement was made by the energetic action of our aviation, which reliably covered the combat zone from the air and gave the troops a great deal of support by means of bomber strikes and storm assaults on the battlefield, as well as at approaching reserves.

This was the inglorious outcome, for the Japanese and Manchurian troops, of the Bain-Tsagan battle on land and in the air in July, which lasted around 3 weeks. It entered history as the Bain-Tsagan slaughter.

After the failure of the July offensive, the 6th Japanese Army was formed, under the command of General Ogisu Rippo, on the orders of the Japanese emperor on 10 August. For a month, new units and companies were added to it. It consisted of the 23d Infantry Division, with new personnel reinforcements, the 7th Infantry Division, an infantry brigade, a mechanized brigade, two independent infantry regiments, seven artillery, two tank and two engineering regiments, six Bargut cavalry regiments and independent air defense and antitank units. The 6th Army had 75,000 soldiers and officers, 1,283 machine guns, more than 500 field guns and mortars, 182 tanks and more than 300 planes.[14] The Japanese troops took the defensive 2-10 kilometers east of the Halhin-Gol River.

Their mission was to take revenge by means of a "general offensive," to lead Soviet-Mongolian troops to the east bank of the Halhin-Gol into the Haylasten-Gol River valley, and, by deliverying the main strike at their right flank, to encircle and destroy them.

The Japanese command, certain of victory, invited foreign correspondents and military attaches, including Germans and Italians, to the zone of combat.

Taking the massive concentration of Japanese-Manchurian forces in the Halhin-Gol zone into account, the Soviet Government made a timely decision to give the fraternal MPR a great deal of additional military assistance. The 82d and 57th Rifle Divisions, the 6th Tank Brigade, artillery and flame-thrower units and other forces and reinforcements were transferred from Siberia to the Halhin-Gol region.

By the middle of August, the superior strength of the Soviet-Mongolian troops consisted of the following: 1.5 times as much infantry, around double the artillery and machine guns, 4 times as many tanks and armored cars, and more than 1.7 times as much aviation. There was not enough artillery in this operation.[15]

Besides this, our aviation also received strong qualitative reinforcement, particularly in the form of I-16 fighters, with considerable improved flight performance, powerful machine guns and jet-propelled missiles (for the first time in the world), as well as I-153 aircraft with four large-caliber machine guns on each and improved speed and maneuverability.

By order of the USSR people's commissar of defense, the first army group was formed to oversee Soviet troops dispositions. It was headed by Corps Commander G. K. Zhukov (with Division Commissar M. S. Nikishev, member of the Military Council, and Brigade Commander M. A. Bogdanov, chief of staff). The artillery of the group was headed by Corps Commander N. N. Voronov. The group of Mongolian troops was headed by Marshall of the MPR H. Choibalsan, MPRA commander-in-chief, and a task force--Division Commander G. Tseren and Colonels B. Tsog and G. Erendo. The MPRA troops were commanded by Corps Commander G. Lhagvasuren. A front task force was formed as part of the Trans-Baykal Military District to coordinate the combat operations of Soviet and Mongolian troops. It was headed by Commander Second Class G. M. Shtern, Division Commissar N. I. Biryukov, member of the Military Council, and Chief of Staff and Division Commander M. A. Kuznetsov.

The army group was ordered to conduct an operation, in conjunction with MPRA troops, to encircle and completely smash the group of Japanese-Manchurian troops which had invaded the MPR and to restore the state borders of the fraternal country.

The concentration of Soviet troops took place under incredible difficult conditions, 750 kilometers from the nearest railroad station, over dirt roads, in a desolate, sparsely populated and arid location. Up to 25,000

tons of ammunition, 4,000 tons of food and more than 10,500 tons of other freight were shipped by motor vehicle over a huge distance to support the combat operations.

Around 6,000 motor vehicles, not to mention large quantities of animal-drawn Mongolian transport, were used for the transfer of troops, ammunition, fuel and other loads. The MPRP Central Committee and MPR Government provided great assistance in organizing the transfer and supply of troops, particularly with food and water. This massive job was supervised directly by Comrade Y. Tsedenbal, now first secretary of the MRP Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Great People's Hural of the MPR.

During the concentration of troops and the transfer of ammunition, which were mainly accomplished at night, and the preparation of forces for the coming offensive, measures were skillfully carried out for tactical concentration, the misinformation of the enemy and the performance of all types of reconnaissance missions.

The approach of the tanks to the forming-up regions was muffled by noise created by night TB-3 bombers, which were involved in night combat operations in July along with MPRA bombers. With the noise of the tractors and a powerful radio station, the sound of large-scale defensive engineering work was simulated on the right bank of the river. Misinformation was broadcasted over the radio in openly worded phrases and in simple code--orders for winter uniforms and so forth. All of these measures created confusion in the Japanese command.

The Soviet-Mongolian command learned of the Japanese preparations for a general offensive, set for 24 August. It was decided to get the jump on the enemy and plan an invasion by our troops several days earlier--20 August, a Sunday.

The plan for the operation called for an all-out strike, the encirclement of Japanese forces by the southern and northern troops and their subsequent destruction by all Soviet-Mongolian forces.

Three groups were set up to carry out this plan. The southern group (commanded by Colonel M. I. Potapov) consisted of the 57th Rifle, 6th Tank and 8th Motorized Armored brigades, part of the 11th Tank Brigade, reinforced with antitank and self-propelled artillery and flame-throwing tanks, and the 8th MPRA Cavalry Division of Colonel Njantaisuren. The southern group was to deliver the main strike in the direction of Nomon-Han, surround the enemy in conjunction with the central and northern groups, destroy the enemy and protect our group from assaults by enemy reserves from Manchuria. The central group of Brigade Commander D. Ye. Petrov consisted of the 82d Rifle and 36th Motorized Rifle divisions and the 5th Machine Gun Brigade. This group was to immobilize the Japanese forces and prevent any flank maneuvers. The northern group (commanded by Colonel I. V. Shevnikov) consisted of the 11th Tank and 7th Motorized Armored brigades, a regiment of

the 82d Division and the 6th MPRA Cavalry Division of Colonel L. Dandar. Its mission was to enter the flank and rear of the Japanese group, surround it and destroy it in interaction with the troops of the southern and central groups.

On 20 August at 0515 hours, a squadron of I-16 planes and, above them, a group of high-speed SB bombers appeared over the right-bank disposition of Japanese-Manchurian troops. The enemy's antiaircraft artillery opened fire on the planes, thereby giving away its location. It was for this reason that the Soviet planes had been sent out. Our artillery and I-16 planes opened fire on the antiaircraft artillery batteries and our bombers struck them. Within a short time, the enemy air defense system had been destroyed. Following this, 150 of our bombers, accompanied by around 150 fighter planes, delivered strikes at Japanese defensive installations and forces consistently for 30 minutes. At 0645 hours, large-scale artillery preparations began in the area of the Japanese defensive positions. At 0845 hours the bombers repeated their mass strike.

At 0900 hours, to the accompaniment of the "Internationale," broadcasted over a powerful loudspeaker, the Soviet-Mongolian attack began. Our tanks, armored cars, infantry and cavalry, reliably supported and covered by aviation, took the offensive along the entire 74-kilometer front.

A fierce battle went on, day and night, from 20 through 23 August. In the first day of the fighting, the southern group, having broken down enemy resistance, had already advanced 12 kilometers and, on 21 August, blocked the path of retreat of the enemy southern group. The 8th Cavalry Division on the right flank, after forcing back units of the Hingan Cavalry Division, reached the MPR border. Our forces were prohibited from crossing this border.

On 20 August, the central group did not make much of an advance, but it immobilized enemy forces, overcame fierce resistance and blocked its strong points.

The northern group engaged in heavy fighting. On its left flank, the 6th Cavalry Division of Colonel L. Dandar smashed two Manchurian cavalry regiments in a cavalry attack and reached Lake Yanhu on the MPR border, taking many prisoners and weapons.

On 22 August, a battalion of Manchurians and Chinese, who had killed their commanding Japanese officers, surrendered their weapons to the northern group of Soviet-Mongolian forces.

The success of the ground troops was largely due to the energetic actions of our aviation. Bombers made around 240 flights the first day. Fighters provided reliable air cover for our troops, shooting down 24 I-97 fighter planes on 20 August alone. The missile-carrying I-16 fighters were used for the first time in the world on the first day of the offensive.[16]

During the course of the fighting in July and August, fighter pilots G. F. Skobarikhin and A. F. Moshin were the first to repeat the immortal feat of Russian pilot P. Nesterov, who was the first in the world to use the ram tactic in an air battle. The same feat was performed by pilot V. P. Kustov. All three were awarded the distinguished title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

Sensing a threat to his flanks, the enemy began to regroup his forces on 21 August, reinforcing the right flank in the assumption that our forces would deliver their main strike there. In fact, however, the main strike was aimed at the enemy's left flank. After receiving intelligence reports about the enemy regrouping, the commander of the 1st Army group sent out the reserve 9th Motorized Armored Brigade and a battalion of the 6th Tank Brigade as reinforcements for the northern group, uniting all reserve forces in a maneuver force, headed by Colonel I. P. Alekseyenko. This force, after overcoming centers of resistance on 22 August, reached Lake Uzur-Nur and destroyed the Japanese supply base. On 24 August, the 9th Motorized Armored Brigade joined up with the 8th Motorized Armored Brigade of the southern group near Nomon-Han, accomplishing the complete encirclement of enemy troops.

By the morning of 24 August, the main Japanese forces were surrounded and broken up into isolated groups. The Japanese command's attempted counter-attacks on 24 and 25 August, delivered from the east for the purpose of breaking through the encirclement, were frustrated by the assaults of our own infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation.

By 25 August, the 8th and 9th Motorized Armored and 212th Airborne brigades were moved out to secure the exterior front of the encirclement all the way to the MPR border, and the 6th Cavalry Division was moved up to the left flank. Until 28 August, these troops successfully repulsed enemy counterattacks coming from the direction of Manchuria. The rest of the troops began to destroy Japanese forces surrounded in support points near the Haylasten-Gol River valley and on Remezov, Peschanaya and Zelenaya hills. In the northern group's sector, the enemy put up a stubborn defense on Palets Hill.

On 27 August, the Japanese resistance and attempts to escape the encirclement on the south bank of Haylasten-Gol River were completely frustrated. The main efforts of our troops were transferred to the destruction of the enemy north of the river and in other regions. In the morning of 31 August, MPR territory was completely cleared of Japanes invaders.

On 1 September, Soviet-Mongolian troops began to reinforce defensive positions along the state boundary of the MPR.

In the morning of 4 September, after bringing up fresh units of the 2d Infantry Division to the southern wing of our group, the Japanese tried to take Eris-Uleni-Obo Hill. Their attack was repulsed by units of the 8th Cavalry Division, subunits of the 57th Rifle Division, the 6th Tank Brigade

and the 603d Regiment. The enemy left more than 350 dead soldiers and officers on the battlefield. The Mongolian cavalry, pursuing the Japanese on horseback, particularly distinguished itself in this battle. In the night of 8 September, the Japanese tried another advance on this same sector. After losing around 500 dead and considerable quantities of weapons on the battlefield, they were thrown back to the east, beyond the MPR border.

In the August operation, the 6th Japanese Army on Halhin-Gol had up to 200 tanks. Despite the crushing defeat of the Japanese troops, however, these tank forces were not used in battle by the 6th Army command. This also testifies to the incompetence and military ignorance of the Kuangtung Army leaders, just as many other errors which caused the Japanese forces to suffer staggering defeats and tremendous losses.

After the Japanese ground forces had been routed, air battles became particularly intense.

Our aviation continued active combat operations until the middle of September, repulsing all attempts by the Japanese Air Force to invade the territory of the MPR. During this time, there were seven group battles, in which Japanese aviation lost 71 planes and Soviet pilots lost 18 fighter planes. On 15 September, 120 Japanese planes tried to deliver strikes at our air fields. The enemy lost 20 planes and Soviet pilots lost 6, with four people saving their lives in these cases by parachuting out.[17]

The Halhin-Gol operation of the Soviet-Mongolian troops ended with outstanding results. The group of Kuangtung Army troops was smashed and ceased to exist.

On 16 September, hostilities came to an end. After the crushing defeats on the Halhin-Gol, the Japanese Government proposed an armistice to the Soviet Government.

During the course of the fighting between May through September, Japanese losses numbered up to 61,000 dead, wounded and captured, 660 planes, and large quantities of military equipment, weapons and ammunition.[18]

In the battles on the Halhin-Gol, Soviet soldiers displayed mass heroism, outstanding military skills and boundless devotion to their homeland and the communist party. An example in battle was set for all personnel by commanders, political workers and communists, who inspired people to heroism with their own courage and bravery. In some units, up to 11 percent of all personnel were party members and candidates for membership. More than 3,500 soldiers were accepted as party members during the fighting, and 10,000 people in all applied for party membership during this time.

For the exemplary performance of military duties, heroism and bravery, the Soviet Government decorated 24 companies and units that had particularly distinguished themselves in battle with the orders of Lenin and the Red Banner. The Order of the Red Star was awarded to the newspaper of the army

group, the GEROICHESKAYA KRASNOARMEYSKAYA, which engaged the services of prominent Soviet writers V. Stavskiy, B. Lapin, L. Slavin, K. Simonov and Z. Khatsrevin as war correspondents.

Around 17,000 Soviet fighters were decorated with orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

Of these, the 70 most courageous were awarded the highest honor--the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Corps Commander G. K Zhukov, Army Commander Second Class G. M. Shtern, Colonel I. I. Fedyuninskiy, Major M. I. Remizov (posthumously) and many others became heroes of the Soviet Union. Those who were given this high distinction included 33 tankmen, 26 pilots, 10 infantrymen, 3 gunners and 1 signalman. Majors S. I. Gritsevets and G. P. Kravchenko and, in November, Corps Commander Ya. V. Smushkevich became the first Twice Heroes of the Soviet Union.

On the Halhin-Gol, MPRA troops fought shoulder to shoulder with Soviet troops, displaying outstanding courage and mass heroism. The Presidium of the People's Great Hural decorated 878 Ciriks, Red Army soldiers, commanders and political workers with orders and medals of the MPR. Twelve MPRA soldiers were awarded the title Hero of the Mongolian People's Republic.

In the military conflicts near Lake Khasan in 1938 and on the Halhin-Gol in 1939, Soviet armed forces confronted the modern, well-equipped and highly experienced army of the Japanese militarists for the first time since the civil war.

The imperialists in England, the United States and Germany gave Japan every kind of assistance, encouraging it to unleash a war against the USSR and China. For example, at the height of the "undeclared war" on the Halhin-Gol, in July 1939, an agreement was concluded between England and Japan, recognizing the Japanese occupation in China.

In 1937 the United States exported more than 5.5 million tons of oil to Japan, and in 1937-1939 it supplied Japan with military equipment worth more than 500 million dollars and increased metal shipments many times over. England, Germany and Italy gave Japan just as much help.

The imperialists were counting on a quick Japanese victory in China, which would have freed the Japanese Army for broader aggression against the USSR and MPR. As we know, their policy ended in complete failure.

As a result of this failure, Japan's entry into World War II was delayed for almost 2.5 years. In World War II, Japan opposed the United States, England and other countries in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, waiting for the right moment to attack the USSR.

In April 1943, Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador in Hitler's Germany, told Ribbentrop: "One fact that is indisputable is that all general staff plans have been drawn up for an attack on Russia for 20 years now."[19]

The defeat on the Halhin-Gol had tremendous repercussions in Japan. It was not until 3 October 1939 that the war ministry published a statement, announcing the huge losses of the imperial army. An ASAHI editorial of 4 October stated: "In terms of dimensions and seriousness, these events are so great that they cannot be reported in full in one day.... We must learn well from the lesson taught us in the Nomon-Han region!" Other influential Japanese newspapers expressed themselves in the same spirit. When the former commander of the Kuangtung Army, General Ueda, testified to the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo, he said that all of the Kuangtung Army leadership had been dismissed as a result of the defeat and death of the Japanese troops on the Halhin-Gol.

As we know, even the Hiranuma Government had to resign as a result of the failure of Japanese foreign policy on 28 August 1939.

In 1946, the International Military Tribunal in Tokyo resolved that there was just cause for the accusation of the main Japanese war criminals of attacking the MPR and USSR in the Halhin-Gol region. The verdict stated: "These were operations of a large scale...for the purpose of destroying an opposing adversary.... The tribunal feels that the combat operations were an aggressive war conducted by the Japanese."[20]

The crushing defeat of the Japanese Army on the Halhin-Gol had tremendous international consequences.

It demonstrated the power of the USSR and its Red Army once again to the entire world and had a substantial effect on the foreign policy and strategic plans of the Japanese Government, forcing it to refuse to participate with fascist Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

The defeat of the Kuangtung Army on the Halhin-Gol frustrated the plans of ruling circles in England, the United States and France, as well as Japan's partners in the "anti-Comintern pact," to launch a Japanese war against the Soviet Union. It also wrecked the Hitlerist leadership's hope of defeating China and involving it in the "anti-Comintern pact" afterwards with the aid of Chiang Kai-shek.

Fascist Germany, which began World War II by invading Poland on 1 September 1939, had to reconsider its plans and schedules for the invasion of the Soviet Union and direct its aggression against England, the United States and France.

The provocative policy of imperialist circles in England, the United States and France, which were attempting to start a major war by fascist Germany and militaristic Japan against the USSR, suffered a failure.

This should now serve as a warning to aggressive circles in some imperialist countries, as well as the Beijing leaders, who are opposing the process of detente and are hoping to start a new world war.

Soviet-Mongolian friendship, the foundations for which were laid in 1921 by V. I. Lenin and D. Suhe-Bator, was tested in the Halhin-Gol battles. The Soviet Union, loyally fulfilling its treaty commitments, honorably performed its international duty as an ally.

Comrade Y. Tsedenbal wrote the following about the significance of the friendship and mutual understanding between our nations: "The victory won by Soviet and Mongolian troops on the Halhin-Gol was of tremendous military and political significance.... The Halhin-Gol events once again demonstrated the power, vitality and grandeur of Mongolian-Soviet friendship, based on the immutable principles of proletarian internationalism... Besides this, our common victory provided even more inspiration to the oppressed people of Asia in their national liberation struggle against imperialist aggression."[21]

This friendship was quite conclusively demonstrated during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 and during the Soviet-Mongolian defeat of imperialist Japan, which surrendered in the fall of 1945.

The principles of the interrelations between our people have taken concrete form in the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and MPR, signed in Ulaanbataar in January 1966 during a visit to Mongolia by a Soviet party and governmental delegation headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, as well as subsequent intergovernmental agreements. They are a vivid example of an inviolable fraternal international friendship, productive cooperation and mutual assistance, tested over a period of almost six decades.

Speaking in Ulaanbataar at a joint festive meeting of the MPRP Central Committee and the People's Great Hural of the MPR, commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Third MPRP Congress and the declaration of the Mongolian People's Republic on 26 November 1974, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committee said: "The chronicle of our friendship includes many glorious pages....

"The battles we fought together in the Mongolian steppes against Baron Ungern's White Guard bands will never be erased from memory. We will also never forget the heroic Halhin-Gol epic, when Soviet and Mongolian troops dealt a crushing blow to the Japanese militarists who had tried to lay claim to Mongolian land."[22]

FOOTNOTES

1. KOMMUNISTICHESKIY INTERNATSIONAL, 1931, No 33-34, p 54.

2. "Istoricheskiy opyt bratskogo sodruzhestva KPSS i MNRP v bor'be za sotsializm" [The Historical Experience of the Fraternal Association of the CPSU and MPRP in the Struggle for Socialism], Moscow, 1971, pp 37-40.

3. See "Dokumenty vneshney politiki SSSR" [Foreign Policy Documents of the USSR], vol IV, Moscow, 1960, p 780.

4. See "Istoricheskiy opyt bratskogo sodruzhestva KPSS i MNRP v bor'be za sotsializm," p 219.

5. See VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1969, No 8, pp 32-33.

6. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [The History of World War II, 1939-1945], vol 2, Moscow, 1974, pp 41-42.

7. Ibid., pp 38, 201-211.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., pp 38-41.

10. Ibid., pp 42-215; VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, 1969, No 8, pp 32-33.

11. In July 1939, G. K. Zhukov was awarded the military title of Corps Commander.

12. S. I. Gritsevets shot down 40 enemy planes in air battles on the fronts of Republican Spain and on the Halhin-Gol. He died in a plane crash on 16 September 1939.

13. See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945," vol 2, p 216.

14. Ibid.

15. In July 1939, the 114th Rifle Division arrived in Ulaanbataar from the Trans-Baykal to reinforce the troops of the Mongolian People's Army (USSR Central Archives of International Relations, f 1314, dr I, c 3, shs 1-3).

16. This group was headed by Captain N. I. Zvonarev, a test pilot.

17. On 7 September 1939, T. F. Kutsevalov, former commander of the 56th Fighter Air Regiment, was appointed Air Force commander of the 1st Army group. On 29 November 1939, Colonel T. F. Kutsevalov was awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by a directive of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

18. See "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1930-1945," vol 2, p 219.

19. Quoted in: "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [The History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], vol 5, bk 1, Moscow, 1970, p 622.

20. Quoted in: M. Novikov, "Pobeda na Khalkhin-Gole" [Victory on the Halhin-Gol], Moscow, 1971, pp 99-106.

21. PRAVDA, 20 August 1969.

22. L. I. Brezhnev, "Leniniskim kursom. Stat'i i rechi" [Following the Leninist Course. Articles and Speeches], vol 5, Moscow, 1976, pp 204, 205.

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INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SIBERIAN DEVELOPMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 65-90

[Article by V. A. Aleksandrov]

[Text] The rapid growth of Siberia--a vast region associated with mineral wealth, the romance of discovery and the heroic efforts of people overcoming the difficulties of bleak natural conditions--is acquiring an increasingly prominent place in the dynamics of Soviet socioeconomic development.

The natural resources spread over Siberia's 10 million square kilometers are unique in terms of quantity and concentration, and their significance transcends the state boundaries of the USSR. Siberia is already producing a third of all the bituminous coal mined in the Soviet Union, more than half of all Soviet oil, and a considerable portion of natural gas and many other important minerals. It was precisely the discovery of Siberia's treasures that made the Soviet Union the world's only industrially developed state with an economy resting completely on its own fuel and energy base.

By building railroads, laying pipelines and constructing new cities in Siberia and by developing its natural resources, the Soviet people are working not only for the present, but also for the future of the nation, consolidating the basis for the further growth of the Soviet national economy, strengthening Soviet defense capability and enhancing public welfare.

Moreover, the increase in Soviet political, economic and cultural potential as a result of Siberia's development is giving the entire worldwide socialist community more influence in international affairs.

The development of Siberian productive forces is providing additional opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation by the Soviet Union with other countries on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Siberia has become a supplier of many types of raw materials and finished products--petroleum, gas, wood, nonferrous metals, machines and equipment. Siberia has simultaneously established itself in the system of Soviet international ties as a large market for the most diverse deliveries--from consumer goods to complete plants.

Siberia's participation in international socialist division of labor and in the Soviet Union's cultural exchange with the fraternal countries is aiding in the consolidation of the worldwide socialist community and expanding the sphere of cooperative labor in accordance with the general guidelines of socialist economic integration.

The inclusion of Siberian potential in Soviet foreign economic turnover is also of great significance from the standpoint of the materialization of the detente policy and the reinforcement of relations of peaceful coexistence with the nations of the opposing social system. In particular, a progressive form of long-term economic partnership--the compensatory transaction--is being widely implemented in many parts of Siberia. Reciprocal trade deliveries are strengthening the fabric of international political mutual understanding.

Finally, it is also significant that the rapid and comprehensive development of Siberia and the progress of all nationalities and ethnic groups in this region, united in the friendly Soviet family, have long served the people of the developing countries as an example.

The Siberian experience demonstrates the economic, social and cultural heights accessible to all people, regardless of population figures, who have become the masters of their own fate under socialist conditions.

Strong Fraternal Bonds

In the system of international communications, the strongest bonds of the workers of Soviet Siberia are the ones connecting them with their friends in other socialist countries. These relations took shape long ago, and they are valued just as much by the Soviet people as by our friends in the states of the socialist community.

Many internationalist fighters--Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Serbs, Croats and Bulgarians--fought for Soviet rule in Siberia in the first years of October. In precisely the same way, many Siberians gave their blood, and sometimes their lives, defending a just popular cause outside the boundaries of their native land. The monuments erected in memory of internationalist fighters in Novosibirsk, Omsk and many other Siberian cities bear testimony to those days.

Along with all other Soviet people, the Siberians believed that it was their international duty to fight against the fascism of Hitler and Japanese militarism and to aid in liberating the enslaved people of Europe and Asia. The words inscribed by guardsmen from the Siberian city of Omsk on the walls of the German Reichstag building on Victory Day in May 1945 are filled with profound internationalist meaning: "We Siberians are in Berlin. We have come to Berlin to keep it free."

The triumph of socialism in the liberated countries of Europe and Asia was accompanied by new features and new milestones in the Siberians' participation in internationalist cooperation with the Soviet Union and the states of the socialist community.

The Prospekt Karl-Marks-shtadt in Irkutsk and the Kemerovo district in the Hungarian city of Salgotarjan testify to the strong bonds connecting these sister-cities, which are separated by a distance of thousands of kilometers.

The internationalism of socialist international relations, in which Siberia is participating intensively, now takes the form of cooperative labor by millions of individuals and their common interest in building a new life under peaceful conditions. Istvan Hanets, the supervisor of the Hungarian group of construction workers involved in a group project of the fraternal socialist countries--a pulp and paper plant in the Siberian city of Ust'-Ilimsk--stated: "We are happy to be in Siberia, where our internationalist countrymen fought side by side with the soldiers of the Red Army to defend the conquests of the Great October Socialist Revolution. We will strive to be worthy members of the great fraternity of internationalists."[1]

The development of Siberia is becoming a way of measuring time that is just as familiar to people from other socialist countries as to the Soviet people. "In Siberia," Hartmuth Moraike, journalist from the GDR, wrote, "the great transforming power of socialism is made completely manifest. When I check Siberian time against that of other cities, I see a kind of symbolic meaning here. In our day, Siberian time has become a synonym for speed and progress. There, in the East, beyond the Urals, the outlines of the future can be seen clearly."[2]

Siberia represents a marvelous beachhead for cooperation by the fraternal countries. Equipment labeled with the trademarks of all CEMA members is used widely here. Besides this, Siberia is the initial point of departure for many commodities that are of vital significance to the economies of other socialist countries. The sources feeding the Druzhba petroleum pipeline with the most valuable crude resource are located in Siberia.

The discovery and exploitation of oil and gas deposits in Siberia are directly connected with increased shipments of these energy sources from the USSR to the CEMA countries. Between 1950 and 1976, Soviet oil deliveries rose from 800,000 to 77 million tons. Vietnam, Mongolia and Cuba are receiving around 10 million tons of oil. Exports of natural gas to the CEMA countries, which began in the 1960's. reached 13.4 billion cubic meters in 1976.

The full-capacity operation of the Soyuz gasline, which starts in regions of Orenburgskaya Oblast adjacent to Siberia, will provide for another increase of 15.5 billion cubic meters in gas deliveries to Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia--that is, the countries which participated in the project.

Along the entire route of the pipelines, shipments moving in the opposite direction supply Siberians with the commodities they need. For example, chemical assemblies and complete sets of drying, processing and cleaning equipment come to Siberia from the GDR at the request of Tyumen'--or, more precisely, Surgut--oilmen.

International cooperation by the socialist countries has given birth to many modern projects in Siberia, incorporating the highest achievements of technical progress. In accordance with the provisions of the Comprehensive Program for Socialist Economic Integration Between the CEMA Countries, cooperative efforts were used in building the world's largest "450" medium-grade mill for the production of new effective types of rolled metal products at the East Siberian Metallurgical Plant in the Kuzbass. This mill was designed and built by Soviet workers in conjunction with experts from machine-building enterprises in the CSSR and GDR.

The socialist countries are cooperating closely in the development of the Siberian transportation network. Ships built in Czechoslovakia and Hungary can often be seen on the Lena, Ob', Irtysh and other Siberian rivers. Hungarian "Icaruses" serve tourist lines in Siberian cities. All of the CEMA countries are participating in one way or another in the construction of the Baykal-Amur Trunkline.

For more than 30 years, Siberians have been cooperating with the automotive industry in Czechoslovakia to provide for freight traffic along one of the most difficult motor routes in Europe or Asia--the road from Magadan to Central Kolyma. A special center has been set up in Magadanskaya Oblast to train workers to drive Czechoslovakia's Tatra trucks. These vehicles are delivered to Siberia with special adjustments for northern conditions and they have gained a deservedly good reputation in Siberia. It is no coincidence that an extraordinary monument has been set up on a pedestal in one part of the Kolyma motor route as a sign of gratitude to the Siberians' friends from Czechoslovakia--the Tatra III, the first motor vehicle which arrived in Siberia almost 25 years ago from a distant country for the development of this region. The Kolyma Tatra has become a monument to the cooperative labor uniting the people of the socialist countries in the development of Siberia.

Just as in other eastern regions of the Soviet Union, the most highly perfected and complex forms of multilateral cooperation by the socialist countries are widely used in Siberia. One international project, located in one of Siberia's most remote regions, is the Ust'-Ilimsk Pulp and Paper Combine. Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union are participating in its construction.

The foreign participants in the project are shipping metal structures and equipment here, having taken on a total of 40 percent of the expense of equipping the enterprise. In exchange, the five fraternal countries will receive shipments of cellulose for several years, in quantities commensurate with their contribution. Each year, the complex will produce 500,000 tons of bleached cellulose, 1.2 million cubic meters of lumber and 25,000 cubic meters of shingles, as well as fodder yeast, turpentine, rosin and other products.

The first section of the pulp and paper plant in Ust'-Ilimsk should begin operating this year. The participating countries are working energetically toward this, filling orders precisely on schedule and in accordance with the highest quality standards. For example, in Hungary, metal structures for shops in Ust'-Ilimsk were being manufactured in the Femmunkas Plant in Kecskemet. The chief engineer of this plant, Imre Nagy, reported that the structures were solid enough to withstand any load at temperatures ranging from 50 degrees below zero to 40 degrees above. "Besides this," the Hungarian engineer said, "we have paid close attention to the need for quick assembly, so that not one additional hole will have to be drilled for bolts on the construction site."

In order to ensure the start-up of this enterprise on the precise date planned, several countries have sent workers to Siberia who have distinguished themselves in their native lands and have expressed a desire to work in an international collective. A brigade of first-class drivers from Bulgaria, named after Georgiy Dimitrov, the Hungarian Bela Kuhn Construction Brigade and the Ernst Thaelmann Work Brigade from the GDR are highly respected by their comrades.

The commander of the Georgiy Dimitrov brigade of Bulgarian workers, Stefan Stanev, stressed, in a conversation with journalists, that here, on this international construction site, the Bulgarian representatives were not only gaining production experience. "We are also learning about national economic development on a massive scale, bold planning and persistence in the fulfillment of plans. Our project is an excellent school for character development."[3]

As participants in the project have noted, technical standards here evolve into moral standards and are organically combined with internationalist principles: Work under difficult conditions requires a high sense of responsibility not only for oneself, but also for the entire project as a whole, responsibility to one's comrades, to one's country and to the workers who have come here from other fraternal countries.

The joint international project provides many examples of selfless and sincere comradely mutual assistance. The following incident took place in Ust'-Ilimsk. A Soviet woman was in critical condition in a hospital due to hemorrhage. She could only be saved by immediate transfusions. This was announced over the municipal radio station. It was already late in the evening and the city was settling down after a difficult work day. Within several minutes, however, a bus drove up to the city hospital. The first to answer the call for help was Bulgarian Viktor Porstoyev. The woman was saved. This was one of the many signs of the fraternity of individuals united by common goals, interests and ideals and the common fate of their people.

Examples of international socialist cooperation can also be seen in other large enterprises and construction projects in Siberia. In Tyumen' and Surgut, representatives of fraternal Bulgaria are taking part in the

construction of residential buildings for oilmen. "We are giving the conquerors of West Siberia a helping hand," Kh. Zakhariyev, Hero of Socialist Labor of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and leader of a group of Bulgarian builders, said in a conversation with journalists, "the best specialists, experts in their field, have come to Tyumenskaya Oblast."[4]

The formation of international student youth construction brigades has become a noteworthy tradition. The young builders are constructing animal husbandry complexes, industrial enterprises, schools and the buildings and dormitories of higher academic institutions. For example, a united brigade of young construction workers from the USSR, the GDR, Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia worked for a long time on the construction of the science village of the Siberian Branch of the All-Union Agricultural Academy imeni V. I. Lenin near Novosibirsk. Mongolian youths, students from Ulaanbataar State University, worked on several construction projects in Megino-Kangalasskiy Rayon of the Yakut ASSR. At the same time, a brigade of students from Yakut State University participated in one of the people's construction projects in Ulaanbataar. Other academic institutions are also making extensive use of this kind of exchange of student construction brigades.

An international construction brigade, made up of students from the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, took an active part in the construction of auxiliary lines on the Tayshet-Lena Railroad, one of the branches of the Baykal-Amur Mainline (BAM).

The BAM project as a whole represents an important object of socialist cooperation. Here, just as on other Siberian construction sites, machines, equipment and materials from the socialist countries are being widely used. In addition, however, there are also numerous other forms of personal and social contacts, which are developing a new attitude toward labor and strengthening the socialist community.

In this respect, interaction by the builders of the Soviet Union and Cuba--two countries separated by oceans--is characteristic. At the end of 1977, an agreement was concluded on socialist competition between the builders of BAM and the builders of the Santiago de Cuba-Havana Railway, a steel railroad which is supposed to traverse the entire Island of Freedom. This agreement envisages the exchange of experience and shock labor on the job. Ivan Mashkov, a construction worker on BAM's western section who took part in concluding the agreement, said that this form of competition would serve as an important means of stimulating the labor of the young builders of the Siberian trunkline. Our Cuban friends also gained much that was useful from the experience of the BAM builders. When they met with BAM workers, they were interested in working, living and leisure conditions and ways of organizing competition between various brigades and sections of the construction project.

Twice a year, on 4 April (the day the Cuban Young Communist League was founded) and 29 October (the day the Komsomol was founded), the results of the competition are summed up. Outstanding BAM builders are awarded challenge banners of the Cuban Young Communist League, and Cuban builders who have distinguished themselves are awarded banners of the BAM Komsomol headquarters. A museum will be opened in Havana to commemorate the friendly cooperation in these two projects. Expositions, illustrating Soviet-Cuban ties of friendship, have been set up in many cities along the BAM route.

In addition to a multitude of production and social ties, the Siberians are also keeping up individual contacts and are frequent guests in the socialist countries. For example, since the first year of the BAM construction project, the young builders have traveled to foreign countries on tours organized by the Sputnik International Youth Tourist Bureau. The bureau organized a trip to the GDR in 1975, to Hungary the next year, then to Bulgaria and so forth. BAM workers have also toured the socialist countries on the traditional friendship trains.

Working together to build a new life, helping in one another's work and welcoming friends into one's home for rest--these are the completely logical results of the way of life that is taking shape on the basis of identical principles in the nations of the socialist community. And the great distances are no longer an obstacle now that the Siberians have a high standard of living and a developed system of modern communications.

The Soviet Union is part of the socialist community, and Siberia is part of the Soviet Union, having the same interests and concerns as the whole. Siberia is participating in socialist international division of labor, in the common life of the fraternal countries and in their common struggle to build socialism and communism.

Prospects for Cooperation: An Outsider's View

Siberia is becoming increasingly important in Soviet economic, scientific and technical cooperation with countries of the opposing system. Views on the prospects for Western and Japanese participation in Siberian projects are also changing.

In this respect, the evolution of the views expressed in the WASHINGTON POST newspaper is indicative. In May 1974, the newspaper printed a long analysis of the economic development of Siberia and ultimately arrived at the following conclusion: "The economic arguments in favor of natural gas and oil projects in Siberia are at best questionable."

Just 4 years later, however, the same newspaper noted that the Siberian regions constituted one of the last large untouched basins of natural gas. "Texas oilmen have been keeping an eye on Soviet oil reserves for a long time," the WASHINGTON POST stressed, "and these are not tourists

or communist sympathizers, but serious businessmen." The newspaper stated quite definitely that American businessmen would not be reluctant to supply the equipment for oil fields, particularly the oil rigs. To rationalize this cooperation, the newspaper even stooped to the implication that the Soviet Union had still not mastered the art of drilling under northern conditions.

It would be a waste of time to argue about what the Soviet oilmen can and cannot do or where and how they drill for oil. In a short time, perhaps in another 4 years, the WASHINGTON POST will be saying something different about the Soviet capability of oil production, just as it has already changed its mind about the potential of Siberian oil fields. The significance of Siberian resources is widely recognized. And this recognition is no longer limited to representatives of the press.

In August 1978, literally just a few days before the abovementioned article appeared in the WASHINGTON POST, the UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL AGENCY issued a release, stating that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had prepared a special report on the development of the Soviet gas industry. According to the authors of this report, Soviet reserves of natural gas are probably the largest in the world, and the richest deposits of natural gas are in West Siberia. The authors of the report concluded that these reserves could last for many decades.

We will not dwell on the American intelligence community's predictions as to how long the Siberian reserves will hold out. Public judgments by the CIA always boil down to attempts to somehow belittle what our nation has. In any case, it is indicative that the oil, gas and other energy sources in Siberia constitute an object of close attention overseas. This attention, naturally, does not reflect happiness with the discoveries of Soviet geologists, but slight annoyance over the fact that the advantage in the world balance of energy resources is held by the socialist world, rather than by the capitalist world.

A magazine published in Paris, REVUE D'ETUDES COMPARATIFS EST-OUEST, published an article by American economists J. Burnheim and R. Furthmeyer entitled "The Prospect for Siberian Economic Development." "The purpose of this article," the authors noted, "is to analyze the possibilities of Siberian development both in the context of the economic development of the USSR and from the standpoint of economic cooperation between East and West and the continuation of political detente."

Estimated total reserves of coal in Siberia, according to these authors, are equivalent to approximately 2.3 billion tons, deposits of iron ore are twice as great as in the United States, Great Britain and France combined, and reserves of petroleum are greater than in the Middle East. Siberia has the world's largest deposits of natural gas and huge quantities of rare metals.

Naturally, even in this study, the authors' numerical computations do not take in all of Siberia's possessions. There might also be some error in the calculations, since total geological reserves of coal in the Kansko-Achinsk basin alone are estimated at 600 billion tons. We must remember that total reserves of coal in the USSR are estimated at 8.6 trillion tons, or 57 percent of all known coal deposits in the world.[5] What is important is the recognition of the significance of Siberia and, naturally, the entire Soviet Union in the correlation of world natural resources. Just as the CIA report, this study reflects anxiety over the depletion of natural resources in the West in contrast to the discovery of more and more new deposits in Soviet Siberia.

The study contains interesting estimates of the economic advantages that could be derived from the purchase of energy sources from Siberia. For example, shipments of coal from the United States cost Japan 18 dollars a ton, while shipments from Siberia would cost 3 dollars; the cost of a ton of unrefined oil from the Middle East is 1,000 yen, but oil shipped from the Soviet port of Nakhodka would cost only one-fifth as much. In comparison to non-European sources, shipments of Soviet natural gas would be extremely beneficial to West Germany, since they could be transported by the cheaper pipeline method. Taking these and other factors into account, the authors of the article note, economic interests could motivate the FRG to take a more active part in the development of Siberian resources. As for Japan, it will strive, according to these authors, to participate in Siberian development to an incomparably greater extent than other capitalist partners, despite China's negative attitude and the need to consider U.S. views.

The development of Siberia has become a constant topic of discussion in the works of many capitalist scientists and journalists.

Their opinions are usually also unequivocal--they recognize the tremendous prospects of Siberia and the positive value of cooperation with the Soviet Union both in the shipment of necessary goods and in the purchase of all that this region is famous for.

Naturally, foreign partners can only offer to participate in the development of Siberian resources and must not assume that their agreement is the only factor determining the prospects for cooperation.

Unfortunately, hopes are still being confused with reality in the West, particularly in the United States: There have been some attempts to suggest that, without the use of Western equipment and technology, the Soviet Union will not be able to develop Siberian oil, gas and other deposits in regions that are not easily accessible.

As Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in his reply to the questions of Japan's ASAHI newspaper in June 1977, there is no basis for the allegations "that the Soviet Union cannot develop the abundant resources of Siberia and the

Far East by itself. It is completely obvious, and this is illustrated by the entire history of our state, that we have every possibility of coping with this task."[6]

It is a fact that no one helped the Soviet Union in the prospecting of oil deposits near Tyumen', but Soviet geologists found oil there, and in unprecedented quantities at that. No one helped the Soviet Union to work these deposits either, but the output here quickly reached 300 million tons a year in spite of this. The growth rate of oil and gas production in the USSR is unprecedented. Suffice it to say that the average annual increase in national oil production between 1966 and 1978 was 25.3 million tons, and the increase in gas production was 18.8 billion cubic meters. It is therefore quite natural to conclude that if the Soviet Union has been able to develop the extractive industry to such dimensions, nothing can keep it from continuing to move ahead at a rapid rate.

More competent foreign researchers do not overestimate the significance of cooperation by capitalist firms in the development of Siberia. As Canadian University Professor R. North remarked in an article published in CURRENT HISTORY, foreign capital participating in Siberian projects will finance, but not control, the exploitation of natural resources and transport potential. The authors of the abovementioned article entitled "The Prospect for Siberian Economic Development" also admit that although Western participation would be important from the standpoint of effective, rapid and low-cost exploitation, it is not essential to the USSR.

The Soviet Union, recognizing the great positive role of international economic contacts, both from the standpoint of economic interests and with consideration for the part played by this factor in the total political picture of peaceful coexistence, has repeatedly stressed the excellent prospects for the development of trade and economic relations with the capitalist countries on the basis of mutually beneficial cooperation in working the natural resources of the Far East and Siberia. It was no coincidence that the possibility of a long-range program for economic cooperation over the next 10-15 years, mainly through the more intensive use of Siberian and Far Eastern resources, was discussed when Comrade L. I. Brezhnev met with a delegation from the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren) in the Crimea in August 1976. Soviet cooperation with other states should accelerate the completion of Soviet plans for the development of these areas.

The Soviet Union distinguished itself long ago as a stable and responsible partner. Sincere cooperation with no trace of discrimination or political extortion will be in the mutual interests of all parties involved. In this respect, the development of Siberia presents additional extensive opportunities.

On a Compensatory Basis

Businessmen in the capitalist countries are not concealing their great interest in more intensive economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, including cooperation in Siberian projects. As Keidanren Chairman Toshiyo Doko said at the time of his meeting with L. I. Brezhnev in the summer of 1976, Japanese economic circles attach great significance to commercial cooperation with the Soviet Union on a long-term basis and favor the further development of friendly ties with the USSR.[7] In an apparent reflection of this view, many Japanese newspapers have suggested that cooperation with the Soviet Union in the development of Siberia would be extremely beneficial with respect to Japanese economic development.

Petroleum, petroleum products and gas represent a substantial share of Soviet exports. These important types of raw material and fuel are being shipped in increasing quantities to the CEMA countries. They are also being exported to Italy, Finland, the FRG, France and other capitalist countries.

In addition to commercial operations, however, long-term international cooperation in the working of Siberian natural resources is also becoming more important. One way of attaining this objective, the significance of which was particularly emphasized by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, is the so-called Yakut gas project. This is a project involving interaction by three countries--the USSR, the United States and Japan--which is distinguished both by the huge scale of economic contracts and by their considerable duration.

The ultimate goal of the project is the extraction of Yakut gas, both for use in the USSR and for shipment to the United States and Japan. Much remains to be done before this goal can be attained: Geological exploratory work must be completed in the Yakut ASSR, gas production workers must be provided with the necessary equipment, a pipeline must be laid from the deposit work sites to the Pacific coastline of the USSR, and a gas liquefaction plant must be built at the end of this pipeline.

The American and Japanese sides are participating in the project by extending credit to the Soviet Union and by supplying the necessary materials and equipment, which will be compensated for in the future by shipments of gas. This is one example of the kind of compensatory transactions that are becoming increasingly popular in the practice of Soviet foreign economic ties.

In the summer of 1978, Soviet, Japanese and American delegations met in Tokyo, and the result of this meeting was a trilateral memorandum. This document defined specific objectives in the development of Yakut gas reserves and realistic ways of turning the Yakut project into a reality.

"The energy problem," one man who attended the conference, Chairman A. Anzai of the board of directors of the Tokyo Gas Company, said in a conversation with newsmen, "is one of the most serious nationwide problems facing our country, and we are placing great hopes in the realization of the Yakut gas project."[8]

According to the project, shipments of Siberian gas to foreign participants will continue into the beginning of the next century. Naturally, the project will require thorough and all-round preparations. The memorandum signed in Tokyo, and other documents, meetings and conferences connected with the Yakut gas project are steps leading in the direction of large-scale cooperation, but they are realistic steps, reflecting the carefully planned and responsible approach of the participants to long-term multilateral cooperation. The project illustrates how seriously and thoughtfully the Soviet Union approaches the development of ties with other countries, how firmly it keeps its promises and how implicitly it is trusted ty its partners.

Siberia is also an active participant in international cooperation in the use of coal, this "most convenient fuel," as it is called by power engineers throughout the world. Siberia's reserves of coal are vast--they are estimated in figures of 13 digits. According to researchers, if the annual output of just the Kansko-Achinsk basin in the south of Krasnoyarskiy Kray is brought up to a billion tons a year, the basin will provide fuel at this rate for more than 100 years. Kansko-Achinsk is not the only coal basin in Siberia.

For a long time, the coal mined in the Kuznetsk basin has been highly acclaimed in the world market. Coking coal, enriched at local enterprises, is known as an excellent raw material for metallurgy. Japanese metallurgical firms are its traditional consumers.

Soon the coking coal from another Siberian region will make its appearance in the world market. When the meridian branch of the Baykal-Amur Mainline--so-called "BAM Minor"--is completed, the coking coal of the South Yakut region will make its way into the world at large. The unique qualities of this basin have been sufficiently discussed in the world press. The most important feature of this basin is that the coal is not far underground, but close to the surface, and in thick layers, reaching a depth of 80 meters in some spots.

A complex unique in terms of productivity is being set up here, and the most modern equipment is being used. Excavator scoops will hold 20 tons, and dumpers with a carrying capacity of up to 180 tons will be used to transport the coal. The loading assembly will operate at the rate of 4,000 tons of coal an hour.

These figures not only indicate the dimensions of this project, begun in a "virgin" spot, but also point out another, equally important social feature: that Siberia is in the vanguard of technical progress, ensuring

that the labor of the people working here will be productive to the maximum.

The first supply trains carrying coal were already departing from the South Yakut basin and moving along the Baykal-Amur Trunkline in 1978. As yet, energy-producing coal from the top strata of the deposit is still being shipped out of this region. When this coal has been removed, it will be the turn of the coking coal, and then the general agreement with Japan on shipments of South Yakut hard coal to this country will begin to be carried out. The agreement was signed in Moscow in June 1975. It envisages shipments of coal from the Yakut city of Neryungri to Japan in increasing quantities over a long period of time. By 1986 these shipments should exceed 5 million tons of coal a year. The agreement envisages compensatory transactions. The Japanese side has extended 450 million dollars in credit for the purchase of machines and equipment. The agreement is indisputably of mutual interest, as both sides are functioning as suppliers and purchasers of the goods they need.

The successful completion of these projects and other agreements will be important, and not only as a solution to the energy problems of the Soviet Union and its trade partners. The fulfillment of contracts will represent a substantial contribution to the expansion and reinforcement of the material and technical base of the policy of peaceful coexistence by states with different social systems and will aid in deepening the process of international detente. Therefore, the development of Siberia and the participation of various nations in this development are part of the general peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and of its efforts to consolidate detente and give it a solid and irreversible nature.

Technical Progress and International Ties

It would certainly be a mistake to assume that Soviet Siberia is only participating in international division of labor as a supplier of energy sources and other raw materials. Developing along with the rest of the Soviet Union, Siberia is an important industrial region, where the achievements of the contemporary scientific and technical revolution are being widely incorporated. It is not surprising that the products of many Siberian enterprises meet the highest requirements and standards.

An example of efficiently running modern production can be seen, in particular, at the Bratsk Aluminum Plant. Its products are widely known throughout the world. Hungary, the GDR, Bulgaria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Italy, England, France, the FRG and Japan--this is far from a complete list of the nations to which products with the plant's trademark are sent.

This broad range of international ties is not surprising: The plant manufactures aluminum of 99.5-percent minimum purity. The metal has no flaws, slag-forming constituents or other impurities. And this is not amazing:

Technical monitors take 2,500 samples of the metal during the production process. Air purity is also monitored, as the condition of the air also affects the quality of aluminum.

This enterprise, the world's largest aluminum plant, is famous for more than its main product. The automated system of production control has brought the entire technological cycle up to the highest level of perfection and has minimized human participation in this cycle. The high level of technical progress seen throughout the plant has established the necessary conditions for the manufacture of "products" of an absolutely unexpected type: The plant exports scientific and technical thought, in the form of patents and licenses.

The use of modern production methods has also turned the coal mining industry in Siberia into one of the branches exporting, in addition to the direct results of production, ideas which further the cause of technical progress. For example, in the Kuznetsk basin, in addition to underground and open-pit coal mining, the underground gasification of coal is now being widely practiced. The Siberians have achieved the best possible indicators in the development of this method. "The Soviet Union is the only nation which has begun full-scale work on underground gasification," B. Clemens, president of the American firm of Texas Utilities, said in this connection. "No one in the world has reached the level of the USSR." The company represented by B. Clemens has purchased a license in the USSR for the progressive technology developed in the Kuzbass.

Representatives of Canadian and Japanese business foresaw great benefits for themselves in the widespread use of the hydraulic method of coal mining, which is also commonly used in the Kuznetsk basin. They have concluded several sub-licensing agreements on the use of the Soviet method in other countries.

Several firms have purchased the rights to the method worked out at the Novokuznetsk Aluminum Plant for aluminum casting in an electromagnetic field. Representatives of the Italian and Japanese business communities have acquired the license to a design for a blast furnace with a heightened gas-pressure mouth, first used at the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine and the West Siberian Metallurgical Plant. The use of Soviet methods alone has won two world records in blast-furnace production for the metallurgists of the Japanese city of Nagoya.

The interest aroused abroad in a method worked out in Novokuznetsk for the dry slaking of coking coal is noteworthy. The licence for this method was quite quickly purchased by Japan, Italy, Great Britain, Spain and several other countries. Its progressive features are indisputable. English businessmen G. Simpson said the following in reference to this: "Our firm, Newton Chambers Engineering, which has been in existence since 1793, has acquired an extremely important license. This method is important because it will conserve energy. The energy shortage is

frightening, for future generations if not for us. We must show some concern for those who will live after us."

These examples constitute only a small part of the international contacts in the area of scientific and technical exchange between Siberian scientists and production workers and their colleagues and representatives of the business world in other countries within the framework of Soviet participation in general international cooperation. At one time, Siberia was a wilderness, a "god-forsaken place." Now conditions have changed radically. The interest in Siberia today does not stem from the exotic implications of impenetrable swamps or the possibility of encountering bears, but from the possibility of viewing the highest achievements of 20th-century civilization, the heights of technical and scientific progress. This new interest attests to the fundamental transformation of Siberia under the conditions of socialist development.

The Siberian Market: Great Possibilities and High Demands

Until the time of the Great October Socialist Revolution, neither machine tools nor industrial consumer goods were produced in Siberia. Even nails were shipped in from the European half of the nation. Now Siberia produces a broad variety of high-quality goods.

In addition, the region is reputed to have one of the largest markets in the Soviet Union. The high level of production at Siberian enterprises gives Siberians every right to demand that their suppliers adhere completely to the current standards of technical progress.

The following facts attest to this and another feature of the Siberian market. In July 1976, intergovernmental documents were signed in Tokyo on the purchase of complete sets of equipment in Japan for three plants for the processing of casing-head gas, derived from oil fields in Siberia's Tyumenskaya Oblast. Around 800 Japanese firms worked on this contract, estimated at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars. One of the main terms of the agreement was the stipulation that the firm would ship highly productive equipment, corresponding to modern technology.

These huge purchases were made necessary by the rapid growth of the Siberian petroleum industry. Huge quantities of casing-head gas were derived along with the oil. The question of its efficient utilization arose. In many developing oil-producing countries, foreign companies do not wish to spend money on refining this gas and they simply burn it. In the Soviet Union, mineral resources have always been treated carefully and thriftily. But Soviet industry was overloaded with other orders, and plants for the utilization of this gas could not be set up quickly. Under these conditions, the possibilities of foreign trade were used effectively. The purchase of the necessary equipment abroad and its rapid start-up will add 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to national annual supplies, to the great benefit of the national economy, and this will be equivalent to 10 million tons of oil in terms of heating capacity.[9]

The vast scales of Siberian projects create opportunities for the broadest international cooperation. After all, the total cost of setting up the West Siberian oil production complex alone is estimated at 70-90 billion rubles. Naturally, most of the equipment for this gigantic project will be manufactured in the Soviet Union. But wherever foreign firms can offer modern equipment or progressive technology that can considerably enhance the impact of labor, a broad field for mutually beneficial cooperation comes into existence.

For example, so-called gas-lift equipment has been purchased in Canada since 1970 for Tyumen' oil fields, where part of the gas is pumped back into the oil deposits and pushes the oil out of the ground with the aid of this equipment. Also for the Tyumen oil fields, chemical reagents were purchased in Japan for the desalinization and dehydration of petroleum. Reagents from the United States came to Siberia to prevent salt buildup on underground equipment.

A contract was signed with the English Coverrow consortium on the delivery of 42 gas pumps for the Tyumen'-Chelyabinsk gas line. The world-famous Rolls-Royce Company, as a member of this consortium, is supplying the project with its engines. An important feature of this contract is its long-range nature: The English firms have been contracted to not only supply equipment, but also to take care of its technical maintenance and supply spare parts.

The English press called this agreement one of the most important in the history of this nation's relations with the USSR.

While foreign firms offer modern products that considerably enhance production efficiency, Soviet Siberia is becoming a reliable and long-term partner.

The business world in the capitalist countries is well aware of this and takes this into account in its production. The following example is indicative. In the summer of 1977, a group of Soviet representatives visited a newly remodeled plant of the Mannesmann firm for the production of large-diameter pipe, near Dusseldorf in the FRG. The remodeling was so thorough that all that was left of the previous enterprise was the personnel staff.

It was obvious that the gigantic cogging mills were producing pipe of much smaller diameter than their technical capacity would allow. In answer to a question about this, one of the company's technical directors said: "It is true that the mills are intended for the manufacture of pipe of up to 18 meters in length, but are now producing pipe 6 meters shorter." When he was asked why capacities were being underused to this degree, he gave a rather surprising answer. "The firm," the technical director said, "delivers pipe to the USSR. Railway transport capacity limits the length of pipe to 12 meters. In time, however, a way of

transporting longer pipe will be found, perhaps with the use of the northern waterway and Siberian rivers. Longer pipe will be quite convenient for the Soviet Union, as it will reduce the number of seam weldings by a third." Naturally, the West German businessman was not motivated so much by worries about Soviet economic benefits as by a desire to stay ahead of competing firms. "If it were possible to get along without the railroad," the director continued, "our pipe would be unrivaled, because this is now the only plant in Europe that is capable of producing pipe one and a half times as long as the standard."

The logic of these calculations cannot be denied, considering the interests of both the suppliers and the consumers.

Another example, which is brought to mind by the above conversation, is also noteworthy. Large reactors were ordered from the FRG for the electrochemical combine in the city of Zima in Irkutskaya Oblast. The firm working on the order of the Siberian chemists made one stipulation: The equipment would have to be delivered in fully assembled form. In view of the fact that the dimensions of the reactors surpassed the capacity of railway rolling stock, it was decided to ship them through Scandinavia along the northern waterway, the Yenisey and the Angara. Therefore, the idea expressed by the Mannesmann administrator takes Siberian conditions into account sufficiently, including the Siberian transportation network.

This kind of cooperation benefits both sides. The Soviet Union is striving to economize as much as possible on resources for the development of Siberian mineral deposits, particularly since the resources in question are quite substantial in quantity. After all, just the laying of one section of gas line 142 centimeters in diameter, along with the installation of compressor stations, from Tyumenskaya Oblast to the central regions of the nation will cost 2.5 billion rubles.

The Soviet Union's foreign partners are well aware that cooperation is not limited to existing projects. New fields of interaction are discovered with each year. For example, in the future pipe will be laid to transport not only oil and gas, but also ground coal from the Kuznetsk basin to the Urals and the center of the nation. Experiments of this type are already being conducted. Pressure of up to 100 atmospheres will have to be built up in this pipe, and more durable metal will have to be used. Scientists estimate that the hydraulic transport of coal will reduce shipping costs by half or even more. Who knows, perhaps Siberia will be the pioneer in international cooperation in this work as well.

There is also another side to these commercial contacts. The Soviet organizations are not merely the passive consumers of foreign products. The technical level of the training of engineers and workers on most of the new construction sites allows them to take an active part in the process of perfecting new equipment and giving foreign designers the benefit of their ideas and experience.

For example, when pipelines began to be laid through West Siberia and the sites of oil and gas extraction began to be built up, it was necessary to overcome the problem of swamps, sometimes 10-12 meters in depth. These bogs did not freeze even at 50 degrees below zero. The builders learned that Canadian firms had designed fairly comfortable snow and swamp vehicles. Soon these machines were purchased and used to install lines in the swamps for the transmission of power from the Urals. This made it possible to convert drilling rigs to electrical power and, consequently, sharply increase the speed of drilling. At the same time, the Soviet oilmen conducted skilled tests of the all-purpose vehicles, discovered some of their weak spots and suggested ways of correcting them. The Canadian firms implemented the Soviet experts' suggestions, as a result of which the quality of the vehicles was improved. Therefore, both sides benefited from the cooperation.

Trans-Siberian Routes

Modern means of communication have turned the vast expanses of Siberia into a corridor of unprecendented length, linking Europe with the Far East. A new term has now joined such established international concepts as trans-continental, trans-Atlantic and Pan-American--trans-Siberian.

It was precisely the trans-Siberian route that gave a new type of civil aviation--turbojet--a start in life on the international scale. The world's first regular passenger flights on TU-104 turbojet planes began in the Siberian sky in September 1956.

Now many other world airlines have joined the Soviet Aeroflot, the Japanese JAL Company and the French Air France Lines in connecting Paris, London, Rome, Copenhagen, Frankfurt-on-Main and other cities in Western Europe with the islands of Japan and Southeast Asia. Approximately 40,000 people annually fly across Siberia between Tokyo and Moscow.

Only highly qualified ground services are capable of receiving intercontinental planes, servicing them, inspecting all components and ensuring flight reliability. Siberian aviators are distinguished by precisely this level of qualification and are justifiably proud of this.

The resolution of transport problems is of primary importance to the development of any region. This completely applies to Siberia as well. The Siberian transport network has many unique features. Railways, the river fleet, aviation, maritime transport and motor transport all play an active role in this network.

Until recently, all of these types of transport, operating in close coordination and to great capacity, filled the needs of Siberian development. But rapid industrial progress gradually came into conflict with transport capacity. Shipping, particularly over latitudinal distances, became the bottleneck, so to speak, that was holding up the growth of industry and the

extraction of minerals. The more developed railway network of West Siberia gradually narrowed as it moved to the East, and the trans-Siberian railroad was the only line from Baykal to the Pacific Ocean. The diversified network of pipelines did not solve the problem of shipping freight that could not be pumped through a pipe.

There was only one possible solution: the implementation of the proposal, which was set forth during the years of the early five-year plans, to build a Baykal-Amur railway trunkline. The beginning of this project was announced in 1974, and it seems almost unbelievable that more than one-third of this steel railway, the total length of which will be 3,200 kilometers, has already been laid under the conditions of uninhabitable taiga and permafrost.

In addition to the part of the road that has been laid in a latitudinal direction, the so-called BAM Minor has also began operating. This line is located along the meridian and connects the old trans-Siberian road with the South Yakut coal fields. This section quite graphically illustrates the complex construction problems that must be solved in the installation of a trunkline. The BAM Minor line, 397 kilometers in length, has 303 bridges and one long tunnel. Engineering structures are being erected on almost each kilometer of the road--support walls, bridges and trestles, which require highly developed engineering knowledge and modern technology.

The BAM builders have benefited greatly from the results of Soviet international cooperation. They are making extensive use of equipment not only from the CEMA countries, but also from the United States, Canada, the FRG, Japan and other nations: motor vehicles (particularly heavy-duty dump trucks), bulldozers, excavators, various types of construction machinery and equipment for telecommunications.

At the same time, BAM is also providing additional and substantial opportunities for the development of Soviet foreign economic relations with active participation by Siberians in these relations. It is precisely along the BAM route that coal moves from the Neryungri region to the Pacific Coast and from there to overseas importers.

The construction of BAM has been accompanied by work on the end of the line--the port of Vostochnyy in Primorskiy Kray. Vostochnyy Port is expected to provide for the quick loading of vessels arriving here to pick up Siberian cargo, and the unloading of ships bringing in goods. This January, a coal complex with annual productivity of 5 million tons began operating here. It is justifiably called the reloading center of the South Yakut coal basin.

The opening of the first section of Vostochnyy Port will considerably improve transport connections in northeastern regions and establish favorable conditions for the further development of Soviet foreign economic ties. This is what Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said about the significance of this

construction project in a message congratulating all of the workers involved.[10]

The construction of BAM is arousing great interest abroad. There was a great deal of gossip and speculation, but many serious studies were also conducted and many interesting opinions were expressed in regard to the importance of the second trans-Siberian route to the Soviet Union and its overseas partners.

An example of the combination of various opinions, in which respect for the scales of the project coexists with arguments taken from the cold war arsenal, can be seen in a book published in New York in 1977--"Gateway to Siberian Resources (BAM)." One of its authors, Houston University researcher V. Mout, remarked that, from the standpoint of developmental rates and expenditures of human labor and money, BAM is unrivaled in the world. In his opinion, the latest large project in North America--the trans-Alaskan pipeline--cannot compare to BAM, neither in terms of transport efficiency nor in terms of the complexity of construction problems.

It is interesting that the study contains recognition of the tremendous economic significance of the Baykal-Amur railroad. If the construction is completed, according to plan, in 1983, Mout writes, BAM will take its place among the world's grandest railways, the trunkline will make thousands of square miles of territory rich in raw materials accessible and the line will play an important part in determining the future appearance of adjacent regions.

After determining to make this admission, the American author seems to repent his action and hurriedly splashes the pages of the book with a large portion of doubt about the feasibility of the Soviet plans. "This prediction," Mout goes on to write, "could be questionned, as it is not known whether the construction of BAM will be economically effective and whether Soviet workers and specialists will be able to overcome gigantic physical difficulties. This question will not be answered for another 10 years."

But this kind of skepticism is unfounded. And it will not take 10 years to verify the practicability of the Soviet plans. The work has already been completed on 1,200 kilometers of the BAM route, and the work on the meridian branch confirmed the high effectiveness of the entire project.

Mout, just as several other Western researchers of the development of Soviet Siberia, cannot resist allusions to some kind of "threat" which BAM allegedly poses for the United States. It is impossible to find any serious arguments to back this up and, for this reason, one American author cites another's words as proof. He cites his colleague from the University of Hawaii, J. Stephan, who was already asserting, back in 1975, that "if the present trend continues (referring to the development of the Soviet East), the Soviet Union will be able to replace the United States as the leading power in the Pacific."

The later work naturally includes more far-reaching assumptions and, for this reason, V. Mout is not satisfied with the term "leading power," but uses the more fashionable concept of "hegemony in the Pacific," paying homage to the blatant propaganda coming from behind the Wall of China.

There is no point in ignoring the fact that the politicians who are trying to build a Beijing-Washington axis would like to see Soviet Siberia remain an unchanging and unpopulated virgin area and hope that not only the Soviet East, but also all other parts of the USSR, will go to seed. But no one has the right to take charge of Soviet land in this manner.

There are no incantations in any languages, whether they use letters or characters, which can stop the construction of BAM, not to mention the entire process of industrial development in Siberia and the Soviet Far East. Besides this, there is no reason for anyone to see this as a threat to his own interests. The Soviet Union did not use the construction of pipelines from the Northern Foothills to Port Valdez in southern Alaska or from the Daqing oil fields to the Yellow Sea coast as an excuse to invent problems.

The development of trans-Siberian communications, including BAM, will certainly be of great international significance. But its main purpose consists in the development of the productive forces of a vast zone of the USSR in the interest of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, the further elevation of their standard of living and the expansion of the sphere of international economic cooperation.

In the Orbit of Scientific Progress

The development of Siberian science is one of the major achievements of today's Siberia and one of the objects of Siberian pride. This facet of intellectual activity in Siberia has roots that stretch back far into the past. Its origins were influenced by the revolutionary ideas of the exiled Decembrists, who were here serving sentences passed by the tsar at the beginning of the last century. Polish revolutionaries who were exiled to this remote region took part in the establishment of Siberian science. Both groups left a deep imprint on the Siberian outlook and aroused a thirst for scientific knowledge. Many of their names live on in the names of the mountains, valleys and passes they explored.

Until the triumph of socialism in the Soviet Union, however, science in Siberia was represented by only isolated scholars with small groups of disciples. The first large scientific centers did not appear here until the Soviet regime had been established. The development of science in Siberia has been particularly rapid in the last 20 years, when the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences was founded and began active work.

The Siberian Department now represents a powerful scientific center, whose fame has spread far beyond Soviet boundaries. The Siberian Department unites 48 research and experimental design institutions, representing virtually all major branches of the natural and social sciences. These institutions are also united by five regional centers--in Novosibirsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk, Ulan-Ude and Yakutsk. In all, around 35,000 people are now working in Siberian scientific establishments, including many people whose services to world science are widely acknowledged in our nation and abroad. The work of such prominent scholars as Academicians M. A. Lavrent'yev, S. A. Sobolev, S. A. Khristianovich and many others is associated with the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences.

It is noteworthy that along with representatives of the older generation, more than one generation of scientists has matured locally, for whom Siberia has been both the object of research and a beneficial environment for the display of scientific and organizational talents, the accumulation of knowledge and the implemention of research findings. These include Academician G. I. Marchuk, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences and chairman of the Siberian Department, Director A. A. Trofimuk of the Institute of Geology and Geophysics, Director A. G. Aganbegyan of the Institute of the Economics and Organization of Industrial Production, Director G. K. Belyayev of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics and other scientists.

Just a partial list of the projects now being worked on by Siberian scientists is sufficient for an appreciation of their depth and, with could say, their global significance: a program of soil examination by means of vibration, a program on the use of aerospace information methods for the assessment of natural phenomena and resources, work on the development of catalytic heat generators and the investigation of methods for increasing the yield of vegetation with the aid of growth stimulants.

Characteristic features of the activity of Siberian scientists are its complexity, their concentration on a few major fields and the unification of the efforts of scientists representing different fields. The scientific establishments of the Siberian Department are working on long-range programs--regional, sectorial and intrasectorial--for example: "West Siberian Oil and Gas," "Kuzbass Coal," "The Oil and Gas Base in Regions of East Siberia," "The Program for the Economic Development of the BAM Zone" and "Ecology and Environmental Protection." These and other programs, which are vast in themselves, are all part of a single large-scale comprehensive program called "The Comprehensive Development of Siberian Natural Resources," or "Siberia" for short.

It is also quite important that the scientific activity of the Siberian Department of the USSR Academy of Sciences is closely connected with many economic organizations and is aimed at the rapid implementation of scientific discoveries in the production sphere. Siberian scientists call their approach "branch-oriented." For this purpose, in particular, the

administrators of the Siberian Department concluded long-term--up to 5 years--agreements on cooperation with several USSR ministries and large industrial enterprises. The branch-oriented approach provides for heightened production efficiency and the rapid incorporation of scientific and technical achievements in the production process.

Siberian scientists are conducting interesting studies in the area of economics and social development. They have accumulated abundant experience in the planning and modeling of complexes, the new territorial-production structures. They were instrumental in the planning of the Sayansk complex, the Bratsk-Ust'-Ilimsk complex and the West Siberian complex and are now working on complexes in the BAM zone. The idea of the complex, representing the territorial concentration of a large group of production units connected with the mining and refining of minerals, has been extremely productive. It is not surprising that the effectiveness of the Siberian complexes is being studied by scientists in many other nations or that these complexes are being investigated by international organizations for the purpose of implementing the experience accumulated in Siberia. In his works, Canadian researcher R. Nord has called the Siberian city of Bratsk an example of regional development based on the comprehensive use of local resources.

The Siberian scientific community has extensive international contacts, which are of great practical value for the Soviets and the foreigners involved in these contacts. It is indicative that the city of Yakutsk, in the depths of Siberia, was once chosen as the site of the second international conference on geocryology, attended by representatives of 14 nations. And this was not because Yakutsk is situated on permafrost, as there are many such cities. The reason was the Yakutsk Scientific Research Institute of Geocryology, the only institute of its kind in the world, the studies of which are treated with respect by foreign scientists and builders.

The scientific centers of the Siberian Department of the Academy of Sciences and many of its institutes have broad contacts with foreign colleagues.

The exchange of experience with representatives of the fraternal socialist countries has become the norm in Siberian scientific activity. For example, Siberian specialists in soil science and agrochemistry assisted in the compilation of the Mongolian State Soil Map. They also recommended procedures for the agrochemical regionalization of farming areas in this country. The CEMA Coordinating Center on Industrial Catalysis was founded on the basis of a catalysis institute here in the beginning of the 1970's. Scientific establishments in almost all of the CEMA countries and Yugoslavia are participating in its work. It makes all of the arrangements for the exchange of scientific information, of trainees and of scientific personnel. The same institute maintains constant contact with a similar institute in France and with research establishments in the United States. Siberian scientists are responsible for many inventions patented in the United States, England, Japan and other countries.

It is not surprising that there is great interest everywhere outside the Soviet Union in information about the development of Siberian science and the life and work of scientists in this part of the USSR. For example, the exhibit "Scientific Siberia," which was shown in Washington and Chicago, was tremendously successful in the United States. Specialists and the general public were interested in the content of the scientific work of Siberian research centers and in the organization of scientific activity in the USSR.

This last feature has been the object of particularly close attention in the developing countries as well as the developed nations. It is far from coincidental that the small town of Boumierdes, where the new Algerian scientific center is beginning to take shape, is called, in addition to its official name, something else by Algerian scientists--Academic Village, in honor of what the Algerians regard as its elder brother--the Academic Village near Novosibirsk.

The works of Siberian historians, ethnographers and archaeologists are renowned throughout the world. Siberian scientists participated in the study of the sixth century B.C. cliff paintings in Mongolia's Harhad region. The results of this research suggested that the culture of ancient Mongolia should be included among the other Eastern civilizations of antiquity.

An interesting joint study was conducted by Soviet and American scientists in 1974 on the ancient migration of people from Eurasia through the Aleutian Islands to North America. "We were all interested in the possibility of man's migration from Siberia to the New World," wrote Dr W. Laughlin, head of the American group. "The Soviet scientists knew where the first inhabitants of America had come from, and wanted to learn more about where they had gone. The Americans, on the other hand, knew the routes of their further progress and wanted to learn more about their ancient native land." The Soviet Union was represented on the expedition by several scientists, headed by Siberian researcher, Academician A. P. Okladnikov.

This expedition filled several gaps in the existing theory that the first inhabitants of the "New World" had come here from Siberia over an ancient isthmus in the Bering Sea. The combined efforts of scientists from both countries, the journal AMERICA reported in this connection, made it easier to take a look into the history of people separated from us by at least 10,000 years.[11]

Interest in scientific investigations of Siberian history is the same as interest in Siberia in general. The following episode is indicative. A few years ago, Soviet representatives participating in the opening ceremony of the "Soviet Socialist Siberia" Exhibit met in Tokyo with Tokai University President S. Matsumae. At the end of the talk, Professor Matsumae said that he had a gift for his guests and presented them with

a newly printed volume of the Japanese-language version of "Istoriya Sibiri" [The History of Siberia]. This was a translation of one of the most fundamental Soviet historical studies, compiled by a group of Siberian scientists under the supervision of Academician A. P Okladnikov. The Japanese publishers began to issue the five-volume work with the last, fifth book instead of the first, because the last decades of Siberian history apparently interested them more than the "bygone days."

When the Soviet participants in the exhibit returned to Moscow and contacted Novosibirsk so that they could pass the Japanese translation of the book on to its Siberian authors, Academician A. P. Okladnikov expressed amazement at the exceptionally speedy operations of the Japanese publishers: They took less than 2 years to translate and publish a book of around 1,500 pages. The Japanese reading public's interest in Siberian development was so great that the academic publication was assigned the status, one could say, of a political emergency.

The attention of the foreign public was aroused by scientific studies of Siberia and by Siberian science itself for many reasons. If it were necessary to categorize the major causes of this interest, they would probably fit into the following logical sequence: Siberia is part of a socialist state, the first one constructed in accordance with the science studying the development of human society--Marxism-Leninism; the progress of socialist society rests on all knowledge accumulated by mankind; this knowledge, compounded by the possibilities of socialism, is becoming a magnet, attracting inquisitive minds everywhere.

Siberia and the Cultural Revolution

Siberian development also has another feature of far more than local interest: This is the rapid cultural development of the former "god-forsaken spots" that were once described only as backwoods.

The cultural revolution which began in Russia with the triumph of the Soviet regime, transformed Siberia, brought the educational level up to the level of the nation's central regions and created the necessary conditions for the development of Siberian artists whose works are now the pride of the Soviet people and are part of the cultural values of our era.

As proof of this, it is enough to simply list the names of just a few writers who grew up and matured in Siberia--Vasiliy Shukshin, Aleksandr Vampilov, Georgiy Markov, Viktor Astaf'yev, Valentin Rasputin and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. Their works are know far West and East of the Angara, Irtysh and Yenisey. The novels, poems, plays and screenplays of these and other authors related to Siberia by blood are well known to foreign readers and audiences.

It is not only the writers who were born and lived in Siberia whose works have won international recognition. This recognition has also been awarded to masters of the drama, an art form which was absolutely unknown to the

inhabitants of these parts prior to the revolution. The overseas tours of troupes from Novosibirsk, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk and other large cities corroborate this. But another example will probably be even more indicative.

The premiere performance of Jean Schneitzhoffer's ballet "Les Sylphides" was extremely successful in March of this year at the Novosibirsk Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet. This ballet was first staged in Paris in 1832, and the choreography was considered at that time to be unsurpassed. A few years ago, the old production was revived by P. Lacquotte, ballet-master of the Paris Grand Opera. Then the master of the Paris stage also put on a revival of the performance in Novosibirsk. It is no coincidence that the opera and ballet theater here has been given the honored title "academic."

The Novosibirsk Symphony Orchestra is widely known for its variety of musical programs. Its repertoire includes works by the classics, as well as by Soviet musicians, including such Siberian composers as A. Novikov, A. Murov, G. Ivanov and others. It should be noted that music in Novosibirsk has absorved many of the features of the musical culture of Leningrad, the famed cultural center of the Soviet Union. During World War II, Novosibirsk was the home of a large group of artists and musicians who had been evacuated from Leningrad, which was then encircled by enemy blockades. The Leningrad Philarmonic also played in Novosibirsk. The active participation of Leningraders in Novosibirsk cultural life contributed much to the development of highly professional artistic collectives and soloists here.

When one now views the rich and varied cultural life of Siberia, thoughts of how far this region and its people have progressed in their development automatically come to mind.

In 1921 V. I. Lenin wrote that Siberia had vast expanses which could accommodate dozens of literate and cultured states. But all that prevailed in these expanses was "the patriarchal way of life, semisavagery and the most genuine savagery."[12] The powerful energy of the Great October Socialist Revolution put Siberia's tremendous forces in motion, served as a turning point in the development of this region and gave it an absolutely new life.

There is an even more amazing contrast between the past and present in the lives of the Siberian natives--the Yakut, Buryat, Altay, Khanty, Mansi and Nenets people and many others.

The reader of historical documents shudders at the description of the state of poverty in which these people lived, crushed by local feudal lords, shamans and traveling extortionist merchants.

The report of a trachoma prevention brigade sent to the Altay alpine regions after the triumph of October states that the many cases of incurable blindness among the Altay people "indicates an extreme shortage or,

more precisely, a total lack" of medical care for the population. "Culture," the document stressed, "has not touched the natives at all: They live like primitive men. The farms are in ruins and the children are totally naked in some settlements.... They suffer in silence and go blind in silence." There were two wooden plows, one harrow and 15 hand plows for 100 farms here. The main conclusion of the document is that the inhabitants of the Altay alpine region needed education and medical assistance; the activities of the first physicians and teachers would prove to the Altay mountain dwellers that "they have not been forgotten by the working people, who will send them as much help as they can.

Now this zone is an autonomous oblast with developed mining, logging and food industries. The recent nomads now make up a strong working class. There is a pedagogical institute here, five other specialized academic institutions and a local intelligentsia. Kolkhozes and sovkhozes have irrigated land, where they grow abundant harvests. The number of specialists in various fields has reached 12,000. Disease, poverty and ignorance are recalled as evils of the past, as a horrible nightmare which will never come back.

The same kind of progress has been evident in the development of other national regions in Siberia. This can be seen in the indicators of economic growth, social welfare and the public standard of living. But the dynamics of general development can also be seen in examples of individual human lifes.

In the Yakut ASSR there is a settlement far from the large centers--the village of Ullahan-Chistay. A Yakut woman, D. Koryakina, is the head of a reindeer-breeding brigade on the local Iskra Sovkhoz. Just as many other Soviet women who have borne and raised at least ten children, she has been given the honorary title of "Heroine-Mother." Here is what she says about herself and her family: "I gave birth to 11 children. The Soviet regime has helped me to raise them to be healthy, strong and educated. The oldest, Gavriil, graduated from the Institute imeni Gertsen in Leningrad, Volodya trained to be a pilot, Faina became a doctor and now treats the reindeer breeders on our sovkhoz, Dima works as a hunter for the fur trade just like his father, Kolya works as a herdsman in my brigade and Zina is working as an orderly at the local hospital and hopes to attend an institute. And the rest are still in school."[13]

When representatives of the Soviet regime began to come to the nomad camp, D. Koryakina recalls, the Yakuts would say: These are Lenin's people. "We still have little understanding of what was going on," the woman says about those years long ago, "but we sensed that the mountains separating us from people, from Russia, were becoming lower, and it was becoming easier to breathe."

Again, comparisons unavoidably come to mind. News correspondent W. Guilder of the NEW YORK HERALD, who made a trip through Siberia in search of the American expeditionary vessel "Jeannete," which was commanded by Captain

DeLong, wrote the following at the end of the last century: "One can only make friends with the Yakuts by beating them." This approach reflected the slaveholder's attitude towards negroes, the war to exterminate the Indian population and the system for the ruthless exploitation of the Alaskan Eskimos, echoes of which are still present in the practice of making decisions on ethnic issues in the United States.

As for the Yakut ASSR today, this is a flourishing autonomous Soviet socialist republic. A third of the population is enrolled in republic schools, tekhnikums and VUZ's. For every 10,000 inhabitants of this region with a once totally illiterate population there are now 105 VUZ's students. This is a much higher percentage than in many developed countries of the West.

Tremendous changes in the life of the native population are taking place in zones of the active working of oil and gas deposits in North Siberia. The local population--Khanty, Mansi and Evenks--is not being left out of this work. More and more people are becoming involved in industrial labor in addition to the traditional crafts and pursuits, which have retained all of their significance. Young men and women in the North are enrolling in vocational and technical institutes and the industrial institute in Tyumen'. Many student slots with relaxed admission requirements are reserved each year for the children of native ethnic groups. Some of them become workers on the oil and gas pipeline routes.

Particularly significant changes are taking place in settlements located in oil and gas production zones. The network of schools, hospitals and clubs is growing here. Great care is taken to ensure that all children are covered by the educational system. A PRAVDA correspondent, B. Strel'nikov, included in one of his reports the following statement by a helicopter pilot working in the Surgut region: "At the end of August we fly from lake to lake, from hut to hut, picking up all of the Khanty and Mansi children to take them to boarding school. We cannot forget a single one. This would be a colossal error."

Naturally, life does not change immediately. But there was a radical, qualitative change at the time of the victory of the October Revolution.

If we look into the past, 40-50 years back for instance, we can clearly see the social changes brought about by the Soviet regime. In November 1936, a man named Karelin, the chairman of a rural soviet in the Narym region, spoke at a meeting of the Third Extraordinary Congress of Soviets of West Siberia. His speech was the testimony of a man who could compare, on the basis of his own experience, the prerevolutionary past with the present and thoughts about the future.

Here is what he said: "What was life like under capitalism in Narym? It was very bad. There was no culture or literacy. There was only the merchant who arrived to rob the natives. These merchants arrived twice a year and took valuable furs. They paid 15-17 kopecks for a squirrel

skin. Their own goods were high-priced. If the merchant had to travel 10-15 versts, he would add on a kopeck or two for each couple of feet. This added up to high prices. The prices of flour and sugar were particularly inflated. How much sugar did the strong hunters and the prosperous inhabitants buy? Around 2 or 3 pounds a year. This is what life was like. We only had two people who were literate, and they were only able to write because they had been trained for the priesthood. They imposed a tax on us--the yasak. If one of the poor could not pay the tax, he was sent to the merchants to work for them for 1 or 2 years. Entire nomad camps and entire villages would die. But now we have a hospital. Instead of a church, we have a boarding school. There are no more illiterates, they are studying in tekhnikums and VUZ's. Several people have graduated from the Leningrad Institute of the People of the North. In the past, we did not know anything about growing vegetables. The people had to be taught to do this. Now our own seeds are sufficient to plant all of the vegetables--turnips, carrots, cabbage and potatoes--necessary for human health. This is how our life has improved. We owe all of this to the party and government policy of restoring the local population, about whom it was previously said that this native population was becoming extinct, that it had come to an end, that it would be impossible for these people to be anything other than ignorant and backward, and so forth."

Cultural development coexists with a high standard of living in the small ethnic groups inhabiting Siberia. Prominent party worker and researcher V. N. Uvachan cited the following statistics in his book "Narody Severa v usloviyakh razvitogo sotsializma" [The People of the North Under the Conditions of Developed Socialism]: In 1974, the average wage of workers and employees in Krasnoyarskiy Kray was 172 rubles, while the average wage on sovkhozes in Evenk was 214 rubles, and the wage of reindeer herders (one of the main Evenk lines of work) was 280 rubles a month. The people living in the northern national districts enjoyed all of the benefits established for workers and employees in the Far North. These are wage differentials, seniority raises and longer vacations. It is indicative that commodity turnover, the per capita value of commodities, is approximately one-fifth higher here than in other parts of the nation.

The high standard of living, material prosperity and well-organized system of health care have made large families the rule here rather than a rarity. For example, in the Autonomous Republic of Tuva with its relatively small population, there are 1,100 heroine-mothers and over 17,000 women with at least five children.

The comprehensive development of the Siberian people is based on a solid foundation. This foundation is the Soviet socialist order and the strong friendship binding the peoples of the USSR.

Many years ago, V. I. Lenin made the following reply to a question about the particular conditions under which backward people could avoid the agonizing course of capitalist development: "If the revolutionary triumphant

proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among these people, and if the Soviet Government comes to their aid with all of the resources at its disposal, it would be wrong to assume that backward ethnic groups would have to go through the capitalist stage of development."[14]

A monument, depicting two Soviet soldiers--a Russian and a Khakas--which was erected several years ago in Abakan, the center of Khakasskaya Autonomoust Oblast, is deeply symbolic. Both of them are rushing forward, seized by the same impulse, just as they rushed to victory together as fighters of the multinational Soviet Union in the struggle against the fascist hordes.

The great fraternity of peoples has been forged in the Soviet Union during the years of socialist rule. This fraternity was an important force, ensuring the speedy and thorough development of Siberia over a relatively short period of time. It was no coincidence, and it was just as profoundly symbolic, that the first radiogram sent from northern Tyumen' about the discovery of oil was worded in Russian and in the language of Azerbaijan. Representatives of various republics took part in these explorations. And the title of the richest oil region passed from Azerbaijan to the Tatar ASSR, then to the Bashkir ASSR and finally to Siberia.

Many of the achievements of Siberian national republics, oblasts and districts have truly become part of world culture. The artistry of the stars of the opera and ballet theater in Ulan-Ude--the capital of the Buryat ASSR--is renowned far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. The Koryak National Troupe, Mengo, has performed on the stages of various theaters in the world. Literary works by such remarkable writers as Buryat Nikolay Damdinov, Chukchi Yuriy Rytkheu, Mansi Yuvan Shestalov, Nivkhky Vladimir Sangi and other poets and prose writers, representatives of the native people of Siberia who have come from the depths of this taiga region, have been published in many languages abroad.

Under the influence of the current cultural achievements of the Siberian people, the cultural heritage of the past is being reassessed. Researchers are discovering more and more highly artistic works. In 1978, for example, a group of French ethnographers made a special trip to Ulan-Ude, the Buryat capital, to work on a French translation of the Buryat hero epic "Geser." This epic tale, which has been passed down from one generation to another, has preserved a wonderful story about the exploits of a legendary national hero.

The planned, dynamic development of previously backward outlying districts and the elevation of the contemporary civilization of people, who were doomed to extinction not long ago, to the point of the highest achievements, can all be regarded as a domestic matter of the Soviet nation. In our era, however, now that the indivisibility of the world is taking the form of countless ties connecting various nations and peoples, life in Siberia, just as in other parts of the USSR, is the object of close attention for people far from the Soviet borders.

The rapid development of the Siberian economy and culture and the national rebirth of its people demonstrate the tremendous potential of socialism, which has turned a cold and deserted taiga region into a flourishing territory, and prove how quickly this order is able, with the aid of planned social production, to restore productive forces and place them at man's service.

The development of Siberia proves that it is not enough to have natural resources; it is also important that they serve the interests of the working people. This is setting an example for many groups in the developing countries, which are striving to put their own natural wealth at the service of national rebirth.

The development of Siberia demonstrates the strength of the international solidarity of people, united by the great doctrine of Marxism-Leninism and a desire to build a society with the following grand objectives inscribed on its banner: Peace, Labor, Freedom, Equality, Fraternity and Happiness for all people.

As an organic part of the nation of soviets, Siberia is ruled by the common interests of the entire state. This applies not only to the objective of building a new society, but also the guarantee of favorable peaceful conditions for its development.

During his tour of Siberia and Far East in the spring of 1978, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev noted the high moral qualities and deep patriotic feelings of the Soviet people who live and work on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. In reference to the workers of Komsomol'sk-on-Amur, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stressed: "Knowing full well that their city is located in a border region, they are working with the greatest persistence, sparing no effort, energy or knowledge on behalf of the noble goal of the stronger economic and defense might of the Far Eastern frontiers of their socialist fatherland; they are selflessly assuming labor duties, displaying a high degree of political vigilance, responsibility and organizational ability." These words naturally apply completely to inhabitants of other krays, oblasts and autonomous republics in Soviet Siberia and the Far East.

The international solidarity of the Siberians and their desire to promote the cause of peace are taking many forms. They were guided by these feelings when they named various geographic locations, stations, and settlements after the Soviet Union's foreign friends. There is a touching sign sign of these feelings in the names given to the unique diamonds found in the city of Mirnyy, such as the Unita diamond, named in honor of the Italian communist newspaper, and the Allende diamond, named after the hero of the Chilean people.

Their concern for the fate of the world is expressed by the Siberians, just as by all other Soviet people, in their desire to take a direct part in measures intended to promote stronger international detente. Participation--individual and group--in financing the Soviet Peace Foundation is now

widespread, for example, a festival of political songs was organized in the Academic Village near Novosibirsk, including ensembles and soloists from several Siberian cities. The proceeds of this festival were deposited in the Soviet Peace Foundation. The foundation received a letter from tekhnikum students in the settlement of Shushenskoyi, where V. I. Lenin spent his Sibierian exile during the years of tsarism. They wrote: "We are sending you our latest contribution of 250 rubles, collected by students in the agronomy department. We are striving to live and study in the Leninist manner, and we want to become real internationalists."

Many BAM collectives and builders are active members of the Peace Foundation. And it is no coincidence that one of the celebrated organizations involved in the project, the Angarstroy Organization, was awarded an honorary certificate of the Soviet Peace Foundation. This is how the contribution of the BAM builders to the great job of consolidating peace was recognized. It is in this area that the general and individual interests of the Soviet citizens merge.

In their concern for lasting peace, the Siberians, along with the rest of the Soviet people, are keeping a watchful eye on international developments and reacting vigorously to current events. Just as the rest of the Soviet Union, the cities and rural villages of Siberia have been swept by a mighty wave of protest against the treacherous behavior of the Chinese aggressors, who have interfered in the peaceful labor of the people of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Speaking at a mass-meeting in Chitinskaya Oblast, dispatcher I. Voytenko, for example, declared: "In the last war, I suffered all of its torments, and now that the Maoists are inciting a new world war, I resolutely protest the Chinese aggression, I totally support the announcement of the Soviet Government and I call upon you, comrades, to work even better and strengthen the might of our powerful nation--the invincible stronghold of peace on our planet."

"We instructors, researchers and students of the Technological Institute in Ulan-Ude," noted other participants in this broad protest movement, "condemn the Beijing aggressors and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam. We are adding our voices to the protests of all progressive mankind."

"We are keeping an eye on the development of events in Indochina with profound apprehension," workers from the seaport of Vanino wrote to PRAVDA newspaper. "We have sent off a number of motor ships with cargo for our Vietnamese friends. We assure you that we will continue to put all our effort into this work. Let the aggressors remember that we have always been on the side of socialist Vietnam."

Therefore, the workers of Siberia, who are developing their own region, building new cities, plowing virgin land and laying railroads and pipelines, have the same concerns as all other Soviet people in the multinational Soviet family. They are making their material and spiritual contribution to the progress of mankind. This contribution will continue to grow as

the influence of the Soviet Union and of peaceful socialism on the world increases dynamically.

FOOTNOTES

1. IZVESTIYA, 4 October 1976.
2. PRAVDA, 24 January 1979.
3. Ibid., 16 February 1979.
4. IZVESTIYA, 25 December 1976.
5. SOVETSKIY EKSPORT, 1978, No 6, p 78.
6. PRAVDA, 7 June 1977.
7. Ibid., 14 August 1976.
8. IZVESTIYA, 21 June 1978.
9. PRAVDA, 29 July 1976.
10. Ibid., 9 January 1979.
11. AMERIKA, 1976, No 235, p 28.
12. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 43, p 228.
13. Quoted in IZVESTIYA, 6 March 1977.
14. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 41, p 246.

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CHINA AND WESTERN EUROPE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979, pp 91-105

[Article by S. G. Yurkov]

[Text] The policy of China's top rulers toward Western Europe stems from Beijing's general foreign policy objectives and internal needs. Counting on a war between the USSR and the United States, and between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact states, the Chinese leaders are making every effort to interfere with the process of detente in Europe and to return this continent to the days of the cold war. At the same time, the Chinese authorities are exaggerating the myth of the "Soviet threat" and emphasizing the common interests of China and the Western European countries in an attempt to win the assistance and support of these countries in the accomlishment of the "four modernizations" in China, mainly for the purpose of creating powerful military potential, with the aid of which they will be able to attain their aggressive hegemonistic goals.

Opposition to Detente in Europe

Beijing is actively opposing the efforts of the nations of the socialist community to achieve European regulation, to establish the proper prerequisites for the creation of a system of collective security in Europe and to develop cooperation by the nations of the continent. For example, Chinese propaganda called the decisions of a meeting of representatives of communist and workers parties in Karlovy Vary (April 1967) an attempt to "put together a counterrevolutionary 'holy alliance,' to stifle the revolutionary movement in Europe and to stabilize the situation in the capitalist world."[1] This statement against the program for European regulation was "justified" by demagogic and slanderous talk about the desire of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to "make use of an anti-Chinese, anticommunist and anti-people combination in the future."[2]

The Chinese leadership has made a great effort to denigrate the very idea of convening an all-European conference on security and cooperation, which was proposed by the Soviet Union and its allies--the socialist states. In 1969, Vice Premier Li Xiannian of the PRC State Council called the initiative of the socialist countries an attempt to "share a sphere of influence with American imperialism and to control and enslave Eastern

Europe." Beijing tried to keep the all-European conference from being convened by slanderously calling it a "conference on insecurity in Europe," as it was described, for example, by the head of the PRC delegation at the 27th session of the UN General Assembly in 1972.

When the 24th CPSU Congress' Program of Peace was being implemented, several bilateral agreements between future participants in the all-European conference, belonging to different socioeconomic systems, set forth such principles as the inviolability of boundaries and the complete exclusion of territorial claims by one state on another; the avoidance of force or threats of force and the resolution of intergovernmental disputes exclusively by peaceful political means; peaceful coexistence by states of the two social systems and so forth. The next step consisted in reinforcing these principles with international law on a multilateral, all-European basis. This is what irritated the Maoists, as it undermined Beijing's position even more in its attempts to stir up territorial disputes in Europe and beyond its boundaries for provocative purposes and for the escalation of tension. As early as 1964, in a conversation with a group of Japanese socialists, Mao Zedong frankly expressed doubts about the boundaries that had taken shape in Europe as a result of World War II and advocated their modification. In December 1969, RENMIN RIBAO expressed regrets that the idea of European security was aimed at the "preservation of the status quo in Europe."

This was one of the main reasons for Beijing's attacks on the treaty between the USSR and FRG, which contains, in particular, a provision concerning the compulsory recognition, on the international legal level, of existing boundaries in Europe, particularly the Oder-Neisse line and the boundary between the GDR and FRG. An article in RENMIN RIBAO implied that this treaty was a "betrayal of the interests of the German people, the Soviet people and all the European people," "the grandest of frauds," "the encouragement of West German militarism"[3] and so forth. Beijing's "assessment" of the quadrilateral agreement on West Berlin was similar.[4]

Taking a negative stand on the treaties of the USSR, Poland and CSSR with the FRG, the treaty between the GDR and FRG and the quadrilateral agreement on West Berlin, the Chinese leadership, having failed in its attempts to undermine them, began to search for new issues to complicate relations between the socialist countries and the FRG and to set up new obstacles in the way of the international legal reinforcement of the principle of the inviolability of boundaries. The Maoists stressed that the division of Germany was "abnormal," playing up to those who advocate a "single German nation." In October 1972, PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei said at a reception in honor of W. Scheel, who was then FRG foreign minister: "Although it has been 27 years since the end of World War II, a peace treaty has not been signed with Germany, and the two German states are still existing under abnormal conditions." The thesis of the "single German nation," which is supposedly personified by West Germany, was expressed by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council when H. Kohl, leader of the West German opposition, came to Beijing at the beginning of September 1974.

Beijing understood that the presence of certain forces in the FRG and in the West which believed that the German problem is "unresolved" indicates the possibility of an explosive situation, which could sharply escalate international tension, and this would be in line with Beijing's long-range antisocialist strategy. The Maoists have tried to stimulate the activities of overtly revanchist circles in West Germany, demanding the revision of the results of World War II, particularly the postwar boundaries in Europe, and have assured these circles of support for their hope of restoring the German empire with its 1937 boundaries. "While FRG circles living in the past are stubbornly disputing the reality of the existence of two sovereign German states that are independent of one another," stressed General Secretary E. Honocker of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] Central Committee, "the Chinese leaders are taking up revanchist slogans concerning the so-called future existence of the 'single German nation,' the alleged 'need to conclude a peace treaty with Germany' and the need to 'reunite the German people.' Beijing is singing in unison with those who would like to 'keep the German question open' so that it can be used as a fuse for new conflicts in Europe."[5]

China intensified the process of establishing diplomatic relations with the particular Western European states with which it did not have such relations. Relations were established with Austria, Belgium and Iceland in 1971, with Greece, Luxemburg, Malta and the FRG in 1972, and with Spain in 1973. Diplomatic agencies in England and Holland were elevated to embassy status in 1972.

The Chinese leadership's turnabout in the direction of rapprochement with Western Europe went far beyond the boundaries of the conventional process by which intergovernmental relations are developed between countries. Whereas Beijing once regarded Western Europe as "an object of U.S. oppression" and then began to equate the policies of the United States and USSR, since 1970 its efforts have been concentrated only on bringing about a confrontation between Western Europe and the USSR. Naturally, as always, the Beijing rulers have overestimated their own capabilities in this area.

The Beijing leaders now advocate the preservation of the U.S. military presence in Europe and the reinforcement of Western Europe's military alliance with the United States. The desirability of the retention of American troops in Europe was unequivocally stated by Zhou Enlai in July 1972 when he met with American Senators H. Boggs and G. Ford.

In an attempt to substantiate the thesis concerning the need for Soviet "containment" in the West, Chinese rulers, with the clumsiness characteristic of the Maoists, sometimes make allusions to the "threat to China from the North." The theme of the "Soviet menace" has been present in all of the Chinese leaders' talks with representatives of the Western countries. The Chinese leaders have alleged that detente between East and West would "bring Soviet troops to the northern boundary of China" and even cause them to deliver a "preventive strike." When none of these phony stories were taken seriously in the Western European countries, Zhou Enlai, obviously losing his self-control, reproached them, saying that "the West

only thinks about how Soviet revisionism might be turned against the East, how this evil might be turned against China, so that there will be peace and quiet in the West."[6]

The Beijing leaders became so confused in their fabrications that they made new allegations each day, forgetting what they had said yesterday. At first the Beijing leaders asserted that the Soviet Union was "threatening" China, then they said that it was preparing to "attack in two directions"--China and Western Europe--and, finally, the Maoists began to say that the USSR was "more of a threat to Western Europe than to China."[7]

The Maoists warned the capitalist nations of the need to be "strong" and "vigilant" and advised them against the acceptance of any socialist proposals aimed at detente on the European continent. According to a report in the English TIMES, Deng Xiaoping informed a delegation of West Germany youths, who visited the PRC in April 1974, that "war in Europe is inevitable" and that "it has only been temporarily postponed."[8] In May 1975, Deng Xiaoping went to France to learn more about attitudes in Western Europe, and also to complicate the convening of an all-European conference. His statements about the situation in Europe, which were made in an anti-Soviet tone, were not supported by his listeners; the French Government reaffirmed its course toward detente in Europe.

The Chinese leaders saw the transformation of Western Europe into a self-sufficient political, economic and military entity as an alternative to all-European cooperation. Taking out the reactionary slogan of "Europe for the Europeans,"[9] they upheld the thesis of certain circles in the West concerning the "creation of a Europe for the Europeans, independent of the two superpowers--the United States and the Soviet Union,"[10] and thereby hoped to set up some European states against others.

The hope of preserving European discord was also the motive for Beijing's proposals concerning the creation of micro-European associations and various groups such as the "Mediterranean alliance," the "Balkan group" and so forth. The attempts to create a Balkan quasibloc were frustrated by Bulgaria; Beijing could not find a common language with Albania either, and it eventually broke off ties with China.

Acting on motives hostile to the socialist community, Beijing changed its criticizing attitude toward the EEC. "The Common Market, as the first step toward European independence, is probably a positive feature," said the premier of the PRC State Council at the end of 1971.[11] It is probable that Beijing was more concerned than anyplace else in the world about whether England would or would not become a member of the EEC. "The new situation in Western Europe," wrote the BEIJING REVIEW in reference to England's entry into the EEC, "represents a serious obstacle for the United States and the Soviet Union, impeding their policy of hegemony in Europe." In a Western Europe "united" around the Common Market, the Chinese leaders wanted to see a force opposing the USSR and the socialist countries, a lever with the aid of which the struggle to improve the atmosphere in Europe and the rest of the world could be undermined.

When the Beijing top rulers suddenly became admirers of the EEC, they tried to keep the Common Market countries from developing mutually beneficial cooperation with the socialist states. Reporting that China would soon recognize the EEC, the Yugoslavian newspaper POLITIKA stated that it would do this "in the hope of using the EEC as a counterbalance" to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese authorities, in their characteristic manner, implied to the Western European countries that Europe would not attain its goals if it limited itself to cooperation only in the economic and political spheres, and that the "tendency toward stronger cooperation and unity in Western Europe" should extend to the military sphere as well. In October 1973, Zhou Enlai frankly said that "NATO and Western Europe should remain strong," declaring that NATO was "a defensive alliance against the now aggressive Warsaw Pact." When English Conservative leader Heath visited the PRC in May 1974, Zhou Enlai advised him to hurry with the "joint organization of Western European defense within the NATO framework."[12] "The philosophy of Chinese foreign policy is grossly simple," remarked the West German newspaper NEUF REINZEITUNG. "Anything good for the Russians is bad, and anything that is bad for them is good. Therefore, according to this formula, NATO is good."

The successful conclusion of the all-European forum signified the complete failure of the efforts ob Beijing leaders. The Maoist leadership responded with a more intensive subversive propaganda campaign, hoping to denigrate the results of the conference, arouse skeptical feelings in the European and world public about the new prospects and prevent the further spread of detente on the basis of the decisions made in Helsinki. RENMIN RIBAO asserted: "What the Soviet Union needs is not security and cooperation in Europe, but a document which will make it easy for it to conceal its plans for aggression and expansion...and plans for the establishment of hegemony in Europe."[13] Beijing propaganda alleged that the Final Act was not legally binding, that it was no more than a "meaningless paper," "pulp literature" and a "fictitious document," and that the conference on security (the name of the conference is invariably enclosed in quotation marks by the Chinese) could therefore give Europe only the illusion of security, "security on paper."[14]

The main target was the list of ten principles, by which the signatories promised to be guided in mutual relations. Chinese propaganda did not wish to openly deny these principles, but it attempted to belittle the significance of the very acceptance of these principles as the fundamentals of an intergovernmental "code of behavior." In Beijing's view, the inclusion of these principles in the Final Act was "gratuitous," since, as the Chinese said, their fulfillment was already part of compliance with the UN Charter.[15] Instead of drawing up principles, the Maoists lectured, the conference should have discussed the "fierce battle between the superpowers in Europe and the rest of the world."

The Chinese leadership's most blatant attacks were reserved for the principle of the inviolability of boundaries--the cardinal principle in the prevention of war in Europe, which reinforced, in the interest of peace, the results of the victory over fascism in World War II. The adoption of this principle dealt the most severe blow to militaristic revanchist forces with their dreams about the resurrection of the "German Reich" in its pre-war boundaries, and to those who hoped to use these forces for the escalation of tension in Europe. This enraged the Maoists. Beijing declared that the inclusion of this principle in the Final Act allegedly reinforced the transformation of Eastern Europe into a Soviet "sphere of influence" and "sphere of dominion."[16] This view was interpreted as a direct attack on the socialist community, attesting to the Chinese leadership's contempt for the principles of socialist internationalism.

In addition to attacking the principle of the inviolability of boundaries, Beijing also objected to the fact that the Final Act left open the possibility of changing boundaries by peaceful means, through negotiations. According to Chinese propaganda, this would also allow the "superpowers" to "take whatever they want and continue their squabble over Europe."[17] Representatives of both the West and the East, however, said at the conference that the implementation of the principles proclaimed in the Final Act would guarantee lasting peace on the continent. "By observing these principles, we can drive war and armed conflict out of our continent," said J. Kadar, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, in his speech in Helsinki.

Beijing's extremely hostile attitude toward the possibility of deeper detente in Europe was due to, among other factors, the fear that the "spirit of Helsinki" might have a favorable effect on the resolution of security problems in other parts of the world, particularly Asia.

The 'Four Modernizations' and Plans for Western Europe

Ever since the all-European conference and, in particular, ever since the new leadership took power in China, Beijing has tried, on the one hand, to sow the seeds of suspicion in Western Europe in regard to the USSR's intentions, to stimulate the arms race and to prevent the conclusion of agreements aimed at detente between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact states and, on the other hand, to maximally expand opportunities for the use of Western European credit, to acquire modern technology and to purchase new types of weapons.

During the course of the struggle in the Chinese leadership after the death of Mao Zedong, the upper hand was taken more and more frequently by those who proposed that all previous demagogic declarations be renounced and that China turn to the developed capitalist countries for large loans, agree to the construction of enterprises on a compensatory basis, acquire all progressive technology within reach, send thousands of Chinese to

school in the capitalist countries and invite foreign specialists to the PRC. Vice Premiers of the State Council Deng Xiaoping, Gu Mu and Fang Yi and Ministers Li Qiang and Huang Hua were sent to the developed capitalist countries, where they began to discuss their fantastic plans for construction and their tremendous opportunities for the profitable investment of capital. In the hope of gaining from economic ties with the PRC and of simultaneously using China as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Western European monopolies began to speedily offer China credit, economic deals and so forth. To a considerable degree, it was under the influence of these factors that ruling circles in the NATO countries, with the probable exception of the FRG and, to some extent, France, took a tolerant stand in regard to China's aggression against Vietnam, while some circles even anticipated a military conflict between the USSR and the PRC.

Country		1970	1975	1976	1977
Western Europe	Turnover	1,892.9	5,656.4	5,032.2	5,205.2
	Exports	649.4	2,040.4	2,196.6	2,285.4
	Imports	1,243.5	3,616.0	2,835.6	2,919.8
FRG	Turnover	226.5	541.5	671.6	588.0
	Exports	76.0	162.5	202.9	210.0
	Imports	150.5	379.0	468.7	378.0
England	Turnover	168.7	220.9	212.6	213.0
	Exports	72.4	93.9	119.2	133.4
	Imports	96.3	127.0	93.4	79.6
France	Turnover	136.9	396.6	402.3	213.0
	Exports	63.6	125.0	147.5	143.0
	Imports	73.4	271.6	254.8	70.0
Italy	Turnover	108.3	201.4	215.1	173.0
	Exports	56.9	94.3	119.2	114.0
	Imports	51.4	107.1	95.9	59.0

In 1977 the volume of PRC trade with the Western European countries began to grow. The dynamics of trade can be traced in the table (in millions of rubles).

In 1978 the volume of Chinese trade with several Western European countries grew and amounted to the following: 867 million rubles with the FRG (over 233 million in exports and over 633 million in imports), 267 million with England (133.5 in exports and 133.5 in imports), 294 million with France (154 in exports and 140 in imports), and 300 million with Italy (133.5 in exports and 166.5 in imports).

The PRC purchases metal-cutting tools, electrical equipment, equipment for the mining industry, control and measurement devices, ships and rolled steel products, paying for them with the products of agriculture and the mining industry.

A veritable pilgrimage of delegations has been witnessed: 71 Chinese delegations came to the Western European countries in 1977 and 188 came in 1978, while the respective figures for delegations from Western Europe visiting China were 233 and 307.

In an attempt to gain broader opportunities for trade and economic cooperation, Beijing has been working on rapprochement with the European Economic Community for a long time. The Western European monopolies, in turn, want to obtain economic privileges in China. On 3 April 1978, an agreement between China and the Common Market was concluded in Brussels. This agreement, signed for 5 years, envisages, in particular, the extension of most-favored-nation terms by each side to the other and the creation of a joint commission to verify the fulfillment of the agreement, investigate all problems that might arise and work out recommendations. One important and advantageous point for the EEC is the provision included in the agreement for the "benevolent" attitude of the PRC toward imported goods from the EEC countries; in exchange for this, the Common Market vaguely promised that it "will strive for the ever-broader liberalization" of imports of goods from China through the gradual augmentation of the list of commodities imported from the PRC and the expansion of their assortment. An analysis of the agreement shows that Beijing was unable to include one provision mentioned during the negotiations--concerning the creation of a "corrective mechanism" (for the purpose of decreasing or reducing a negative balance of payments in trade with the EEC) and the categorization of the PRC as a developing country, which would have given it a few additional privileges. The EEC insisted on a protective clause; it states that, in cases of dire necessity, the sides can "take measures to limit or reduce imports of goods."

During the EEC delegation's trip to China, an agreement was reached on questions connected with the opening of representative agencies of the Common Market and Western European firms in Beijing and on the organization of the first session of the Joint Trade and Economic Commission in the PRC. The delegation of the "big nine" expressed an interest in acquiring Chinese uranium, titanium and nonferrous metals. Beijing insisted on expanded deliveries of its textile goods to the markets of the nations belonging to the community. Hua Guofeng, according to reports in the West German press, expressed "misgivings," in a conversation with EEC Vice President Haferkamp, over the security of oil and raw material transport routes to Western Europe and called for united efforts to deter the "Soviet penetration" of Africa and the Middle East.

On 21-24 February 1979, despite the fact that China was then carrying out its aggression against Vietnam, EEC Commission Chairman R. Jenkins was staying in the PRC as a guest. The discussion at this time touched upon a broad group of political and economic problems and an agreement was reached on the creation of a joint committee to oversee the fulfillment of the agreement between the Common Market and China and the elaboration of recommendations on the development of trade. Soon, however, difficulties arose in connection with restrictions imposed by the Common Market

on imports of Chinese textiles, and this slowed down the entire process of building up relations between the EEC and PRC.

Beijing was placing the greatest hopes in the FRG. In the expectation that rightist forces would soon take power in the FRG, the Chinese leaders twice (in January and September 1975) invited Strauss to China, but these visits were of little benefit: The former Bonn minister could only criticize the government, but did not have any real political influence. After W. Brandt had resigned the chancellorship in May 1974, Beijing made a persistent effort to achieve a closer relationship with the FRG Government. It energetically worked toward a China visit by Chancellor H. Schmidt. On the day the chancellor arrived in Beijing, RENMIN RIBAO reported that the conference on security and cooperation was a "conference on danger" and that "a new stage of detente had not begun, but, on the contrary, the danger of a new world war is increasing." Playing up to the revanchist feelings of some forces in the FRG, the newspaper also expressed support for "objections to the perpetuation of the division of the German nation."[18] Deng Xiaoping, as the main Chinese figure who talked with the chancellor, spoke constantly about the inevitability of a new world war and insisted on the "multiplication of NATO forces"; Mao Zedong predicted a war with the Soviet Union in the next 10 years if the Western European states did not unite.[19]

The Schmidt Government expressed no desire to associate itself with the Chinese leadership's adventuristic policy. Officials in Beijing were irritated by the chancellor's remarks in favor of the creation of an atmosphere of trust and detente in Europe and his positive comments on the FRG's treaties and agreements with the USSR and other socialist states. This is why the Chinese leaders received A. Dregger and W. Marx, representatives of the opposition bloc, with such pomp in February 1976. At a reception, then PRC Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua spoke in favor again of the "unification of the German nation," called upon the Western European countries to unite and praised the West German revanchists and neo-Nazi.[20]

Trade and economic ties between the two countries, however, were expanded. In September 1978, Chairman Hüffnagel of the Eastern Committee of German Industry in the FRG (he is also the president of the West German heavy machine-building association) signed a protocol in Beijing, in accordance with which a large set of orders for the construction of coal industry enterprises in the PRC were to be turned over to the West Germans. The cost of the planned transactions would come to around 8 billion marks. The protocol offered West German firms an opportunity to deliver equipment and render assistance in the construction of two open-pit coal mines in the PRC (each with production capacity of 20 million tons of coal a year), five underground mines with a total output of 23 million tons of coal a year and a large factory for the manufacture of mining equipment, and to enlarge and modernize an existing mine (with a view to increasing its production capacity to 22 million tons of coal a year) and seven mining equipment factories. The agreements specified in

the protocol (it is also called a "framework agreement") will only be legally binding after the proper contracts have been signed with FRG firms.

The reports of the possibility of receiving orders for the construction of a large metallurgical combine with a projected capacity of up to 10 million tons of steel a year in the province of Hebei aroused a noticeably livelier response in West German business circles. As Chairman of the Board Weiss of the Schleman-Siemag firm announced on 12 September 1978, Beijing had proposed that his company organize a consortium of firms and quickly submit the plans for the construction of such an enterprise. Similar proposals, according to reports in the West German press, were made to the French and the English. The consortium headed by Schleman-Siemag included such concerns as Gutehoffnungshutte-Shterkrade (fulfilling the metallurgical part of the project), Siemens (electrical equipment) and Thyssen (all auxiliary and ancillary enterprises and the training of specialists). Specifically, the project envisages the erection of a metallurgical combine with its production process ranging from the blast smelting of steel to the output of the finished product (primarily sheet metal) and the construction of several enterprises which will ensure the normal operation of the plant, including a 1 million-kilowatt electric power station. The first section of the enterprise should be ready for operation before 1985.

At the request of Beijing, the Dresdner Bank organized a consortium of banks, which plan to extend a large loan for a period of 10 years to finance the construction of this combine. The FRG press has stated that the Chinese payments on the loan, in the event that the credit is extended, will total around 28 billion marks (including interest).

Explaining the attitude of the FRG Government toward these major transactions with China, Chancellor H. Schmidt made the following remarks in a SUDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG interview in the middle of October 1978: "We have no intention of using diplomatic relations with the PRC as some kind of auxiliary instrument in the development of German-Soviet relations. From the geographic standpoint, the USSR is our next-door neighbor. In the political and military sense, it is also our next-door neighbor and an exceedingly important factor in world politics. I said the same thing in Tokyo that I have repeatedly and openly said in Bonn: The federal government cannot feel bound by the present exacerbation of differences between Moscow and Beijing." In response to a question concerning the "comparability of the Bonn idea of detente with the Beijing thesis concerning the inevitability of a new world war," the chancellor said, during the course of talks with top PRC officials, "We have always objected to their statements about the inevitability of a third world war.... I believe that this thesis is false, and even dangerous."

The Chinese leadership has persistently sounded out the possibilities for purchasing weapons in the FRG. Chancellor H. Schmidt said the following in this connection: "One of the principles of our foreign policy is the

refusal to deliver weapons to any country outside the NATO bloc. We have no intention of changing our views on this question."[21]

The FRG Government and Chancellor H. Schmidt personally had an extremely criticizing attitude toward China's attack on Vietnam, and this received extensive press coverage. "Beijing is playing with fire," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE commented on 23 February 1979. "China is still far from a realization of how a great power should act," STUTTGARTER ZEITUNG remarked the same day. "This week it has shown the world how dangerous it is to conclude close pacts with Beijing." The statements made by Chinese leaders, that the aggression against Vietnam was no more than a "limited action," were described by Chairman H. Wehner of the SPD Bundestag faction as "provocation which could be fatal for both sides."[22]

When the Tories came to power in England in the spring of 1979,* they were obviously in a hurry to sell military equipment to Beijing, particularly the vertical-takeoff Harrier fighter plane. They are nurturing the illusion that this kind of transaction would give London a stronger position in the Chinese market and simultaneously give it some opportunity to play the "Chinese card." It is indicative, however, that no other Western European country has followed England's example as yet, and several prominent politicians in Great Britain itself are sharply criticizing the government's intentions in this matter.

Beijing is trying to exert influence on France. In May 1975, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping of the PRC State Council visited France, accompanied by Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua. Paris dissociated itself from the PRC course of opposing detente and international cooperation. After a meeting with Deng, President Giscard d'Estaing declared that he did not agree with the Chinese opinion concerning the "Soviet threat" to Western Europe. The Chinese leaders were also unable to impose their views of the state of affairs in Europe on French Minister of Foreign Affairs J. Sauvagnargues, who visited China in November 1975.

The new Chinese leadership, suggesting all the old theses about the "threat" to Western Europe to Paris, began to expand military and economic ties with France. When Guy Mery, chief of the general staff of the French Armed Forces, visited China in July 1976, the Beijing rulers raised the question of broader military ties with France. In September, when this visit was followed by a reciprocal visit to France by a Chinese delegation, headed by Yang Chengwu, deputy chief of staff of the Chinese Armed Forces, the delegation toured military facilities and saw several types of new weapons. In October 1977, Minister of Foreign Affairs Huang Hua stopped in Paris on his way home from New York, and the two sides reached an agreement on the expansion of economic ties.

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* For a discussion of Beijing's position in regard to England, see A. G. Larin, "England in Beijing's Foreign Policy," PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1979, No 2.

In January 1978, French Prime Minister R. Barre was in China. The two sides set forth their views on international issues. During the course of this discussion as could have been expected, differences were demonstrated in the approach to detente. Deng Xiaoping called the West's policy "absurd" and appealed for opposition everywhere to the "expansionist policy" of the USSR. R. Barre stressed the significance France attaches to detente; he noted that the desire for detente was expressed in a joint Franco-Soviet document signed at the time of L. I. Brezhnev's visit to France, and he said that Paris was satisfied with the development of cooperation with the USSR. The prime minister added that France would accept a detente which was consistent with its concept of national defense. At that same time, the two sides reaffirmed their approval of plans to create a "strong (Western) Europe," but the French leader did not agree with the allegation that Europe is the "center of rivalry between the two superpowers" and asserted that European cooperation should primarily serve to relax international tension and eradicate political barriers. The Chinese side declared its desire to considerably expand purchases of industrial equipment and technology. France agreed to take part in the modernization of PRC industry; basic guidelines for cooperation in this field for at least 20 years were discussed.

A consortium of banks began to negotiate the extension of a loan of 12 billion dollars to the PRC, which is supposed to be repaid within 10 years. France suggested an interest rate of 7.5 percent per annum, and the Chinese side agreed to 6.5 percent. When Vice Premier Gu Mu of the PRC State Council visited Paris in May 1978, he told Giscard d'Estaing: "France has become one of China's chief partners."[23]

France agreed to sell China two nuclear power stations of the PWR-900 type (operating on light water, with a capacity of 900,000 kilowatts each). In July 1979, however, Beijing had to cancel the purchase due to a shortage of funds. In December 1978, a Sino-French agreement was signed on the development of economic relations and cooperation for the 1979-1985 period. France will aid in the development of ferrous metallurgy, electronics and the petroleum industry, in geological prospecting, in the mining of nonferrous metals, in the construction of hotels, in the manufacture of motor vehicles and aircraft, in the equipping of ports, in the development of transportation and communications and in the use of outer space. Besides this, the two sides agreed that China would place orders in France for 11 large enterprises "on the condition that prices and world technical levels are observed." This agreement was in reference to the remodeling of a large metallurgical combine to increase its production capacities to 10 million tons of steel, the construction of two thermal power stations, a plant for the manufacture of pipe and rolled metal products and an aluminum combine, and orders for communications satellites. The two sides will strive to bring their volume of trade up to 12 billion dollars by 1985.

French monopolies have expressed willingness to supply China with Milan portable projectiles and Hot anti-tank missiles, large Super Frelon helicopters and Mirage figther planes. "But the present negotiations between

France and China only represent the first phase of an entire series of larger civilian and military transactions, which will lead, in the second stage, to the purchase of much more complex and modern military equipment, and even offensive equipment."[24] The negotiations concerning the delivery of weapons to China were brought to a standstill in the spring of 1979 by the objections of the Soviet Union and the protests of the French public. France refused to sell the Mirage-2000 and Mirage-4000 fighter aircraft.

According to "informed sources in Paris," the "United States has apparently decided not to sell arms to China, so as to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union. But American officials are evidently promoting European exports as a means of expanding Chinese military potential, as a result of which the Chinese will be able to divert Russian attention to them on the eastern front."[25]

In meetings with representatives of the NATO countries, particularly Italy, the Chinese leaders have stressed that Italy is the "weakest link in the North Atlantic Alliance," that there is the possibility of a communist takeover there and that rightist forces must be united to prevent this. The Italian Communist Party has been called "revisionist" and is being blamed for the crisis in the nation.[26]

In June 1977, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Forlani visited Beijing. The guest from Italy and the Chinese side, represented by Li Xiannian and Huang Hua, ascertained the similarity of their views on problems in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and southern Africa. The Italian statesman did not respond to the appeals for a "united front" against the "superpowers."

Italy has always been primarily interested in the possibility of more active involvement in the Chinese market. For this reason, the Italians who have visited China have tried above all to learn the plans for the industrialization of China and the means by which, and scales on which, the PRC proposes to use foreign capital and Western technology.

During Huang Hua's visit to Rome in October 1978 and the negotiations conducted by Italian Minister of Foreign Trade R. Ossola in China in November of the same year, the question of extending a loan of 1 billion dollars to the PRC was discussed. Italy hopes to participate in the development of machine building, including agricultural machine building, the chemical industry and oil production, in the construction of highways and in the delivery of equipment for enterprises manufacturing weapons, tractors, trucks, railroad cars and electrical equipment.

On 23 April 1979, an agreement on economic cooperation between China and Italy was signed in Rome. It envisages the development of cooperation in the fields of ferrous metallurgy, machine building, chemicals, electronics, ship building and agriculture. A joint intergovernmental commission on

economic cooperation is being formed. Italy has agreed to extend credit of around 1 billion dollars to China. Italian businessmen feel that strong competition from Japan, the FRG and France lies ahead. "Naturally," commented STAMPA, "the situation would be ideal if the European countries, instead of trying to divide the Chinese market--frequently in competition with one another--would make an attempt to unite, to act as a united front in relations with the Chinese both in the sphere of production and, primarily, in the sphere of the financial credit that must be extended. It is essential, as Ossola proposed, to establish a European export bank, which would serve as the only body extending foreign loans for all nations of the community; this would be another means of European integration, and it might be capable of withstanding, more successfully than any other means, the competition of Japan and the United States in the broader world market of the 1980's."[27]

The Chinese leaders have always tried to involve the smaller nations of Western Europe in confrontation with the Soviet Union and the socialist community as well. Beijing has also expressed interest in the technical potential of the states in this group.

Belgium interests China primarily because it is the site of NATO and EEC headquarters; Brussels is a location for active contact with the EEC and meetings with representatives of the business community. The policy of the Netherlands impresses Beijing because this country, along with England, supports U.S. policy on many international issues most vigorously. Holland has taken in around 500 Chinese students and scientific workers for education, is striving to reach an agreement on a contract for the construction of a port and the deepening of the Yangtze River, and reached an agreement on air communications between the two countries in January 1979. There is a small trade volume with Luxemburg; Luxemburg banks and the Arbed metallurgical concern are prepared to extend credit in the amount of up to 5 billion francs to China for the remodeling of steel foundries and to accept nonferrous metals as payment for the loan.

Beijing symphatized with the regime of the "four colonels" in Greece, and it was this regime that established diplomatic relations with the PRC in Apri 1972. The response of the Chinese leaders to the fall of the military regime was unenthusiastic, and they were particularly disturbed by the announcement of Greece's intention to withdraw from the NATO military organization. When Huang Hua visited Greece in September 1978 and tried to "educate" the Greek in the spirit of Beijing theory, Athens let him know that China had no business in the Balkans and could not expect Greece to join in its "political game." In connection with the Chinese aggression against Vietnam, the Greek Government is now taking an increasingly negative view of Beijing's attempts to penetrate the Balkans.

Beijing did not object to the pressure exerted by the "four colonels" on Cyprus or condemn the piratical actions of General Grivas' detachments, which were trying to impose Greek annexation on Cyprus. When President

Makarios visited China in May 1974, Chinese officials told him that the PRC supported the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of this country,[28] but Beijing did not actually do anything to promote the settlement of the Cyprus problem. China wants the problem to be settled within the NATO framework and in the interests of expanding this bloc's zone of influence.

For almost 5 years, the Chinese rulers refused to recognize the new government in Portugal after the fall of the fascist regime there. They took a disparaging view of the democratic processes taking place in Portugal. Beijing was afraid that developments in Portugal might affect its membership in NATO.[29] Beijing propaganda constantly accused the USSR of "intervention" in the internal affairs of Portugal.[30] Beijing did not establish relations with Portugal until February 1979, when it apparently concluded that leftist forces in this nation had lost power.

The desire to preserve an extra source of currency and, simultaneously, to avoid any change in PRC positions in Hong Kong determine the attitudes of the Chinese rulers toward Macao, which has been a Portuguese colony on Chinese territory for more than 400 years. When the new Portuguese Government gave up its former colonies, it learned to its amazement that Beijing had no interest in gaining sovereignty over Macao. As the NEW YORK TIMES reported on 1 April 1975, the Chinese rulers rejected the Portuguese Government's proposal that Macao be returned to China. "Beijing," the newspaper remarked, "has no desire to change the status of this territory."

Relations between the PRC and Spain were established under the Franco regime, which aroused indignation in Albania and disturbed many Maoist groups. After the liquidation of the fascist regime, Beijing energetically joined the Western circles that are trying to draw Spain into NATO and the Common Market. In meetings with Spanish statesmen, including King Juan Carlos, who visited China in July 1978, Chinese representatives have recommended Spain's total integration in NATO and the EEC.

Beijing tried to push Switzerland into a military and political alliance with NATO. Vigorous attempts at this were made by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei, who visited this country in August 1974.[31] None of this, however, had the desired effect. In March 1979, a Swiss economic delegation conducted negotiations in China. The prospects for expanded Chinese imports of Swiss machine-building technology and the means of financing trade were discussed. China promised to involve Swiss firms in the construction of a metallurgical base in Shanghai and sounded out the possibility of credit.

In an attempt to win Austrian recognition of the PRC, the Chinese leaders promised Austria trade benefits in China, but the Austrians found the Chinese market "extremely difficult." The Maoists asserted that Austria is located "in the frontal strip of the skirmish between the two superpowers over Europe,"[32] but this did not impress Vienna. When Zhou Enlai met with Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kirchschlager, he "pointedly

criticized" Austria for its "excessively meager efforts" in the military sphere; the Austrian statesman maintained that Austria represented a convincing example of the viability of the principles of peaceful coexistence.[33] Business circles in Austria do not wish to lose their stake in trade and economic ties with China. Trade is growing, but the volume is still insignificant (482 million shillings in 1977 and 793 million in 1978).

The PRC could not start a relationship with Ireland for a long time. Minister for Foreign Affairs O'Kennedy announced in February 1979 that Ireland did not wish to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing due to complications between China and the USSR. Relations were not established until June 1979. The two sides agreed to expand trade and planned to increase trade volume to 20 million dollars in 1981.

The Scandinavian countries have not been ignored by Beijing either, particularly since they are in direct proximity to the USSR. Beijing propagandists asserted that the Soviet Union was supposedly regarding Scandinavia as a strategic beachhead for the accomplishment of its "expansionist plans" in regard to the European continent, and declared that "it is precisely the Scandinavian countries that will be suffering the most" as Soviet plans allegedly call for a flank attack on Europe.[34] Besides this, Sweden interests China as a partner with a highly developed metallurgical industry; Sweden has agreed to take Chinese students into its schools, but has rejected a request for military helicopters and tanks. Beijing is pleading with Norway to take an active part in NATO and to join the Common Market soon. Denmark won the affection of the Chinese rulers by its membership in the EEC and NATO, and they are advising Denmark to agree to closer military cooperation. Denmark is willing to increase trade with China and proposes to remodel several of its ports, but insists that the sale of weapons to China would contradict national policy. The Maoists are striving to create disagreements betwen Finland and the USSR, treating Finland as a nation which has supposedly fallen into economic and political dependence on the Soviet Union. Although the Scandinavian countries have agreed to broader economic contacts with China, they are taking an extremely cautious stand on the policy of the Beijing top rulers; they reacted with anger to the invasion of Vietnam by Chinese troops.

The small countries with the largest trade volume with China are Holland (102 million rubles in 1977), Spain (45 million in 1977 and 100 million in 1978), Sweden (74 million in 1977), Switzerland (67.8 million in 1977) and Belgium-Luxemburg (59 million rubles in 1977). Chinese trade with other countries is negligible.

In the present "gold rush" atmosphere, now that the developed capitalist countries are scrambling for Chinese orders, some people are asking how China will repay them and what medium of payment it will use. Chinese spokesmen answer that China will pay for services with the petroleum,

uranium, titanium, cobalt, manganese, tungsten and bauxites whose extraction foreign capital will promote. Here is what the London ECONOMIST had to say about this in the middle of October 1978: "China, which was so insulated and isolated under Mao Zedong, is drawing closer to the outside world under Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping and is giving some thought to its economic growth. All of this promises genuine 'manna from heaven' to Western companies manufacturing the means of production, which are suffering from sluggish growth rates in their own markets.... How long will this blessing last? For the last 2 years, China has had a positive balance of trade and has therefore been able to supplement its reserves (the corresponding sum is probably around 3 billion dollars, including 1 billion in gold). But the positive balance will turn into a deficit for the Chinese quite soon."

Disillusionment seized the West German monopolies which discovered that most of the Chinese overtures were obviously meaningless. "The army of Chinese economic delegations which literally flooded our industrial enterprises last year," stated FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, "gave the public reason for excessively high expectations. But the time has come to sober up.... The following conclusion can be drawn from the recent experience in bargaining with China: There are many opportunities for broader economic cooperation between the FRG and China. These, however, should not serve as the basis for excessively high hopes, particularly in regard to the speed with which all of this will take place."[35]

President Amerongen of the FRG industrial trade association advised a realistic approach to trade with China in a statement published in the DICHTNACHRICHTEN bulletin at the end of April 1979. German representatives still need China as a trade partner, and even as a more active trade partner than before, but the capabilities of this nation must be examined from the proper perspective. In the further development of trade between the FRG and China, a matter of decisive significance will be the particular goods China can deliver to the FRG, so that this trade, in which a positive FRG balance is characteristic, will display a stronger tendency toward equalization. This will be one of the main problems in commodity exchange.

Beijing's adventure in Vietnam and the criminal irresponsibility with which it was launched are casting doubts on the reliability of China as a partner. The FINANCIAL TIMES noted that the invasion of Vietnam "is causing doubts as to the permanency and predictability of the actions of the Chinese leaders. Bankers have sufficient grounds to take a more cautions approach to a nation which resorts to war so readily."[36]

Although the Beijing leaders have not overcome a single one of their major internal political problems and have driven the nation into a blind alley of permanent stagnation, they are eager to advise others, the European countries for example (although they have no relationship to this continent), on behavior and on policy-making. What choice have they offered Europe. They offer a return to the cold war, the revival of the atmosphere

of constant confrontation, hatred and conflict and, finally, nuclear war. This is advice which is obviously intended for maniacs and political ignoramuses.

In an attempt to make use of the adventurism and anti-Sovietism of the Chinese leaders, Western European officials are displaying political near-sightedness: In the final analysis, they would be just as misled as the leaders who agreed to the Munich conspiracy on the eve of World War II and tried to incite Hitler's Germany against the USSR, since Beijing can endanger world peace and drive their nations to nuclear war.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 11 September 1969.
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3. Ibid., 13 September 1970.
4. Ibid., 9 September 1971.
5. PRAVDA, 7 October 1973.
6. "Tenth All-China CCP Congress. Documents," Beijing, 1973, p 26.
7. In the TIMES, 6 September 1973.
8. Ibid., 3 May 1974.
9. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 July 1971.
10. Ibid., 25 June 1971.
11. AVANTI, 20 November 1971.
12. DAILY TELEGRAPH, 30 May 1974.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 31 July 1975.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., 4 August 1975.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid., 29 October 1975.

19. B. Koloskov, "Vneshnyaya politika Kitaya. 1969-1976" [Chinese Foreign Policy. 1969-1976], Moscow, 1977, p 300.

20. RENMIN RIBAO, 14 February 1976.

21. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1 November 1978.

22. WESTFALISHE RUNDSCHAU, 7 March 1979.

23. FIGARO, 16 October 1978.

24. LE MONDE, 20 October 1978.

25. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 25 October 1978.

26. RENMIN RIBAO, 28 June 1976.

27. STAMPA, 24 April 1979.

28. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 May 1974.

29. TIMES, 25 February 1975.

30. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 July 1975.

31. Ibid., 4 August 1974.

32. Ibid., 2 March 1975.

33. WOCHENPRESSE, 18 April 1974.

34. RENMIN RIBAO, 10 August, 18 September, 25 September 1976.

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FROM ANTI-IMPERIALISM TO ALLIANCE WITH IMPERIALISM AND REACTION

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[Article by A. G. Kruchinin]

[Text] The coming 30th anniversary of the People's Republic of China provides legitimate grounds for surveying, from the heights of past decades, the truly tortuous path it has traveled. The immutable value of the ideals and goals, which inspired Chinese workers to struggle for many years and which brought them to the great victory of 1949, to the establishment of a people's state, to fundamental social changes and to the outstanding successes of economic and cultural construction in the 1950's, is particularly evident against the background of the massive reversals and regression of this nation.

The People's Republic of China appeared on the political map of the world at the time of the most significant event in world history after the triumph of the October Revolution in Russia--the spread of socialism beyond the boundaries of a single country and its transformation into a worldwide system of states.

From the very beginning, the new Chinese State had to deal with many difficult tasks, which could never have been successfully accomplished without extensive and all-round support from outside; the Chinese State could never have accomplished these on its own. The principal objective was the prevention of direct imperialist aggression against this state.

In view of the fact that the PRC was immediately officially recognized by all nations of the socialist system, it was regarded from the very beginning by hostile imperialist forces as part of the united world camp opposing them. A decisive guarantee of the firm establishment of people's China on the political map of the world was the Soviet-China Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, signed 14 February 1950. The formation of a military and political alliance with the USSR was made all the more important to the PRC by the fact that it was precisely in the late 1940's and early 1950's that American imperialism sharply intensified its aggressive actions near the PRC

borders. At the end of June 1950, it launched a war in Korea and actually occupied Taiwan. The reinforcement of defense capabilities became a principal objective for China.

In the performance of its international duty and in accordance with the spirit of the 1950 treaty, the Soviet Union immediately gave the PRC maximum assistance in the attainment of this objective.

The United States eventually had to discard its plan to extend the war to the territory of the PRC. "If we had decided to extend the war to China," U.S. President H. Truman admitted in his memoirs, "we could have expected revenge. Peiping and Moscow were allies, both by ideology and by treaty. If we had attacked communist China, we could have expected Russian intervention."[1]

Even Mao Zedong once had to acknowledge the tremendous and decisive role played by the PRC's alliance with the worldwide socialist camp and its military and political alliance with the USSR in the very survival of the new Chinese State. At a conference of representatives of communist and workers parties in Moscow on 14 November 1957, he said: "If it had not been for the Soviet Union, the imperialists could have devoured us."[2]

In addition to the objective of repulsing imperialist aggression and consolidating the international position of the PRC, another urgent problem during the first period of the PRC's existence was the problem of establishing a nationwide system of administration, particularly a system of national economic control. As Mao Zedong admitted in his speech in March 1958 at a confidential meeting in Chengdu, the new regime in China had neither experience nor specialists in the beginning, and the "ministers were ignoramuses." By July 1951, however, the PRC had an annual state plan for national economic recovery and development, compiled with the aid of Soviet specialists. At the same meeting, Mao admitted that China was incapable of "planning, building and equipping enterprises in heavy industry." Nonetheless, even during the period of economic recovery, this branch of the PRC economy was not only lifted out of the ruins, but was also making great progress. More than 50 large enterprises and other facilities in heavy industry were reconstructed, remodeled and built in the nation with Soviet assistance. In addition to these facilities, which had been stipulated in an intergovernmental agreement, several other industrial facilities were also reconstructed and built with the assistance of Soviet specialists. The Soviet side contributed much to the recovery and efficient operation of railway transport in Northeast and North China.

Just as economic aid, trade deliveries to China from the USSR and the other socialist countries were goal-oriented even during the restoration period--they were aimed at ensuring the economic independence of the PRC and helped to lay the cornerstone of a foundation for an integral national economic system in the PRC.

On the whole, the PRC's solidarity and cooperation with the socialist world during this period not only constituted the deciding factor in the consolidation of the new China's international position, but also largely predetermined the solidity of the popular regime in this nation by aiding in the establishment of prerequisites for a transition to extensive planned construction of the foundations of socialism within only 3 years after the founding of the PRC.

The documents of the CCP and the people's government, which set forth foreign policy principles for 1953-1957, quite definitely reflected the socialist tendency in the development of Chinese society in these years, although the process of the formation of socialist bases for PRC foreign policy was accompanied by a fierce struggle between two lines in the CCP. The general trend in PRC policy in the international arena called for preliminary unification with the nations of the socialist system not only in the interest of peace, independence and the sovereignty of the new China and in the interest of the struggle against imperialist aggression, but also in the interest of socialist construction in China. Solidarity with the socialist system and all-round support from the socialist system were the only methods by which a nation as backward as China, which had not undergone the stage of capitalism, could achieve truly successful and healthy development along the socialist path. The decisive significance of the course toward this kind of solidarity for the fate of socialism in China, as well as in other countries similar to China in terms of their nature and level of socioeconomic development, had been revealed long ago in Marxist-Leninist theory and had been confirmed by experience, including the experience of the PRC.

Meeting the demands of proletarian, socialist internationalism, the fraternal countries, particularly the USSR, aided in the reorganization of Chinese society on the basis of the principles of scientific socialism and, above all, in the accomplishment of socialist industrialization, and not "as far as possible" but to the maximum. During the years of the first five-year plan in the PRC, virtually no large and important industrial facilities were built without the direct or indirect cooperation and assistance of the socialist countries, particularly the USSR. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Union alone provided the Chinese, virtually free of charge, with more than 1,400 plans for large industrial enterprises and over 24,000 complete sets of various scientific and technical documents, the value of which is estimated at billions of dollars. The socialist countries were not only the PRC's sole source of progressive technical and scientific experience, but they were also a wide open source. It was precisely these countries that paved the way for the technological revolution in China.

More than 250 of the largest industrial enterprises in China, as well as individual shops and other important national economic facilities, were built just with the direct participation of the USSR. When Li Fuchun, vice premier of the PRC and member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo,

spoke of their significance in the industrialization of the PRC, he said: "We believe, and this is our firm belief, that the enterprises planned and built in our nation with the aid of the Soviet Union truly represent all the newest and the best that the Soviet Union has to offer. These enterprises are the backbone of our industry, not only in terms of volume, but also in terms of the level of contemporary progressive technology."[3]

The European socialist countries played an important part in the industrialization of the PRC and the establishment of an integral industrial system in China. These countries assisted in the construction of 85 enterprises in the PRC (and, in addition, the partial construction of 10), as well as 172 individual shops and assemblies. Just as the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries assisted China primarily in the development of heavy industry, particularly power engineering and the construction materials industry.

The period of the first five-year plan, marked by extremely intensive all-round cooperation by the PRC with the fraternal countries, is still distinguished in its 30-year history as a period of truly thorough and comprehensive modernization and the effective preparation of the basis for China's transformation into an economically independent socialist state. It was precisely the solid and complete nature of the industrial basis laid at that time that permitted China to later develop its economy, despite the truly catastrophic consequences of the Maoists' antisocialist policy, their voluntaristic economic and social experiments and their severance of all connections with international socialist forces.

During the years of the first five-year plan, when the PRC was essentially acting within the framework of the general line of the socialist countries in the international arena, it set forth initiatives in the interest of world peace and invariably supported all similar initiatives set forth by socialist and other peace-loving states. Assigning unconditional priority to convergence and cooperation with the socialist countries, the PRC achieved outstanding successes during the course of the first five-year plan in the resolution of fundamental problems in socialist construction, considerably expanded its contacts with the outside world and consolidated its international position. These successes, on the one hand, inspired and stimulated truly socialist forces in Chinese society to advocate further convergence and the development of fraternal cooperation with the socialist world and, on the other, alarmed the group led by Mao Zedong and incited it to subversive activities for the purpose of discarding the socialist principles of PRC foreign policy, diverting the CCP onto the path of petty bourgeois nationalist revisionism and imposing great-power hegemonistic ideals on the party. It was precisely in the last years of the first five-year plan that Mao Zedong displayed particular persistence in his attempts to instill cadres with these ideals.

Substituting these for the class goals of the CCP, Mao Zedong made his first attempt to urge socialist international forces to reject the Leninist policy of struggling for peace in November 1957. At a conference

of representatives of communist and workers parties in Moscow, he proposed a comparison of strength with imperialism[4]--that is, he actually suggested the launching of a preventive war against imperialism.

But the Mao Zedong group refrained from any overt propaganda of its anti-humanitarian position during the Moscow conference and immediately afterward, preferring to persist in pretending to represent Marxist-Leninist forces in the CCP. At that time, the group's prevalence within the party leadership was not yet completely definite, and Mao Zedong's attempt to impose the provocative idea of a preventive strike against imperialism on the socialist world was essentially condemned by the international communist movement. For this reason, although Mao Zedong left Moscow with the intention to attain his hegemonistic goals with respect to socialist forces in the world, the CCP delegation he headed agreed with the conclusions and strategic and tactical aims that had been collectively worked out by the Moscow forum of world communists. Besides this, during the stay in Moscow, Mao Zedong himself made several public statements about the international significance of the experience of the CPSU, stressing that "the program of struggle for the construction of communism in the USSR, set forth by the 20th CPSU Congress, will serve as an outstanding example." He also declared that "any government that refuses to live in friendship with the Soviet Union will only harm the real interests of its own people."[5]

After creating the semblance of loyalty to scientific socialism, the general line of the international communist movement and the ideals of the socialist camp, the Mao Zedong group prepared more intensively for an attack on socialist forces within the nation and in the international arena.

The PRC's outstanding success in the construction of socialism on a scientific basis during the years of the first five-year plan is a historical fact. The Mao Zedong group took credit for the success of socialist construction and China's socialist foreign policy, making extensive use of this to consolidate its own position in the party and government and to reinforce its prestige as a purported fighter for the cause of the international working class. This was one of the main reasons for the ease with which the group was able soon afterward to force the CCP to accept a social program that was incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, an avant-gardist-hegemonistic line in regard to the socialist countries and the international communist movement and a strategy for the attainment of great-power goals by inciting a global military confrontation between the two world systems.

The changes that took place in 1958 in the balance of power within the Chinese leadership soon affected PRC foreign policy as well. The Mao Zedong group felt that the time was ripe for a gradual transition to struggle for great-power goals.

The first object of Beijing's hegemonistic ambitions was the world socialist system. By this time, it had grown even stronger and the entire international anti-imperialist front was more active. Whereas the communist movement saw these changes as favorable prerequisites for the intensification of the worldwide liberation process, the restraint of aggressive imperialist circles and the prevention of world war, the Mao Zedong group saw the entire situation only as a convenient atmosphere for more intensive struggle for hegemonistic goals through the provocation of tension between the two world systems behind a screen of ultra-leftist and extremist appeals.

As early as 1958 and 1959, the Mao Zedong group was already attempting to impose its foreign policy line on the socialist camp. This was precisely the purpose of the acute crisis provoked by Beijing in the summer and fall of 1958 in the Taiwan Strait, which threatened to evolve into a global conflict. The position occupied by the PRC leadership in 1959 on the border conflict with India was also permeated with overt hegemonism and an attempt to force the socialist camp to follow Beijing in international affairs.

By the end of 1959, however, the Maoists were essentially convinced that they would not be able to dictate their will to the socialist camp. Proceeding once again from avant-gardist calculations in regard to international anti-imperialist forces, they tried to create a separate group of socialist states under their own aegis. In this way, the Maoist's struggle to control the socialist system began to evolve at the end of the 1950's into a struggle to split up the system and to undermine its solidarity, which, by virtue of historical circumstances, had taken shape around the first and strongest socialist power--the USSR. From that time on, anti-Sovietism quickly became the focal point of China's policy toward the socialist system and the focal point of its entire foreign policy.

As for the Maoists' claim to ideological leadership in the international communist movement, which was made quite openly in April 1960 in articles included in the famous collection "Long Live Leninism!" which contained a Maoist provocative plan for a head-on confrontation with imperialism, this claim was resolutely denied. This is attested to by the results of two international conferences held in Bucharest on 24-26 June 1960--a meeting of the communist parties of the socialist countries and a meeting of 51 communist parties of socialist and capitalist countries--and by the later results of the conference of representatives of communist and workers parties in Moscow in November 1960.

While they were attempting to influence world socialist forces in their own hegemonistic interests, the Chinese leaders were simultaneously taking more energetic action in the zone of the national liberation movement.

Striving to win recognition of China's leading position from at least some revolutionary forces in the world, the Beijing leaders took every opportunity to demonstrate their tough line in regard to imperialism in 1958 and 1959. By 1960, however, Beijing's "ultra-revolutionary" pressure on the imperialist powers began to be accompanied by maneuvers which reflected the basic power motives that had always determined the political ambitions of Maoism. In August 1960, the PRC began to restore trade and other relations with Japan. In talks with some Liberal Democratic Party activists who visited Beijing at the end of the 1950's, the Chinese leaders stressed their willingness to strengthen relations with Japan on a frankly racist basis. At the end of 1960, in a meeting with American journalist E. Snow, who had long played the role of liaision between Washington and the Maoist leadership of the CCP, Zhou Enlai underscored the fact that a basis existed for the normalization of Sino-American relations.

All of this represented the initial attempts to sound out the West's reaction to the new role of the PRC in the global confrontation between progressive and reactionary forces, and to its move to schismatic activity against the world anti-imperialist movement. Although these attempts were virtually unproductive, the symptoms of nationalist pragmatism, particularly the anti-Soviet aspects of this, which became apparent in the Chinese leadership's "ultra-revolutionary" position in the late 1950's and early 1960's, nonetheless did not escape the scrutiny of the West. Even then, they provided strong stimuli to discover the real underlying cause and the actual mainspring of Beijing's "unique" position. More experienced pilots of anticommunism saw promising prospects for the West in the anti-Soviet aspects of this position. During the decades of struggle against communism after the October Revolution in Russia, they had become firmly convinced that anti-Soviets, even those with the most clearly defined revolutionary past and the most extremist anti-imperialist platform, would eventually and unavoidably join the camp of the enemies of the international proletariat, the enemies of the social and national liberation of workers.

As a time of transition in the history of the PRC foreign policy, the 1958-1960 period naturally retained many of the features of the preceding period. Moreover, these features even appeared externally to be dominant. In fact, however, by the end of 1960 the socialist basis of Chinese foreign policy had been discarded and its place was taken by the Maoist version of great-power, hegemonistic Sinocentrism.

The 1960's in PRC foreign policy was a period of increasing struggle by the Maoist group to break up international socialist forces and the entire world revolutionary front behind a screen of extremist anti-imperialist appeals concentrating its attacks primarily to undermine the solidarity of real worldwide socialism and the international communist movement, it purposefully worked toward a break with these forces.

The intensive process by which the CCP leadership dissociate itself from the international communist movement, which began in 1960, was actually completed by 1966. By this time, the Mao Zedong group had made all of

the necessary ideological and political preparations to declare that real worldwide socialism and the communist parties of the world were the enemies of socialism and that China was its only citadel and the center of world revolution.

The frontal attack on opposition forces within the country, launched by the Mao Zedong group in 1966-1969 and called the "Cultural Revolution," was accompanied by a display of hostility toward both world social systems. However, in spite of Beijing's seemingly equal hostility toward both worlds, its announcement that the PRC was allegedly "encircled by hostile forces" and its declaration of a strategy of struggle on two fronts--against imperialism and against so-called contemporary revisionism, or, in other words, the socialist countries and the communist parties--anti-socialist aims were quite obviously dominant in PRC foreign policy in 1966-1969.

Within the framework of the struggle against this notorious "hostile encirclement," Beijing went even further in 1966-1969 in the reduction of economic contacts and the virtual curtailment of relations in other areas with the majority of the countries in the socialist system. In the economic area, this struggle had an extremely curious result: Capitalist countries accounted for 76.2 percent of PRC foreign trade turnover in 1969 and socialist countries accounted for only 23.8 percent (in 1960 the respective figures were 35.6 percent and 64.4 percent). This was the cardinal element of the Maoist course toward hostile isolation of the country from the socialist world.

The results of the Maoist struggle against the "hostile encirclement" in the sphere of political relations with the two worlds were also quite indicative. In 1965-1969, when the United States was demonstrating its military strength in Vietnam, Beijing expressed no desire whatsoever to match strengths with the United States or to engage in "head-on" confrontation. Moreover, it was precisely at this time that it not only conducted hostile propaganda against the socialist countries on an unprecedented scale and with heightened intensity, but also initiated the most diverse subversive actions against them in an attempt to focus their attention on itself and thereby weaken their position in the confrontation with imperialism.

In the 1960's, the Mao Zedong group launched a propaganda campaign on a colossal scale to imply that war was the most effective and, in essence, the only means of revolutionary action by the international proletariat. This hymn to war was an underlying theme in all of the major policy-planning documents issued by the Maoists in 1960-1969.

Beijing associated its hope of creating "universal chaos" mainly with the national liberation movement and the zone of the developing countries. The anti-imperialist struggle on the colonial periphery of the West, which broke out in several cases in the most acute forms, was seen by the Mao Zedong group as a means of involving the main opposing forces--worldwide socialism and imperialism--in an overt military conflict.

The Beijing leadership's hopes of manipulating the growing anti-imperialist potential of the national liberation movement in its own hegemonistic interests turned out, however, to be built on sand. The end of the first decade of Beijing's open struggle against the socialist forces of the world also marked the end of Maoist illusions concerning the possibility of gaining a significant sphere of influence in the world liberation process with ultra-leftist positions and the use of the national liberation movement to provoke a global conflict (in spite of all of Beijing's appeals, the nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America were not seized by "people's wars," the world did not witness "dozens of Vietnams"--that is, local wars--and those that did take place did not result in the "great chaos on earth" that the Beijing hegemonists had desired so much). The shattering of these illusions accelerated the rightward shift in the Maoist position and turned the hope of provoking activity on the part of belligerant imperialist and reactionary circles into the main element of Maoism's hegemonistic strategy. Maoist foreign policy began to quickly acquire the rightist, nationalist, social-chauvinist form that had always been suited to its basic great-power hegemonistic content, which, by virtue of its sociopolitical function, is part of world reaction and an accomplice of imperialism and all other counterrevolutionary forces.

In accordance with this, profound changes took place in the position and role of anti-Americanism in Maoist foreign policy strategy. By the end of the 1960's, the Maoist leaders had completely stripped anti-Americanism of its previous social content, replacing it with a nationalist power approach to the United States as one of China's greatest rivals in the world arena. In view of the fact, however, that China had another global rival in the USSR and the socialist community, and this was a more important rival from the standpoint of Maoist social chauvinism, anti-Americanism underwent a natural metamorphosis into a specific foreign policy tactic, aimed ultimately at the achievement of mutual understanding with the United States and, consequently, with imperialism as a whole, since the majority of developed capitalist countries are essentially still caught up in the world strategy of American monopolistic capital.

The nature and results of the Maoist Chinese leadership's foreign policy activity throughout the 1960's, particularly in the second half of the decade, testify that it had reached the point of open and overt alliance with imperialism and the inevitable transformation of anti-Americanism into frank pro-Americanism, and false anti-imperialism into 100-percent practical pro-imperialism.

The possibility that the great-power militarist group in the Chinese leadership would ally itself with the most belligerant imperialist circles, which had already been predicted by the international communist movement as early as the beginning of the 1960's, was becoming a reality. Participants in the conference of communist and workers parties in Moscow in June 1969 had to face this fact. The representatives of most communist and workers parties thoroughly revealed, in detail, Beijing's false

anti-imperialism and its great-power hegemonistic ambitions and resolutely condemned the hostile actions of the Chinese leadership against international forces for peace, democracy and socialism. Speaking at the conference, General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev of the CPSU Central Committe said: "Beijing's actual behavior in the international arena convinces us more and more that Chinese foreign policy has actually severed all connections with proletarian internationalism and has lost its class socialist content.... The facts testify that the Chinese leadership only talks about struggle against imperialism while actually giving it a direct or indirect assistance."[6]

The Maoists' attack on truly patriotic and socialist forces in the CCP in the 1960's, particularly during the period of the "Cultural Revolution," and the establishment of a system of military-bureaucratic authority in China provided unprecedented scope for the Mao Zedong group's struggle for great-power goals. Besides this, the hostility displayed during those years by the Beijing social chauvinists toward real socialism, which they quite justifiably regarded as the most resolute opponent of their great-power hegemonistic plans, was essentially enough to motivate the West to respond positively to Beijing's appeals for interaction in the international arena in the struggle against forces for peace, democracy and socialism.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, changes of great historic importance began to take place in world development. For the first time, the tendency toward various types of cooperation between the two world social systems became prevalent, as well as the tendency toward detente between these systems. This was primarily a result of the growing economic and defense might of the socialist community and the increasing influence of its peaceful policy on the entire international atmosphere. The decisive contribution of the USSR, the socialist world and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally in the development of detente is now quite definitely acknowledged by the entire world. Even responsible leaders in the West acknowledge this. In particular, U.S. President J. Carter addressed the following remark to L. I. Brezhnev in one of the speeches he presented during the days of negotiation in Vienna in June 1979: "I hope, Mr Chairman, that the detente which is developing in Europe as a result of your tremendous efforts, will envelop other parts of the world as well."[7]

The process of detente obviously reshuffled the Beijing leadership's cards, forcing them to hurriedly establish direct and closer contacts with imperialism as a whole, particularly its more extremist forces, in order to stop the development of a climate unfavorable for struggle for hegemonistic goals in international relations. Imperialism became the last hope of the Chinese social chauvinists in this struggle. By the first half of the 1970's, they were already subordinating almost all aspects of their foreign policy position and all of their foreign policy aims to the objective of alliance with imperialism.

Ostentatious hostility toward the socialist world was still Beijing's trump card in its hope of political convergence and unification with the West. In the first half of the 1970's, this was most widely and comprehensively reflected in the sphere of global confrontation between forces for socialism, peace and progress and forces for imperialism, war and reaction.

In the pursuit of their own great-power hegemonistic goals and in a flirtation with imperialist forces for aggression and war, the Chinese leaders went so far as to say that the declaration of war did not depend on the will of the people and that war was therefore unavoidable. To make this thesis doubly convincing, Beijing renounced the definition of the contemporary era in Ninth CCP Congress documents as an era "when imperialism is moving toward general collapse and socialism is moving toward victory throughout the world."[8] Speakers at the Tenth CCP Congress announced that our era is supposedly still the era of imperialism and proletarian revolution.[9] By performing this "theoretical" caper, the Maoist undoubtedly wanted to stress, in a purely hegemonistic spirit, their nonrecognition of real worldwide socialism and to justify any and all hostile actions against it. Maoist social chauvinism was distinguished from the very beginning by an attempt to depict itself as the leading force for world progress. As soon as the world would advance objectively toward socialism, the true path toward socialism and its most perfect form, according to the Sinocentric theory, could only be pointed out by China. For this reason, all of the achievements of the international proletariat in the struggle for socialism were arrogantly canceled out by the Maoists. By returning to the definition of the contemporary era as the era of imperialism, however, Beijing wanted to stress above all that war in our time is objectively unavoidable because it is inseparable from imperialist domination of the world, which is supposedly still the situation even today. Beijing also said that the major, most threatening source of the danger of war was real socialism, or the socialist community, and thereby performed an invaluable service to world anticommunism. The Tenth CCP Congress in August 1973 and the NPC [National People's Congress] session in January 1975 provided a legal basis for the Beijing social chauvinists' course toward preparations for war, particularly war against the "neighbor to the North." This made Beijing's position especially appealing to extremist circles of imperialism and reaction: In essence, it offered the latter not only an active political partner in the present, but also a military ally in the future.

This general increase in hostility toward the socialist world was accompanied by, and served as the basis for, Beijing's more active search for ways of achieving mutual understanding with the United States in the first half of the 1970's. By the summer of 1971, the stage of mutual probing had ended. On 9 July 1971, H. Kissinger, the American President's special adviser on national security affairs, arrived in Beijing to reach an agreement with the Chinese leadership on a China visit by President Nixon.

This sharp turnabout in Sino-American relations aroused a quick and completely definite response in the capitalist world, where most of the nations had been treating the PRC as an aggressor for two decades and denying its legal right to represent the Chinese people in international organizations: There was a boom in diplomatic recognition of China. By 26 October 1971, the 26th session of the UN General Assembly had resolved to restore the PRC's rights in this organization and to simultaneously exclude representatives of the Chiang Kai-shek regime from all of its organs (76 states voted for this resolution, including all of the socialist countries; 35 voted against it and 17 abstained).

In February 1972, the President of the United States of America, R. Nixon, was in China on an official visit. At the end of the visit, a joint American-Chinese communique was published in Shanghai on 28 February 1972. Despite the deliberately vague wording of the communique, the anti-Soviet aim of the agreements reflected in it was completely evident. As the NEW YORK TIMES commented later, on 21 August 1973, "in essence, a political basis was laid for the possibility of a future Sino-American alliance against the USSR."

The actual renunciation of anti-Americanism presented the Beijing social chauvinists with new opportunities for convergence with the entire capitalist system (the majority of states in this system had already established official relations with the PRC in the first half of the 1970's) and with all world reaction on an anti-Soviet, antisocialist basis. As the NEW YORK TIMES reported on 10 October 1972, Zhou Enlai acknowledged, for example, that the normalization of Japanese-Chinese relations would have been impossible if it had not been preceded by the change in Sino-American relations.

Striving to prove its reliability as a political partner to the United States, Beijing performed many services for American imperialism after Nixon's visit. In particular, it helped Washington to disentangle itself from the hopeless filthy war in Vietnam by exerting pressure on the DRV and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to urge them to stop fighting against American aggression and agree to the preservation of the reactionary pro-imperialist regime in the nation's South. By 1973, Beijing had already cut off all military assistance to Vietnam. The historic victory of the Vietnamese people, who had invariably relied on the support of the socialist community, the reunification of the nation's North and South, achieved in spite of Beijing's "advice," and the determination of the Vietnamese leadership to conduct an independent policy, which was demonstrated in the most crucial situations, all ran counter to the Mao Zedong group's great-power and pro-imperialist plans. Less than a week after the liberation of Saigon, troops of the Kampuchean regime, acting on orders from Beijing, attacked the Vietnamese islands of Fu Quoc and Tho Tiu. In this way, the Chinese social chauvinists began a new round of attempts to dictate their will to Vietnam and opened a front of overt struggle against yet another country in the socialist system.

During negotiations with President G. Ford, who was in Beijing from 1 through 4 December 1975, the Chinese side vigorously demonstrated its anti-Sovietism, objected rabidly to detente and tried to exacerbate U.S.-Soviet relations. Although no joint declaration was published at the end of this visit because too many conflicts existed between the two sides at that time, the new "Pacific Doctrine" set forth by President G. Ford after his trip to the PRC, Indonesia and the Philippines nonetheless stressed that the need for American leadership in the Pacific was recognized in the capitals of all these countries. Therefore, in the mid-1970's, the situation was no longer one of a separate Maoist antisocialist front directed against the interests of all peaceful forces in the world, but one of the gradual merger of this front with the old front of imperialism and reaction--that is, the creation of a new balance of power in the world, capable of reinforcing the dangerous illusions of anticommunism concerning the possibility of reversing the course of history.

Beijing's line was reflected in detail in the notorious "theory of three worlds," which absolutely ignores the basic objective conflict of the contemporary era--the conflict between socialism and capitalism, which determines the course of all world development--and appeals for the creation of the "broadest possible international united front" under China's aegis for struggle, allegedly against the "two superpowers" but actually exclusively against the USSR and the socialist community.

The 1970-1976 period reflected, even more fully and consistently than in the past, the counterrevolutionary essence of the turnabout in Chinese foreign policy that had been accomplished by petty bourgeois nationalist forces in the Beijing leadership. Striving even more openly for great-power hegemonistic goals precisely through the provocation of international tension, the Chinese social chauvinists worked with increasing intensity to turn China into a political, economic and military reserve of imperialism in its struggle against socialism and, consequently, against democracy and against peace on earth. Beijing's virtually complete shift over to the side of extremist imperialist forces in regard to all fundamental issues of the present day was also supposed to promote heightened activity on the part of these forces, which represent the main source of aggression and war today.

Although the pro-imperialist foreign policy position of Maoist social chauvinism in the first half of the 1970's was an all-pervading tendency in China's behavior in the international arena, it should be noted that its development was still quite contradictory at that time. There was evidence of ultra-leftist, extremist revolutionary elements in the position of part of the Chinese leadership, still opposing at least the total rejection of anti-Americanism. The West's unhurried reaction to Beijing's invitation to an alliance, aimed at the destabilization of the world situation, motivated rightist nationalist forces in the Chinese leadership to go even further in making concessions and playing the lackey to imperialism and reaction. But the death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and Deng Xiapoing's second dismissal from all positions of authority in April of the same year noticeably weakened the position of the rightist nationalist

group and heightened the West's worries about the possible future development of the domestic political situation in China under the influence of the revitalized ultra-leftist faction of the Beijing leadership. As a result, the process of Beijing's convergence with imperialism, a process so dangerous for the people of the world, came to a standstill for a time.

The death of Mao Zedong and the expulsion of his closest associates, the so-called ultra-leftist "gang of four," caused the friends of the Chinese people in the world to hope for positive changes in PRC foreign policy. The USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, which had been consistently and enterprisingly conducting a course aimed at the restoration of friendly relations with China since the beginning of the 1960's, took several new steps in this direction. Their initiatives, however, aroused a sharply negative response from Beijing. Moreover, Mao Zedong's heirs, adhering to the logic of his chauvinist course, made a new, even sharper turn to the right and launched a vigorous campaign for a military and political alliance with imperialism and reaction.

The new Chinese leadership placed even more emphasis on propaganda of the inevitability and inexorable approach of a global thermonuclear conflict. Speakers at the 11th CCP Congress stressed that "there cannot be a lasting peace." The new leadership discarded all of Mao Zedong's hypocritical excuses concerning the possibility of preventing world war by means of revolution. The greatest concession Beijing now makes is the admission of the possibility of postponing the war for a short period of time. Furthermore, the Chinese leaders are now associating, more openly than ever before, this possibility with the struggle of China and the imperialist camp against the USSR.

The Chinese leadership is not only "substantiating" the inevitability of a new world war, but is also energetically working toward this and engaging in more intensive material preparations for war. The objective set forth at the 11th CCP Congress and the first session of the Fifth NPC, that of turning China into a powerful state by the year 2000 which will take a leading place in the world, should be examined precisely in this connection. This objective is supposed to be attained through the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." In reference to this, the journal HONGQI commented: "We must strive to complete all of our preparations for war before it begins. The best and most complete of these preparations will be the accomplishment of the four modernizations."[10]

The fact that Chinese propaganda has recently begun to discuss peace and disarmament and that the Beijing leaders have begun to believe that talks on the general improvement of relations with the USSR will benefit them does not at all mean that the position of the Beijing leadership is no longer incendiary or pr[illegible]. Beijing is persisting in spreading the imperialist lie about th[illegible]ary threat posed to the capitalist states by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization. Moreover, it is calling upon the proletariat in the capitalist countries to advance to the

forefront of preparations for war--that is, to give maximum support to the most reactionary circles of the monopolistic bourgeoisie. The Beijing leaders approve completely of the NATO arms race. They have fiercely attacked the new treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons, signed in Vienna in June 1979, and are stubbornly trying to block the proposed ban on nuclear tests in all spheres. The Chinese leadership openly supports the revanchist demand for the "reunification of Germany." The talks held in Geneva and Vienna on arms limitation and disarmament have also been under the crossfire of Beijing propaganda. Nuclear weapons are still being tested in the atmosphere in China. Beijing's desire to acquire a neutron bomb of its own sheds considerable light on the aggressive policy of the Chinese leadership.

The successes achieved by the Soviet Union and other states of the socialist community in the construction of socialism and communism and in defense of the cause of peace and international security are limiting Beijing's possibilities for struggle for great-power hegemonistic goals. Beijing is afraid of the increasing influence of socialism in the international arena and the example it sets for the people of the world. For this reason, it is not stopping its slanderous hostile campaign against the socialist countries for a single minute.

The Chinese leadership has been particularly shameless in its continued slander of the Soviet Union. It has rejected the Soviet side's important constructive initiatives aimed at the establishment of good relations between the USSR and the PRC. In an official memorandum on 9 March 1978, Beijing rejected the proposal of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium to the NPC Standing Committee concerning the issuance of a joint statement on the principles of interrelations between the two countries, and in April 1979 Beijing publicly denounced the Soviet-Chinese Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance of 14 February 1950.

In order to weaken the mutual ties of the socialist countries, set them against one another and separate them from the Soviet Union, Beijing is still distorting the essence of the increasingly deep integration processes within the socialist community and is using the notorious "differentiated approach" to nations of the socialist system. The Chinese leaders are now prepared to demonstrate their "friendship" and even restore interparty ties with any country in the socialist system as long as it displays clearly expressed negative attitudes towards genuine and close solidarity and united action with the socialist community. On the other hand, acting more and more as the striking force of imperialism and reaction, Beijing is now quite openly demonstrating the rigidity of its "differentiated approach" to those particular countries in the system which only joined the active struggle against the counterrevolutionary great-power ideology and policy of Maoist a comparatively short time ago.

In recent years, Beijing has been exerting stronger pressure on Vietnam, which has gained the admiration and respect of the entire world as a result of its heroic struggle against the American imperialists. The PRC's treatment of Vietnam rapidly deteriorated after this nation's complete liberation and unification. As early as 1975, Beijing stopped giving Vietnam free assistance. In 1977 it stopped extending Vietnam credit and initiated the even more extensive provocation of incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border and along the SRV seacoast.

To complicate the internal situation in the SRV and to arouse anti-Vietnamese feelings in the PRC, the Beijing leadership organized the "mass flight" of Chinese living in Vietnam to China. At the same time, on orders from Beijing, the reactionary rightist clique in Kampuchea sharply expanded the scales of the border war against the SRV. After the fall of the bloody Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime in Kampuchea in January 1979, Beijing began to exert even stronger pressure of its own on Vietnam.

During his trip to the United States and Japan in January and February 1979, Deng Xiaoping boastfully promised to "punish" Vietnam several times in an absolutely great-power tone in his many public statements. On 17 February, a few days after the end of this trip, Chinese troops invaded the territory of the SRV along the entire Sino-Vietnamese border. For a whole month, the interventionists committed excesses in the occupied Vietnamese territory. With the aid of the material assistance of the fraternal socialist countries, heroic Vietnam put up strong resistance from the very first days of the aggression. Beijing's planned "pacification of the Vietnamese" turned into a severe and shameful military, moral and political defeat for China.

All progressive mankind angrily protested the Chinese aggression. The statement issued by the Soviet Government on 19 February 1979, declaring the USSR's determination to fulfill its obligations in accordance with the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation concluded with the SRV in November 1978, had a particularly cooling effect on Beijing's imperial passions and ambitions. This determination was reaffirmed on 1 and 2 March in speeches by L. I. Brezhnev and A. N. Kosygin to the voting public.

In a display of goodwill, the Vietnamese side offered to negotiate with Beijing. The first round of the negotiations, which took place in Hanoi in April and May 1979, produced no positive results. The Chinese side, demonstrating only one desire--to dictate its own terms to Vietnam, broke off negotiations on 18 May but offered to resume them later in Beijing. The second round of the talks began at the end of June in the capital of the PRC. Just as during the first round, Beijing officials continued to state that they were ready to "punish" Vietnam again.

The increasing rigidity of Chinese policy toward Vietnam and Laos was accompanied by a campaign of slander against Cuba, which was conducting a consistently active anti-imperialist policy in close alliance with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

If we disregard the Maoist verbal trappings, the documents of the 11th CCP Congress and the first session of the Fifth NPC quite clearly stipulate the aim of creating an antisocialist united front, made up of China and the imperialist states, as the primary foreign policy objective of Mao Zedong's successes. The main partner in the "united front" against the "chief enemy"--the Soviet Union--is naturally supposed to be the United States.

The dangerous plans of U.S. ruling circles to play the "Chinese card" and Beijing's equally dangerous plans to use the "American card" and, in general, the "imperialist card" are giving rise to a critical situation in the world. Naturally, the West, including the United States, hopes to make a profit in the Chinese market. But before the potential, often mythical possibilities of this market become reality for the imperialist countries, China will have time to become a strong military power by using the technical and financial support of these countries and its broad commercial ties with them exclusively in the restricted military-industrial sphere. The irresponsible behavior of Western ruling circles and their self-seeking encouragement of Beijing's great-power militaristic ambitions threaten complications, and not only for socialist forces in the world. This was pointed out by L. I. Brezhnev in his responses to the questions of TIME magazine in January 1979: "Pardon me, but the plans to use the increasingly strong Beijing regime as an instrument of NATO policy and to channel its belligerant aspirations in directions benefiting the West are no more than self-sufficient naivete. The consequences of the Munich policy for Western powers provide sufficient evidence of this."[11]

Regarding the imperialist powers as the main force, which can be used in the struggle for its own goals, Beijing has long subordinated its policy toward the developing countries, in principle, to the strategic objective of all-round convergence and close military and political alliance with imperialism. It is completely natural that one of the results of this has been Beijing's great-power line of primarily supporting reactionary, pro-imperialist regimes in the developing countries and of intensifying its over hostile actions against national liberation movements.

Beijing's pro-imperialist line in relations with the developing countries acquired its general outlines while Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai were still alive and has become absolutely definite in the last 2 or 3 years. The essence of this line is reflected in Beijing's attempts to promote the restoration and development of relations between the former colonies and semicolonies and the former colonial mother countries and the United States--that is, attempts to support the neocolonialist efforts of imperialism with the aid of local pro-imperialist reactionary forces in the developing countries.

In accordance with this role, Beijing is realizing its own great-power ambitions in this zone mainly as a mere by-product of imperialist neocolonialism. Mao Zedong's successors are apparently totally satisfied with this for the time being. They obviously prefer the more realistic

prospect of active participation in a united front with imperialism for a struggle against forces for peace, democracy and socialism to the extremely problematic, as experience has shown, prospect of conquering their own sphere of influence in the so-called "Third World." Within the framework of the united front with imperialism, they hope, above all, to ensure China's quicker evolution into a powerful militaristic state, which will be capable of using power to reinforce its desire to gain a sphere of influence in the world, including a sphere of influence in the developing countries.

The lessons of the 30-year history of PRC foreign policy are highly educative. International socialist and other anti-imperialist forces must draw useful conclusions from them.

In the 1950's, while China was actually laying the foundations for a socialist society, guided by Marxism-Leninism, its foreign policy was also aimed at this objective and based on socialist principles and goals. Unification and cooperation with the nations of the world socialist system for the defense of the Chinese people's revolutionary gains, the establishment of a socialist society in China, the reinforcement of the international front of struggle against imperialism, social progress, national liberation and peace on earth were naturally the alpha and omega of China's course in the international arena. In the 1950's, there was virtually no significant aspect of the construction of people's China and its struggle to consolidate its position in the world system of states that was not, in some way or another, closely connected with the assistance of the fraternal countries, primarily the USSR, and with China's cooperation with the socialist world.

Under the conditions of scientific socialism, the PRC's fundamental problem of achieving modernization, of turning China into a modern developed state, was being solved extremely quickly. A solid material and technical basis for socialism was being laid successfully through the combined efforts of China and the fraternal countries.

At the end of the 1950's, the Chinese leadership, influenced by the ideology of Maoism, began to look for other ways, inconsistent with scientific socialism, of ensuring the accelerated development of national economic potential. The fact that it is still making plans for "modernization" provides conclusive evidence that the wrong ways were chosen.

During the two decades of isolation from the socialist world and hostility toward this world, Beijing was unable to achieve any advances in economic construction comparable to the successes of the first five-year plan.

It is certainly probable that the current Chinese leadership will be able to enliven national industrial development to some degree by means of its alliance with imperialism. But this development, which will depend on the interaction of internal petty bourgeois social chauvinist forces with

external capitalist forces and which has originated and gained strength on the basis of their common hatred for real worldwide socialism, is contrary, by its very social content and consequences, to the interests of the Chinese working class, all Chinese laborers and the spirit of the age. This interaction will reflect the irreconcilable conflict between Maoist policy and the tendency toward socialist development in China. Moreover, this interaction is now demonstrating that the ideology and policy of Maoism, with its great-power hegemonistic goals, are opening the door ever wider for imperialism's neocolonialist policy toward China.

Foreign policy is a precise and profound reflection of the social interests, ideals and goals of a state. Any significant changes in foreign policy will immediately have the corresponding effect on the state's position in international affairs. Under present conditions, as the evolution of PRC foreign policy has demonstrated, the surest symptom of unhealthy development in a nation that has embarked on the socialist course is its leadership's violation, not to mention open denial, of the principles of an internationalist attitude toward the nations of developed socialism, toward the socialist community, and the need for the most consistent solidarity with these nations as the highest international duty and as a mandatory, and ultimately decisive, condition for the triumph of the working class cause in the given country.

The transformation of PRC foreign policy from a constructive factor in world development into a destructive factor, which is promoting the class goals of the world bourgeoisie more and more, took place over the last two decades under the conditions of new victories for international forces for socialism, democracy and peace. The socialist community grew stronger and larger. The international communist movement became more cohesive and the class battles of the proletariat in the capitalist world became more tense. New victories were won by the people of several Asian, African and Latin American countries in the struggle for independence and social progress. Obvious progress was made in the struggle for peace and for deeper detente, and one of the extremely important elements was the signing of the Soviet-American SALT II treaty, which could improve the international atmosphere even more.

All of this testifies that, in spite of China's metamorphosis into a reserve of imperialism, and into its direct military and political ally, the balance of power in the world is still in favor of the cause of progress and peace.

This, however, is no reason to relax, particularly since the issue here is one of the most burning and urgent problems of our day--peace. The enemy of detente who wishes to violate peace and to bring mankind to the brink of thermonuclear catastrophe does not necessarily have to be the strongest from the military standpoint. The most dangerous is often not the strongest, but the most reckless. Hitler's Germany was far from the strongest imperialist power when it started World War II. But it was precisely this country that had the most adventuristic and irresponsible

leadership, acting in accordance with the chauvinistic, hegemonistic ideas of Hitlerism, which naturally evolved into a policy of aggression and war.

Maoism, as the last two decades have irrefutably proved, is an ideology and policy of great-power, chauvinist aspirations to world supremacy and, consequently, an ideology and policy of aggression and war.

Maoism, which is still being used as a guide for action by the rulers of a large state with definite nuclear missile potential that is being intensively built up, is turning China into the most dangerous source of the threat of war on earth. This danger could turn out to be even greater as the Beijing militarists and the imperialist war-mongers, who are related to them in spirit, interact more closely. Unfortunately, the indications of the development of this kind of interaction are becoming increasingly numerous and increasingly disturbing.

The extreme danger of the policy of Maoist social chauvinism for the cause of peace and social progress is naturally turning this policy into one of the main objects of struggle by peaceful forces in all countries. Their coordinated and tireless efforts could force Beijing to take a more reasonable stand, just as imperialism has been forced to accept peace and peaceful coexistence.

International forces for progress and peace, all people, including the Chinese, and all that is reasonable in mankind have no objective that is more important at present than the subversion of the conspiracy involving the Maoists and belligerant imperialist circles against peace. The broadest possible mobilization of international forces and the stimulation of their coordinated action within the framework of this objective would not only guarantee its successful attainment, but would also considerably aid the Chinese people, who have been compelled for more than two decades to waste their colossal material and spiritual potential on goals alien to their true social and national interests.

FOOTNOTES

1. H. S. Truman, "Memoirs, vol 2. Years of Trial and Hope," New York, 1956, p 382.

2. Quoted in: "O chem umalchivayut v Pekine?" [What Are They Hushing Up in Beijing?], Moscow, 1972, p 18.

3. Quoted in: "Leninskaya politika SSSR v otnoshenii Kitaya" [The Leninist Policy of the USSR in Relations with China], Moscow, 1958, p 202.

4. See "Statement of the Soviet Government," PRAVDA, 21-22 September 1963.

5. "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya. 1917-1967. Sb. dokumentov" [Soviet-Chinese Relations. 1917-1957. Collected Documents], Moscow, 1959, pp 364-365.

6. L. I. Brezhnev, "O vneshney politike KPSS i Sovetskogo gosudarstva. Rechi i stat'i" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State. Speeches and Articles], Moscow, 1978, p 82.

7. See PRAVDA, 18 June 1979.

8. See "Ninth All-China Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (Documents)," Beijing, 1969, p 150.

9. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 October 1973.

10. HONGQI, 1978, No 10, p 12.

11. PRAVDA, 16 January 1979.

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JAPAN IN THE SEVENTIES: EXACERBATION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUGGLE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 123-136

[Article by V. N. Khlynov, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Recent years, the 1970's, have marked the beginning not only of a new stage in Japan's economic development--a stage of unprecedented difficulties and upheavals in the national economy--but also serious changes in domestic politics in Japan. And this is not surprising. As a reflection of economics in concentrated form, politics in general and the internal political situation in particular naturally reflect the complex and contradictory processes of socioeconomic development in the contemporary bourgeois society. High economic growth rates were replaced, as we know, by the most severe economic crisis of the nation's postwar history in 1974-1975, and later by an exceptionally prolonged period of recovery. Such major cataclysms in the economy cannot fail to exacerbate internal political problems.

The main factor determining Japanese internal political development in the 1970's was the increasing weakness of the political positions of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, representing the interests of monopolistic capital, and the mounting authority of opposition forces, particularly the leftist opposition, defending the interests of the broad working masses. This took concrete form in the serious intensification of the struggle for political power on the central and local levels and in the persistent efforts of progressive forces to create a democratic coalition government, which could replace the present one-party government of the conservatives and carry out radical social reforms in the nation. What we are now witnessing, therefore, is the maturation of qualitative changes in the internal political structure of Japanese society.

Peculiarities of the Internal Political Structure and the Balance of Political Power in the Nation

The existing internal political structure in Japan is described by ruling circles as a "parliamentary democracy." The doctrines they exploit in connection with this are supposed to give the general public the illusion of politics of a supra-class nature. The attempts to prove the existence

of some kind of "diffusion of political authority" in Japan are indicative in this respect. This is supposedly reflected in the fact that the contemporary Japanese State is not governed by some kind of specific dominant force, but by all strata of Japanese society, including the working masses.[1]

There is no question that the activities of democratic forces in the nation, particularly the struggle of the working class, are having some effect, sometimes even quite substantial, on the planning of isolated political measures and on the general nature of domestic policy. As long as the nation is governed by the monopolistic bourgeoisie, however, Japanese domestic policy ultimately depends, and will continue to depend, on precisely this exploitative elite, which is insignificant in terms of size but has concentrated a tremendous amount of power in its hands.

The direct agent of the policy of the Japanese monopolies is the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which was founded in November 1955 as a result of the unification of conservative forces. The ideological basis of the LDP is anticommunism. In order to attract the workers, it has included a slogan concerning "a state of universal prosperity" in its program.

All LDP activity is based on its indissoluble connections with big business and the top-level bureaucracy. This is a unique "trilateral alliance" which is held together by the common class interests of its members. As progressive Japanese scholars point out, the determining factor in LDP interrelations with monopolistic capital is the offer of vast monetary rsources to the former by the latter in the form of so-called political contributions. The great scales of this kind of financing are not concealed even by bourgeois analysts. "The financial support of conservative parties by big business," the authors of an American collective work on Japan remark, "is as natural as it is immutable. The same values and common interests unite businessmen and conservative politicians in a system of mutual understanding, which has permeated the entire postwar period."[2]

This "support" actually does cover every aspect: It ranges from election financing to the allocation of funds for the daily needs of each conservative politician. An entire network of intermediary organizations has been set up to camouflage this bribery. These organizations are officially of a public nature and openly finance the LDP, supposedly on behalf of the "public." The largest is the so-called People's Political Association, through which half of all "political contributions" pass on their way to the party treasury.

For more than two decades, from the time of its founding to the mid-1970's, the LDP had a comparatively firm grip on political power and was virtually unimpeded in its monopolization of public administration. The relative solidity of the political dominance of monopolistic capital's party was the result of an entire set of favorable objective and subjective factors. Among the most important, the long period of high economic indicators in the nation must be given special mention. Making use of the powerful mass propaganda system, the LDP was able, under these conditions, to constantly

depict itself as the chief organizer of a series of positive changes in the lives of the workers, which contributed to its increasing prestige. The LDP also benefited from the fact that opposition parties in the nation did not have any sufficiently specific or constructive economic programs to offer as an alternative to the policies of the ruling party. The LDP made skillful use of factionalism in its ranks: The alternation of various groups in positions of power convey the impression of "attention to criticism" and implied that past mistakes were being corrected. This improved the "party image," muffled the dissatisfaction of the masses and ensured the continuation of LDP rule.

As early as the second half of the 1960's, however, the political positions of the LDP gradually lost strength. This was reflected, in particular, in the constant decline of its influence in parliament and in local government. The culminating point of this process was the defeat of the LDP in the general elections for the lower house of parliament in December 1976 and the upper house in July 1977, when the party won less than half of the legislative seats for the first time in its history.

The decline in LDP political influence was also due to the deterioration of economic conditions, the exacerbation of factional conflicts to a point beyond control, and the unprecedented spread of corruption within the party. The most vivid demonstration of the latter was the huge scandal that broke out shortly before the general election of 1976 in connection with the payment of large bribes to LDP leaders by the American Lockheed firm for providing this company with Japanese orders. It turned out that the individuals involved in the scandal were K. Tanaka, then the president of the LDP and the prime minister of Japan, General Secretary T. Hashimoto and many others.

It was in this atmosphere that a group of comparatively young parliamentarians, headed by Y. Kono, ostentatiously withdrew from the LDP in June 1976. Despite the small size of the group, its secession exacerbated the crisis in the LDP even more. The seceders formed the so-called New Liberal Club (NLC)--a political organization advocating a "new conservative policy." Despite the fact that the NLC quite sharply criticizes the LDP for its corruption and its "destruction of the system of liberalism," however, the new political organization does not differ fundamentally from the LDP, and its program is close to the program of the latter. Like the LDP, the NLC takes the anticommunist stand in defense of the "free society" and the interests of big capital. "The goal of the NLC," noted the press organ of the Japanese communists, ZENEI magazine, "is to carry on the policy of the LDP by more subtle, covert means with some consideration for the demands and attitudes of the popular masses."[3] A characteristic statement was made by NLC Chairman Y. Kono immediately after the elections to the lower house of parliament: He openly admitted that the NLC was created chiefly to appeal to voters who were disillusioned with LDP policies and to keep them from going over to the leftist opposition camp. In other words, the NLC represents an integral part of the conservative camp.

The ruling Liberal Democratic Party is opposed by a far from homogeneous opposition camp, consisting of several political parties and numerous political groups of the most varied leanings.

The most serious challenge to the LDP emanates from the leftist opposition. It is represented primarily by the Japan Communist Party (JCP). This party, which was founded in July 1922 and has made its way through the difficult school of heroic struggle against Japanese fascism and imperialism, was illegal for a long time. Immediately after the defeat of Japanese militarism in World War II, however, the JCP emerged from the underground and took the fore among fighters for the class interests of the workers.

The JCP now has around 400,000 members. The diversified network of the party press has been of great significance in increasing the party's prestige in the broad working masses. The total circulation figure of just one central press organ, the AKAHATA newspaper (daily and Sunday), exceeds 3.2 million.

According to the JCP Charter, "the Japan Communist Party is the forward detachment of the Japanese working class, and the highest class organization of all the different working class organizations."[4] The main goal of the Japanese communists stems from this. "The goal of the Japan Communist Party," the charter stresses, "is to free the working class and the people of Japan from exploitation and oppression, to build a socialist society in Japan and then to create the highest type of society--communism."[5]

This aspiration is confirmed in the "Declaration of Freedom and Democracy" adapted by the party's 13th special congress in 1976. It states, in particular, that the party advocates the construction of an "independent, democratic Japan through the accomplishment of an anti-imperialist democratic revolution, the progression toward a socialist Japan through the accomplishment of a socialist revolution and, ultimately, the construction of a communist society."[6]

Another influential party of the leftist opposition is the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), founded in November 1945. In contrast to several other social-democratic and workers parties, the JSP takes the stand of class struggle and defends the principle of proletarian solidarity. The JSP political platform as a whole is antimonopolistic and anti-imperialist in nature.

The JSP, which has the largest number of parliamentary seats after the LDP, is a serious force in the parliamentary opposition. The JSP cooperates closely, on the central and local levels, with the nation's largest central labor organization--the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo). The JSP has around 50,000 members. Most of them are labor activists.

The JSP has declared that its main objective is the construction of a socialist society in Japan. Its program (adopted in 1955) states the following: "The main task of our party is to transform the present

capitalist society in accordance with the current stage in the development of Japanese capitalism and historical conditions by peaceful democratic means and, with the aid of a so-called peaceful revolution, to create a socialist society."[7]

The specific means and methods of making the transition to socialism are set forth in a policy-planning document--"The Way to Socialism in Japan." This document states: "Bearing in mind that the transition to socialism will be accomplished gradually, it will be necessary to ensure at least the following basic measures: 1) the complete control of the major agencies of public administration by progressive forces, as well as control over the administrative system, the police and other organs; 2) the eradication of American domination; 3) the socialist reorganization of the main branches of industry; 4) the guarantee of leadership by the working class and our party in the majority of anti-imperialist and democratic groups and the transformation of the democratic majority into a socialist majority."[8]

As a member of the Socialist Internationale with ties linking it to many social democratic parties in the world, the JSP also maintains contact with the CPSU and other communist and workers parties.

The intermediate position between the conservatives, on one side, and the leftist opposition parties, on the other, is occupied by so-called middle-of-the-road political parties--the Democratic Socialist Party and the Clean Government Party.

The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), which was founded in January 1960 by certain groups that had resigned from the JSP, unites the rightist social democrats. Its social base consists of the petty and middle bourgeoisie. The party is also supported by the rightist reformist central labor organization--the Japanese Confederation of Labor (Domei). This party has around 40,000 members.

The DSP program states that it is not a class party, but a "people's party which recognizes the interests of the most diverse social groups and, at the same time, of the entire nation as a whole."[9] This is the reason for the extremely contradictory goals the DSP has set for itself. While proclaiming a policy of "building a socialist society" and "overcoming capitalism," the party is simultaneously "against nationalization for the sake of nationalization"--that is, it actually favors the preservation of private ownership. In an attempt to reconcile the interests of various classes in the capitalist society, the DSP denies the need for radical revolutionary change. It regards the "course of reform" as the only acceptable means of "ensuring social progress." As part of this process, the DSP takes every opportunity to stress that the socialism to which it aspires is of a special, "democratic" nature and that it is distinguished from existing real socialism by its "genuine humanism."

The DSP is formally in opposition to the LDP. In fact, however, this party avoids making any clear choice between democratic and conservative forces, thereby giving rise to serious difficulties in the nation's democratic camp, and supports the ruling party, frequently allying itself with the LDP, on many important political issues. In recent years, this has won it an unenviable reputation: The DSP is often called the "second LDP."

The Clean Government Party (Komeito), which was founded in November 1964 by adherents of the Soka Gakkai Buddhist Organization (Value-Creation Society), has around 15 million members in Japan and supporters in many countries of America, Europe, Asia and Africa.

The members of this society constitute the backbone of the party. Annual congresses, representing the highest party organs, are formally convened and held, and are limited to the approval of decisions made by the party leadership. The party has 141,000 members.

Komeito's political goals and slogans are vague, contradictory and eclectic. According to the party, its main objective is the construction of a "society of prosperity" on the basis of "humane socialism" and three chief principles--the observance of human rights, national sovereignty and pacifism. "Our party," the Komeito program says, "will establish an economic system, based on humane socialism, which will guarantee responsible and free economic activity and the equitable distribution of its results, with the aim of building asociety of well-being, in which the flourishing of the entire society and the happiness of the individual will be achieved."[10] This objective is to be attained exclusively by means of social reforms, which are supposed to be carried out by a "progressive coalition of middle-of-the-road authorities." The term "humane socialism" is used here to describe the kind of society in which each individual "will be guaranteed the right to own property, while progressive real estate and inheritance taxes will put an end to the inequitable distribution of wealth."[11] Aspiring to the role of "people's party" and taking the increasing dissatisfaction of the masses with the capitalist order into account, Komeito quite pointedly exposes the flaws of capitalism. But the entire matter is reduced to this kind of exposure. The party does not advocate radical social transformations. The reforms it proposes will not affect the foundations of the capitalist order.

Many ultra-rightist and ultra-leftist organizations make up an integral part of the contemporary Japanese internal political structure. Despite the relatively small size of these groups, they play a definite role in national politics and are frequently used by Japanese reaction in the struggle against democratic forces.

In recent years, many ultra-rightist and ultra-leftist organizations, despite ideological differences, have searched for means of mutual convergence and alliance in an attempt to overcome serious internal difficulties.

Therefore, the main opponents of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party are the leftist opposition parties, represented by the JCP and JSP. It is precisely between the LDP on one side and these parties on the other that stubborn class battles are now being waged over all important aspects of Japanese internal political development.

More Intensive Confrontation Between the Democratic and Reactionary Camps Over Major Internal Political Problems

The diminished influence of the LDP and the weakening of its positions in the political arena have created a new domestic political situation in Japan. In contrast to previous years, when the LDP held power firmly within its grasp, a situation has now developed which is objectively favorable for an extensive and intensive offensive struggle by democratic forces. The possibility of replacing the one-party government of the Liberal Democrats with a coalition of opposition parties is becoming a reality. The LDP, which has had to take the defensive, has made a maximum effort to retain its dominant position. As a result, the confrontation between the democratic and reactionary camps has taken on characteristics of unprecedented intensity. Touching upon the major aspects of Japanese internal political development, it is focused, in particular, on such major issues as the fight for the majority in parliament and local government and the struggle to prevent the excision of the democratic gains of the people from the Japanese Constitution.

Some idea of the development of the race for parliamentary seats can be acquired from the results of general elections, particularly the elections to the lower house--the nation's chief legislative body. Whereas the LDP received more than half of the vote prior to the 1967 elections (57.6 percent in 1960 and 54.7 percent in 1963), it received less than half in all subsequent elections. In the 1976 election, it won just slightly over two-fifths (41.8 percent) of the total vote. Even if the votes won by the LDP splinter group of the New Liberal Club are counted (4.2 percent), the total number of voters supporting the conservatives equaled 46 percent.

Therefore, ever since the 1967 election, more than half of all voters have supported various opposition parties instead of the LDP. The successes of the communists have been particularly noticeable. Between 1960 and 1976, the absolute number of voters supporting the JCP has increased more than 5-fold (from 1,156,000 to 5,188,000), and the relative number has increased more than 3.6-fold (from 2.9 percent to 10.5 percent). As for the JSP, it is being supported by one out of every five voters--that is, it is second only to the LDP in the number of votes it wins. The absolute increase in the number of voters supporting it (from 10,887,000 in 1960 to 11,713,000 in 1976) has not been significant, and the relative number has decreased (from 27.5 percent in 1960 to 20.7 percent in 1976).

This period has not brought the DSP with its "middle-of-the-road course" any particular success. Between 1960 and 1976 the number of voters supporting this party remained virtually unchanged, frozen at around 3.5 million. The relative number, however, decreased by almost one-third (from 8.8 percent to 6.3 percent).

Komeito, the second of the "middle-of-the-road" parties had some success. In 1976 it was supported by approximately 2.5 times as many voters as in its first election in 1967 (from 2,472,000 to 6,177,000). The relative number doubled in these years (from 5.4 percent to 10.9 percent).

The sharp intensification of the parliamentary struggle is also attested to by the dynamics of the distribution of seats in the lower house. Throughout the period in question, excluding the 1969 election, the number of mandates won by the LDP constantly decreased. As a result of the general election of 1976, this decline reached a critical low point. For the first time in the nation's postwar history, the Liberal Democrats, as pointed out above, won less than half of all parliamentary mandates. Conversely, the influence of opposition parties in the lower house increased perceptibly. As a result, after the 1976 election the conservatives lost substantial influence in the standing committees of the lower house, which play an important role in the legislative process and are constructed in proportion to the number of parliamentary seats belonging to each party. The opposition parties now have almost as many representatives on these committees as the Liberal Democrats. The LDP holds the majority in eight of them, but the opposition holds it in seven, including the extremely important budget committee. The forces are equal in one committee. Representatives of opposition parties head 4 of the 16 standing committees. This gives them an opportunity to exert definite influence on the fate of bills and, consequently, on the resolution of domestic political problems. What is most important, however, is that the LDP is no longer capable of ensuring a two-thirds vote in the lower house, which is needed for constitutional revisions, and this is precisely what reaction is striving for in order to limit the democratic rights and freedoms gained by the people in the first postwar years. Even if the parliamentarians who are members of the NLC and some independent deputies who support the LDP are included in the total, the LDP can only count on an extremely unstable majority.

An equally intensive struggle between democratic and reactionary forces in the nation is being fought for the upper house of parliament. The LDP's status here has deteriorated noticeably as a result of serious election defeats in July 1977. The conclusively proved that the influence of the party of monopolistic capital over the general voting public was constantly declining. Whereas the LDP won 44.3 percent of the vote in the previous election to the upper house (in 1974), it won only 35.8 percent of the total vote in 1977. In other words, almost two-thirds of the voters supported the opposition. In place of their previous 126 seats, the Liberal Democrats received 124 mandates--that is, less than half of all seats.

They did not even collect the minimum number of mandates needed for the passage of a bill through this chamber. Only the association of three independent deputies with the LDP after the election allowed the party to retain a meager majority here.

The deterioration of LDP parliamentary positions is arousing serious alarm in the party and in the big business community. The organ of the Japanese elite, SENTAKU magazine, has regretfully admitted: "As a result of the elections for the lower house of parliament in December 1976 and the upper house in July 1977, the era of prolonged one-party rule by the LDP has virtually come to an end."[12]

Ruling circles and representatives of monopolistic capital have begun to admit the inevitability of the LDP's entry into a coalition with "middle-of-the-road" opposition parties, particularly the DSP. The idea of founding, if necessary, yet another conservative political party, which would vie for power with the LDP, was simultaneously raised--that is, the possibility of establishing a two-party system like the American one in Japan. Expressing these feelings, the YOMIURI newspaper reported: "We must have a ruling and an opposition party, which, just as in the United States, will not differ significantly in their views and will be able to take turns as the dominant authority without making any serious changes."[13] One attempt to carry out these plans consisted in the creation of the "Society of Thinkers About a New Japan" in July 1976. The members included representatives of Komeito, the DSP and one of the JSP's rightist reformists, S. Eda. who later left the party. In an article describing this political group, the Japanese weekly GENDAI-NO MEI wrote: "No one doubts that this organization intends to succeed the LDP if the latter should completely lose its monopoly on political power."[14] But this attempt failed. Soon after its founding, the society ceased to exist.

Under these conditions, the need to continue reinforcing and expanding the influence of the leftist parliamentary opposition parties, represented by the JCP and JSP, is acquiring particularly great significance. Holding more than one-fourth of the seats in the lower and upper houses of parliament, these parties naturally have substantial influence in domestic politics. Since, however, they have not been able to win at least one-third of all seats, they are incapable of opposing the more reactionary maneuvers of the LDP, not to mention the concerted attacks of the conservative coalition in parliament.

The fight for parliament has been accompanied by increasingly intensive rivalry on the part of democratic and reactionary forces for stronger positions in local government. The one-party rule of the LDP has seriously suffered here as well. Despite the fact that the LDP was able to win the DSP and Komeito over to its side during the last election in April 1979, and won significant victories only as a result of this, its position in local government is far from one of undivided rule. It is extremely indicative that more than three-fourths of all deputies in local government are independents. Most of the voters have lost faith in the ruling

party on the local level and, under these conditions, conservatives do not take the risk of campaigning under the LDP banner but prefer to label themselves independents.

The JCP's representation in local government has expanded considerably. As a result of the abovementioned election, the number of communists occupying seats on municipal assemblies rose from 3,328 to 3,555. The combined number of JCP and JSP deputies in local government now exceeds 7,000, which is equal to almost 10 percent of all deputatorial seats.

The struggle between democratic and reactionary forces over the Japanese Constitution is becoming more heated. This constitution, which was adopted in 1947 under the pressure of the progressive Japanese and world public, proclaimed the basic democratic rights and freedoms of the people for the first time in Japanese history, including universal suffrage, freedom of worship, speech, the press, assembly and demonstration, the right to work, to receive an education and to form organizations and so forth. Its Ninth Article, which declares Japan's renunciation of war and the militarization of the country, is of great significance.

The present Japanese Constitution, representing the main legal basis for the struggle of progressive forces in the nation in defense of democratic procedures, is a serious obstacle for Japanese reaction, which is striving to eradicate many of the people's gains. This desire has grown noticeably stronger in connection with the decline in the ruling camp's political influence.

Japanese reaction is directing its main attacks against the Ninth Article and is not concealing its intention to repeal it. Japanese democratic forces are resolutely opposing this dangerous intention. The struggle to liquidate the Japanese-American "security agreement"--a military and political alliance of American imperialism and Japanese reaction, on the basis of which Japan can be involved in U.S. adventures in Asia and which is simultaneously aimed at supporting conservative forces within the nation--is also directly related to the struggle for the preservation of the Ninth Article. Within the framework of this struggle, Japanese democratic forces are resolutely demanding the liquidation of American military bases on Japanese territory, the withdrawal of American troops from Japan and the prohibition of the entry of American nuclear submarines and ships into Japanese ports. They are also opposing the dangerous plans of Japanese reaction to reinforce the so-called self-defense forces, which have been created in violation of the constitution. In addition to reinforcing the "self-defense forces," Japanese reaction plans to institute compulsory military service for all citizens, create a "reserve defense corps" of 1 million individuals and establish a "civil defense system." Preparations are also being made for unconstitutional "war-time regulations."

The movement for peace is constantly growing and taking the most diverse forms.

For more than 30 years now, Japanese peace advocates have conducted extensive anti-war demonstrations each year on 6 and 9 August in connection with barbarous actions of the recent past--the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the Americans. In 1977 and 1978, on the anniversaries of these tragic events which took the lives of 370,000 Japanese, these demonstrations were particularly massive in scale and nature. This was due to the fact that, after a fairly long period of dissent in the Japanese peace movement, the peace advocates united their ranks and acted as a united front. On the eve of the memorial dates, the traditional peace marches took place in the nation, leading from the streets of the overwhelming majority of Japanese prefectures to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The International Conference Against the Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, which was held in August 1977 in Hiroshima, was also of exceptional significance. It was attended by around 5,000 delegates, including 138 delegates from 36 other countries.

Similar anti-war demonstrations took place in Japan at the beginning of August 1979--on the 34th anniversaries of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies suffered by the Japanese people.

Each year at the end of February and the beginning of March, all peace-loving forces in Japan commemorate what they call "Bikini day" (1 March 1954)--a day to commemorate the victims of American thermonuclear tests in the region of the atoll of the same name. In 1979, Japanese peace advocates commemorated the 25th anniversary of this tragedy with mass meetings and demonstrations, the participants of which resolutely demanded an end to the arms race and a ban on thermonuclear weapons.

Mass demonstrations by Japanese fighters for peace and against thermonuclear weapons also marked the first UN Disarmament Week. This campaign was held from 24 through 30 October 1978 and, encompassing the entire country, included the most diverse undertakings, such as mass-meetings, demonstrations, symposiums, exhibitions and so forth. During this week, the Japan Council for the Organization of Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Victims (Hidankyo) demanded the passage of a new law to provide more effective assistance to atomic bomb victims. According to data for the beginning of 1978, the number of such victims in Japan was 369,000, and it is constantly rising. The overwhelming majority of these victims are suffering serious financial difficulties, not to mention their state of health. Hidankyo resolved to launch a campaign for the collection of 10 million signatures demanding fundamental improvement in the status of the victims. A mobile exhibit, describing the tragic fate of atom bomb victims, was organized to support the campaign. Plans call for its display in 200 populated points in the nation before the summer of 1979.

An important contribution to the overall struggle for peace and against the danger of a new world war is being made by the annual anti-war demonstrations of Japanese peace advocates on 21 October, a date set aside for united anti-war action since 1966 at the initiative of Sohyo. At

present, peace-loving forces in Japan are preparing for the 13th day of united anti-war action. It will take place on 21 October of this year and will be accompanied by mass demonstrations by democratic forces.

The period of the 1960's and 1970's was marked by an entire series of governmental actions aimed at the reinforcement of nationalist feeling in the nation. The most arrant of these actions has been the reinstatement of the day commemorating the founding of the state as an official state holiday on 11 February 1967, although this is actually a day commemorating the founding of the Japanese empire. The rebirth of this "black date on the Japanese calendar," which was annually commemorated prior to the war as the day of militaristic Japan, aroused a storm of indignation on the part of democratic forces in the nation. Despite nationwide protest, however, reaction, which then held the majority of deputatorial seats, was able to push this shameful resolution through parliament. In recent years, Japanese democratic forces have resolutely opposed all government attempts to conduct official ceremonies on this date.

The goal of stimulating nationalist feeling is also being pursued by reactionary circles in their increasingly noticeably efforts to extol the actions of the emperor and expand his prerogatives. In connection with this, it is indicative that the cabinets of ministers resolved in June 1977, on the recommendation of the minister of education, to make the old militarist hymn "Kimi-ga yo" (Long Live the Emperor) the Japanese national anthem.[15] This is also attested to by the institution of a unique system of chronology in the nation ("gengo"), based on the years of rule by Japanese emperors. In the beginning of 1979, the House of Representatives approved a bill to legalize this system.[16]

The rebirth of nationalist feeling is serving ruling circles as an important means of keeping political power in their hands and assaulting the positions of democratic organizations.

One important domestic political issue, over which democratic and reactionary forces have constantly conflicted from more than two decades, is the question of the future of public education. Resolutely opposing the intentions of reaction to place this system at the service of the monopolies by giving it, in violation of the Japanese Constitution, a militaristic, nationalistic nature, Japanese democratic forces are persistently fighting for its democratization, for the education of the younger generation in the spirit of humanism and democracy and against discrimination in the educational shpere on the basis of social status.

Serious conflicts between democratic and reactionary forces in this important field also take place in connection with the education minister's constant attempts to revise the content of academic curricula and bring textbooks "up to date." American researcher G. De Vos wrote the following about the essence of these attempts: "Considerable pressure is being exerted, in particular, to restore 'morale' (nationalistic--V. Kh.) in textbooks for Japanese schools. Those who once fought against the use of

this morale for nationalist purposes see this as a serious omen of the possible rebirth of reaction."[17]

Japanese democrats' constant demonstrations for the repeal of all reactionary laws and against the passage of new reactionary laws contrary to the spirit of the Japanese Constitution represent an important part of the overall struggle of democratic forces.

The confrontation between the two political camps in the domestic political arena of Japan encompasses, therefore, the broadest group of problems. The diametrically opposed objectives of reaction and democracy make this confrontation particularly heated. In an attempt to regain its lost positions at any cost, the reactionary camp has sharply intensified its attacks on the people's democratic gains. Nonetheless, in many cases democratic forces in the nation have been able to not only resist the attacks by their political opponents, but even to win quite substantial victories. The most important of these has been the ability of Japanese democratic forces to oppose, for many years, reaction's constantly increasing attempts to repeal the Ninth Article of the Japanese Constitution and thereby pave the way for the broad-scale militarization of the country. Equally significant victories have been won by democratic forces in defense of the existing electoral system, the frustration of reaction's attempts to institute the antidemocratic system of "minor" electoral districts in the nation, the protection of the democratic principles of public education and so forth. The future success of these forces will depend largely on the guarantee of their effective cooperation and on their efforts to achieve united action.

Progressive Japanese Forces Against Monopoly Domination and for Democracy and Social Progress

The change in the internal political situation in Japan, reflected in the decline in the LDP's political influence on one side and the increasing authority of opposition parties, particularly the leftist opposition, on the other, has established new, more favorable conditions for the continued development of the struggle of progressive forces against monopoly domination and for democracy and social progress. The present internal political situation necessitates the unification of all Japanese democratic elements, all "forces for renewal," opposing domination by monopolistic capital and Japanese reaction.

From this standpoint, the programs drawn up by Japanese communists and socialists as a democratic alternative to the present course of ruling circles are of great significance.

The JCP is actively promoting the unification of democratic forces in the nation and the accomplishment of fundamental social reforms. In 1970, from the rostrum of their 11th congress, Japanese communists addressed all progressive organizations with an appeal for efforts to create a democratic coalition government in the 1970's, which could replace the

anti-people government of the conservatives and radically renovate all state policy.[18]

In 1971 the JCP set forth three important objectives of democratic reform: 1. The liquidation of the Japanese-American military and political alliance and the establishment of genuine Japanese neutrality. 2. The cessation of politics in the monopoly interest and the institution of politics in defense of human life and rights. 3. The prevention of the rebirth and reinforcement of militarism, the defense of democracy and the democratization of parliamentary activity. The Japanese communists believe that the struggle for the attainment of these objectives should lie at the basis of the creation of a broad and stable antimonopolistic coalition of democratic forces.

In November 1973, the JCP set forth a concrete program for the activities of a coalition democratic government on the basis of these objectives at its 12th congress. In the report of K. Ueda, member of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee, "On the Program for a Democratic Coalition Government," he stressed that it represented a "government for the protection of vital public interests and democratic reform, which will attain national objectives within the framework of the present constitution--the three objectives of renovation, namely the sovereignty and security of Japan, peace and neutrality, and political and economic democracy" and that "it will not be a socialist regime working toward the construction of socialism."[19]

The 13th special congress of the JCP, held in July 1976, again appealed for the unification of all Japanese democratic elements. The congress stated that "the only way out of the crisis lies in the unification of all progressive forces and the establishment of a democratic coalition government."

The idea of creating a democratic coalition government and carrying out democratic reforms was reaffirmed in the decisions of the 14th JCP Congress, held in October 1977. Congress resolutions indicate that, in view of the increasingly reactionary course of the foreign and domestic policy of Japanese ruling circles and the heightened activity of American imperialism in Asia, the organization of concerted action by democratic forces in the nation in defense of basic human rights, for the cancellation of the Japanese-American "security treaty," for guaranteed Japanese neutrality and in defense of peace and democracy is becoming even more urgent. "The development of the crisis," the resolution states, "makes political renewal through the creation of a democratic coalition government an increasingly urgent national objective. With even more hope and conviction, we must hold high the banner of the united front of forces for renewal and a democratic coalition government as the only means of escaping the crisis and achieving the political regeneration of Japan."[20]

The appeal for the unification of Japanese democratic forces on an anti-monopoly basis and the accomplishment of social reforms is also made in documents of the Japan Socialist Party. The Japanese socialists have worked out the theory of a popular coalition government to replace the one-party government of the conservatives and carry out fundamental social reforms. The goals, methods and means of this coalition are set forth in the "Program for a Popular Coalition Government," adapted by the 37th JSP Congress in 1974. It stipulates the three major political objectives of the creation of a united front, which are identical in general to the JCP's three major objectives of democratic reform. These are, firstly, the repeal of the Japanese-American "security treaty," Japan's development along a peaceful democratic course and struggle against the rebirth of imperialism and militarism; secondly, struggle in defense of human life and rights and against the anti-people policy of the monopolies; thirdly, struggle for human dignity through the defense of constitutionally guaranteed democratic rights, the revival of democracy and the reform of society, education and culture.[21]

The basis of the people's coalition government, according to the JSP's design, should consist of an anti-monopoly popular front. This kind of government will represent a "democratic government supported by a popular front. It will be made up of representatives of democratic organizations, movements and associations in the popular front, with progressive parties and groups as its basis. This government, backed up by the popular front and guided by the 'fundamentals of the policy of popular unity' or the program of the popular front, compiled with a view to the opinions of the organizations making up the bloc, will resolve pressing political, economic and social conflicts encountered by the working strata of Japan and will carry out reforms aimed at the achievement of peace and democracy in the nation. Although this government will not conduct an expressly socialist policy, it will fully observe constitutional provisions and will have the responsibility of preparing for a peaceful transition to socialism."[22]

As part of the daily struggle for the creation of a united anti-monopoly front and the accomplishment of fundamental social reforms, the JCP and JSP are conducting various campaigns for dialogs and discussions with the broadest variety of democratic organizations, politicians, public spokesmen and private individuals. These campaigns, aimed at the unification of all supporters of political renewal, are being conducted on the nationwide scale and on the regional level. Primary attention is being given to the achievement of a united workers front on a class basis, as the first step in the unification of all democratic forces in the nation.

The further intensification of the struggle for democracy and social progress should safeguard the concrete program for economic development worked out in recent years by the JCP and JSP, which represent the basis of the democratic alternative to monopoly domination. Reflecting the actual plans for the reorganization of the Japanese economy under capitalist conditions, they envisage the accomplishment of an entire group of democratic reforms aimed at limiting the power of the monopolies and improving the status of the working masses.

The existence of concrete and largely identical programs for socioeconomic reforms, set forth by the JCP and JSP, and their periodic joint demonstrations in defense of the true interests of the Japanese nation attest to the presence of favorable objective conditions for a more powerful struggle by democratic forces in the nation and the unification of their efforts in the fight against monopoly domination and for democracy and social progress. Nonetheless, there are substantial difficulties in the way of democratic unity. Internal and international reactionary forces are striving to prevent the unification of segments of the Japanese democratic movement. Above all, reaction is resorting to an old favorite method of action--the intimidation of the masses with the so-called threat of communism. It is precisely for this reason that it is directing its main assault against the Japanese communists.

In order to undermine the influence of the JCP in the masses and to denigrate the idea of struggle for the creation of a broad united anti-monopoly front with the participation of communists, Japanese reaction is inspiring and organizing various anticommunist campaigns and is accusing the communists of antidemocratism, violence, the desire for a "bloody coup" and so forth. The mass propaganda media, controlled by monopolistic capital, are taking every opportunity to exaggerate the need for the unification of "middle-of-the-road" forces on an anticommunist basis. These efforts, which are calculated to win the DSP and Komeito over to the side of the LDP, have been productive for Japanese reaction.

In connection with this, the transformation in the political positions of the "middle-of-the-road" parties is quite indicative. In the beginning of the 1970's both the DSP and Komeito took part in joint democratic demonstrations against reactionary LDP policy on some issues, although with certain reservations. But Japanese reaction's courtseys in the direction of these parties and the hope of receiving ministerial appointments in the conservative government have brought about an abrupt reversal in their political course. Since the beginning of 1978, centrist parties have been much more likely to support the LDP, and this has become almost the norm for the DSP.

This signifies not only the open display of anticommunist and antisocialist political doctrine by the "middle-of-the-road" parties, but also their support for the dangerous plans of Japanese reaction.

The scarecrow of anticommunism, which is being waved about by reactionaries, is also having a definite effect on some Japanese socialists when the question of organizing joint demonstrations with the JCP is raised.

All of this is seriously complicating the daily struggle of democratic forces in Japan for democracy and social progress. In spite of numerous difficulties and obstacles of an objective and subjective nature, however, Japanese democratic forces are filled with determination to continue this struggle, firmly believing that it will be successful. Expressing the

feelings of the overwhelming majority of participants in this struggle, Deputy Chairman K. Ueda of the Presidium of the JCP Central Committee said the following to a Tokyo PRAVDA correspondent: "The outcome of the Japanese people's struggle against the danger of the revival of militarism...will depend primarily on the efficacy with which anticommunist actions of this kind will be repulsed, as well as on the possibility of organizing joint struggle by the broadest segments of the public and creating a united front of progressive forces on this basis. Although we are well aware of the obstacles and difficulties which lie before us in this struggle, we cannot nonetheless view the future optimistically."[23]

This kind of revolutionary optimism is shared by all peace-loving forces on earth, by all those who are contributing to the development of the worldwide revolutionary process.

FOOTNOTES

1. In an editorial entitled "Who Rules Japan? The Structure of Power Without Control," the journal ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, for example, states: "The answer to this question seems quite simple: the Liberal Democratic Party, government and big business. But we are not certain of this. The difficulty involved in determining where, on which level, real power is exercised is a unique feature of Japan" (THE ORIENTAL ECONOMIST, January 1976, p 10).

2. "Asia's New Giant," Washington, 1976, p 759.

3. ZENEI, 1977, No 3, p 107.

4. "VII s"yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Yaponii" [The Seventh Congress of the Japan Communist Party], Moscow, 1959, p 435.

5. Ibid.

6. ZENEI, 1976, No 400 (Special Issue), p 64.

7. "Nihon shakaito no sanjunen" [The JSP Turns Thirty], Tokyo, 1976, p 727.

8. "Nihon-ni okeru shakaishugi-e-no michi" [The Way to Socialism in Japan], Tokyo, 1974, p 50.

9. "This is Minshuto," Tokyo, 1972, p 11.

10. S. Hiroyuki, "Nihon-no seito koryo" [The Programs of Japanese Political Parties], Tokyo, 1977, p 293.

11. KOMEI, 1976, No 9, p 38.

12. SENTAKU, 1978, No 2, p 8.

13. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 10 June 1976.

14. GENDAI-NO MEI, 1976, No 9, p 222.

15. MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 11 June 1977.

16. AKAHATA, 3 February 1979.

17. G. De Vos, "Postwar Social Change in Japan," Tokyo-Berkeley, 1972, p 25.

18. AKAHATA, 23 October 1977.

19. "Main Documents of the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Japan," Tokyo, 1973, p 268.

20. AKAHATA, 23 October 1977.

21. "Nihon shakaito no sanjunen," pp 870-871.

22. Ibid., p 871.

23. PRAVDA, 10 February 1979.

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BEIJING'S EXPANSIONIST POLICY LINE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 137-143

[Article by Ngo Thanh Diong (Vietnam)]

[Text] On 17 February 1979, Beijing reactionary ruling circles launched an aggressive war against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping arrogantly declared that this action had supposedly been taken for the purpose of "punishing" Vietnam and "teaching it a lesson." Beijing sent seven armies, numbering 600,000 soldiers, large quantities of tanks, personnel carriers and guns into Vietnam to attack the six Vietnamese northern border provinces. The aggressors barbarously murdered Vietnamese civilians, most of them women, old men and children, and destroyed administrative and sociocultural facilities. Almost all of the industrial enterprises, academic institutions and medical establishments in the regions they traversed were wiped off the face of the earth.

After a 17-day military presence in Vietnam, the Chinese aggressors were dealt a crushing blow by Vietnamese militia and local troops in the border provinces. Around 62,500 people were killed and hundreds of tanks and motor vehicles were destroyed. It was only then that Beijing hastened to announce the withdrawal of its troops from Vietnam, thereby admitting its shameful defeat.

The Beijing ruling circles' aggressive act against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, a nation which recently routed American aggressors, completely liberated the southern half of the nation, reunited the whole land and is now moving toward socialism on a statewide scale, represents a betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, the world revolutionary movement and the Chinese revolution itself. It exposed the expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic nationalism of the Beijing reactionary leaders to all progressive mankind.

People who did not clearly see the pseudo-Marxist, pseudorevolutionary characteristics of Beijing reactionary circles until recently, have now witnessed their disgusting practices. Even the imperialists and their accomplices did not want to openly defend the Chinese rulers.

China is a vast territory with the largest population in the world. The history of China is the history of ancient human civilization. The Asian method of production kept the Chinese economy in a state of stagnation for a long time. Feudalism, with its absolutist government, and the feudal ideology, based on such philosophical, political and ethical doctrines as Confucianism, Taoism, legalism and others, prevailed in China for thousands of years. The history of China is filled with interethnic wars. It is the history of a struggle for hegemony between feudal military-bureaucratic groups. Many dynasties ruled the nation, rising and then falling. There were periods of dissent and disintegration, and times when the nation fell under the absolutist despotism of a particular dynasty. China's expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic nationalism dates back to ancient times. The Chinese feudal lords believed that China was the center of the world, that the Chinese were the superior race and that other people were inferior. All of China's history testifies that the Han feudal lords belittle and disregarded the rights of ethnic minorities in the nation and of small neighboring states.

In the 19th century, however, imperialist countries--Japan, England, France and Portugal--began to fight for a share of China. This aroused the patriotic feelings of the Chinese people. For more than a century, they waged an anti-imperialist struggle.

At the beginning of the 20th century, when the Chinese began to wake up from a sleep lasting thousands of years, nationalism began to develop, and this was nationalism with bourgeois overtones. The bourgeois revolution in China formally declared that feudalism was its enemy, but it was too weak to put an end to the feudal order. In contrast to the European bourgeois democratic revolutions of previous centuries, the bourgeois revolution in China not only failed to reject feudal traditions, but spontaneously assimilated feudal ideology, both in theory and in practice.

Under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia, Marxism-Leninism reached China and spread throughout the country. The Chinese people's persistent revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism in the first years of the 20th century was an extremely favorable factor for the spread of Marxist-Leninist ideas. The Chinese working class, however, did not have a mature enough class consciousness as yet, and it was not capable of leading the struggle. In 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was founded, but it was not theoretically prepared to properly refute petty bourgeois views. Instead of fighting for the spread of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine in China and against the feudal ideology, the Chinese Communist Party drew no distinctions between the proletarian and feudal ideologies and did not criticize expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic nationalism.

The kind of great-power nationalism that is inherent in bourgeois ideology is alien to Marxism-Leninism--the revolutionary ideology of the proletariat. Marxists must correctly assess the relationship between national

and class factors. This problem must be solved with the organic combination of real patriotism and proletarian internationalism. K. Marx and F. Engels noted in the "Communist Manifesto" that the proletariat must first win national independence and build socialism in each nation and then construct socialism on the worldwide scale.

In the contemporary era, the era of transition from capitalism to socialism in the worldwide scale, the beginning of which was marked by the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the national liberation movement has begun to be organically combined with the proletarian revolutionary movement. It was precisely this that V. I. Lenin had in mind when he issued the slogan "Proletarians of all nations and oppressed people, unite!"

In Vietnam, in the lengthy history of a small nation which has constantly been subjected to aggression by the northern feudal lords and to their domination for many centuries, the patriotism and adamancy of the Vietnamese people constituted the prime mover in the stubborn struggle for their own government and for the protection of their homeland. The Vietnamese people's national liberation struggle was uninterrupted during 100 years of domination by French colonizers. Until the Vietnam Communist Party was formed, however, all of the patriots' revolutionary actions failed because they could only raise the banner of national independence and were incapable of combining the national liberation movement with the international proletarian movement. Only Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, our President Ho Chi Minh, could find the right way to save the homeland, seeing it in the unification of the struggle for national independence with the struggle for socialism. He stressed: "Proletarian revolution is the only way of saving the homeland and liberating the nation."[1]

The Vietnam Communist Party, founded in 1930, was able to coordinate Marxism-Leninism with the patriotism of the Vietnamese people. From the very beginning, our party conducted a course of "proletarization," staunchily supported the working class and fought against all manifestations of alien ideology within the party. Our party outlined the true revolutionary course of transition from national, democratic revolution to socialist revolution bypassing the capitalist stage of development. As a result of this, the Vietnamese revolution achieved outstanding success.

In China the national problem was solved under different historical conditions. Vietnam is a small country which has always been the object of aggression. China is a huge country which was ruled by feudal lords engaged in aggressive campaigns aimed at external expansion and the assimilation of other nationalities. Since Vietnam was constantly being subjected to aggression, the need for national consolidation demanded the unification of various population strata. In China, on the other hand, the feudal rulers, who were constantly conducting an expansionist

1. Ho Chi Minh, "Selected Works," Hanoi, 1960, p 705.

policy, had been cultivating absolutism and despotism in the nation since antiquity. It was precisely under these historical conditions that expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic nationalism came into being in China.

The profound hatred of the Chinese people for the imperialists, landowners, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucracy and militarists provided fertile soil for the propagation of Marxism-Leninism. But the gradual onset of opportunism diverted the Chinese people's revolutionary movement from the Marxist-Leninist channel.

In an attempt to attain their great-power, hegemonistic objectives, Beijing reactionary circles are using Marxist-Leninist phrases as a camouflage in order to mislead the masses.

Beijing ruling circles are now working toward the "four modernizations"--supposedly for the purpose of building socialism in China, but actually only in pursuit of great-power hegemonistic goals--and are concentrating on the modernization of defense, allocating 40-50 percent of the state budget for the acquisition of new types of weapons from the imperialist states. In this way, they are undermining the bases of socialism and betraying the interests of the Chinese people themselves. It is indicative that the struggle for power within the nation never keeps Beijing reactionary groups from striving for expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic goals. This is most clearly reflected in the foreign policy of Beijing ruling circles, which is acquiring an increasingly overt reactionary nature.

To conceal its hegemonistic aspirations, the Beijing reactionary clique is loudly criticizing hegemonism. It has set forth the "three worlds theory," labeling the Soviet Union and United States superpowers and drawing other states into a struggle that is supposed to be against these two giants. In fact, however, it is directed exclusively against the Soviet Union, which has been called superpower number one, allegedly "more dangerous than the United States." The Beijing clique is now trying, step by step, to win the United States over to its own side for a fight against the Soviet Union, adhering to the principle of "sitting on a mountaintop while watching two tigers fight." Chinese reactionary circles are profoundly interested in starting a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, according to Beijing's calculations, should weaken them and allow China to become the only great power in the world.

This unscientific analysis of the international situation and the reactionary course worked out on this basis reflects the subjectivism and voluntarism of Beijing ruling circles.

The objective laws of development, however, do not correspond to the subjective desires of the Beijing reactionary group. The revolutionary forces now fighting for peace, national independence, democracy and

socialism, with the Soviet Union as their basis of support, are strong enough to prevent war and preserve peace throughout the world. Even aggressive and belligerant American imperialism, realizing the power of the Soviet Union, does not wish to start a war against it and has had to conduct negotiations on disarmament.

Ever since the Shanghai joint American-Chinese communique of 1972, Beijing reactionary circles have been the allies of imperialism and reaction and have openly opposed the international workers movement and worldwide socialist system.

Pursuing far-reaching goals with limited capabilities, the Beijing reactionary group, realizing its weakness, is concentrating first on its expansionist and great-power, hegemonistic plans in Asia, particularly Southeast Asia. From the maps of China used in Chinese schools since 1954, we can gain a clear understanding of the Beijing rulers' expansionist aspirations--for the return of China's supposedly "lost territories in Asia." These "lost territories" include Korea, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, Annam (Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea), Burma, Bhutan, Nepal, part of India and vast regions in the Soviet Union (part of Khazakhstan, Primorskiy Kray, the cis-Amur zone and Sakhalin Island). The territory of the Mongolian People's Republic is also regarded by Beijing leaders as part of China. Mao Zedong once said: "The triumph of the people's revolution in China will obviously make Outer Mongolia part of China."

Beijing ruling circles are paying special attention to Southeast Asia. In 1965, Mao Zedong announced: "We must take Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Malaysia and Singapore. Southeast Asia is extremely rich, minerals are in abundance there, and it is worth taking. In the future this region will greatly benefit China's industrial development. In this way, expenditures can be completely recouped. After we take Southeast Asia, the wind from the East will overcome the wind from the West."

Beijing reactionary circles believe that they have tremendous advantages in this region:

In the first place, the Southeast Asian countries are rich in resources, but they are economically underdeveloped, in view of which China will be able to expand its economic, technical and cultural influence there.

In the second place, around 20 million emigre Chinese live in the Southeast Asian countries, and they can be used as a "fifth column" or as a basis of support for Beijing's expansionist aims.

In the third place, some communist parties in the Southeast Asian countries adhere to a pro-Beijing line.

The Beijing reactionary clique has worked out a long-range plan for carrying out its expansionist plans. It is striving to gain control over the communist parties of some Southeast Asian countries, brainwash Chinese emigrants (including the comprador bourgeoisie), take every opportunity to impose Beijing policy lines on the governments of the Southeast Asian countries and so forth. The Beijing leaders have made numerous attempts to intervene in the internal affairs of these countries.

Vietnam, which is located right on China's southern border, has been the direct victim of the expansionism and great-power hegemonism of Beijing reactionary circles.

The history of Vietnam is the history of continuous heroic struggle by its people against the northern aggressive feudal lords. Even after the People's Republic of China was formed, the Maoists continued to carry out expansionst plans for the purpose of annexing Vietnam on the pretext of solidarity, "international assistance" and so forth.

I will cite a few instances.

Between 1949 and 1954, China aided Vietnam in its fight against the French imperialists. Just before the Geneva agreements were concluded, however, China entered into a conspiracy with the imperialists and exerted all types of pressure on Vietnam to force its division into two halves: This was done for the purpose of alloting Laos two provinces bordering on China for the redisposition of troops and preventing Kampuchea from gaining a redisposition zone. This clearly testifies that China was striving to solve the problem only to its own benefit, using North Vietnam and the two liberated provinces of northern Laos as a buffer zone near China's southern border, and was tolerating the French presence in South Vietnam for the purpose of setting up a barrier against American penetration of the region.

When the American neocolonizers crowded the French out of South Vietnam, the Chinese leaders advised Vietnam to "lie in ambush" and stop waging the war for the liberation of South Vietnam.

Adhering to our independent sovereign line, we fought long and hard to save our homeland. In this struggle, we were given tremendous assistance by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. For some time, China also helped us, and we were grateful for this. But the Beijing leaders betrayed the interests of the Chinese people, deceived them and used this assistance to impose their own anti-Soviet policy line on Vietnam. They wanted us to "fight down to the last Vietnamese" and defeat the United States for the purpose of forcing it to make concessions to China and join China in its fight against the Soviet Union. Evidence of this can be found in the Beijing leaders' opposition to negotiations when Vietnam was fighting against the American imperialists and simultaneously conducting negotiations with them. After entering into a conspiracy with the

American imperialists, however, the Beijing leaders changed their tone and declared that Vietnam was "acting correctly in negotiating with the United States in Paris." When they approved the Shanghai joint communique in connection with Nixon's visit to China in 1972, they agreed to American preservation of the Nguyen Van Thieu regime in South Vietnam. As a sign of gratitude, the Americans verbally admitted that Taiwan belonged to China. This was a manifestation of national egotism and a betrayal of the interests of the Vietnamese revolution.

The complete liberation of South Vietnam in April 1975 and the reunification of both its halves did not please the Chinese leaders because it was inconsistent with their plans for Southeast Asia. They did not wish Vietnam a total victory, since the triumph of the Vietnamese revolution, the advancement of a united Vietnam toward socialism and its transformation into a strong and independent state would constitute a huge obstacle in the way of their expansionist plans in Southeast Asia.

It was precisely at that time that the expansionist, great-power and hegemonistic aspirations of the Beijing leaders began to be manifested in all their clarity. The Chinese leaders exerted various kinds of pressure on Vietnam: They cut off all aid, recalled all specialists to China and invented a story about "suffering emigrants," falsely accusing Vietnam of treating the emigrants offensively, as a result of which they were supposedly pleading for permission to return to their homeland. This was actually a deliberate attempt to create confusion in Vietnam. They were trying to use the Chinese emigrants as a "fifth column" in order to prepare for the annexation of Vietnam.

The most insidious aspect of the situation was the attempt made by Beijing ruling circles, immediately after the liberation of South Vietnam, to use their proteges, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary, to turn Kampuchea into a beachhead for assaults on Vietnam from the southwest. They had long planned to support the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique to conduct a policy of genocide in Kampuchea and set up a fascist dictatorship there, which was branded a disgrace by the entire world. They gave generous military and economic assistance to Kampuchean reactionaries for the launching of a war against Vietnam and for the subsequent subjugation of all of South Vietnam.

The Beijing leaders' intrigues in Kampuchea were an utter failure. Vietnam dealt a crushing blow to Kampuchean reaction in the southwestern provinces of Vietnam. The genuine revolutionary forces of Kampuchea overthrew the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique with our help on 7 January 1979 and formed the People's Republic of Kampuchea. This was the grandest of victories for the Kampuchean revolution and the most serious of defeats for the expansionist, great-power, hegemonistic plans of Beijing ruling circles. They are now still supporting the remnants of the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary clique, but the situation in Kampuchea is irreversible.

The Beijing expansionists also resorted to various ruses in dealings with Laos. On the pretext of assistance, they tried to impose their own policy line on the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, to win over administrative personnel, to conduct espionage, to create bases of support, to attract the public over to their side, to arouse disagreements within ethnic minorities, to overthrow the revolutionary government and so forth. They openly supported Bang Pao and Kong Le and were preparing to make use of them to set up a puppet government. Under the wise leadership of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party, the united Lao people are successfully fighting against these insidious schemes.

Beijing reactionary circles are seriously alarmed by the cohesive alliance of three countries--Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. This is why they are making every effort to disunite our people. Given the invincible and traditional solidarity of the Vietnamese, Lao and Kampuchean people, all of the expansionist schemes of the Beijing leaders will inevitably fail. The solidarity of the three countries is stronger now than ever before. Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea are filled with determination to defend their friendship and fight together against their common enemy--the Beijing expansionists.

Vietnam was subjected to direct aggression by the Chinese hegemonists, who started a war against it. On 17 February of this year, they mobilized large quantities of troops and military equipment for an offensive attack on several northern border provinces in Vietnam, hoping to seize these provinces and use them as a beachhead for a future march on Hanoi and the subjugation of all Vietnam. They prepared for this in advance. by forming secret organizations in regions populated by ethnic minorities, by planning to set up a puppet government and so forth. All of these plans, however, failed. The inhabitants of our border regions, most of whom are representatives of ethnic minorities, came together and immediately rose up in a resolute struggle against the Chinese aggressors. Within 17 days, Beijing ruling circles had to announce the disgraceful withdrawal of their troops from Vietnam. But they have not given up their expansionist, hegemonistic aspirations and are trying to harm the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

After the disgraceful failure of the recent aggression, which was condemned by all progressive mankind, and in connection with internal disagreements and economic difficulties, the Beijing rulers had to agree to negotiate with Vietnam. The first round of the Vietnamese-Chinese negotiations was held in Hanoi on the deputy foreign minister level, but the talks have still not produced any positive results through the fault of the Chinese side.

At the first meeting, the Vietnamese side set forth three reasonable stipulations as primary objectives--the immediate normalization of the situation in border regions, the withdrawal of the troops of both sides to a distance of 3-5 kilometers from one another, the creation of a neutral zone and the exchange of prisoners of war. We have displayed a

great deal of restraint and good will in these talks, making every effort to ensure their successful outcome, but the Chinese side is constantly inventing obstacles. It recently voiced eight stipulations, demanding Vietnamese recognition of China's sovereign rights to the Paracel Islands and Vietnam's denial of international commitments to Laos and Kampuchea. These absurd demands constitute intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and are a reflection of Chinese expansionism and great-power chauvinism.

The Beijing leaders are prolonging the talks and are trying to confuse international and Chinese public opinion. They are simultaneously making preparations for new aggressive acts. During the course of the negotiations, they mobilized nine armies, positioned more than ten divisions near the Vietnamese border and provoked unrest on the Vietnamese and Lao borders. Deng Xiaoping is threatening to give Vietnam a "second punishment."

The Vietnamese people are displaying constant vigilance and combat readiness. If the Beijing reactionary ruling circles start a war, they will certainly suffer defeat.

The Vietnamese people are certain that, under the wise leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party, a genuine Marxist-Leninist party, and with the support and assistance of the Soviet Union, the fraternal socialist countries and all progressive mankind, they will win a victory over the Beijing reactionaries' expansionist, hegemonistic plans and will be able to defend their socialist homeland and built socialism in their nation.

We are fully aware that the struggle against the Beijing expansionists is not only our national objective, but also an international struggle for peaceful revolution in the interests of the people of the world and in the interests of the Chinese people themselves.

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MAOISM AND THE FATE OF SOCIALISM IN CHINA

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[Article by V. F. Feoktistov, candidate of philosophical sciences]

[Text] The victory of the people's revolution of 1949 in China was one of the most important world events after World War II. It provided the Chinese workers with the prospect of national and social liberation and the economic and political reorganization of society on the basis of socialist principles. This process, which was begun successfully in China in the early and middle fifties, was later cut short by the Maoists in the CCP, who, after seizing the dominant positions in the party and government, not only inflicted serious harm on the progressive development of the PRC, but also endangered the very socialist prospects of this development.

Nonetheless, official Beijing propaganda is still asserting that it is precisely the "Thought" of Mao Zedong and his theoretical and practical activity that represented the main condition and prerequisite for not only the triumph of the anti-imperialist people's democratic revolution in China, but also the "foundation" of all the Chinese workers' achievements in "socialist construction." This is exactly how the contribution of Mao Zedong and his "Thought" to the socioeconomic development of the PRC was assessed in December 1978 at the Third Plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. Current Chinese propaganda, in spite of its admission of isolated "errors" and negative moments in the past activities of the Maoists, is striving to depict the "Thought" of Mao Zedong, and Maoism as a whole, as the theoretical basis of China's socialist development.

All of this lends particular scientific and political importance to the question of Maoism's attitude toward socialist revolution, socialist construction in China and the fate of socialism in this country.

I

Maoism first took shape as a unique petty bourgeois nationalistic current in the CCP in the beginning of the 1940's. This was a concrete sign of the struggle between two lines or two tendencies in the communist movement

in China--proletarian internationalism on one side and petty bourgeois nationalism on the other. Riding in on the crest of the Chinese people's revolutionary national liberation movement, Maoism was a parasite from the very beginning, feeding on the revolutionary mood of the Chinese working masses and striving to make use of them for their own great-power chauvinistic purposes. It was precisely nationalism, or reactionary great-Han chauvinism, that represented the focal point which determined Maoist theoretical and practical activity throughout the lengthy and strange evolution of Maoism. Whereas this feature of Maoism, reflecting its essence, could still be interpreted as the revolutionary ideal of national liberation, aimed against imperialist domination, during the first stages of the national liberation movement in China, the fundamental incompatibility of Maoist nationalism with the objectives of both the national and the social liberation of the Chinese workers was revealed more and more clearly later, as the Chinese revolution progressed toward the resolution of social problems. And this was no coincidence. After all, it was precisely at the time when the democratic revolution was evolving into a socialist revolution that the class nature of the forces involved in the revolutionary movement during its initial stage was most clearly apparent. The same was true of Maoism. After the victory of the people's revolution in China in 1949, during the process of its evolution into a socialist revolution, the Maoists in the CCP revealed their petty bourgeois nationalist essence and their hostile feelings about the actual socialist reconstruction of Chinese society. The political bankruptcy and degeneration of the petty bourgeois revolutionary essence of the Maoists into a petty bourgeois counterrevolutionary essence did not simply represent an isolated "episode" in the evolution of the Maoists, but a natural manifestation of their class essence and ideological and theoretical platform.

From the very beginning, this platform contained the great-power chauvinistic idea of turning China into a strong militarized state, capable of guaranteeing the Maoists world hegemony. "We must conquer the entire globe"--this is how the main goal of Maoist theoretical and practical activity was candidly defined by Mao Zedong at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee Military Council in 1959. Consequently, this was not a matter of restoring China's national independence or consolidating its prestige in today's world, but of establishing its supremacy over other states and nationalities. In connection with this, it would be wise to remember the intolerance with which V. I. Lenin viewed bourgeois nationalism as the direct opposite of proletarian internationalism and Marxism-Leninism. "Bourgeois nationalism and proletarian internationalism," V. I. Lenin wrote, "are two irreconcilably hostile slogans corresponding to the two great class camps of the entire capitalist world and reflecting two policies (or, in fact, two outlooks) on the national question."[1]

Subsequent events completely confirmed the accuracy of these words. Lenin's conclusion sounds particularly timely in our day, now that increasingly broad segments of the non-proletarian masses are being drawn into the revolutionary liberation movement, bringing their petty bourgeois

attitudes and prejudices with them, including the prejudices of bourgeois and petty bourgeois nationalism. These attitudes and views become all the more dangerous for the public interest when they turn into the official platform of the ruling party of a nation embarking on the path of socialist reforms. In this case, nationalism and the chauvinism deriving from it are capable of distorting the goals of scientific socialism and replacing its ideals with the concept of "barracks communism" as an internal means of attaining hegemonistic objectives. In other words, in the theory and practice of such petty bourgeois nationalists, socialism is transformed from an ideal reorganization of society in the workers' interest into nothing more than a speculative slogan, with which they try to win the working masses over to their own side. In this process, scientific socialism loses all of its social and economic meaning.

The history of the revolutionary movement in China and the history of the People's Republic of China have conclusively proved that Maoism, from the very beginning of its functioning as a petty bourgeois nationalist current, was the opponent of scientific socialism and the direct opposite of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism as its most important integral component. During this process, Maoism always pretended to be "true Marxism," developing within the communist movement in China. In no way, however, can this refute its fundamental incomparability with scientific communism. Otherwise, Marxism could include many nationalistic currents, which could act as the proletariat's ally during the course of the national liberation, anti-imperialist struggle and could play a progressive and even revolutionary role in certain stages of this movement.

Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish between the community of interests of currents that differ in terms of their class nature during certain (initial) stages of the national liberation revolution and the subsequent and inevitable (in the absence of a desire to make the transition to the proletarian position) dissociation during the process of profound social reforms, which affect the class interests of its participants in different ways. For this reason, it would be absolutely erroneous and politically harmful to categorize petty bourgeois nationalistic currents as Marxist simply on the grounds that they play a progressive role in the initial stage of the national liberation, anti-imperialist revolution and act as the allies of proletarian internationalist forces or try to pass themselves off as Marxist. An objective scientific analysis of the entire process of the formation and evolution of Maoism confirms this conclusion.

II

In view of the fact that Maoism is a petty bourgeois current by its very class nature, it must consequently be the ideological and political opponent of Marxism-Leninism and the theory and practice of scientific communism. During all stages of its evolution, Maoism was not guided by the hope of building a truly socialist, in the Marxist sense of the term, society in China, but by great-power chauvinistic views on China's place and role in the world. This basic strategic premise is the basis of all Maoist activity.

As the heirs of feudal Sinocentrism, the Maoists have transformed this reactionary idea into an avant-gardist chauvinistic theory, according to which China now supposedly represents the "center of the worldwide revolutionary process" and, consequently, its role as world leader has been historically predetermined. This chauvinistic and hegemonistic program, however, has been clothed by the Maoists in a Marxist disguise, with the aid of which they have tried to conceal its true purpose, consisting in the unscrupulous distortion of the ideas of scientific communism. As we know, this is not a new trick. V. I. Lenin once stated: "The dialectic of history is such that the theoretical triumph of Marxism will force its enemies to disguise themselves as Marxists."[2] This particularly applies to the petty bourgeois nationalistic forces within the communist movement: By virtue of circumstances, they must "disguise themselves as Marxists" to stay within the movement. The shameless parasitical assimilation of some premises of Marxism-Leninism and attempts to conceal chauvinistic ideas and antisocialist practices with Marxist terminology have always been characteristic features of Maoism.

The petty bourgeois nature of Maoism predetermined the eclectic and contradictory nature of its theories. Maoism provides examples of isolated theses and refrains from the most diverse, sometimes contrasting, theories and concepts--from "leftist," Trotskyst and anarchist (such as the thesis concerning world war as a condition and prerequisite for the triumph of the "world revolution") to rightist, bourgeois (such as the geopolitical descriptions of the balance of power in today's world). It would be wrong, however, to reduce Maoism to any one of these theories or to identify it with them. Although Maoism assimilates and borrows isolated premises and theses from other currents (including Marxist ideas) and maneuvers between these currents, it refashions these theses into its own doctrine--a Chinese version of social chauvinism. It is precisely chauvinism that brings all of the diverse elements of Maoism together to make up an integral system of views and gives it its own, nationalist logic. This "logic," in turn, dictates the proper "handling" of theories or ideas by Maoism. As an essentially political current, Maoism vulgarly and pragmatically subordinates all of its theoretical activity to political intrigues and immediate political practices, thereby turning theory and ideas into a mere appendage of its practice, into its instrument and handmaiden. This is the reason for the contradictory, and sometimes even incomparable, nature of the "ideas" and theoretical premises of Maoism, which have been set forth during different periods of its functioning. Consequently, a correct assessment of the content of Maoist activity in any specific period necessitates consideration of these two "strata," two levels of Maoism's functioning--the theoretical and the political, the vulgar and pragmatic nature of its "theories" and "ideas" and their direct dependence on political practice.

This does not mean that Maoism does not have a methodological basis to make it a relatively stable current. It does have this kind of methodology, and this determines its approach to processes and events in today's world.

All of this applies to something else--to the political ideology of Maoism, to its sociopolitical and economic "ideas," which are vulgar and pragmatic and are supposed to provide theoretical justification for the inconsistency and contradictoriness of Maoist practices. This feature of Maoism provides extensive opportunities for the "regrouping" or reshuffling of individual Maoist "ideas" and postulates in accordance with the "needs of the day"--in other words, the pragmatism of Maoism as a theory gives rise to the same kind of pragmatism in the handling of Maoism. A consideration of the pragmatic nature of Maoist ideological and theoretical constructions aids in revealing the mainspring or "unifying theme" of the entire evolution of Maoism and explaining the fluctuations in Maoist policy that seem contradictory at first glance. This theme has always been great-power chauvinism in ideology and hegemonism in policy.

The following is a brief summary of the main stages in the evolution of Maoism and their content.

Maoism made itself known as a unique ideological current in the beginning of the 1940's with the "new democracy" theory, which aspired to the role of some kind of "Chinese version of Marxism" but essentially represented a revision of the fundamental Marxist-Leninist premise concerning the worldwide historic mission of the working class and replaced the Leninist doctrine about the evolution of bourgeois democratic revolution into socialist revolution with the concept of the "new democratic revolution" as a purely "peasant revolution," which was supposed to result in the dictatorship "of all revolutionary patriotic classes," including the national bourgeoisie, which, according to Mao Zedong, would actually signify the "transfer of power to the peasantry."[3] The idea of dictatorship of the proletariat as a political instrument of socialist construction was replaced in this theory by the idea of a "coalition government"--a political alliance of various "patriotic" and democratic forces.

The "new democracy theory," in spite of its obvious anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist content, was declared a "creative development of Marxism," which was already being called "Sinized." "The Sinization of Marxism," Mao Zedong said in October 1938, at the Sixth Plenum of the CCP Central Committee, "signifies that every form it takes will apply specifically to China."[4] Therefore, from the very beginning of its functioning, Maoism claimed the chauvinistic and hegemonistic right to "Sinize" Marxism, so that this "Marxism" in the thought of Mao Zedong could later be passed off as the "acme" of Marxism's development.

Completely in accordance with the chauvinistic essence of its ideology, Maoism also states its own "unique" views regarding world war as a factor of social progress, as the "bridge" mankind must cross if it wishes to make the transition to "a new historical era."[5]

The "new democracy" theory, the idea of militarism and the apology for world war constitute the basis of the theoretical "baggage" with which Maoism approached the year of 1949--the year of the victory of the

revolution. There was no room, and there could be no room, for the ideas of scientific socialism in this baggage. Maoism turned to these ideas later, but not for the purpose of assimilating them, but in the same pragmatic and chauvinistic interests. The fact is that the development of the Chinese revolution in 1946-1949 substantially strengthened Marxist, internationalist forces in the CCP, and these refuted Mao Zedong's "new democracy" theory in principle at the March Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in 1949 and embarked on the gradual transformation of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution. It was then that Maoism made the change to a new tactic--an attempt to adapt the ideas of socialism to its own great-power chauvinistic course.

Between 1949 and 1957, the Maoists took the dominant Marxist tendency in the CCP into account and made every effort to conceal their own views and true goals. It was at this time that another feature of Maoism became particularly evident--its double dealing and its theoretical and political mimicry. With no intention of putting away their weapons, the Maoists continued their anti-Marxist, nationalist activity, but they moved it mainly into the sphere of confidential intra-party statements. These statements, which became known at the end of the 1960's as a result of Red Guard publications, testified that Maoism was still a petty bourgeois chauvinistic current in the CCP, and that its social ideal was a society of "barracks communism" and a militaristic state capable of guaranteeing the implementation of the Maoists' hegemonistic plans. This is attested to, for example, by a confidential statement made by Mao in 1956 at a conference on the intelligentsia, where he frankly said: "It will be unforgivable if, in a few decades, we are still not the world's leading power." At the second session of the Eighth CCP Congress, Mao Zedong expressed an overtly chauvinistic and hegemonistic view on China's role in today's world in another speech (also confidential). "In our practice," he said, "we have surpassed Marx.... Lenin called Asia progressive and Europe backward. This is a fact. It is still true. The development of China illustrates the developmental tendency of the entire international situation." Here Mao repeated his old idea about the "benefit" of world war: "We must not be afraid of war.... It does not matter if half of mankind dies in the war. It will not be frightening even if only a third remains.... If atomic war actually breaks out, it will not be so bad, because it will result in the death of capitalism and eternal peace will reign on earth."

Therefore, even at this time, Maoist activity was based on chauvinistic and hegemonistic premises. They dictated a corresponding policy to the Maoists--the policy of the militarization of China and its transformation into a society of "barracks communism." The Maoist socioeconomic experiments of 1957 and 1958, known as the policy of the "Three Red Banners," represent an attempt to implement this petty bourgeois "ideal."

Here it would be wise to recall that when Mao Zedong set forth his views on "Chinese" or "barracks" communism in 1958, he unequivocally disavowed the entire preceding period of PRC development (that is, up to 1958),

calling it the materialization of a "revisionist line" and a concession to "bourgeois ideology" and "bourgeois style."[6] It is particularly important to point this out now, as contemporary Beijing propaganda is depicting Mao Zedong as the "engineer" of the successes achieved in the PRC precisely during that period in its development. The words of Mao himself refute this "version." Maoism is only connected with real socialism in China and the socialist reforms which began to be carried out in this nation in the mid-1950's as their ideological and political opponent.

After failing in his attempts to impose his "model" of "barracks communism" on China at the end of the 1950's, Mao Zedong and his group transferred the emphasis in their struggle against scientific socialism to the international arena in the early 1960's. It was at this time that Maoism worked out its own "special views" on the cardinal issues of the day--questions of war, peace and revolution--and tried to impose these views on the world communist movement. Here the Maoist group again revealed its great-power chauvinistic ambitions by rejecting the documents agreed upon at conferences of communist parties and offering its "own," leftist revisionist platform in exchange.

Within China, however, the Maoists were preparing for a political counter-revolutionary coup, which took the form of the "Cultural Revolution" of 1965-1969. It resulted in the establishment of a new political regime in China--an anti-people military-bureaucratic dictatorship--in place of the previous democratic political superstructure. Maoism was officially declared the party and state ideology. At the same time, the "Thought of Mao" was declared the "acme of Marxism-Leninism" of our era.

In the years following the "Cultural Revolution," right up until Mao Zedong's death in September 1976, the process of the ideological and political evolution of Maoism essentially ended with its final transformation into a social-chauvinist, militaristic doctrine and practice, hostile to scientific socialism and all segments of the world revolutionary movement, and into a reserve of imperialism and forces for aggression and war. This was the precise conclusion set forth by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his report at the 25th CPSU Congress.

If we summarize all that we have said about Maoism in Mao's lifetime, we can define its main features in the mid-1970's as the following: Firstly, chauvinism in ideology and hegemonism in policy; secondly, militarism as an ideology and practical policy; thirdly, the ideology and practice of despotic rule in the form of a military-bureaucratic anti-people dictatorship, based on the coercion of the workers; fourthly, the parasitical feeding on individual Marxist-Leninist premises and the attempt to pass Maoism off as the "Marxism-Leninism of the contemporary age"; fifthly, fundamental hostility toward scientific socialism, taking the form of anti-Sovietism; sixthly, alliance with the most reactionary forces in the capitalist world on the basis of anti-Sovietism and struggle against the international communist and revolutionary-democratic movements, and the transformation of Maoism into a "Sinized" variety of anticommunism.

III

When the new stage in the evolution of Maoism after September 1976 is analyzed, the retention of the features listed above, which characterize it as a specific ideological and political current, distinct from other petty bourgeois and chauvinistic currents, must be taken into account. The forms taken by the basic features can undergo certain modifications, as was frequently the case in the past, and this is due to Maoism's pragmatic approach to theory in general, and, even more, to the eclectic and contradictory nature of the theoretical premises found in the "Thought" of Mao Zedong.

An analysis of the theoretical platform and political practices of the Chinese leadership after Mao Zedong's death shows that Maoism, in its principal and essential content, has been taken up by the new Chinese leaders in its entirety and is still the official ideology of the party and state. This is attested to by the materials of the 11th CCP Congress (1977) and the first session of the Fifth NPC [National People's Congress] (1978), as well as all the political practices of the present PRC and CCP leaders.

The period since Mao Zedong's death has demonstrated that the present leaders of China have not only accepted the main features of Maoism--chauvinism and hegemonism--but have also taken a further step to the right on the basis of Maoism's inherent tendency toward merger with the forces of the monopolistic bourgeoisie, world reaction and anticommunism. This provides more evidence of the reactionary essence of Maoism as a petty bourgeois, nationalist current, which objectively, as long as it remains this kind of current, can evolve only to the right, in the direction of merger with the capitalist world. This merger does not "nullify" the petty bourgeois character of Maoism, but emphasizes it and makes it, in the final analysis, the absolute opponent of scientific communism.

The present stage in the evolution of Maoism can be defined as the further intensification of the reactionary essence of Mao Zedong's theory and practice by the present leaders of China, and the extension of his anti-socialist theories and policies to their logical end--direct merger with world anticommunism in theory and in practice.

The ideological, theoretical and political platform of today's Chinese leaders can be described as an attempt to adapt Maoism more effectively to the needs of the kind of national economic development that would make it possible to turn the nation into a militarized state of "barracks communism." It is precisely this attempt that should provide the key to an understanding of the "deviations" from "classic" Maoism of the last 10 years, and the "adjustment" of Maoism that is now being carried out by the Maoist regime's ideologists and practical workers. The purpose of this "adjustment" is to create a contemporary, "modernized" version of Maoism and to rid it of the facets and features which became too unpopular

and evoked overt dissatisfaction from the working masses and cadres. This "adjustment" of Maoism provides more proof of its permanent crisis and its ideological bankruptcy.

The struggle over the "Thought of Mao Zedong," which has become increasingly heated in the Chinese leadership since the middle of 1978 and has brought two tendencies into conflict--the ultra-leftist nationalist tendency and the rightist nationalist--is more concerned, despite the different interpretations of the "Great Helmsman's" legacy, with Maoism's tactical goals rather than its strategic objectives. Objectively, it naturally discredits the "Thought of Mao Zedong," but it is subjectively aimed at reinforcing its principal, social-chauvinistic and militaristic essence. In other words, today's Maoists are trying to purge Maoism not only of bankrupt and unpopular "ideas" and postulates, but also of errors made by Mao Zedong himself. It is from this standpoint that we should apparently also examine the campaign that has been going on since May 1978 for the "liberation of the consciousness" and the crowning point of the campaign--the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee in December 1978. This "liberation" in China consists not only in freeing the mind of the fetters of Maoism as a whole, but in the attempt to give Maoism and the "Thought of Mao" a more "contemporary" sound, and in the selective choice of only those of Mao's statements that can most effectively serve the strategic interests of great-power and hegemonistic aspirations.

Although the process of creating a contemporary, "modernized" version of Maoism cannot be considered complete, the following features of this version can already be discerned:

1. The growth of great-power chauvinism and hegemonism in the theory and practice of Maoism after Mao.

Mao's successors, by placing more emphasis on Maoism's inherent great-power hegemonistic aims, have intensified, rather than relaxed, their attempts to crown the corrected and purged "Thought of Mao Zedong" with the halo of the "highest stage" in the development of Marxism-Leninism.

Above all, Mao's foreign policy ideas are being camouflaged as Marxist, because it is is in these ideas that the great-power hegemonistic essence of Maoism is manifested with the greatest clarity and breadth. This essential feature of Maoism was quite fully revealed in the "three worlds theory."

The main distinctive feature of the present Chinese leadership's approach to the propaganda of Maoism is reflected in a desire to depict "Mao Zedong's contribution to the development of Marxism" as a fundamentally new theory of scientific communism, based on the "generalization" of the actual experience of proletarian dictatorship and the actual practice of socialist construction, to which the ideological legacy of the founders of Marxism-Leninism supposedly has no direct relationship.

2. More pronounced anti-Sovietism as a reflection of the fundamental hostility of Maoism toward scientific socialism.

Mao's successors, by denouncing the "gang of four" faction, essentially acquired unlimited freedom to merge with imperialism and make active use of it. Never before has the antirevolutionary and antisocialist platform of Maoism been so extensively and openly reflected in Beijing's attempts to form a military and political alliance with the largest imperialist powers, including the United States. It is this attempt that represents the most substantial indicator of the Chinese leaders' continuous progression toward the right, toward the position of extremist and [illegible] circles, whose dreams of settling the historic dispute between socialism and capitalism by military means are being revitalized by the anti-Soviet activity of Beijing.

3. A continuous move to the right, toward direct merger with world imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis. The development of the "three worlds" theory as theoretical justification for the pro-imperialist policy line.

Convincing proof exists that Mao's successors are associating their hope of achieving these hegemonistic goals more and more with the most energetic exploitation of the anti-Soviet and antisocialist extremism of the more belligerant imperialist and reactionary circles. Beijing's increasingly rapid progression toward military and political cooperation with these circles, as a totally natural symptom of Maoism's counterrevolutionary essence, provides irrefutable proof that Mao's successors are not only carrying on the social-chauvinistic line of Maoism, but are doing this even more insistently than in the past.

Turning pro-imperialism into the central element of their current policy and simultaneously striving to verbally camouflage it as thoroughly as possible, Mao's successors have used pseudo-Marxist phrases to "develop" Mao Zedong's primitively geopolitical and chauvinistic "idea of the three worlds" and have proclaimed it the "class line of the proletariat in international affairs."[7]

For this purpose, they have given a new definition to the "third world." Whereas Mao included all of the countries in Asia (with the exception of Japan), Africa and Latin America in the third world, the concept is now much broader. Mao's successors have, as it were, put China into the center of the "third world," along with a few other socialist countries, which, in conjunction with the oppressed (in Beijing's view) nations, make up the "third world." Moreover, this "third world" is called the only generator of historical progress in Beijing. The most important responsibilities of this "third world," according to the Beijing leaders, are not only the launching of all-out war against the USSR, but also the creation of the "broadest possible international united front" of all anti-Soviet, imperialist forces, which are called fighters for peace and for justice in international relations and--what is most important--are proclaimed the powerful allies of the international proletariat in the work of advancing the "world revolution."

4. More energetic attempts to undermine international detente and provoke a new world war.

Beijing's rapprochement with the imperialist West is now being particularly stimulated by the common desire of Beijing and the more reactionary imperialist forces to undermine international detente, which originated and developed largely through the efforts of the USSR and the entire socialist community. Although people in Beijing are talking about the possibility of postponing world war and are saying that China wants only peace (for itself), Mao's successors are actually taking every opportunity to intensify the very "fight between the two superpowers" which, in their own words, will lead directly to worldwide military conflict.

5. A new policy toward the international working class, aimed at entangling it in an alliance with the international bourgeoise for struggle against the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

The present Chinese leaders are verbally insisting on an analysis of the real facts, but the "three worlds" theory presents a completely distorted picture of the international balance of power and the contemporary status of the international workers movement.

Above all, Beijing official documents actually deny the revolutionary role and revolutionary potential of the working class in the developed capitalist countries. It is assigned an auxiliary role, while the people of the "third world" are assigned the role of the main force providing for the resolution of urgent problems in world development.

The Maoists believe that the principal enemy of the working class in the so-called second world is not monopolistic capital, but the Soviet Union, and that the main current objective is not struggle for peace, democracy and socialism, but the defense of "national independence."

"The international proletariat," a policy-planning document of the new PRC leaders states, as reported in a RENMIN RIBAO editorial of 1 November 1977, "must strive to the maximum now to create, reinforce and broaden an international united front," which will actually be directed exclusively against the USSR and the socialist community, and "thoroughly develop its role as the nucleus of this front."

6. The special role of the Maoist theory of "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat" and its domestic and foreign policy functions.

In their ideological and political activity, the present leaders of China attach primary significance to Mao Zedong's theory of "continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat." The foreword to the fifth volume of Mao Zedong's works noted that, even in his works of the 1949-1957 period, Mao Zedong had already "revealed the law governing the

development of socialist society and created the great theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat."[8] This "theory" was given the official status of state ideology in the new 1978 Constitution of the PRC.

According to Beijing's official version, the elaboration of this "theory" was occasioned by the need to summarize the "experience of proletarian dictatorship after the Leninist period." In view of the alleged inability of the international communist movement to carry out this historic mission, it became the responsibility of Mao Zedong, who is once again depicted as V. I. Lenin's immediate heir and "the greatest Marxist of our time."

Until recently, current Chinese propaganda was no longer calling this "theory" the result of a "combination of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the specific experience of the Chinese revolution," but the "greatest contribution" to "Marxism of the socialist period," pointing out the "basic means" of building socialism and having "great and far-reaching worldwide significance."

Recently, particularly after the Third Plenum of the CCP Central Committee (December 1978), the direct propaganda of this Maoist "theory" has been muffled in China and transferred to another plane--the purely philosophical realm. Primary significance is attached to its "philosophical" substantiation, provided by Mao Zedong in the work entitled "An Enquiry Into the Correct Resolution of Contradictions Among the People" (1957). This does not change the essence of the matter: The thesis concerning the existence of the bourgeoisie as part of the public under socialism has actually been retained, and the concept of "continued revolution" has merely been given a new interpretation--it has been directed to the right, to justify the policy of flirting with the Chinese bourgeoisie and encouraging it to carry out the hegemonistic plans of China's present leaders.

7. Increased speculation on the prestige of Marxism-Leninism.

Under the guise of struggle against the "gang of four," the current Chinese leadership is making certain adjustments in Maoism. As part of this process, it is speculating more on the prestige of Marxism-Leninism and attempting to expand its ideological camouflage for the more effective implementation of the previous antisocialist policy line.

The 11th CCP Congress underscored the Maoists' claims to "Marxist" ideological and political hegemony. The "Thought" of Mao Zedong was proclaimed the "latest addition to the theoretical repository of Marxism-Leninism" and the "victory banner of world revolutionaries."[9]

The facts indicate that the Chinese leadership is still taking an anti-Marxist, anticommunist stand in spite of its use of revolutionary Marxist phrases and its declarations of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

8. The increasingly contradictory economic policies of Chinese leaders: the retention of Maoism in theory and a utilitarian approach to practice.

In an attempt to adapt some of Mao Zedong's postulates to the actual needs of China's economy and, thereby, to find an escape from economic chaos, the Chinese leaders have had to take several immediate measures to eradicate or diminish the force of some of the more odious aspects of Maoist economic policy, which had essentially paralyzed the national economy by 1976 and had endangered the very existence of the political system set up as a result of the so-called "Cultural Revolution."

Statements by the Chinese leaders and an analysis of their actual behavior indicate that the goals and essence of the economic policy of China's new leadership have remained unchanged in principle: This policy is still aimed at subordinating national economic development to the interests of the quickest possible buildup of Chinese military power for the purpose of realizing great-power, chauvinistic ambitions. This policy is still working against socialism and against the public interest.

Militarization, which is the most important component of the set of social relations cultivated in China since the end of the 1950's, now permeates all spheres of public life in the PRC.

Despite the fact that the policy of militarizing the economy and all public life in the nation, which has been actively implemented throughout the 1960's and 1970's, represented the main obstacle in the way of social progress, gave rise to sharp conflicts within Chinese society and threatened socialist gains in China, the new leadership of the PRC has quite definitely announced its firm intention to continue and even intensify the course toward the militarization of the country and its transformation into a militaristic, aggressive state.

9. The perpetuation of political instability and the power struggle within the Chinese leadership.

Political instability has become a permanent feature of the internal state of affairs in China in recent years. Mao Zedong's successors, in spite of their propagandistic condemnation of factionalism, are essentially carrying on his line of legitimized and allegedly unavoidable struggle between party groups, whereby various groups let off steam in an internal political struggle.

Therefore, the political and ideological activity of the present Chinese leadership provides convincing proof of the continuous progression of its ideology and politics toward the right, in the direction of increasingly close alliance with the forces of global anticommunism. This process is being accompanied by the creation of a contemporary version of Maoism, which will more effectively serve the expansionist, antisocialist purposes of the current Maoist leadership and its hegemonistic,

militaristic policy. Without changing the essence of this policy, today's Chinese leadership has had to make adjustments in the means and methods of its implementation--that is, to breathe new life, so to speak, into Maoism.

The policy and the ideological platform of the present Chinese leaders are also becoming increasingly dangerous because they have not only retained the main feature of Maoism--its antisocialist, anticommunist aims and its hostility toward Marxism-Leninism--but are also attempting to adapt Maoist postulates to the realities of life, to "ennoble" and "beautify" them and to make them more respectable. The present Chinese leaders have retained and are reinforcing the fundamentally antisocialist, nationalist bases of Maoism.

What is more, Maoism provided new evidence of its expansionist, reactionary essence in early 1979 by starting an aggressive war against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Beijing's treacherous attack on a socialist country completely exposed the counterrevolutionary nature of Maoism and its fundamental hostility toward real socialism and demonstrated the kind of danger Maoism poses to the fate of mankind.

Therefore, the entire history of Maoism testifies that it has always, during all stages of its evolution, been the principal opponent of scientific socialism--both within China and in the international arena.

Our party has waged an unrelenting struggle against Maoism, but it has never associated Maoism or the Maoists with the Chinese people. The CPSU and the Soviet State, taking the fundamental interests of the Soviet and Chinese people into account, have always favored the normalization of relations with the PRC and the restoration of good-neighbor terms with it. Our party line was reaffirmed in a statement made by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on Hungarian television on 1 June this year: "We have offered the Chinese side many chances to discuss the normalization of our relations and direct them into friendly channels. We are willing to do this even now, but certainly not to the detriment of the interests of third countries. In other words, if the Chinese side expresses genuine goodwill, we will not hold up the matter."[10]

The experience of the Chinese revolution and the People's Republic of China have conclusively demonstrated that the cardinal resolution of economic, social and other problems in China and the restoration of its role as an active force for world progress will depend not on Maoism, but on a return to the camp of peace, democracy and socialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 24, p 123.

2. Ibid., vol 23, p 3.

3. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 3, Moscow, 1953, p 246.

4. Mao Zedong, "The New Stage" (in Chinese), Chongqing (date of publication unknown), p 75.

5. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works," vol 1, Beijing, 1967, p 232.

6. See the "Speech by Mao Zedong at the Extended Meeting of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in Beidaihe" (August 1958).

7. RENMIN RIBAO, 1 November 1977.

8. Mao Zedong, "Selected Works" (in Chinese), vol 5, p 1.

9. HONGQI, 1977, No 9, p 4.

10. PRAVDA, 2 June 1979.

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MAOISTS AND CHIANG KAI-SHEK: AGREEMENT OF POLICIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 156-162

[Article by A. M. Ledovskiy]

[Text] In 1957 the head of the reactionary Guomindang regime, Chiang Kai-shek, published a book "Soviet Russia in China," which was reissued in 1958 and 1965. One of the main purposes of the book as the author stresses, was to "look into" the reasons for the fall of his regime. This book is filled, from beginning to end, with hatred for the Soviet Union and for the "Russian communists," whom the author brands as enemy number one and the chief perpetrator of the collapse of the Guomindang regime and the victory of the CCP.

As Chiang Kai-shek himself admits, he had specific scores to settle with the "Russian communists." He hated them primarily because they had carried out the Great October Socialist Revolution, which, as he writes, "had a decisive influence on progressive people in the Asian countries, where centuries of colonial domination by the Western powers had already sown the seeds of dissatisfaction and protest by that time."[1] Chiang Kai-shek hated the "Russian communists" because "they organized the Chinese Communist Party" and gave it all-round assistance and support, promoting its convergence with Sun Yat-sen, which "marked the beginning of a period of peaceful coexistence between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party, and between China and Soviet Russia."[2]

If we disregard his anti-Soviet and anticommunist terminology, Chiang Kai-shek is actually admitting that the improvement of relations between China and the Soviet Union always benefited revolutionary democratic sources and kept the Guomindang from taking military action against the CCP when the Guomindang was obviously superior in strength. "Every time the Chinese communists were defeated on the battlefield," Chiang Kai-shek writes, "the international communists (this is what he calls the CPSU and other fraternal parties--A. L.) invariably came to their aid." This was the case, he comments, in 1927, as well as in the later Guomindang army campaigns against the CCP, "and it happened again at the end of World War II."[3]

Chiang Kai-shek stresses that the 1945-1949 period decided the fate of his regime. Among the main events of these years, which determined the development of the entire situation in China and led to the formation of the PRC (in his terminology--to "China's move behind the iron curtain"), Chiang Kai-shek lists the conclusion of the Soviet-Chinese treaty on friendship and alliance of 14 August 1945, as well as the entry of Soviet armed forces into the war with Japan and their deployment in Manchuria in connection with this treaty.[4] Chiang Kai-shek notes that the Soviet troops complicated the establishment of Guomindang control over Manchuria and helped CCP troops "to enter this region first. Later they gave the Chinese communists all of the weapons that had been laid down by more than a million Japanese and puppet troops."[5]

Chiang Kai-shek goes on to say that, during the period of the Guomindang regime, the Soviet Government advised China to "conduct an independent policy" in its relations with the United States and Russia and "set up a coalition government." Chiang Kai-shek declares that he was against this, as this would have allowed the CCP (in his terminology--Soviet Russia, the Russian communists and so forth--A. L.) to establish its control--that is, to take power in China "by means of peaceful reforms" without "spilling a single drop of Russian blood."[6]

The policy of Soviet support for the struggle of democratic forces in China, headed by the CCP, is labeled nothing other than "Soviet aggression" by Chiang Kai-shek.

Chiang Kai-shek writes that the Guomindang was decidedly superior in strength to the CCP after Japan's surrender and that if it has immediately launched "direct warfare" against the Chinese Communist Party, it would have been able to "finish it off." Chiang Kai-shek regrets that he agreed to negotiate with the CCP and to institute peaceful settlement, "imposed on the Chinese Government by Moscow...and international communists." As a result, he writes, "my government and I were unable to provide ourselves with peace or war"[7] (that is, the winning of a victory over the CCP by means of war--A. L.).

Chiang Kai-shek notes that, in addition to the transfer of captured Japanese weapons to the People's Revolutionary Army in Manchuria by the Soviet Union and other forms of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communist Party, an exceptionally important role was played the international moral and political support the CCP received from the Soviet Union and "world communism," particularly in the mobilization of world public opinion and the exposure of the Guomindang regime to the public. "I was described," Chiang Kai-shek writes, "as a fascist, and my government was called reactionary, incompetent and corrupt."[8] All of this was done, in his words, so that the "Chinese communists could seize power."[9]

"Moscow," Chiang Kai-shek writes, "mobilized international communists to discredit our government in the eyes of the American public and upset our relations with the American Government. Under this pressure, the U.S.

Government withdrew its troops from China and cut off all financial and military assistance to my government."[10]

Chiang Kai-shek liked to "teach" the government and people of other countries. In his statements, he made every attempt to discredit CPSU foreign policy and appealed to people to be wary of the Soviet Union and its peaceable disposition. He demanded that the policy of peaceful coexistence be rejected in international relations, because it, in his words, signified the establishment of "communist domination." "I plead with the noncommunist Asian countries," writes the head of the Guomindang reactionaries, "not to fall into the same trap of 'peaceful coexistence' with Russia that we fell into when we were still in mainland China."[11] Chiang Kai-shek called upon the nations of the so-called "free world," particularly the United States, to resolutely fight against the policies of the "Russian communists," aimed at the support of anticolonial movements and the rendering of assistance in the national liberation struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American people "for the purpose of forcing the Western countries out of these regions." He persistently advises the United States and its Western allies to "not give up" its positions in these regions, and not relax their "presence" there.[12]

Chiang Kai-shek advises the reinforcement of NATO and the settlement of all serious disagreements within this bloc, since, as he asserts, "these weaknesses give Russia an opportunity to create mutual distrust between NATO members, particularly between the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic pact."[13]

Chiang Kai-shek preached that world war was inevitable. Ascribing aggressive intentions and the desire for world supremacy to the USSR, he suggested that the United States and its imperialist allies attack the Soviet Union first. Inciting the United States to start a war against the USSR, he assured the Americans that they had nothing to fear, since, as he put it, they would have others to do the fighting for them, while the United States would only have the responsibility of serving as the "rear," "arsenal" and "main support base" of the "free world" in its struggle "against communism," and that the United States would therefore not be threatened by the danger that its own territory would become a "battlefield."[14]

Chiang Kai-shek assured his imperialist masters that the war against the national liberation and revolutionary-democratic movement in Asia (he called an "anticommunist war") would be "local" in nature. "If the Western powers should fear, however, that this local war would give rise to global war and if they strive to avoid it at any cost, this will put the free nations (that is, reactionary and puppet regimes--A. L.) in an absolutely hopeless position in the face of indirect aggression on the part of Russia."[15]

Chiang Kai-shek calls upon the "free nations" to act in concert to wreck "Russia's plan to rule the world" and recommended that they "arm" themselves with his experience of "30 years of struggle against communism."[16] Chiang Kai-shek felt that imperialism's "greatest achievements" in the fight against communism were the creation of NATO, the involvement of West Germany in this bloc and the conclusion of treaties "between the Allies and Japan."[17]

Chiang Kai-shek also advised the imperialists to use all means, any opportunity and the slightest conflicts and "cracks" in the communist and workers parties to break up the world communist and workers movement and undermine the socialist countries, and recommended, without any embarrassment, intervention in their internal affairs and "the assistance of anti-communists behind the iron curtain to fight against communist regimes" in these countries.[18]

Chiang Kai-shek advised a policy of direct aggression combined with internal subversive activity in relations with the socialist countries. "Waiting for the communists to fail," he wrote, "is tantamount to climbing a tree and trying to catch fish in its branches.... I repeat that the anticommunist people in the free world (that is, reactionary forces in the capitalist countries--A. L.) would be making a huge mistake if they chose to sit out the situation, waiting for the communist bloc to fall apart of its own accord."[19]

Chiang Kai-shek's delirious ideas would not deserve to be considered or remembered if they had been buried and turned into dust along with him. Unfortunately, Chiang Kai-shek found worthy successors in Mao Zedong and the Maoists, who shook the dust of the grave of his political "last will and testament" and adopted it in its entirety.

Chiang Kai-shek's political doctrine was published at the same time that Mao Zedong and his followers were preparing for and organizing a counter-revolutionary coup in China, known as the "Cultural Revolution." It could hardly be a coincidence that the basic foreign policy concepts propagandized by Chiang Kai-shek actually concurred with the foreign policy course proposed by Mao Zedong and taken up by his successors in Beijing.

At one time, Chiang Kai-shek's reactionary views and the statements he made as an instigator of a new world war and the troubadour of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism were harshly condemned by CCP leaders, including Mao Zedong. In December 1947, for example, Mao Zedong said: "American imperialism and its stooges in various countries, who took the place of the German and Japanese militarists and their stooges, combined to make up a reactionary camp and waged a struggle against the Soviet Union, against the nations of people's democracy in Europe, against the national movement in the colonies and semicolonies and against the liberation of the Chinese people. It was precisely then that the Chinese reactionaries, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, became the stooges of American

imperialism, just as Wang Jingwei had become the stooge of Japanese imperialism, sold China to the United States and started a war against the Chinese people.... When the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek clique started civil war throughout the country in 1946, it only dared to embark on this adventure because it could count on its own superior military strength, but, and mainly, also because it could count on American imperialism.... This clique believed that American imperialism would serve as an inexhaustible source for the satisfaction of its military and monetary needs, while, on the other hand, it cherished the wild hope that a third world war would certainly break out."[20]

In November 1948, Mao Zedong declared that "American imperialism is feverishly preparing for a new world war and is threatening the entire world." He called upon revolutionary forces in all nations to unite and "create a united anti-imperialist front with the Soviet Union at its head."[21]

In 1949 and later, Mao Zedong issued warnings to the "naive people" in China who were building up illusions in regard to the United States and were expecting to receive U.S. economic assistance. He cautioned that this assistance would have its "insidious" aspect. He did not believe that the United States and other imperialist powers should be asked for assistance. Mao Zedong recommended that consideration be given to Sun Yat-sen's directives: "He persistently advised the people not to put their trust in the assistance of imperialist countries, but to unite with the nations in the world that treated them as equals." Dr Sun Yat-sen arrived at this conclusion, Mao Zedong taught, "through personal experience." "We must remember his words so that we will not be victimized by new deceptions. On the international level, we are part of the anti-imperialist front headed by the Soviet Union, and we should only look for real international assistance from this quarter, and not from the imperialist front."[22]

Castigating Chiang Kai-shek for his connection with American imperialism, Mao Zedong criticized the Chinese "liberals." "They easily fall for the flattering phrases of American imperialists and believe that these imperialists can build a relationship with people's China on the basis of equality and mutual advantage, even if a serious and prolonged struggle is not waged against them. The minds of these intellectuals," Mao Zedong stressed, "still contain a multitude of reactionary--that is, anti-people--views."[23]

Ridiculing the illusions of some Chinese in regard to U.S. policy, Mao Zedong called them "Chinese muddle-headed intellectuals." They believed, he said, that "the butcher instantly becomes Buddha when throws down his knife" or "the robber becomes virtuous as soon as he confesses." Mao Zedong cautioned over and over again: "Intrigues, failure, more intrigues, another failure, right up to the end--this is the logic of imperialists and all reactionaries in the world in their approach to the people's cause,

and they will never go against this logic. This is one of the laws of Marxism. When we say that 'imperialism is savage and cruel,' we mean that its nature cannot change and that the imperialists, right up to the very end, will never draw down the knife of the butcher and will never become Buddhas."[24]

In a conversation with Anna Louisa Strong in August 1946, Mao Zedong said the following in answer to her question about the possibility of a U.S. attack on the USSR: "The propaganda of war against the Soviet Union must be examined from both sides. On the one hand, American imperialism is preparing for a war against the Soviet Union and the political basis of the preparation for this kind of war consists of the current propagandization of war against the Soviet Union and the intense anti-Soviet propaganda. On the other hand, this propaganda is a smokescreen that has been created by American reactionaries to conceal many existing conflicts, with which American imperialism has now been directly confronted."[25] Later, in reference to U.S. policy toward other countries, Mao stressed: "I am certain that it will not take long for these nations to realize who is actually oppressing them--the Soviet Union or the United States. The day will come when the American reactionaries will learn that the people of the entire world are against them.... As you know, Hitler and his partners, the Japanese militarists, used anti-Soviet slogans for a long time as a pretext for enslaving the people of their countries and conducting aggressive campaigns against other countries. The American reactionaries are now acting in exactly the same way."[26]

Echoing Mao Zedong, his personal secretary, Chen Boda, wrote the following in his book, entitled "Chiang Kai-shek--Enemy of the Chinese People": "An inveterate murderer and traitor, Chiang Kai-shek personified all of the vileness of the Chinese feudal slaveholders."[27] To attain their reactionary goals, Chiang Kai-shek and his clique relied on American imperialism, which generously supplied them with weapons, military equipment and money. In exchange for this assistance, they "faithfully and staunchily served American imperialism, making every effort to justify its hopes."[28]

In this book, which reflects Mao Zedong's criticism of Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang is condemned for the following:

For treating the USSR with insincerity, for passing himself off as a "friend" of the Soviet Union when he saw "what seemed to be a perfect opportunity to earn political capital";

For behaving like a "sly and perfidious fox," frequently "flinging about leftist phrases," "slandering the Soviet Union" for the benefit of the Americans and so forth.[29]

After carrying out a counterrevolutionary coup in the mid-1960's and establishing a military-bureaucratic regime, Mao Zedong and his group actually renounced all that they had previously defended and began to

praise all that they had previously condemned. Above all, they raided the Guomindang cupboard for all of the old anti-Soviet and other reactionary, misantrophic theories and made them their general foreign policy program. Adhering to Chiang Kai-shek's "last will and testament," they called the USSR "enemy number one." As we know, no other government in Asia had displayed such open hostility toward the Soviet Union or set forth the kind of program for a new world war that was proposed by Chiang Kai-shek. The Maoists, on the other hand, had a foreign policy program that was even more aggressive and more barbarous. With uncommon cynicism, Mao and the Maoists declared their willingness to incinerate half of mankind in the flames of nuclear war.

As we know, Chiang Kai-shek, who cared little about the fate of the people in his own country, had expansionist plans for other countries, particularly Burma, the countries of Indochina, Korea and the Mongolian People's Republic. These plans were supported and encouraged by U.S. ruling circles, who suggested to the Guomindang regime that China should play the role of a "great power" and "bastion of democracy" in Asia, that the United States and China had a special role to perform together in Asia--the protection of "free world" interests, and so forth. The United States was lavish with declarations of this kind when it addressed the Guomindang regime, since this could not threaten its own imperialistic, colonial supremacy in Asia. It actually had no intention of sharing this dominant position with anyone else and gave even less thought to any kind of serious concessions to China. In view of the extreme weakness of Guomindang China and its total political, military and economic dependence on the United States, Chiang Kai-shek's expansionist aims were no threat to American imperialism. Moreover, this expansionism was to its advantage, as it provided an opportunity to use China for the enslavement of other nations and the implementation of Washington's aggressive policy in South and Southeast Asia and the Far East.

For several reasons, however, the expansionist aims of Chiang Kai-shek and his group were never realized. Their aggression toward other countries was more of a "cartographic" nature: The Guomindang regime published maps, on which many of their neighbors were included within China's boundaries. But they could not any further. The revolution threw them onto the junk heap of history along with their maps and plans.

Mao and the Maoists did not limit themselves to "cartographic" aggression, but resorted to the kind of direct armed hostilities that Chiang Kai-shek and his group had been afraid to conduct. For example, in 1962 the Beijing authorities attacked India and seized part of its territory. They made absurd claims on the USSR and provoked an armed conflict on the Soviet-Chinese border. Mao and the Maoists urged leftist extremists in Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, the Philippines and several other countries to conduct armed demonstrations. They imposed the Pol Pot-Ieng Sary puppet regime on Kampuchea and, with its assistance, tried to turn this country into a Chinese province, annihilating a considerable segment of the population. Mao Zedong's successors resorted to an even more loathsome crime--they launched a bloody aggression war against socialist Vietnam.

The parallels between the Chiang Kai-shek group and the Maoists extend into many other areas and spheres. As we know, the Chiang Kai-shek regime had a clearly defined military-bureaucratic nature. The party and state power structures merged with the military structure, and this merging was reflected in the activities of the Guomindang and its party organs, as well as in the activities of the state structure and administrative organs. A constant struggle was waged in top ruling circles between militarist cliques and political groups. Each was backed up by supporting forces in the nation. Some were supported by the army, others were supported by the party or state structure, still others were backed up by "SS-type" police and so forth. Chiang Kai-shek stayed in power by skillfully maneuvering among these groups. He took every opportunity to keep them separate and prevent them from accepting one another and uniting. He carefully ensured that no one group prevailed excessively over the others. At moments of crisis, he came to the aid of the weakest group. Although many members of ruling circles saw and realized Chiang Kai-shek's total incompetence to serve as the leader of a vast nation, and although many secretely despised him, all of them verbally praised him as a "wise leader," the "father of his country" and so forth. In the same way that these ruling groups with their mutual antagonisms were needed by Chiang Kai-shek to remain in power, he was needed just as much by these groups as an arbiter, who could always take action to keep them from outbidding one another or falling under the influence of the strongest of these groups. This arbiter also had another important advantage over all other pretenders to the supreme dictatorial authority in the nation: As the commander in chief, he had direct jurisdiction over the so-called National Army of the central government, the daily supervision of which was the responsibility of the chief of general staff, who was appointed from among the generals loyal to Chiang Kai-shek.

When Mao Zedong and the Maoists were striving to attain their egoistical goals, primarily the seizure and reinforcement of personal power in the party and in the nation as a whole, they made every effort to adopt many features of the Guomindang military bureaucratic regime, even the worst of these features, and put them to practical use in the activity of party and state organs (first in CCP base regions, and then on the nationwide scale after the founding of the PRC). After he had concentrated all party, state and military power in his own hands (directly or through his most obedient administrative officials), Mao Zedong imposed methods of leadership that were alien to Marxism-Leninism on the CCP. Leadership by means of orders and decrees took the place of party indoctrination for communists. Persuasive methods were replaced by coercive methods, usually involving outright force. This was apparent not only during the "Cultural Revolution," but long before it as well. This "revolution" had its own unique pre-history--the notorious "zhengfeng" campaign (the campaign for the "correction of the style of work"), during the course of which Mao Zedong and his group killed thousands of honest communists simply because they did not care for them. After the founding of the PRC, this took the form of the endless campaigns against the "three evils" and "five evils."

Officially, these campaigns were supposed to combat counterrevolutionary elements, as well as graft, the embezzlement of public property, and various symptoms of moral and political degradation in the party and state structure. But in fact, as many internationalist communists pointed out, the campaign slogans were used not only for struggle against class enemies, but also as a convenient pretext for the violent treatment of the best party cadres, who were most loyal to Marxism-Leninism, and as a means of intimidating and frightening party members and the broad non-affiliated masses. Mao Zedong and the Maoists had to do this because the great victory of the Chinese revolution, the crushing defeat suffered by the multimillion-strong Guomindang army, the eviction from China of more than 100,000 U.S. Army troops with powerful air, naval and other forces, and the inspiring example set by the Soviet Union, which had dealt a fatal blow to German fascism and Japanese militarism, aroused unprecedented political enthusiasm in the CCP and the entire Chinese population and a tremendous increase in the creative strength and political awareness of the working public. Mao Zedong saw this as a threat to his own egotistical plans and decided to "deaden" the nationwide political enthusiasm, force the party and the general public to accept his own autocratic authority, deprive them of their revolutionary will and make them submissive and obedient to the will of the "Great Helmsman."

In his description of Chiang Kai-shek's many insidious ruses, Chen Boda wrote that Chiang Kai-shek wanted sons to rise up against their fathers, students to rise up against their teachers, subordinates to rise up against their bosses. "This was one of the smokescreens used by Chiang Kai-shek to conceal his attempts to usurp the army, usurp the party, usurp power."[30] Chen Boda also remarks that, until Chiang Kai-shek achieved his goals, he continued to "play at revolution."[31]

As the events of the 1960's showed, all of this was reflected in the "Cultural Revolution" instituted by Mao Zedong. Just as Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong chose the CCP to serve as the main target of terror, and more than 5 million Chinese communists fell victim to this terror.[32]

This cost the Chinese people much more than the losses China had suffered in battles with the Japanese invaders in 8 years of war (3.2 million Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded in this time).[33] Around 40 million students, workers, instructors, physicians and other representatives of the intelligentsia were forcibly evicted from the cities and sent to the most backward rural regions.[34] Hunger and disease killed many of them. Some young people escaped and returned to the cities, supplementing the already huge army of declasse elements, making their living by robbery, prostitution and so forth.

Chiang Kai-shek annihilated his class political opponents, especially the communists. He also fought against the Guomindang activists he did not care for. But his struggle against them was not as massive or as bloody as Mao Zedong's struggle. Chiang Kai-shek spared the lives of members of

his own class, preferring to manipulate positions by promoting some and demoting others. Chiang Kai-shek established a huge number of honorary positions in the highest central state and military organs and awarded them to top-level Guomindang activists, including important generals, because he had to deprive them of all real authority. For almost all of Chiang Kai-shek's term in power, right up to the time of his flight to Taiwan, essentially the same people occupied the highest state, party and military positions in the Guomindang regime.

Mao Zedong treated his comrades-in-arms differently. He punished some of them brutally and executed many.

The counterrevolutionary coup of 1927 was carried out under the slogan "Long live Commander-in-Chief Chiang Kai-shek!"[35] The slogan of the "Cultural Revolution" was "Long live Chairman Mao!"

Chiang Kai-shek was the first to order an "attack on headquarters"--that is, municipal party committees and the administrative centers of trade unions and other progressive organizations. Instead of Red Guards, Chiang Kai-shek sent out detachments of "blue shirts" and various types of gangs, consisting of members of secret societies of the lumpenproletariat and other rabble with "worker" arm-bands, to attack these headquarters. They were aided by armed forces of the regular army, police and militia, allegedly sent out to restore order.

The same script was later played out by Mao Zedong.

As for the brutality, terror and other barbarous methods used by Chiang Kai-shek for the attainment of his egotistical goals, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and other CCP activists quite justifiably pointed out this facet of the behavior of the head of the Guomindang regime. Here is what Mao Zedong said about Chiang Kai-shek: "He, as everyone knows, is an exceptionally cruel and insidious individual.... Feelings of gratitude are absolutely unfamiliar to this man.... After he had fought his way to power, he not only failed to thank the people, but even pushed them into the abyss of a bloody 10-year civil war.... Now that the war (against Japan--A. L.) has ended in victory...he is planning to start an anti-people civil war and punish the people mercilessly.... Chiang Kai-shek is always striving to force war on the people. He holds a sword in his left hand and in his right hand.... Who does he want to kill with this sword? The people.... Military suppression and political deception are the two basic means by which Chiang Kai-shek keeps his reactionary authority."[36]

Those who worked in the PRC in the first years after its founding or carefully kept track of events in this nation from afar were shocked by the outburst of repressive actions taken by the new Chinese authorities under the supervision of Mao Zedong. Naturally, the PRC's external and internal enemies did not accept their defeat, they continued their subversive activity and the struggle against them was unavoidable and

necessary. But the people's government was widely supported by the Chinese working masses. It had sizable armed forces. The firm support of the powerful socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, was on the side of the PRC. For this reason, the scales of the represssions instituted by the Mao Zedong leadership went far beyond the bounds of actions dictated by internal and external security considerations. Military courts functioned throughout the nation, holding mass public trials--in city squares or, more frequently, in stadiums, with tens and hundreds of thousands of spectators attending. Verdicts were pronounced without giving the defendant any kind of rights or possiblity of legal defense. Defendants were forced to confess publicly to the crimes of which they were accused The voice of the crowd of thousands was regarded as the verdict of the "people's court," and the sentence was immediately carried out, in the crowded squares and stadiums. Tens and hundreds of the condemned were immediately shot in this manner. Reports of mass trials filled the pages of many Chinese newspapers.

As we have already pointed out, under the guise of a struggle against enemies, Mao Zedong and his group attacked the most progressive segments of the working class and the best party cadres, who firmly took a Marxist-Leninist stand. They used fanatical methods that were unknown to the Guomindang executioners.

The facts show that coercive methods were "perfected" during the "Cultural Revolution," and even in subsequent years, which only proved that the essence of the Maoist military-bureaucratic dictatorship had not changed. The Maoists not only inherited much of Chiang Kai-shek's foreign and domestic policy, but even "surpassed" him in several respects. The Beijing regime is working against the vital interests of the people and has set itself up in opposition to the people. This naturally gives rise to profound dissatisfaction in the nation and the real possibility of a mounting struggle by the Chinese workers and intelligentsia against the current regime, which is leading the nation along the path of militarization and war, is opening the door to foreign capital and is openly opposing the socialist countries.

In time, history will pronounce its verdict on the rulers who have pushed China and its great population into the camp of reaction and imperialism.

FOOTNOTES

1. Chiang Kai-shek, "Soviet Russia in China," New York, 1965, p 5.

2. Ibid., pp 5-6.

3. Ibid., pp 149-150.

4. Ibid., p 6.

5. Ibid., p 98.

6. Ibid., p 105.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., p 106.

9. Ibid., p 77.

10. Ibid., p 13.

11. Ibid., p 188.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p 196.

14. Ibid., p 208.

15. Ibid., pp 202-203.

16. Ibid., p 177.

17. Ibid., p 190.

18. Ibid., p 181.

19. Ibid., pp 181-182.

20. Mao Zedong: "Selected Works," vol IV, Beijing, 1969, pp 191, 208.

21. Ibid., p 347.

22. Ibid., p 509.

23. Ibid., p 522.

24. Ibid., p 523.

25. Ibid., pp 114-115.

26. Ibid., pp 115, 117.

27. Chen Boda, "Chiang Kai-shek--Enemy of the Chinese People," Moscow, 1950, p 16.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., pp 26-33.

30. Ibid., p 37.

31. Ibid., p 39.

32. Krum Bosev, "Tayfun" [Tayfun], Moscow, 1978, p 5.

33. Chiang Kai-shek, Op. cit., p 90.

34. Tai Sung-an, "Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution," 1972, p 113.

35. Chen Boda, Op. cit., p 46.

36. Mao Zedong, Op. cit., pp 8-11, 165.

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SOME NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESE LITERATURE

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[Article by A. N. Zhelokhovtsev, candidate of philological sciences]

[Text] When Mao Zedong's heirs took power in Beijing, their fundamental approach to literature did not change; they are still demanding that it serve the group interest and glorify certain individuals, primarily Hua Guofeng (up to the end of 1978). Maoism's dominion is still putting Chinese literature in a hopeless position: It is supposed to serve a specific and immediate political purpose, to be an instrument of intrigue and to forget its social and class role and its duty to educate the people in the socialist spirit and expand the spiritual horizons and socialist awareness of the masses. Under the conditions of Maoist policy, Chinese literature has no future. Along with each successive Maoist political fiasco, the "literary works" extolling transient goals are also consigned to oblivion. This was true of the "Great Leap Forward," the "New Cultural Revolution," the "struggle against people taking the capitalist road within the party," the "glorification of wise leader Chairman Hua" and so forth.

The present Chinese leadership is striving to preserve the personal authority of Mao Zedong and his "Thought," including the "line of Comrade Mao Zedong" in regard to literature and art, and his proposed "creative method of combining revolutionary realism with revolutionary romanticism." No matter what the subjective intentions of top-level leaders may be, however, a process has begun in Chinese society, which is gradually undermining the absolute authority of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" in public life, essentially if not officially. This agonizing process, which has been accompanied by fierce internal political struggle, is similar to a process of ideological erosion, but it has nonetheless begun: Chinese society is awakening from the numbness caused by the "Cultural Revolution."

It could be said that an important stage in modern Chinese literary history ended in 1976, and that the next page in this chronicle is being revealed to us. Will a truly healthy, new socialist literature appear, or will everything amount to no more than callous nationalism and great-power egotism?

The concessions the Maoists had to make to creative forces in the nation as early as the 1972-1976 period led to an increase in the number of young people involved in creative activity--in one form or another, even if only group, depersonalized activity--and created the possibility of a social milieu capable of realizing the fruitlessness of Maoism and of opposing the "line of Mao Zedong in literature and art." The political peculiarities of the Beijing regime make open opposition of this kind impossible, but there is another way--a traditional one for China, accustomed as it is to despotism: the method of opposing the essence of the "Thought of Mao Zedong" while giving lip service to piety and engaging in purely formal verbal tributes in the form of eulogies and so forth.

The changes in the Maoist PRC leadership, which took place in October 1976, could have resulted in an outburst of public indignation with Maoist cultural policy of the preceding decade. Under these circumstances, the Chinese leadership had no alternative to a gradual and compulsory departure from the lifeless dogmas and artificial prohibitions of the "Cultural Revolution." The leadership tried to strictly regulate this process, so as to take maximum advantage of the legacy of the "Thought of Mao Zedong." This was not in any sense the "de-Maoization" on which the Western press was so eager to report, from 1977 on, for the purpose of political manipulation. This was a conciliatory policy necessitated by the fear of anti-Maoist feelings within the party and the general public. Ample evidence of this can be found in the leadership's attempts in 1977 and 1978 to create a cult of personality revolving around Hua Guofeng in PRC literature and culture, based on the same cliches the Maoists had previously used for the glorification of Mao Zedong. In a purely Maoist spirit, Chinese propaganda created an idealized image of Hua Guofeng, constantly comparing him to Mao Zedong. Reproductions of pictures of Hua Guofeng with Mao Zedong were printed. Since Hua Guofeng, in contrast to Mao, had never displayed any talent as a poet, a facsimile of a folk song jotted down by Hua Guofeng was printed.

After Mao's death, his poetry, other works and letters, having no literary value, continued to be published regularly for political purposes. Three poems written between 1923 and 1964 were published for the first time on 9 September 1978 on the second anniversary of his death. In the spirit of the same Maoist tradition, the verses of other Chinese leaders--Dong Biwu, Zhu De, Chen Yi, Zhou Enlai and Ye Jianying--were printed in the newspapers and published in separate collections. Finally, Hua Guofeng's accountability report to the 11th CCP Congress in August 1977 and many pieces of literary criticism reiterated that the creative method of Chinese literature was still the "creative method of combining revolutionary realism with revolutionary romanticism," invented by Mao Zedong, under the banner of which the "Cultural Revolution" of 1966 and all literary activity of 1966-1976 took place.

Even now, Maoist, persistently ostentatious and boundlessly complimentary odes to the leadership prevail in the Chinese press and dominate the

dramatic stage. Works of this kind are not known by the names of their authors or by their artistic merits, but only by one characteristic: the particular top leader they are glorifying and "immortalizing." For example, in January 1979 the Chinese press gave extensive coverage to three theatrical performances: "Daybreak" ("Shuguang"), in which He Long comes on stage; "Attack the East! Attack the East!" ("Dong jin! Dong jin!"), which glorifies Chen Yi; and "The Xian Incident" ("Xian shibian"), in which Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De are simultaneously eulogized on the stage.[1]

"Political" verses abound in the field of poetry. These are still anti-Soviet, but this is now supplemented with attacks of socialist Vietnam. The famous older poets Zhao Puchu and Zou Difan have lent their names to this kind of poetry. But the "office" of poet laureate has been awarded to Ye Jianying by virtue of his position. Copies of his verses are printed on the front pages of newspapers and magazines. The Soviet reader can gain a general idea of these from the ode to the neutron bomb, which acquired a sorry reputation in our nation after a Russian translation of it was published in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 12 October 1977.

The central literary journal RENMIN WENXIUE put out a special issue (No 12, 1978) of recollections of Mao Zedong on the 85th anniversary of his birth. Memoirs, poems and stories pertaining to the Chinese Red Army's great campaign of 1934-1935, written in the same Maoist spirit, are also constantly seen in the press.

All of these works are written in accordance with the compulsory pattern for Maoist literature, differing only in the greater number of CCP activists mentioned. Instead of praising only Mao Zedong, they now extol many leaders, both dead and alive. Essays on the work of Hua Guofeng in Hunan Province, on the services of Ye Jianying during the period when the Chinese Red Army was being organized, and on Deng Xiaoping's participation in the Huaihai operation of 1949, which culminated in the liberation of Nanjing, the capital of Guomindang China, appeared in 1977 and 1978.

In the decade between 1966 and 1976, Chinese literature consisted almost exclusively of works of this type. In the last 2 years, however, it has taken a new direction, represented in the short story genre. There are already many of these, and they are printed frequently. The first work to give readers, editors and critics a breath of fresh air was Liu Xin's story "The Class Leader."[2] This story was officially recognized as the best story of 1978. The writer was asked to speak at literary conferences and editorial conventions. Since that time, he has already managed to publish a few more stories.

"The Class Leader" describes a series of events in a Beijing secondary school in 1977, and is based on the author's personal experiences as a teacher. Liu Xin said the following about his idea for the story: "I began to think back over my life in the last few years. Various incidents

from the time when I was a class leader and teacher-specialist, as well as people I had met: teachers, students and parents.... Why should the real conflicts and contradictions of life be ignored while the search for a plot is blindly conducted elsewhere? Spreading out my writing paper, I said to myself: This time you must be true to life. You must not formulate the theme in a few words in the beginning and then illustrate it. You must sincerely give the reader your own thoughts about life."[3] These were the author's subjective intentions. The reality he depicts is frightening, and not because the scenes he describes are horrible, but because they are so ordinary and commonplace.

The hero of the story is Zhang Zenshi, a teacher and class leader. He is summoned by a public security agency and is requested to take a young boy, Song Baoqi, who has already been arrested, into his class. The severity of the Maoist dictatorship is known to the entire world, and not only to Chinese readers of Liu Xin's story. It turns out that Song Baoqi was arrested because he and some other boys broke into a warehouse, which had been filled with "banned" literature from the school library during the time of the "Cultural Revolution," and stole a banned book from the warehouse--E. Voinich's "The Gadfly." There was an illustration in the book: The young hero and heroine were kissing! This was enough to classify Voinich's book as "yellow" (sordid) literature in Maoist China.

The arrest was not Song Baoqi's only punishment. His parents, fearing public condemndation and persecution, changed their place of residence and moved to a new neighborhood. They wanted to enroll their son in a new school, but no school wanted to take him after he had been arrested. The teacher Zhang commits his first unusual and unconventional act: He agrees to take Song Baoqi into his class. This act of kindness was so unusual at that time that Zhang's colleagues censure him in the teachers' lounge and he has to enter into a fairly heated argument with them. But the greatest difficulty is encountered in the classroom: The other students, particularly the girls, refuse to go to school with the "hooligan" Song Baoqi. One particularly vehement protester is activist Xie Hueimin, who has been nurtured on the "Cultural Revolution" and for whom "The Gadfly" is--oh, horrors!--a foreign, "yellow," banned book.

This is an extremely strong portrayal of the spiritual tragedy of today's Chinese youth, deprived of even the desire for spiritual growth by the "Cultural Revolution," with the very concept of this growth distorted by Maoist propaganda and newspaper articles, as the author points out in the story.

But the story centers around the teacher Zhang himself. This is an extremely active and energetic individual. He debates the issue with his colleagues, persuades his students both in class and in their homes, rides across Beijing on his bicycle to talk to Song Baoqi and his parents and visits the security authorities. Zhang is not simply a man of action. He is constantly thinking. The hero's internal monologs are extremely

interesting. He sees the "hooligan" Song Baoqi as a victim, not a culprit. In 1977, when the story was written, the author could not openly say that the boy was the victim of the "Cultural Revolution," but his train of thought is clear. The author assigns the blame for the boy's misfortunes on the now disgraced "gang" of Mao's former associates (now this is strictly prescribed by official bodies), but this is not all: The hero of the story berates himself for not openly opposing the "four" before their political downfall and not exposing their "reactionary lies." He is also concerned about the fate of the "activist" Xie, who, in his opinion, is just as much a victim of the spiritual blindness caused by the "Cultural Revolution" as the "hooligan" Song Baoqi: "As soon as he was made class leader, he delicately hinted to her that it would be better for her to study the original works of Marxism-Leninism on her own and develop her own views than to memorize quotations and blindly assimilate articles commenting on the Thought of Chairman Mao. Xie did not understand what he was talking about at that time. Perhaps he should have said it bluntly, helping her to open her eyes and see the difference between facts and lies more clearly."

Zhang believes that students "must develop their own analytical capability, so as to carry on the work of socialist revolution and construction more effectively." Frankly, this is quite an accomplishment for a man who has lived through the Maoist "Cultural Revolution." Zhang has not only lived through it, but, what is more important, has not changed, has not been "re-educated in the Maoist style" and has not forgotten the early 1950's, when socialist construction was being carried out according to plan in China. Zhang himself has read "The Gadfly" and views the work in a totally different way from the younger generation of Chinese, who have been traumatized by the Maoists: "Zhang frowned, deep in thought. He remembered that this book had been recommended to him when he was a student and Komsomol member. One day, sitting around the campfire, they had taken turns reading it out loud, with all of their adolescent passion. On an excursion to the Great Wall, they had hotly argued the merits and shortcomings of the gadfly. This novel, written by Englishwoman Ethel Voinich, had particularly inspired Zhang and his classmates." Yes, it is no wonder that the teacher Zhang dreams of "arousing an interest in world literature in his students." He has reason for this: his own personal experience, his education in the spirit of the socialist internationalism of the early 1950's.

There are other extremely interesting characters in the story. These are the most intelligent girl in the class, Shi Hong, and her parents, of whom, however, little is said. Here is how the family is described in the story: "Shi Hong's father worked on the district committee and her mother taught in the elementary school. Not long before the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, they both joined the party. The study of Marxism-Leninism became a customary pastime for them. The books on their shelves were worn, filled with underlined passages and bookmarks. Constant use had frayed the corners. Shi also became a bibliophile. She was lucky. In

this family, the hours after dinner were set aside for reading at the table. Her father preferred the historical works which he so loved to read; her mother corrected homework assignments; Shi worked on her physics and mathematics. Sometimes they discussed the latest literature and art. They argued passionately. Even when culture was being suppressed by the 'gang of four,' they had 'banned' Chinese and foreign books on their shelves."

How wonderful that people like Shi Hong's family were able to survive the Maoist "Cultural Revolution" and even keep their books! This means that the Red Guards did not enter their home and build a bonfire of their books right on the floor of the owners' room.

It is Shi Hong that helps the teacher Zhang to change the mind of the other students. She invites all of the girls who have refused to be in the same classroom with the previously arrested "hooligan" to her home and reads them a novella by Soviet writer L. Panteleyev, "Chasy" [The Clock], which was translated by the great Chinese writer Lu Xin in 1935. In this story, the Soviet writer describes the rehabilitation of delinquents after the Civil War in the USSR. The teacher Zhang and Shi Hong see the work as a positive example for themselves in the matter of the "hooligan" Song Baoqi and appeal to the students to behave in the spirit of this Soviet story. It is true that Shi Hong has not read "The Gadfly," but she is willing to read it. "My parents said the book is worth reading. I have just read halfway through 'Kak zakalyalas' stal'' [How the Steel Was Tempered]. The hero, Pavel Korchagin, a proletarian, is quite delighted with 'The Gadfly,'" Shi Hong says. And the author adds: "Shi Hong wanted to read 'The Gadfly," but was unable to find the book."

How could this kind of work appear in the Chinese press--and, for that matter, how could it have been approved by the leadership? In this story, truly vital social issues are raised, the example of Soviet literature plays such an important role and quite definite wishes for a socialist future are expressed.

"The Class Leader" differs from Chinese literary works of the preceding decade by its heroes and their attitudes toward social issues. Nonetheless, the story bears the imprint of the Maoist literary spirit--without this, it could never have been published. Just as all other literary works, this one assigns a prominent place to the mandatory cliches--overt adulation of the new leadership: "The aroma of the lilac blooms grew stronger and aroused pleasant thoughts in him. The 'gang of four' had been overthrown, the party Central Committee was headed by Chairman Hua and the new and wonderful atmosphere was giving the nation hope for the present and the future."

A work with no anti-Soviet attacks is a rarity in Chinese Maoist literature. "The Class Leader" is no exception to this rule. The writer includes the following phrase in the text: "Zhang sat down and talked

to the girls about 'Chasy,' about the changes in the Soviet Union, about the delinquents in the book and then about Song." The original text contains this extremely mild statement about "changes in the Soviet Union." In the English translation of the story, intended for the foreign reader, this phrase is more pointed: "about the transformation of the Soviet Union," with a malicious allusion to some kind of "degeneration" in our country since the time L. Panteleyev's novella was published in 1928.

Some signs of the Maoist influence are quite apparent in Liu Xin's story, but nevertheless, for modern Chinese literature, this work is a step ahead of the mediocre literary products of the Maoists. The tribute to Maoism is not the main feature of the work, and not the point of departure, but a transient, formal, extraneous passage, performing the function of a press pass or residence permit for the Maoist milieu. Liu Xin decided to write the story, according to his own admission, after a long period of uncertainty; he was particularly concerned about his portrayal of the activist Xie Hueimin, who is a negative character, violating one of the time-honored Maoist literary dogmas.

After he had finished the story, the writer took a long time to decide whether he wanted to publish it. Even after he had received many letters from readers and after the story had been praised by prominent critics, the author make the following apologetic statement at an editors' convention: "I did not write an expose, I did not portray any villains; all that I did was to point out some spiritual blemishes."[4]

It is easy to understand why the writer made this statement, because some people immediately labeled his story an "expose" and a "work of critical realism." Just recently, either label would have resulted in inevitable persecution. The fate of the writer was hanging by a hair: What would the official verdict be? If he was considered to be a critic of the "four," he would be praised. If, however, the story should be interpreted as criticism of Maoist ways in general, he would be crushed. But, after all, the Maoists do not and cannot have any objective criterion for this kind of verdict; the fate of a literary work and its author always hangs in the balance, at the mercy of the capricious political winds that blow down "from above." This time Liu Xin was praised. This kind of publication required a great deal of civic courage on the part of the writer and the editors. The arbitrary rule of the period of "Cultural Revolution" is still fresh in the memory of everyone in China. Many of its victims have still not been vindicated, and newly arrested individuals are filling the vacancies left by those who have been pardoned. Sufficient proof of this can be found in an account by American journalist Harrison Salisbury, who visited the PRC in 1977: "Intellectuals and cultural spokesmen are still celebrating the end of the reign of terror; they are enjoying their physical freedom and the ability to hold their heads high, speak in public, write and compose. There has been no increase in creative enthusiasm, however, as yet. The trauma was too great, and too many questions remain unanswered.... In fact, while most of the cultural figures who had been

arrested in the last decade are now at liberty, a new, but smaller, group of artists is beyond the pale. These people were closely connected with Jiang Qing. Some of them have disappeared, and it is possible that they might be found on the same hog-breeding farms to which the released activists and artists are now returning."[5]

As long as the regime continues its policy of arrests and exiles, any kind of literary activity is risky and could end in tragedy; it is only in the context of this reality that the actions of those who resolve to expose the recent past can be fully assessed. The leadership has permitted this criticism within the framework of the general political campaign of "criticism of the four," but this is a narrow and dangerous ledge for literary activity to balance on.

The same issue of RENMIN WENXIUE which was half full of commemorative material connected with the 85th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth contained a story by Li Tuo, "Listen to This Song." It describes the events of 5 April 1976 in Tiananmen Square. In themselves, these events have been officially recognized in China, and writers are allowed to write about them. But this author is most likely using a pseudonym, because the name Tuo incorporates a character that is never found in Chinese names.

The hero of the story is a young man who progresses from a passive, "self-centered" existence to active participation in public life, and even social protest against the Maoist regime.

The hero's name is Yan Yi and he works at a plant--which is never named. He is not a totally ordinary young worker. And this is not because he leads the propaganda brigade at the plant. The Beijing worker Yan Yi has a friend, an old composer, who gives him music lessons in his home: "In the last 2 years, I have spent all of my free time learning composing from a friend of my father's, the old retired composer Huang." The case is not typical, but it is realistic: The young man, who obviously comes from a family of intellectuals, has become a worker because the "Cultural Revolution" has kept him from continuing his education. This is so obvious to the Chinese reader that the author of the story does not even bother to go into the details.

Yan Yi learns to compose music and writes a song--"I Am Waiting..."--which he shows to a friend at the plant, Liu Dahu, secretary of the shop youth organization. This lyrical song appeals to the workers, it spreads through the plant and this begins an investigation into the "case" of the "yellow" song. The investigation drags on for several months. Liu is dismissed from his secretarial post, and Yan Yi himself "spent many sleepless nights in these months." Yan Yi's song is lyrical, but the words "I am waiting" are interpreted not only as a wish for personal happiness, but also as the anticipation of political change. It turns out that the lyrical song appeals to an extremely broad range of feelings. When his friend is punished at a meeting, Yan Yi himself does nothing, and he does not even

publicly admit that the song is his composition. "I did nothing. I knew that I did not have enough moral strength for this. I only waited--perhaps the entire matter would blow over. Perhaps something unexpected would happen at the meeting. But the only thing that happened was that Dahu was subjected to a strict administrative reprimand. That evening, when the shop meeting was over, I did not say anything to him, and we silently walked home together."

The passivity that had been instilled in youth for years by the arbitrary dictates of the Maoists is also characteristic of the hero of this story. He is weak-willed and incapable of putting up any resistance. His character changes under the influence of a girl he meets by chance on the street. The girl amazes him by noisily expressing her dissatisfaction out loud, right on the city street, expressing anger with the way things are, embarrassing and frightening the girl with her. This is the first time Yan Yi has heard frank, bold statements, and they make him wonder. The hero begins to think: "When did I get used to false statements? A young man should be fervent and sincere, and he should speak out boldly, without any reservations. But what do I do? Just the opposite. I very rarely speak frankly, not just in a crowd or in a hall, but even if more than three people are listening. And I do this without even thinking about it. But if you think about it, this kind of life is horrible and futile! Lenin once said that we must keep our own head on our shoulders. But what about my head? Whose is it?"

A second meeting stimulates even more thought. At the Xisi crossing, he sees the girl again, this time just as she is being arrested. The girl, Yang Liu, is being apprehended by a "leiza"--this is what people in China now call plainclothesmen, who pounce on people, right on the spot, for a careless remark.

"We walked ahead and suddenly heard Yang Liu's strong voice: 'On what grounds should I follow you? Who are you? What authority do you have?'

"She had not even finished talking when the man sternly said, in a tone brooking no argument: 'Stop babbling! I said come with me, and I meant it!'

"But it was not easy to intimidate Yang Liu, and she said with a smile: 'Come with you? Who are you? Maybe a vagrant? Or a bandit? And you say we should come with you?'

"Yang Liu's friend, agitated and frightened, pulled her by the elbow: 'Stop arguing with him, let us go quickly!'

"'Go? Go where?' the man shouted and menacingly said: 'You were just saying that there are criminals in the Central Committee. I ask you: Who were you talking about? Answer me!'

"A crowd of curious people had already gathered, but everyone fell silent when they heard his words. In an instant, fear raced through the crowd. The girl from the plant whispered in my ear: 'Too bad, they have run into a "leiza."' I had already guessed this, because I had heard rumors long before that people had to be careful what they said on the streets, as plainclothesmen wandered through the crowds (I do not know why the masses called them 'leiza'). I knew that Yang Liu and her friend were in grave danger, and I had to catch my breath.

"The man's shout dismayed Yang Liu, and her girlfriend's face paled. At that moment, Dahu, who was standing next to me, suddenly said in a loud voice: 'But why are you asking? The criminals they were talking about are Lin Biao and Chen Boda.'

"I was amazed by Dahu's unexpected intervention. Yang Liu heard his prompting remark, came to her senses and quickly said:

"'Yes, that is who I was talking about!'

"The man did not answer her, he turned sharply and, staring straight at Dahu, said in a strained voice: 'Stay out of other people's affairs!' Dahu, putting on an innocent face, continued as if nothing had been said:

"'What do you mean, other people's affairs? There is mass-scale criticism now. I have heard it, so why should I not repeat it?'

"'Nonsense! I have not heard a word about mass-scale criticism! They...'

"But the man was not allowed to finish his sentence. An extremely youthful voice was suddenly heard from the crowd:

"'Comrade! You probably did not catch what was being said! Dogs have a keen sense of hearing, but sometimes even a pup does not catch what is being said!'

"The crowd roared with laughter."

Yes, in 1976, the Beijing crowd had hostile feelings for the Maoists, and we can believe this. It is also typical that the young hero of the story remains passive. He only has to catch his breath, but can do nothing to help. His friend helps the girl who is in trouble. The young friends then help the girl hide in the crowd and lead her to the home of the hero.

In Yan Yi's home, the young men talk to the girls about everything: about the song and about politics. Yang Liu is uncompromising and energetic, and she believes that people must fight for happiness. They cannot simply wait for it with their arms folded--nothing will come to them! "What does silence mean? It means that we do not have even the most elementary democracy, but we do have fascism!" This is what Yang Liu believes. For Yan Yi

her words are a revelation. He recalls his talks with Dahu, his friend, and says to him: "We never even thought about fascism. Could fascism even appear in our socialist China? It is a crime to even think so!"

At this point, Yan Yi stammers to the girl:

"Then you are saying that our China is already being ruled by fascism?"

"Is it possible that you yourself cannot feel the atmosphere of fascism that is growing thicker with each day?" Yang Liu replies. She is firmly convinced of her beliefs and even sets forth the following argument: "The Chinese petty bourgeoisie is a boundless ocean!"

His meetings and talks with Yang Liu change the young man. A willingness to take action is aroused in the hero. And when the girl asks him to put the words of a song to music so that the demonstrators in Beijing's Tiananmen Square can sing it, he agrees. This song is not called "I Am Waiting," but "We Want." Here are the words:

> We want democracy, we do not want fascism;
> We want to be strong and rich, we do not want bragging;
> We want to get down to work, we do not want intrigue and plots;
> We want Premier Zhou, we do not want Franco or Cishi.

This is no longer a lyrical song, but an appeal for struggle and resistance, a song for demonstrators. The words disturb Yan Yi when he first reads them, but, the author stresses, not because he is afraid--he is disturbed by his sense of responsibility. After all, he is not a composer yet. The young man goes to see old Huang, his father's retired friend, and asks him for help.

"After he had taken a glance at the words of the song, old Huang quickly closed the door tightly and pulled all of the window shades shut, and then sat down and remained silent for a long time. I saw a slight tremor in his hands and in the paper he was holding. I waited, sensing the tension. I did not know what to think when old Huang suddenly raised his head and hoarsely asked:

"'Why did you write this song?'

"'Tomorrow we are going to sing it in Tiananmen Square,' I replied.

"Old Huang's face did not change, but his hands began to shake even more. He grabbed me by the shoulders and sat me down in his own chair. He inclined his head strangely and I realized that he was bowing to me! Bowing! I jumped up and hugged him. Tears were flowing down the old man's wrinkled face."

The next day, when the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square had sung "We Want" and Yan Yi descended from a pedestal on which he had affixed the words of

his song, he was apprehended. "I noticed a few suspicious-looking people quickly approach from all sides and surround me. I looked into their somber faces that held no promise of anything good. But I was not the slightest bit afraid. I was overjoyed! I was quite pleased with myself!" Yan Yi has changed so much that the certainty of arrest does not frighten him. He listens to the singing in the square, singing in which he can hear the voice of Yang Liu, the girl he has fallen in love with--a love he has not even acknowledged as yet. This is the end of the story.

If we compare Li Tuo's story, written in 1978, to the first realistic story by Liu Xin, "The Class Leader," of 1977, we see an obvious tendency toward a stronger sense of civic duty, greater responsibility and involvement in important events and the future of the state, even though we also still find traces of Maoist cliches, which are, however, already vague and located in the peripheral content. In accordance with directives from above, the author strives to dissociate the "fascism" mentioned in the story from the name of Mao Zedong. He has his character Yang Liu issue the following tirade: "In 1963, Chairman Mao was already warning us that fascist counterrevolutionary restoration could occur. Why did we not listen to him? Now that we can see with our own eyes that fascism has arrived, why do we not want to admit its presence? Are we still waiting?" It sounds as though Mao Zedong had no connection with the regime the girl so resolutely (although inaccurately) labeled "fascism."

A new feature in this story, and in the literature of 1978 in general, was the use of the word "leiza," which had never been encountered in literature before, and the frequent use of the term "nation." The term "people" is disappearing from the pages of literary works. It is being replaced more and more often with the terms "masses" and "nation." This new trend, which was not previously apparent, is overtly nationalistic. The worries about the future of China, which permeate Li Tuo's story, are not motivated by concern for the public interest, but by anxiety over the fate of the nation. The old composer Huang, shedding tears of joy and delighting in the young man's determination, says: "Boy, good boy! As long as China has young people who are not afraid to die, the state will be saved, the Chinese nation will be saved!" In what century were these words pronounced? Perhaps they sound natural on the lips of an old man, but they arouse deep thought in the young man: "To save the state, to save the nation--but this is the job of the party, the job of a leader. We young people, what can we do--we can only follow! Now I remember this and I think how stupid I was!" The young hero of the story is not even wondering about socialism in China.

A sense of civic enthusiasm, a willingness to sacrifice himself, and patriotic feelings are aroused in the young man Yan Yi, but he is balancing on a dangerous ledge, a step away from nationalistic frenzy. Whether the author of the story intended to say this or not, it is obvious that the young hero is threatened by the disease of nationalism.

Whereas the hero of "Listen to This Song" is, so to speak, balancing on the verge of nationalism, there are also other works in Chinese literature of 1978 in which this boundary has been erased and nationalism has become the main theme. It should be noted that this nationalism, which is "new" for the PRC, is inseparable from belligerent anti-Sovietism and employs the tried and tested methods of the lowest kind of bourgeois mass literature.

In 1978, the science fiction genre was suddenly reborn in the PRC. The first work in this genre, new to modern Chinese literature, was nationalist and anti-Soviet through and through. This was the novella "Death Rays on the Atoll."[6] The author chose the propagandistic pseudonym Tong Enzheng, which could be translated "a policy benefiting all." In other words, even with the choice of a pseudonym, he tried to convince the Chinese reader that anti-Sovietism "benefits" all Chinese.

The action of this story transpires outside the PRC and all the heroes are Chinese emigrants and foreigners. The author does not mention the revolution or the Chinese Communist Party even once; nationalism is his credo. At the risk of hurting the feelings of this nationalist author, we must say that he borrowed his plot from A. N. Tolstoy ("The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin," 1927). In any case, the Chinese physicists who are the heroes of this tale are not the first in literature to invent their rays.

The science fiction element of the story is quite weak. But the plot unwinds according to the laws of detective and adventure stories--with mysterious villains and an abundance of murders and catastrophes. The plot is so convoluted that it would hardly be worthwhile to describe it in detail. What is interesting is the relationship between characters, which, according to the inspirers of this propagandistic work, should poison the minds of the general Chinese reading public in the same way as cheap foreign escape literature.

The Chinese emigrants in the story become physicists in a "developed capitalist country." They are treated well there, surrounded by "friends of China," who wish them "prosperity"; the capitalist press issues a friendly warning to the Chinese about enemy intrigues involving "a certain great power." Before returning to China, one of the heroes attends a banquet at the home of a certain Professor Zhao. "Although the guests were people from different countries, all of them were happy for me that I could return to my homeland and they drank many toasts to the prosperity of China."

The heroes of the tale respect modern science and technology, but their nationalism gives them a feeling of "healthy" moral superiority to the foreigners around them. There is a servant in the story, a Malayan who serves his Chinese masters with doglike devotion. This is the position reserved by this kind of literature for representatives of other Asian nationalities. As for the capitalist society in which the Chinese emigrants are educated, it is regarded by them with condescension because it

has too many flaws: erotic and crime novels, pornography, the music of the Beatles and rock and roll. The Chinese heroes have absolutely no interest in the social problems of capitalism. And even the "prosperity of the homeland" they care so much about is discussed in an asocial tone. There is no clue as to what this "prosperous China" will be like.

The Chinese scientists in the story invent a death ray. There is no question that this is a weapon, and a horrifying one at that. But the author of the story, ignoring the obvious, calls the heroes pacifists and proceeds to absolve them of any trace of belligerence by juggling facts and stretching points in any way he can. The extremely noble Chinese physicist invents the death ray, according to the author, expressly for the purpose of keeping sharks away from public beaches; only "a certain great power" wants to use the Chinese invention for evil purposes, while China itself has absolutely no intention of doing this.

The enemy is not specified in the story; the name of the evil "great power" with its "long bear paw with sharp claws" is never mentioned. The names of the villains are even more transparent. They are Captain First-Class Shabunof and his assistant Ivan. Here is how the author describes Captain First Class Shabunof emerging from a nuclear submarine onto the atoll where the Chinese physicists are working on the death rays: "A tall man with a powerful body, dressed in a snow-white naval uniform, starched and pressed, Shabunof looked like a polar bear. Although his face was all smiles, he could not conceal his arrogance and ferocity."

Naturally, the foul deeds of the villains end with their death. The young Chinese physicist blows up their submarine with the death ray. An atomic weapon is also used in the story, set off by the "great power" in an impotent rage, to blow up the atoll and conceal its "crimes," but, naturally, only after the Chinese hero has left the atoll. The description of the mushroom cloud of the atomic blast in Chinese mass literature signifies that the reader is being convinced that atomic weapons will be used just as conventional ones, depending on circumstances. The Chinese reader is being overtly persuaded of the fairness and wisdom of atomic explosions.

What literary trend does the 1978 story "Death Rays on the Atoll" reflect? In the Chinese literary process, this kind of work is unusual, and this is amazing at first glance, but in general, the work is strikingly mediocre. The novelty of the tale consists simply in the fact that the story was written and published in Beijing, but it follows a recipe of anti-Soviet attack that is well known--the recipe of imperialist "mass" literature.

The Chinese leadership welcomed this work. When it was published in the journal, the same issue contained an announcement that the Beijing Renmin Wenxiue Publishing House was printing "Death Rays on the Atoll" in a mass edition. This means that they did not even wait for reader reaction, but took it upon themselves to quickly distribute this literary poison.

Anti-Sovietism and nationalism go hand in hand in Chinese literature. It is in this, excuse the expression, "spiritual soil" that bourgeois mass literature is being recultivated in the PRC, a literature differing little from the "literary" products of Hongkong or Taiwan--at any rate, imitating the same imperialist models of anti-Soviet propaganda.

At the same time, a critical trend is also becoming apparent in literature, but in China it naturally cannot be consistent, both because of the transitory nature of successive political campaigns and because its representatives are also not devoid of nationalist feelings.

Ostentatiously Maoist literature is also still present, glorifying the top figures in the Maoist hierarchy on the pages of newspapers and magazines, on the stage and on the screen.

In general, literary life in China has become more complex and even more contradictory in the last 2 years. The authors of a few works have been able to describe scenes from real life and partially reflect the social atmosphere despite the abundance of propagandistic trappings. In China itself, works of this kind are called "exposes" and their existence has been temporarily--but probably not for long--permitted. Nationalism, the danger of which cannot be underestimated, is becoming a serious illness in Chinese literature. Taking advantage of official protection, it is taking the path of cheap anti-Soviet amusement and is approaching a direct merger with imperialist "mass culture."

We hope that the Chinese people will have enough healthy creative strength to reject both Maoist dogma and propagandistic trash. It is not escape literature, following the detective novel pattern, or trashy concoctions that will constitute the real socialist future of Chinese literature, but a civic attitude toward the truth about the people's life.

FOOTNOTES

1. GUANGMING RIBAO, 30 January 1979.

2. RENMIN WENXIUE, 1977, No 11; an English translation of the story can be found in the magazine CHINESE LITERATURE, 1979, No 1.

3. GUANGMING RIBAO, 3 October 1978.

4. Ibid.

5. NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, 4 December 1977.

6. RENMIN WENXIUE, 1978, No 8.

8588
CSO: 1805

JAPANESE FILM--PAST AND PRESENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 171-178

[Article by M. G. Dolya]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805

TWICE CONDEMNED (COMMEMORATING THE FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF PENG BAI'S DEATH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 179-182

[Article by M. A. Suturin]

[Text] Peng Bai, hero of the Chinese revolution, was shot in Shanghai's Longhua prison yard on 31 August 1929. The order to execute Peng Bai was issued by Chiang Kai-shek personally, who saw him as the most outstanding leader of the peasant revolutionary movement. Eight of the hero's relatives were victims of Guomindang terror at the same time.

Almost 40 years later, when the People's Republic of China was already 17 years old, the Maoist cutthroats desecrated the hero's memory in Haifeng, his birthplace, located 250 kilometers to the east of Guangzhou (Canton). The local bosses of the "Cultural Revolution," headed by First Secretary Sun Jingye of the Suatou district party committee, and their assistants tortured PengBai's mother--96-year-old Zhou Feng--in prison, killed his son Peng Hong, beheaded his nephew Peng Ke and shot his cousin Peng Jin. Other persons close to the hero also died. More than 100 cadres and common people of Haifeng, who protested the actions of Mao Zedong's executioners, were also killed. More than 400 were maimed and severely wounded and over 3,000 residents of Haifeng were brutally beaten. The massacre in Haifeng was under the direct supervision of Hong Guiwen, who came from the family of the puppet head of the area under the Japanese occupation. He himself had been convicted of gangsterism after the victory of the people's revolution, but he "made himself useful" during the years of the "Cultural Revolution." But the participation of "declasse individuals" in these reprisals was no more than a historical coincidence, interesting in itself but providing no explanation of the actual meaning of the events. These events were so scandalous and so incompatible with the revolutionary traditions and socialist ideals of the Chinese people that Mao Zedong's heirs had to publish lengthy articles, which restored Peng Bai's good name to some degree and condemned the bloody outburst in Haifeng.[1] It became known, for example, that thousands of inhabitants were driven out of the city on the pretext that they were "members of a counterrevolutionary's family." This label placed the victim outside the law, and

1. See RENMIN RIBAO, 31 August 1978 and 12 February 1979.

people saved themselves by escaping, "by running wherever they could, without any specific destination, just for the sake of saving their children, satisfying their hunger with whatever they could and however they could." For 11 years, they were without status and without rights.

When RENMIN RIBAO published articles dealing with Peng Bai, it tried to pacify the reader by reporting that the authorities had taken certain measures: His mother Zhou Feng and his son Peng Hong were "posthumously rehabilitated," the cases of 3,200 individuals were "reviewed," and the "chief perpetrators," Sun Jingye and Hong Guiwen, were "turned over to administrative authorities for punishment." In the first article on Peng Bai, the present Chinese leadership tried to convey the impression that it valued the revolutionary services and glorious memory of Peng Bai. The article stressed that Mao Zedong had supposedly highly commended Peng Bai's activities and expressed concern for his mother, and that Zhou Enlai had taken a personal interest in her fate and the fate of the hero's other relatives. All of the blame for the Haifeng events of 1967 was assigned to Lin Biao and the "gang of four." But the same article quoted the following excerpt from a letter sent to Mao Zedong by Sun Jingye: "We await your instructions day and night, relying on your support." It is precisely this that reveals the true purpose of the defamation of Peng Bai and the persecution of his relatives and friends during Mao's lifetime. The legendary figure of Peng Bai, one of the organizers of the CCP and the revolutionary peasant movement in China, gave the "Great Helmsman," who had taken all the credit for being the leader and theoretician of the Chinese revolution, no peace.

The events of 1967 in Haifeng began when Peng Bai's mother was branded a "black banner." The old woman was dragged through the streets of her native city in a "dunce cap" inscribed "old lady landowner." Sun Jingye mockingly harangued: "Haifeng is facing a tremendous problem. What is this problem? It is the problem of deciding whether it should fly the banner of Mao Zedong or the flag of old madam Peng, whether it should listen to the words of Chairman Mao or the words of old madam Peng. If you do not throw a stone at this black banner of Zhou Feng, the thought of Mao Zedong will not triumph in Haifeng." The Maoists--the enemies of Peng Bai--branded Pen Bai's "Peasant Movement in Haifeng," a work of great historic revolutionary significance, a "black" book. Following the example of Mao Zedong, who had voiced skeptical judgments of the results of the revolution of 1925-1927, the Maoists accused Peng Bai of "confusing two stages of the Chinese revolution" and declared that the uprising in Hailufeng was a sign of "adventurism" and that, consequently, the "commemoration of the Hailufeng councils is contrary to the thought of Mao Zedong." The Maoists threatened that "whoever commemorates Hailufeng will be opposing the thought of Mao Zedong." Peng Bai was accused of "putschism," was described either as a "adventurist with leftist leanings" or as an "opportunist with rightist leanings" and so forth. In the Suatou district, the Maoists formed a "Special Group to Investigate the Peng Bai Case" for the purpose of gathering "evidence" that would expose him as a "traitor" to the Chinese revolution.

The leaders of the massacre in Haifeng destroyed all of the records and relics of the people's uprising of 1927 and the Hailufeng soviets that had been preserved by the town's inhabitants. The Maoists painted the red wall in Haifeng's Red Square yellow and renamed the square. They destroyed the Red Palace, in which the committee of the Hailufeng soviets--an organ of worker and peasant authority--had worked for almost 4 months. The Maoist thugs also destroyed the arch in Red Square, which had been erected to commemorate the victory of the popular uprising. New names were given to the places Peng Bai had called Red Moat and Red Glade. When the indignant inhabitants of Haifeng tried to defend the revolutionary honor of their glorious countryman, to save his relatives and to preserve their monuments, the authorities sent the "militia" into the city, and the punishment began on 26 August 1967. It took the penalizers, however, 2 whole weeks to suppress the unarmed citizens. For the purpose of "intimidation," the head of Peng Ke, Peng Bai's nephew, was displayed in a busy part of the city for 3 days.

Now, 12 years later, Mao Zedong's heirs are trying to use the memory of the revolutionary hero to their own advantage. RENMIN RIBAO is hypocritically complaining that "many young people in China do not know" anything about Peng Bai now. Although this remark is true in itself, it also means that Beijing propaganda can now distort Peng Bai's political biography in its own interest. The publication of articles in the Beijing press about Peng Bai and some other outstanding CCP activists of the 1920's--for example, Li Dazhao--also reflect the struggle in the top circles of the Chinese leadership over the paths taken by the CCP and the people's revolution in connection with the prolonged compilation of the "History of the Chinese Communist Party." The nature of the debates over the Haifeng events of 1967 indirectly attests to reversals in this struggle. It indicates the approach of the Maoist leaders to the vindication of Peng Bai in the Maoist history of the CCP more than it testifies to these leaders' wish to vindicate the victims of the Maoist massacre in Haifeng. Contemporary accounts of these events stress the fact that Ye Jiangying, who was then PRC minister of defense, sent a "task force of the Main Political Administration of the PLA" to this region in 1974 to learn the facts of the matter. Sun Jingye, however, who was a Maoist of relatively low rank, kept the military commission from conducting its investigation by presenting it with some kind of "weighty documents." At that time, the omnipotent Lin Biao, who could have shielded the persecutors, was no longer around, but Mao Zedong was. Nonetheless, as a result of the "task force's" trip to Haifeng, local authorities informed Peng Hong's family of his "death" 8 years after the fact. An investigation showed that Peng Bai's son was seized in Guangzhou by lackeys from a detachment "purging class ranks" and was sent from there to the Haifeng torture chambers. There he was "subjected to criticism" and died. The authorities did not even showed his relatives the spot where his remains had been laid.

The Haifeng "case" was brought up once again in June 1978. An "investigative task force," set up by Guangdong party, administrative and military authorities, received more than 8,000 letters from the population and

listened to the testimony of more than 5,000 witnesses. Just as before, however, little was learned about the organization of the terror in Haifeng. Who had initiated it? Where were the incriminating documents? Sun Jingye was only an executor, who was sent from Beijing. Moreover, he was obviously under someone's powerful protection in subsequent years. Finally, the readers of RENMIN RIBAO never did learn whether the leaders and executors of the violence in Haifeng were ever punished.

Peng Bai has returned to the pages of CCP history, but now he is assigned an extremely insignificant role in the peasant movement--as the leader of this movement only in the district of Haifeng. The revolutionary services of this leader of the peasant masses are still being ascribed to Mao Zedong. Just as before, in Mao Zedong's lifetime, the historic significance of the Hailufeng Republic of Workers and Peasants, created by Peng Bai, is being carefully played down. The Maoist press is still not telling its readers that Peng Bai was part of the generation of educated Chinese Marxists, which also included Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubo, Deng Zhongxia, Su Zhaozheng and Zhang Tailei. Peng Bai had a sounder educational background than Mao Zedong, acquired during his years of study in Japan (1917-1920), and later at the Communist University of Workers of the East in Moscow (1921-1922).

Peng Bai became a revolutionary in his youth, after he had severed his connections with the grand feudal stock he had been born into. His entire short life, which was cut short when he was 33, was filled with feverish revolutionary activity. He formed the first peasant union in China, which united almost 20,000 of the rural poor in the district of Haifeng by the beginning of 1923 and more than half a million peasants in Guangdong Province in another 3 years. In the beginning of 1924, when the CCP became part of the reorganized Guomindang, Peng Bai began to work under Sun Yat-sen's supervision as secretary of the peasant division of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee and director of training courses for peasant movement organizers. This was long before Mao Zedong began to pay any attention to the peasant movement. Peng Bai was a talented organizer and an ardent spokesman. In 1925 and 1926 he supervised the convention of all-China peasant congresses. More than half a year prior to the Chiang Kai-shek coup of 12 April 1927, he astutely exposed the treacherous tactics of Guomindang rightists in LITOU magazine, warning the CCP leadership of the danger of degeneration in the upper echelon of the Guomindang after Sun Yat-sen's death. After the Guomindang betrayal, Peng Bai, along with Zhu De and other CCP military activists, led the "August First Uprising" in Nanchang and supervised the creation of the People's Liberation Army of China. He personally led the armed self-defense of Guangdong's peasant unions against counterrevolution, displaying great personal courage. In October 1927, Peng Bai and Ye Ting broke through Guomindang covering forces, led a combat unit into the districts of Haifeng and Lufeng and stirred up a rebellion by the peasants and urban poor of this zone, which resulted in the formation of the Hailufeng Republic, "the first red regime in China--the Hailufeng soviets," as Chinese historians once correctly called it.[2]

2. See LISHI YANJIU, 1958, No 8.

The Chinese soviets represented a form of revolutionary struggle by the CCP that was progressive for that time. Later, it began to be ignored in Maoist historical works. Mao Zedong, as a nationalist, did not like this form of struggle, and he certainly did not like its name. Peng Bai, on the other hand, was once again in the vanguard in what was truly the first line of the political and armed struggle of the CCP and the Chinese people.

The Hailufeng soviet was elected by a congress, attended by 90 worker, 180 peasant and 30 soldier delegates. The congress resolved to carry out an agrarian reform and to create a Red Army. The Hailufeng Government began to open hospitals, academic institutes, worker and peasant clubs, reading rooms and worker cooperatives, and it published a newspaper and a magazine. The membership figures of the CCP and the League of Young Workers rose quickly, and trade unions and other public organizations were founded. One of the first women's federations in China was created in Hailufeng.

The CCP Central Committee Politburo noted the following in a decree of 3 January 1928: "The abundant material of the Hailufeng political authority, its victory and its experience have set a precedent and should be implemented in all subsequent peasant rebellions (methods of conducting rebellions and uniting the soldiers with the masses, the resolute liquidation of landowners and extortionists, the confiscation and allotment of land, the construction of a soviet regime, the implementation of Soviet policy, the creation of a revolutionary army of workers and peasants, the organization of soviets in each region and each village, the experience in partisan warfare and the heroic struggle in defense of revolutionary tarritories)."[3]

The Hailufeng revolutionary base survived another two and a half months after the death of the Canton Commune, heroically withstanding the attacks of three militaristic armies. When the supply of ammunition ran out, the garrison defending Haifeng moved into the hills on an order from Peng Bai in the dark of a February night. The experience of building the Hailufeng revolutionary base was of great assistance in the creation of the Central Soviet Region in Jiangxi Province, which survived for several years.

The Sixth CCP Congress in the summer of 1928 highly commended Peng Bai's experience and his contribution to the revolutionary cause by electing him a member of the CCP Central Committee Politburo in absentia.

In contrast to Mao Zedong, Peng Bai never doubted the Marxist-Leninist doctrine about the worldwide historic mission of the proletariat, its hegemony in the revolutionary process and the importance of party work in the cities. At the time when Chiang Kai-shek terrorism reached its most brutal limits, Peng Bai was in the most dangerous area of the struggle--in Shanghai, where he was serving as secretary of the CCP Central Committee

3. Ibid., p 10.

in charge of work with the peasantry. He continued to devote a great deal of attention to the creation of a red worker and peasant army in liberated regions, coordinating this objective with the peasant struggle.

On 24 August, Chiang Kai-shek's forces apprehended Peng Bai in his secret hiding-place on Xinjialu Street after he had been denounced by a traitor. Throughout all of the brutal torture in Longhua prison until his dying breath, Peng Bai fulfilled his duty as a communist who had urged the masses to fight and had led the battle. When he was being led to the firing squad, all of the prisoners heard his voice ringing clear: "Down with the Guomindang traitors!"; "Long live the Chinese Red Army!"; "Long live the Chinese Soviet revolution!"' "Long live the Chinese Communist Party!".... At the far wall of the prison yard, where he was to be executed, Peng Bai spoke to the soldiers and they refused to shoot him. Then an officer took one of the rifles and shot Peng Bai himself.

In an article entitled "In Memory of Comrade Peng Bai," Qu Qiubo wrote: "His activity, filled with heroism, a spirit of determination and burning energy, made him an exceptionally respected man in the party at a time of unprecedented outright terror in China. He was the true leader of the long-suffering peasant masses, deeply respected and loved by them.... Peng Bai's death was a tremendous loss for the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolution."

In peasant China, Peng Bai feverishly dreamed of the social emancipation and economic development of rural areas. All of his conscious life as a revolutionary was devoted to this goal. Peng Bai did not live to see the victory of the people's revolution, at which time his dreams began to come true.

Now rural China is quite far removed from these ideals, and the military bureaucratic regime of Mao Zedong's successors is wringing all of the vital fluids out of it. Exhausting labor, a semi-starvation existence and an inferior status--these constitute the peasant condition in China today. It was not for this that Peng Bai roused the Chinese people.

Peng Bai's multifaceted activity, aimed at uniting the peasants, putting labor on a social basis, fighting for social emancipation and the economic reconstruction, enlightenment and improvement of peasant life and combating need and disease, is still a valid historic experiment and example, which stands in vivid contrast to Beijing's present course in the area of agriculture.

Peng Bai dreamed of a socialist future for China, but he died not as a dreamer in conflict with reality, but as a fighter in battle for this future.

Peng Bai's heroic death caused many people to grieve and to fight against the enemy of the people's revolution. The Maoist desecration of Peng Bai's memory and the massacre of his relatives and supporters are now

common knowledge in China. This is upsetting millions of Chinese and is serving the great cause for which Peng Bai fought so bravely.*

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* For a more detailed discussion of Peng Bai's life and work, see A. M. Malukhin, "Pen Bay--geroy kitayskoy revolyutsii" [Peng Bai--Hero of the Chinese Revolution], Moscow, 1975.

YE TING, BUILDER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 183-188

[Article by Professor M. F. Yur'yev]

[Text] One of the builders of the Chinese revolutionary armed forces was General Ye Ting--commander of the famous Independent Regiment in the armed struggle against Chinese militarists, commander of the front at the time of the Nanchang uprising (August-September 1927), commander-in-chief of the Canton Commune troops (December 1927) and commander of the New 4th Army in the war against the Japanese imperialists.

Ye Ting (who also went by the names of Ye Xining and Ye Xiyi) was born in Hueiyang district in the province of Guandong. His parents were peasants. The exact date of his birth is not known. Various biographical publications indicate birth years of 1895, 1896 and 1897 (most frequently 1896). In 1913 he enrolled in the Guangdong Military Institute, located on the island of Huangpu (Wampu) near Guangzhou (Canton), where a famous military and political school was later (in 1924) founded. He later studied at the Baoding Military Academy, the graduates of which included many prominent Chinese military leaders. His classmates included future CCP military activist Zhang Yunyi, future chief of the political administration of the National Revolutionary Army and leftist Guomindang member Deng Yanda, future Guomindang General Xiue Youe and others.

In 1919 Ye Ting completed his military training and went to the city of Zhengzhou (Fujian Province) to enlist in the forces of Guangdong militarist Chen Jiongming, then regarded as one of Sun Yat-sen's supporters. Ye Ting took part in combat operations which resulted in a victory over Guangxi troops in 1920 and the entry of Guangxi by the Guangdong troops. Sun Yat-sen returned to this center of South China soon afterward to head the government.

In this way, Ye Ting found himself in the center of the military and political struggle in South China. In 1922 he became a battalion commander in the Security Guard Company of Sun Yat-sen's headquarters. This company in the first division of Sun Yat-sen's troops was commanded by Deng Yanda.

At this time, Chen Jiongming launched a counterrevolutionary rebellion. Ye Ting, who had joined the Guomindang, took an active part on the struggle on the side of Sun Yat-sen, who regained control over the South China Government in Guangzhou in February 1923.

At this time, Sun Yat-sen began to work toward rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the belief that revolutionary forces in China could only win a victory by relying on Soviet aid and utilizing the triumphant experience of the Bolshevist Party. One of the most significant signs of the nation of October's selfless support was Soviet assistance in the training of Chinese revolutionary cadres, including military cadres for the creation of a revolutionary army in South China. At the request of Sun Yat-sen, Soviet political advisers (headed by old Bolshevik M. M. Borodin) and military experts (headed by Russian civil war hero P. A. Pavlov and, after his death, V. K. Blyukher) came to China. Chinese revolutionaries were simultaneously given an opportunity to attend Soviet schools. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen sent Ye Ting to study in the USSR. Here he joined the CCP and studied at the Communist University of Workers of the East, and later at a Soviet military academic institution (at the same time as Nie Rongzhen). In 1925 he returned to his native land through Berlin and met Zhu De.

In Guangdong, Ye Ting was appointed chief of staff of the IV Corps of the National Revolutionary Army (the corps commander was Li Jishen), and in November 1925 he became the commander of the 34th Regiment of the 12th Division of the IV NRA Corps in West Guangdong. Under the command of Ye Ting, the regiment assisted the peasant movement in its struggle against the landowners.

This was the time when the anti-imperialist national democratic revolution broke out in China, beginning with major strikes by the workers of Shanghai and Hong Kong. In the South, the liberation of Guangdong Province from the militarist troops of Chen Jiongming and Deng Benying was completed. At the end of 1925, Ye Ting was assigned an important mission: To establish the Independent Regiment of the IV Corps as the most reliable and exemplary unit of the National Revolutionary Army.

The regiment, which was located in Zhaoqing, was made up of revolutionary soldiers, including young workers. Many of the officers were communists. For example, two (of the three) battalion commanders and six (of the total ten) company commanders were members of the CCP. In all, 400 of the 2,000 soldiers and officers in the regiment were communists and Komsomol members, and CCP sympathizers brought the figure up to 85 percent of the total.

In March 1926, events took place in Guangzhou which influenced the further development of the revolution: Chiang Kai-shek, taking advantage of his position as head of the Wampu Military-Political School and commander of the I NRA Corps associated with this school, accomplished a military coup. The communists had to retreat, withdraw from the 1st Corps and agree

to limit their influence in the Guomindang. This was a correct line, intended to preserve the united national revolutionary front. Under these circumstances, many communist servicemen in the NRA were transferred from the I Corps to the IV, most of them to the Independent Regiment.

Under Ye Ting's supervision, the men of this regiment underwent intensive military training. Political indoctrination to instill the men with fidelity to the cause of China's liberation from imperialist and militarist authority was of great significance. The excellent combat and political qualities of the fighters and officers of this regiment predetermined its prominent role in the successful accomplishment of the Northern Campaign--this famous event in the history of the Chinese revolution, a military expedition against the North Chinese militarists, organized by the Guangzhou national government with the internationalist support of the Soviet Union, which was aiding the NRA with advisers and equipment. The Northern Campaign became a form of revolutionary war and an important element of the revolution of 1925-1927.

Most of the NRA entered the campaign from Guangdong Province after taking the oath on 9 July 1926. But Ye Ting's Independent Regiment had already entered Guangdong's neighboring province, Hunan, on 19 May 1926. On 1 June the regiment reached the city of Anren, and on the next day it routed the superior forces of the enemy and occupied the city of Youxian. The first prisoners were taken: 4 officers and 40 soldiers from the militarist forces. This battle demonstrated Ye Ting's high standards of political command as a military leader--his ability to act on his own, to surprise the enemy, to make optimal use of his own forces and to rely on the assistance of the population. The enemy was defeated by means of sudden attacks from the flank and in the rear. Armed peasant detachments joined the combat on the side of the Independent Regiment, and this helped the subunits of Ye Ting's Independent Regiment to travel by night through unfamiliar territory to Youxian.

The NRA gained a stronger position in South Hunan. The Youxian victory of the Independent Regiment made it the most popular unit of the NRA and it became known as the "iron regiment."

Ye Ting's regiment acted just as decisively and successfully when it took the important cities of Liling, Zhuzhou and Pingjian in East Hunan, not only guaranteeing the success of the offensive on the main city in Hunan--Changsha--but also ensuring the complete liberation of this province. The peasant volunteers who led the revolutionary troops along mountain paths straight to the walls of Pingjiang played an important part in this success. In a hand-to-hand battle, the NRA soldiers gained control over the city. Many weapons were captured, more than 6,000 enemy soldiers were taken prisoner and the notorious militarist commander who had been defending Pingjiang committed suicide.

Continuing its rapid advance, Ye Ting's regiment marched in the vanguard of the troops of the IV Corps to Wuchang. But before it could reach this major center of the Yangtse River valley, it had to capture positions in Tingsiqiao and Heshengqiao, which were excellently reinforced by the militarist Wu Peifu with the aid of the British. In the battle of Tingsiqiao on 26-27 August 1926, the Independent Regiment achieved its main objective: A sudden flank attack which forced the enemy to retreat. After this, the regiment took the railway bridge and the city of Xianning by storm in hand-to-hand combat. Enemy losses included 2,000 dead, 5,000 taken prisoner and large quantities of captured equipment: cannons, machine guns and 5,000 rifles. Ye Ting's enterprising actions prevented the enemy from consolidating new positions in Xianning and forced enemy troops to hastily retreat to Heshengqiao.

The defeat in Tingsiqiao enraged Wu Peifu. By his order, all brigade, regiment and battalion commanders who retreated without authorization were executed. On 29 August he arrived at the Heshengqiao post to personally direct the defense of the last frontiers on the approaches to Wuchang, 30 kilometers to the south. But even Heshengqiao was taken after an 8-hour night battle and numerous bayonet assaults. Wu Peifu had to escape to the north and his select units were smashed. Great losses were also incurred by the troops of the IV NRA Corps, particularly Ye Ting's regiment, which had borne most of the burden of the battles on the approaches to Wuchang.

One of the most important victories of the Northern Campaign Army was the taking of Wuchang--the main city of Hubei Province on the Yangtse River. Here is what S. A. Dalin, who was in China at that time, wrote about the participation of Ye Ting's regiment in this victory: "The Cantonese attacked Wuchang several times, but unsuccessfully. Finally, the communist regiment launched an offensive. Under a hail of bullets, communists and Komsomol members stormed the walls of the city. Here the best, most selflessly corageous communists in China died. Their courage became the subject of folk legends which later inspired mystical terror in the reactionary armies."[1] Before the last assault, a tunnel was dug under the wall under Ye Ting's direct supervision and according to his plan, and soldiers of the Independent Regiment moved through this tunnel and seized "Snake Mountain"--a chain of hills crossing Wuchang, on which the weapons of the enemy were set up--and, in this way, played an important part in the defeat of Wu Peifu's troops. After a 6-hour battle, Wuchang, which had been under siege for more than a month, was taken by the IV NRA Corps.

This took place on 10 October 1926, on the 15th anniversary of the Xinhai revolution, when the monarchic order was overthrown in China. In the victorious assault of Wuchang, NRA soldiers were assisted by Soviet military advisers, including Soviet pilots Kravtsov, Sergeyev, Tal'berg and Bazenau. Twice a day, two planes flown by these men bombed the enemy troops and reinforcements, conducted air reconnaissance and carried out communication and propaganda missions. The role of the Soviet pilots in

the NRA victory in Wuchang is clearly attested to in the text of a dispatch sent from the headquarters of the IV Corps: "Wuchang was taken by aviation and the IV Corps."

Taking Ye Ting's military services and popularity into account, the NRA command awarded him the title of general. The Independent Regiment was expanded into the 24th Division of the XI Corps. Under Ye Ting's command, this division, as the most reliable revolutionary unit, took on an extremely important mission--garrison duty in the three cities of Wuhan (Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang), which became the official seat of the national government on 1 January 1927.

In Wuhan, Ye Ting met Ye. V. Teslenko, who had been sent to Ye Ting in the capacity of a military adviser. Here is how he describes the revolutionary general: "Ye Ting made a great impression on me. A thin man of above-average height with a good physique and a neat and attractive appearance, he automatically commanded affection. He usually spoke little. In time of battle, he concentrated only on one thing--to rout the enemy. He lived modestly, even meagerly. He had a wife and a 2-year-old son. Ye Ting was extremely interested in the experience of the Anglo-Boer War, the barricade battles and uprising of the Russian sailors in 1905, the civil war in Soviet Russia and the Red Army."[2]

In April 1927, a crisis broke out in the development of the Chinese revolution. Chiang Kai-shek, NRA commander-in-chief, and his followers, the right wing of the Guomindang, carried out a counterrevolutionary coup in Shanghai and other cities in East China. In Guangzhou, in the nation's south, the same kind of coup was carried out by General Li Jishen. Mass reprisals against communists, revolutionary workers, peasants and the intelligentsia began. The united front of the communist party and Guomindang continued to exist in the region of Wuhan (Central China). Even here, however, the polarization of class forces became more pronounced and counterrevolution reared its head.

In this complex situation, the farsighted nature of the decision to turn the garrison duty in Wuhan over to Ye Ting's 24th Division and the guard regiment commanded by Lu Demin, also a member of the CCP, was particularly clear. In the middle of May 1927, Xia Douyin, commander of the 14th Hubei Division of the NRA, launched a counterrevolutionary rebellion against the national government in Wuhan. After he had been awarded the title of "commander of the anticommunist forces for the punishment of Wuhan," Xia Douyin joined forces with other reactionary troops and launched an attack on Wuhan under the slogans "Down with the communists" and "Down with the peasant unions." His units made their way to a point 20 kilometers away from Wuhan after cutting off all rail connections between Wuhan and Changsha. At this crucial time, the 24th Division and a training brigade, made up of students from the Wuhan Central Military and Political School under the supervision of communist Yun Daiying, were thrown into the struggle against the rebels.[3] They, in the words of Soviet military adviser A. I. Cherepanov, "shielded the revolutionary capital with their chests."[4]

The entire operation was led by Ye Ting. On 16 May, under his command, units of the 24th Division, the guard regiment, the training brigade and a workers brigade marched into battle against the rebels. On 18 May, Xia Douyin's division was smashed in a 2-hour battle. But Chairman Wang Jingwei of the Wuhan Government and Troop Commander Tang Shengshi prohibited the pursuit of Xia Douyin's retreating soldiers, and he 'reconciled" with the government soon afterward.

Not long before the counterrevolutionary coup in Wuhan, the 24th Division was withdrawn from Wuchang to the city of Daye on orders from the government, and in the middle of July (during the time of the coup carried out by the Wuhan Guomindang leaders) Ye Ting was ordered to transfer his division to Nanchang. This simplified the preparations for a famous event in the history of the revolutionary movement in China--the Nachang rebellion. Ye Ting's leading role in this rebellion became a new and brilliant page in the biography of this outstanding CCP military activist.

The Nanchang rebellion began under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party on 1 August 1947, at a turning point in the Chinese revolution, when yesterday's allies of the CCP--the leaders of the Wuhan Guomindang--had followed Chiang Kai-shek into the camp of the enemies of the Chinese masses, and most of the units of the Guomindang Army had ceased to be national revolutionary armed forces and had become a tool of reaction. At that time, however, it was not known as yet that the "Guomindang" variety of revolutionary movement had already exhausted itself. An attempt was made to revive the revolution by means of an armed uprising under the banner of the revolutionary Guomindang against the leaders of the Guomindang and its army, who had disrupted the united national revolutionary front.

The decision to launch a rebellion in Nanchang was made at the end of July 1927 at a series of meetings in Hankou and Jiujiang, attended by members of the provisional Politburo of the CCP Central Committee, other leading party activists and representatives of the Comintern and the Communist Youth International. The transfer of troops under some degree of CCP influence (the most reliable in this respect was Ye Ting's 24th Division) to the Nanchang region was simplified by the fact that although the Wuhan Guomindang leaders had severed connections with the united front with the CCP, they still (in the middle and second half of July 1927) had not given up their plans for military action against Chiang Kai-shek. It was precisely in this connection that Ye Ting was ordered, as was mentioned above, to move to Nanchang with his division. Other units of the fighting groups of General Zhang Fagui were also moved there, including He Long's XX Corps, with 700 communists among its soldiers.

Despite the fact that the troops of Ye Ting and He Long were going to Nanchang in accordance with orders concerning the general concentration of Wuhan troops on initial lines of departure for an assault on Chiang Kai-shek's army, the Guomindang command in Wuhan treated them with contempt, particularly since Ye Ting was known to be a communist (at that time, He Long was not a member of the CCP; he joined the party after the

Nanchang uprising began). Attempts were made to delay the move of the 24th Division and XX Corps to Nanchang. The memoirs of workers who took part in the Nanchang rebellion contain the following statements: "After leaving Wuchang, the units of He Long and Ye Ting arrived in Xiujiabu, near Nanchang, on 26 July. The chief of the Guomindang Bureau of Public Security in Xiujiabu reported this to Nanchang and tried to delay them. The Guomindang troops blew up a bridge between Xiujiabu and Nanchang. But Zhu De sent printer Zhao Sanglu on a mission to restore the bridge. He mobilized more than 100 railway workers, who, after working all night, restored the bridge by the morning of 27 July and, in this way, the troops of He Long and Ye Ting entered Nanchang, where they were welcomed by the city's workers."[5]

But the Guomindang leaders did not abandon their idea of preventing the troops from taking the field under CCP guidance. The possibility of removing Ye Ting from the position of division commander and of immediately transferring his troops and He Long's troops from Nanchang to Jiujiang was discussed at the end of June at a meeting attended by leaders of the Wuhan Army and Government. A decision was made to purge the army of communists. The Guomindang 6th Corps was moved to Nanchang to surround the revolutionary units of He Long and Ye Ting.

Under these conditions, it was impossible to move slowly. The CCP front committee (Ye Ting, as the most prestigious CCP military activist, was one of its members) formed in the last third of July to lead the rebellion appointed He Long commander of the revolutionary troops, and Ye Ting commander of the front. He set up his headquarters in the Jiangxi Hotel on Ximachi Street.

The rebellion began on 1 August, in the morning. Around 20,000 soldiers from the units of He Long and Ye Ting and several other units took part in it. They included ai und 1,400 communists. The rebels declared the formation of a Guomindang Revolutionary Committee. Guomindang troops in Nanchang were routed and disarmed. But this was not the rebels' main objective. On 3-5 August 1927, they moved south to regain the old revolutionary base--the province of Guangdong, to fortify their positions there and, in this way, to establish the preconditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. When they left Nanchang, the revolutionary troops were reorganized into three corps: the XX (He Long), the XI (Ye Ting) and the IX (Zhu De). Ye Ting went on ahead as the commander of the advance guard column. The commissar of his corps was Nie Rongzhen.

The revolutionary troops moved southward, overcoming incredible diffculties: extreme heat, difficult terrain, a lack of medical assistance, inadequate food and water supplies, and the overloading of soldiers due to the shortage of bearers. In a few battles, they defeated the enemy's attempt to block their way to Guangdong, but they themselves also incurred great losses. A large-scale battle took place on 24 August in Hueichang. Ye Ting's XI Corps and other units attacked the enemy and emerged victorious after a 10-hour battle involving artillery, taking 900 prisoners, 1,000 rifles and other equipment.

On 24 September the Nanchang rebel army entered the Chaozhou-Shantou (Swatou) region in the east of Guandong. This was an important achievement for the revolutionary troops, but they were unable to reinforce it. The Guomindang command was able to transfer superior forces to this region and, despite the general heroism displayed by the revolutionary fighters, from Ye Ting, He Long and Zhu De to the soldiers, the rebel army of 5,000 was defeated in heavy fighting at the end of September and the beginning of October 1927 and was broken up into several detachments.

Ye Ting, leading 800-900 soldiers of the 24th Division, broke through to the district of Lufeng--one of the centers of the peasant movement in East Guandong. After this, on orders from the party, he moved on to Hong Kong, and then to Guangzhou (Canton), where the CCP was completing the preparations for a worker and soldier rebellion under the Soviet banner. Ye Ting arrived in Guangzhou a few hours before the beginning of the rebellion in the capacity of commander of the armed forces of the Canton commune.

The very fact that Ye Ting was one of the leaders of the Guangzhou rebellion was of great significance: It inspired bravery and lifted the fighting spirit of the rebels--that is a measure of his great prestige. This is discussed by old CCP member Zhu Daonan, who took part in the rebellion as a member of the training and instruction regiment, in his memoirs. He writes that Ye Ting, Zhang Tailei and Yun Daiying came to a regiment mass-meeting before the beginning of the rebellion. In his speech, Ye Ting said that the Guomindang had surrendered to imperialism, had betrayed the revolution, had violated the three great political directives of Sun Yat-sen, was guilty of the mass murder of workers and peasants and had filled the nation with unadorned terror. The Guomindang forces were now the new militarists. The Chinese revolution could now be led only by the communist party. The future and the hopes of 400 million countrymen rested on the shoulders of the communist party. We must take on this responsibility. Our main objective today is to create and expand worker and peasant armed forces and seize political power. Ye Ting's speech was not a long one, Zhu Daonan recalls, but it made an extremely strong impression. Using simple, understandable phrases, Ye Ting explained their duties to the soldiers and gave combat assignments to each company.[6]

Ye Ting took on the military leadership of the rebellion under the most difficult conditions. The plans for the uprising were worked out without his participation under the direct supervision of Zhang Tailei, who was in contact with all CCP fighting forces in Guangzhou. But Zhang Tailei died on the second day of the uprising, and Ye Ting did not have time to familiarize himself with the situation. This had a negative effect on the leadership of rebel actions and, along with other objective and subjective factors, decided the fate of the heroic Canton Commune.

After the failure of the uprising, Ye Ting arrived in Moscow in the beginning of 1928, where he presented a detailed report to the Comintern Executive Committee, including a critical analysis of the Canton Commune experience.

This is a good place to cite another description of Ye Ting, this time by Shao Teng, who met him in Moscow: "Ye Ting was a young man at that time, with a gentle face and beautiful, almost femenine hands. He wrote lyrical verse, loved literature and read the classics. He looked more like a scholar, writer or artist. It was difficult to believe that this was the legendary general. Ye Ting talked about his fighting days eagerly and often. He spoke of the Nanchang and Guangzhou rebellions with pride and sorrow. From Moscow, he went on to Germany."[7]

A new stage in Ye Ting's revolutionary career began in 1937, after the Japanese imperialists had started a war for the purpose of seizing all of China. Implementing the policy of a united national anti-Japanese front, planned under the supervision of the Comintern, the CCP offered the Guomindang Government the use of its Red Army units, operating in North China, against the Japanese aggressors. The offer was accepted, and in August 1937 the Red Army troops were reorganized, on the orders of the Chinese Government's Military Committee, into the 8th National Revolutionary Army under the command of Zhu De and Peng Dehuai, consisting of three divisions (45,000 soldiers).

After this, the CCP entered into negotiations with the Guomindang on the formation of another army in Central China, to be made up of Red partisan brigades remaining in this part of the country after the retreat of the main CCP forces to the northwest. The CCP was represented in the negotiations by Xiang Ying, member of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CCP Central Committee and deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council, who was heading party work and the activities of CCP partisan brigades in the Yangtze River valley. On 12 October 1937, the Chiang Kai-shek Government agreed to the creation of another CCP-controlled army of 12,000 men. General Ye Ting was appointed commander of this army, and his deputy was to be Xiang Ying, the army's political leader. The army was called the "New 4th Army"--in memory of the IV Corps of the National Revolutionary Army during the war against the North Chinese militarists, in which the unit with the most combat glory was Ye Ting's Independent Regiment.

In October 1937, Ye Ting returned to China to take the most immediate and active part in the fight against the Japanese aggressors. With Xiang Ying, he led the successful combat operations of the New 4th Army in the vast and important region of Shanghai-Nanjing, as well as operations on both sides of the Yangtze in Central China. The headquarters of the New 4th Army were established in Nanchang in January 1938. The comrades-in-arms of Ye Ting and Xiang Ying in the political leadership of partisan maneuvers against Japanese occupation forces on the front and in the enemy's rear were Chen Yi, Zhang Yunyi, Rao Shushi, Yuan Guoping, Luo Binghue, Ye Fei, Peng Xiuefeng, Su Yu and others.

Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang command, fearing the growth of the New 4th Army's strength, particularly in connection with the fact that it was operating in direct proximity to such important centers of the

nation as Shanghai, Nanjing and Wuhan, refused to equip it as agreed and even exposed it to attacks by Japanese troops while publicly commending the combat qualities of Ye Ting's army.

Mao Zedong was also suspicious of the New 4th Army and the actions of its leaders, Ye Ting and Xiang Ying, who were renouncing his adventuristic course that was undermining the united front.

In these severe conflicts, Ye Ting again displayed the qualities of an unparalleled military leader devoted to the cause of the Chinese people's liberation. The author of a book of remembrances of Ye Ting,[8] a man who was part of his personal bodyguard in 1939 and 1940, writes that the army commander was strict and benevolent in his relations with his comrades and was concerned about them. He was brave in battle against the enemy and did not lose his composure. Ye Ting liked to spend time in companies, platoons and divisions and then analyze the situation with battalion and regimental commanders before he made decisions.

As a result of heroic struggle, the New 4th Army liberated tens of millions of people from the rule of the invaders and created several liberated regions in the Yangtze valley.

The growth of Ye Ting's army--the striking force of the CCP and the Chinese people--was stopped temporarily by a treacherous attack on his head column in January 1941 by Guomindang troops in South Anhui. According to Wang Ming,[9] a provocative role in this tragic event was played by Mao Zedong. For 7 days, the fighters of the New 4th Army headed by Ye Ting, battled the vastly superior forces of the Guomindang. When Ye Ting set off for the headquarters of the commander of the Guomindang troops, Shangguang Yunxiang (they attended the Baoding Military Academy together) to stop the conflict, he was arrested. Xiang Ying and several thousand fighters died. But the New Fourth Army continued to fight.

The Guomindang kept Ye Ting confined for more than 5 years--in Shangrao, Enshi, Guiling and Chungqing. The demand to free him was one of the most popular demands during the democratic movement against the Chiang Kai-shek dicatorship. Finally, on 4 March 1946, the CCP, with the support of the general democratic public, was able to win Ye Ting's freedom. The same day, Ye Ting, who had not been a party member since 1928, sent a telegram to the CCP Central Committee, requesting his reinstatement in the party. On 7 March, the corresponding decision was made. On 8 April he, along with his family and CCP activists Qin Bangxian, Wang Ruofei, Deng Fa and others, boarded an American plane in Chungqing to fly to Yanan. Near Yanan, however, the plane crashed in the Chashan Mountains. None of the passengers survived.

It would be difficult to overestimate the part played by Ye Ting in the struggle of the Chinese workers against national and social oppression. As an active participant in such major events as the Northern Campaign, the Nanchang and Guangzhou uprisings and the war against the Japanese

invaders, Ye Ting has left a deep imprint on China's contemporary history. People like Ye Ting, revolutionaries and internationalists, have always been the pride of the Chinese people.

FOOTNOTES

1. S. A. Dalin, "Kitayskiye memuary 1921-1927" [Chinese Memoirs 1921-1927], Moscow, 1975, p 224.

2. "Sovetskiye dobrovol'tsy o pervoy grazhdanskoy revolyutsionnoy voyne v Kitaye. Vospominaniya" [Soviet Volunteers Discuss the First Civil Revolutionary War in China. Memoirs], Moscow, 1961, p 123.

3. See A. I. Cherepanov, "Zapiski voyennogo sovetnika v Kitaye" [Notes of a Military Adviser in China], Moscow, 1976, p 556.

4. According to Ye. V. Teslenko's memoirs, the decision to rout Xia Douyin with the forces of the 24th Division and the training brigade was made by Ye Ting, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De, who were then in Wuchang ("Sovetskiye dobrovol'tsy o pervoy grazhdanskoy revolyutsionnoy voyne v Kitaye," p 124).

5. See M. F. Yur'yev, "The Nanchang Rebellion," in the book: "Revolyutsiya 1925-1927 gg. v Kitaye" [The Revolution of 1925-1927 in China], Moscow, 1978, p 204.

6. See Zhu Daonan, "I Remember the Guangzhou Uprising" (in Chinese), Shanghai, 1959, pp 42-45.

7. "Kantonskaya Kommuna (K 40-letiyu vosstaniye v Guanshzhou) [The Canton Commune (Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Uprising in Guangzhou)], Moscow, 1967, pp 153-154.

8. See HONGQOI PIAOPIAO, 1957, No 5, pp 175-179.

9. See Wang Ming, "Half a Century of the CCP and the Treachery of Mao Zedong," Moscow, 1975, p 172. For more detail, see A. S. Titov, "Courageous Son of the Chinese Working Class (Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of Xiang Ying's Birth), PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1978, No 2.

8588
CSO: 1805

NEW JOURNAL ON TOPICS IN ORIENTOLOGY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 189-191

[Article by V. A. Vasil'yev]

[Text] The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Mongolian People's Republic Academy of Sciences has begun to publish a new scientific and socio-political journal--DORNODAHINE SUDALYN ASUUDAL ("Topics in Oriental Studies")--which intends to elucidate topics connected with the history, economics, government and law, culture and international relations of the nations of the Far East.

The journal begins with an article by Candidate of Historical Sciences S. Ishdorj, "The Foreign Policy Line of the 17th MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Congress in Action." The author analyzes the practical steps taken by the party and government of the MPR to implement the foreign policy line worked out at the 17th party congress. The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party is tirelessly fighting for the implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence by states with different social systems and for the peace and security of people in Asia and the rest of the world. Mongolia, along with the nations of the socialist community and other peace-loving states, is taking energetic measures to ensure that the United Nations and other international organizations find positive solutions to such problems of vital importance to mankind as the deepening of detente, the eradication of sources of military danger in the Middle East and Africa, the curtailment of the arms race, disarmament, the prohibition of the production of new weapons of mass destruction, particularly the neutron bomb, the avoidance of force in international relations, the development of egalitarian and mutually beneficial cooperation and the support of the struggle of peoples for freedom, national independence and social progress.

The MPR, as an Asian country, is focusing its attention on the positive resolution of the immediate problems of this vast continent, on the spread of the spirit of Helsinki in Asia, on the development of relations of friendly cooperation between the states of this continent on the basis of universally acceptable democratic principles of international relations,

on the accomplishment of radical socioeconomic reforms and on the preservation and consolidation of peace and security in Asia.

In this article, the author analyzes the main foreign policy steps taken by the MPR Government in this direction since the 17th MPRP Congress and provides scientifically sound criticism of the adventuristic foreign policy line of the Beijing leadership, which has taken the form of all-round militarization of this country, intensive preparations for war against the USSR and other countries of the socialist world and attempts to annex China's neighboring territories and even entire countries.

In an article entitled "The October Revolution and the Oriental People," stressing the worldwide historic significance of the October Revolution, Doctor of Historical Sciences of the MPR N. Isjamts and Candidate of Historical Sciences of the MPR L. Haisandai use the example of Mongolia, China and other countries to demonstrate the revolutionizing effects of Great October on the Oriental countries.

Under the direct influence of the October Revolution, proletarian revolutions broke out in Germany, Hungary and Slovakia immediately after October; the working class and the laboring masses in the capitalist countries rose up in a revolutionary struggle, and a new stage began in the anti-imperialist national liberation movement of oppressed people in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who were given real support by V. I. Lenin personally, the Russian Bolsheviks and Soviet Russia. The authors note that the triumph of the Great October Socialist Revolution, which resulted in the formation of the world's first socialist state, was of tremendous significance for the revolutionary liberation struggle of the Chinese people. The authors of this article also say that the routing of the Kwantung Army by Soviet troops in World War II contributed substantially to the successes of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the subsequent victory of the people's revolution in China.

The Soviet Union's victory over Hitler's fascism and Japanese imperialism also provided substantial assistance to other Oriental people in their liberation from colonial oppression and the launching of their revolutionary struggle.

Several Asian, African and Latin American countries have resolutely rejected the capitalist course of development, have already chosen a socialist orientation and have embarked on the course of non-capitalist development. In close cooperation with the USSR and other countries in the socialist community, they have been quite successful in their development.

The authors devote a great deal of attention to the exposure and criticism of Maoism in connection with the national and colonial question. They expose the antisocialist, anti-Soviet, great-power chauvinistic nature of the Beijing leadership's policy and resolutely condemn its intervention in the internal affairs of Asian, African and Latin American countries.

In conclusion, the authors note that the people of the developing countries and particularly those that have chosen a socialist orientation and are constantly intensifying their struggle against imperialism, neocolonialism and reaction, are working toward stronger cooperation with the nations of the socialist community, which is giving them the ability to complete the process of national liberation and social progress and acquire real independence, freedom and happiness.

Aspects of the spiritual life of society are the subject of an article entitled "Scientific Socialism and the Transformation of the Spiritual World of the Peasantry" by Doctor of Historical Sciences S. Bira. The question of the spiritual life of society, particularly the spiritual life of the peasantry--making up the overwhelming majority of the population in the former colonial and dependent countries--is one of the most urgent and pressing problems in contemporary social development. The author states that a dual process is now going on in the world: on the one hand, the equalization and internationalization of the spiritual values of people in the socialist countries and, on the other, the revival of national culture and the reinforcement of the national consciousness of the former colonial and dependent people in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This historical process is reflected in a variety of forms in the development of socialist and democratic culture in various countries of the world.

The author particularly stresses the fact that Lenin's statements about the cultural revolution reveal one of the general natural laws governing the construction of a new life and are acquiring increasingly broad international application under present conditions. The historical experience in the implementation of this Leninist doctrine in the socialist countries is of vital importance to all people fighting for social progress.

The successful accomplishment of a cultural revolution in Mongolia, which is known to have been one of the most backward Asian countries until recently, graphically corroborates the accuracy of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine concerning the revolutionary reorganization of the cultural life of society in countries taking the socialist path, regardless of their initial level of development and their form of transition to socialism. Comrade Y. Tsedenbal called the cultural revolution a "natural adjunct of non-capitalist development" in formerly backward countries. Analyzing the practice and experience in cultural construction of the socialist nations, the author conclusively demonstrates that the socialist cultural revolution that took place in these countries, which is one and the same revolution in terms of basic content, had nothing in common with the tragic events which were played out in China on the orders of Mao Zedong and his followers and which were nothing other than the most flagrant desecration of the great Leninist doctrine concerning the cultural revolution.

In conclusion, the author criticizes the unscientific theory set forth by bourgeois ideologists in regard to "superior" and "inferior" races, in accordance with which the roots of the social and spiritual underdevelopment of some nationalities can be found in the distinctive natural,

biological and spiritual gifts of people of different races. Marxism-Leninism must be given particular credit for revealing the actual reasons for the different levels of moral, physical and economic development in representatives of various classes and nationalities. According to Marxism-Leninism, these reasons are rooted in the nature of the social organization of human life, and not in distinctive biological and spiritual features. The Marxist-Leninist conclusion has been corroborated by the entire course of development in today's world.

In his article entitled "The Victory of the Indochinese People and Beijing Policy," S. Dashtsevel discusses the many years of heroic struggle by the Indochinese people, which ended in a historic victory over American imperialism and the creation of a unified socialist republic of Vietnam. As a result of this victory, the position of socialism and progressive forces has been considerably reinforced in Indochina, and broad opportunities have been provided for the consolidation of peace, security, stability and good-neighbor relations between Southeast Asian countries.

Beijing, however, was not pleased by the great victory of the Indochinese people or, in particular, the formation of the unified socialist republic of Vietnam. Beijing sees the acquisition and reinforcement of independence by the Indochinese people as serious obstacles in the way of its own great-power, chauvinistic and expansionist plans in Southeast Asia. In order to carry out their plans, the Maoists are, on the one hand, hypocritically declaring their "friendly feelings" for the Southeast Asian countries and, on the other, exerting more and more political and economic pressure on these countries, which reached its extreme with the armed provocations against the independent Socialist Republic of Vietnam. According to the author, the real goal of the Chinese leaders is to establish control over all countries in Southeast Asia. In this connection, Asian progressive forces are fully aware that the policy of the Chinese leadership is becoming more of a threat each day for peace and independence, not only in this region but in the rest of the world as well. Under present conditions, the author stresses, now that the policy of peace and detente is having a favorable effect on the general state of affairs in Asia, there is no question that the further unification of the efforts of peace-loving forces in this region is an essential condition for struggle against all types of aggressive and reactionary forces and the consolidation of the national independence and sovereignty of the Southeast Asian countries.

D. Maam, the author of "Maoist Anti-Sovietism--An Ideology Hostile to Socialism and Communism," notes that Maoist anti-Sovietism, as one variety of anticommunism, is fundamentally hostile to socialism and communism and serves as a kind of bridge to ally petty bourgeois adventurism with the more reactionary forces of imperialism.

The essence of Maoist anti-Sovietism, which is the focal point of the great-power chauvinistic policy of the Chinese leaders, is analyzed in this article.

Despite allegations to the contrary by Chinese propaganda, the anti-Sovietism of the Beijing leadership is directed not only against the USSR, but also against worldwide socialism, the national liberation movement and all progressive forces of the present day, and represents the main component of Beijing's great-power hegemonistic policy.

T. Babuudai, author of "The Campaign for Criticism of the 'Gang of Four' as the Latest Crisis in Maoism," analyzes information in the Chinese press and examines the criticism of the "gang of four," which started in China after Mao Zedong's death.

The dimensions of the campaign for the political persecution of the "gang's" followers, conducted under the slogan of struggle against the after-effects of this "gang's" subversive activities, are constantly expanding. A purge is being carried out in all links of central and local government, public organizations, the mass media and so forth. According to the author, the criticism of the "gang of four" and the purge of the four's followers constitute a "cultural revolution" of a "new type," modeled on the "Cultural Revolution" of Mao Zedong. It should be noted that the current Beijing leadership's means and methods of struggle against all political opponents differ little from the means and methods widely used during the period of the "Cultural Revolution."

The article by D. Hureltogo, "Recent Chinese-Japanese Relations," presents an analysis of the development of Chinese-Japanese relations. Peace and security in Asia, the author stresses, depend to some degree on the development of relations between two Asian states--China and Japan--and the principles on which these relations will be based. His analysis of the development of Chinese-Japanese relations in recent years shows, however, that these relations, in their present form, represent a great threat to peace and security in Asia. This is most clearly attested to by the signing of the Chinese-Japanese treaty "on peace and friendship." Despite statements to the contrary by Beijing leaders and Japanese ruling circles, this treaty has the clearly defined characteristics of a military alliance, concluded between the Maoists and militaristic circles in Japan and aimed against the peace and security of people in Asia and the rest of the world.

In conclusion, the author notes that Chinese-Japanese rapprochement is based, in the final analysis, on racism and chauvinism, closely interwoven with the militarization of China and the revival of militarism in Japan.

The "History and Culture" section of the journal contains articles by C. Dalai, "Mongolian-Chinese Relations (13th-15th Centuries)," N. Altantsetseg, "Inner Mongolia in the Second Half of the 19th Century and the Beginning of the 20th," and M. Dulam, "The Falsification of the History of Mongolia in Some of the Latest Works by Chinese Historians," E. Pungag, "Mongolian-Indian Cultural Ties of the Past and Present," and many other valuable scholarly works.

The publication of this journal was dictated by the ideals of stronger and broader friendship and all-round cooperation between the Mongolian People's Republic and the Asian countries, the preservation of lasting peace and security in this region and the increasing interest of the Mongolian and world public in the problems of countries in this part of the world.

8588
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WESTERN SINOLOGISTS ON MODERN CHINESE LITERATURE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 192-195

[Review by V. F. Sorokin, candidate of philosophical sciences, of the book "Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era," edited by Merle Goldman, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1977, 464 pages]

[Text] For several decades, Western sinology has not spoiled modern Chinese literature with too much attention. Whether this resulted from the academic tradition of regarding only the study of ancient and medieval classics as a pursuit befitting the "real scholar," or from the lack of political affection on the part of influential Western sinologists for the direction in which the mainstream of Chinese literature developed after the "May Fourth Movement" of 1919, or whether the shortage of interest was due to a shortage of information, it is a fact that only a few serious works, written in Western languages and dealing with modern Chinese literature, existed until recently (this does not apply, naturally, to English, French and German translations of works by socialist scholars). Moreover, at least half of these few works were written by Chinese emigrants.

This applies completely to American sinology. Until recently, the main source of information about modern Chinese literature in the United States was a book by Hsia Chin-tsing (who taught at Beijing University in the 1940's)--"The History of Modern Chinese Fiction." The book came out in two editions--in 1961 and 1971. As the author stated, his "main intention was...to refute communist views on literature." Although he promised to do this, "guided primarily by the consideration of the literary significance" of the works he analyzed, his political tendentiousness and his careless treatment of the facts led the author into numerous misrepresentations, arbitrary interpretations and the unconvincing, to put it mildly, conclusion that modern Chinese fiction had reached its highest point in the anticommunist novels of Zhang Ailing (Eiling Zhang), "Yange" and "Bare Earth," which are actually quite mediocre as literary works of art.

In terms of tendentiousness, Hsia Chin-tsing's book is rivalled by the opus of his brother, Hsia Tsi-an (who lived in Taiwan for a long time), with the eloquent title "Gate of Darkness: Studies on the Leftist Literary

Movement in China" (1968). Suffice it to say that the author has made a great effort to absolve the Guomindang authorities of at least part of the blame for the murder of five young revolutionary writers in 1931 and to depict the deaths of Yin Fu, Rou Shi and their friends as the consequence of an intraparty struggle within CCP ranks.

By the time Hsia Tsi-an's book had been published, however, American sinologists were already taking more interest in modern Chinese literature and spiritual life as a whole and were striving for a more objective examination of these topics. The first symptom of this was probably the publication of a collection of articles in 1963, entitled "Chinese Communist Literature" and edited by University of California Professor C. Birch.[1] This was followed by a book by Harvard researcher M. Goldman, "Literary Dissent in Communist China."[2] We cannot agree with all of the author's opinions and conclusions, but she presents a fairly complete and generally accurate description of the ideological struggle in Chinese literature of the 1940's and 1950's.

Both of these books apparently originated as a response to the urgent need to comprehend the dramatic reversals in ideological and cultural policy in the PRC at that time. For this reason, the focus was on the events and problems of recent decades. The thinking researcher was beginning to realize, however, that the roots of these events and trends lay deeper, and that the history of modern Chinese literature, beginning with the "May Fourth Movement," would have to be divided into separate periods, particularly since several of its initiators were still having a perceptible effect on its development. This aroused increasing interest in the history of Chinese literature in the 1920's and 1930's and the works of the most prominent literary figures of this time. This led to the publication, after 1970, of books about the "romantic generation of Chinese writers" (Leo Ou-Fan Lee), the writing careers of Lao She (R. Vohra), Lu Xin (W. Lyell), Guo Moruo (D. Roy) and Zhou Zuoren (E. Wolf), the issuance of a periodical "bulletin" on modern Chinese literature (published in Los Angeles and edited by M. Gotz) and a considerable increase in the number of dissertations and scientific papers dealing with this subject matter.

This broad interest made it possible to hold a scientific conference in August 1974 to discuss the literature of the "May Fourth" period. The conference, which was attended by several dozen researchers (mainly young scholars from the North American and Western European countries), was held in two stages--at Harvard University and in Dedham (Massachusetts). The conference resulted in the collection of articles that is the subject of this review--a sizeable volume, entitled "Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era" and edited by Professor M. Goldman.[3] When I was sent to the United States on an assignment in 1975, I had an opportunity to read all of the reports presented at the conference, and I can testify that the editor and the authors did much to concisely, but as comprehensively and thoroughly as possible, reflect the basic ideas expressed at the conference, although some interesting papers were nonetheless not included in the collection; we can only hope that they will also be published one day.

In the foreword, the editor explains that the collection is not an "encyclopaedic survey of May Fourth literature" and that it does not contain any articles on several prominent writers--both those who have already been the subject of special studies and those who are still awaiting the attention of scholars. It is true that the authors of the articles say virtually nothing about poetry, drama and blank prose, and even among the novelists and short story writers the reader will not find such names as Lao She, Ye Shengtao, Shen Congwen, Ba Jin and many others. But this is understandable--the literature of this period is so filled with vivid, dissimilar talents that a thorough and detailed examination of their works and theoretical views naturally presupposes that some writers will be singled out at the expense of others.

The use of chronological boundaries is equally understandable: Actually, almost all of the authors of these articles focus their attention on the literature of the decade immediately following the "May Fourth Movement"--that is, the 1920's--and pay much less attention to the early 1930's. It is true that the creation of the Chinese League of Leftist Writers in 1930 symbolized the coming of a new era in the history of Chinese literature--an era organically connected with the preceding period, but nonetheless a distinctly separate era, with its own group of problems. These problems are discussed in the book, but it is a more superficial and more general discussion. The concrete facts concerning the literature of this era, on the other hand, are given little attention. And quite naturally, the literature of the period of the Chinese people's national liberation war (1937-1945), which is not examined in the book at all, had to be put in a separate category.

In this connection, it is surprising that the year of 1942--the year when Mao Zedong made speeches on literature and art in Yanan--is called the "high point" of the literature of the "May Fourth era" in the editor's foreword. This was done--and had to be done--by literary scholars in the PRC under the conditions of the cult of Mao; incidentally, there were exceptions even then--for example, Liu Shousong, the author of a two-volume history of modern Chinese literature (1957). There is no question that the line proclaimed by Mao in his Yanan speeches signified a departure from many of the literary gains of the preceding period. But after all, Mao's directives were not implemented on the nationwide scale until much later, so that there is no basis for calling the year of 1942 the beginning of an absolutely new stage.

The 17 articles included in the book are grouped in three sections: "Domestic and Foreign Influence," "The Writers of the May Fourth Period" and "Continuations and Interruptions." The articles in the first of these sections examine the internal and external literary factors that had a particularly noticeable effect on the formation of the basic ideological and artistic components of the work of the leading "May Fourth" writers. In her article, M. Dolezelova-Velingerova (Toronto) asserts that "the radical changes in the linguistic and literary situation, necessary for the appearance of a new literature, had begun and were generally

completed" at the end of the 19th century and, in particular, in the first decades of the 20th century in China (p 34). In her opinion, the foreign influence on modern Chinese literature is often exaggerated, while the role of the "internal historical development of the main traditional genres" is underestimated.

These misgivings are apparently not shared by the authors of several subsequent articles, in which the influence of Western, Japanese and Russian literature on art and the general spiritual climate in China is examined from various vantage points and with the aid of various reference sources. B. MacDougall (Harvard) and Tsingmao Cheng (Amherst, Massachusetts) do this in the form of a review of cultural history, discussing the fate of works by Western and Japanese authors and literary schools in China and analyzing examples of obvious foreign influence on Chinese writers. There were cases involving the inaccurate or oversimplified interpretation of overseas cultural phenomena in the Chinese publications of those years. Dutch scholar D. Fokkema examines the role of Russian literature in the life and work of Lu Xin. E. Widmer (Harvard) discusses Qu Qiubo's attitudes toward Russian literature during various stages in his struggle to create a revolutionary culture in China. In themselves, these topics are not new--they have been energetically analyzed, mainly by Soviet, Chinese and Czechoslovak researchers. But there are still many unsolved problems and unutilized materials and, for this reason, new investigations and theories should be welcomed, even if not all of the authors' conclusions are indisputable.

B. MacDougall's article contains interesting sections in which the writer presents a detailed account of the influence of Soviet literature and of the Chinese leftist writers' contacts with international progressive organizations, admitting their positive significance, in contrast to other Western sinologists who are striving to denigrate everything connected with the Comintern and the "influence of Moscow."

The second section, which takes up more than half of the book, is devoted to an analysis of various aspects of the writings of several leading authors of this period in connection with their ideological evolution and with political events in the nation. This section begins with an article by E. Vogel, Harvard University sociology professor--"Unexpected Heroes: The Social Role of the May Fourth Writers," which praises the young writers who rejected the traditional path for previous generations, leading to a bureaucratic or academic career, and became the heroes of the struggle for new moral and social values. In recent years, Vogel notes, most of the works of that time have been banned, for different reasons, in the PRC and Taiwan. However, "their authors have remained heroes...in the memory of their readers." They have become a "new kind of hero--unsung heroes because it is dangerous to talk about them" (pp 158-159).

This is followed by three articles on Lu Xin, among which the most significant is the work by H. Mills (Michigan), "Lu Xin: Literature and Revolution" (part of an unpublished long study by the writer). Two articles

deal with the early works of Mao Dun. Their authors are young researchers J. Berninghausen (Middlebury College) and Yushi Chen (Hunter College). The article by M. Feyerwerker (she is also known as Mei Yi-tsu, Michigan) is entitled "The Changing Relationship Between Literature and Life: Aspects of the Writer's Role as Exemplified by Ding Ling." Although she concentrates mainly on the first stages in the writer's career, the author of the article describes all of the events leading up to the campaign for "struggle against rightists," which put an end to the literary activity of Ding Ling in 1957. Finally, M. Egan (Toronto) writes about the significance of Yu Dafu's work in the establishment of modern Chinese literature.

Within the limits of a review, it would naturally be impossible to even briefly discuss each article, point out all of the new and interesting passages and debate everything that seems erroneous or unsubstantiated. This can only be done in special studies of the writers being analyzed. Here I will limit myself only to a few remarks of a more general nature.

Almost all of the authors note that the literary careers of the writers of the "May Fourth" era were indissolubly connected with the ideological debates and political conflicts of that time, and this is absolutely correct. In several cases, however, and these primarily involve young authors, this connection is somewhat oversimplified. For example, Yushi Chen discerns "allegories of certain political events" in some of Mao Dun's early works. The story "Autumn in Guling," in her opinion, depicts the Nanchang rebellion and the "Chinese communists' attempt to sever ties with the Comintern" (p 4). But nothing of the kind can be found in the published portion of the story, and the rest of the chapters, according to Mao Dun, have been lost. How can such far-reaching conclusions be drawn from mere suppositions or such "proof" as the fact that the characters making up the surname of one of the fictional heroes coincide with those in Li Lisan's name (p 279)? I will not even discuss the strange, to say the least, interpretation of the political significance of the Nanchang rebellion.

Against the overall background of serious and intelligent discussion, the different cliches of Western bourgeois propaganda that are used by some of the authors seem particularly glaring. For example, J. Berninghausen writes: "It is true that in Mao Dun's works we do not find the externally jolly, self-sacrificing, puritanical, unyielding and rather boorish but appealing heroes who are too often encountered in didactic allegories in the works of socialist realism or revolutionary romanticism" (p 255). But after all, the critic Qian Xingcun did not call for the portrayal of characters possessing all of these positive features, but spoke only about "bold, true revolutionaries," and it is true that there were none of these in Mao Dun's early works. Or does the researcher believe that they did not exist in real life--but then who was it that fought the revolution? As for "didactic allegories," these can be found in the work of representatives of the most diverse creative methods, and not only the particular two that are mentioned by Berninghausen in an offhand and slightly condescending manner.

For many years, we had to acknowledge the fact that Western sinologists knew almost nothing of, and had no use for, the works of Soviet sinologists (and, to a lesser degree, the Chinese scholars of the 1950's). Our Western colleagues generally blamed this on their unfamiliarity with the Russian language. Now the situation is beginning, although quite slowly, to change: Many young sinologists are studying Russian, and reviews and surveys of our works are being published more often. Some mention is found in this collection of the books and articles of M. Konrad, V. Semanov, M. Shneyder and a few other Soviet researchers. But a great deal is still outside our overseas colleagues' field of vision. Here is just one example: In the article about Yu Dafu, M. Egan does not even mention V. Adzhinamudova's book "Yuy Dafu i literaturnoye obshchestvo 'Tvorchestvo'" [Yu Dafu and the "Creativity" Literary Society], which was published in 1971 and pertains in large part to the same topics that interest the Canadian author.

The last part of the book, which is made up of three articles, is supposed to provide an answer to the question of whether the literature of "May Fourth" was a continuation, even if on a qualitatively new level, of Chinese literary and intellectual traditions or a departure from them. In this connection, P. Piekowicz (San Diego) analyzes statements by Qu Qiubo, who accused the writers of his generation of being obsessed with "Westernization" and of not reflecting the needs and tastes of the masses adequately. In a search for an answer to this question, C. Birch compares the heroes of three novels: Li Boyuan's "History of Civilization" (1906), Mao Dun's "Before Daybreak" (1933) and Hao Ran's "Bright Journey" (1972). After revealing that the first and third works have more features in common, the researcher concludes that the literature of the "May Fourth" period--in spite of the fact that the writers were carrying on Chinese tradition in their vocabulary, methods of characterization and several other aspects--was a kind of "anomaly," a brief episode in the spiritual life of society. He believes that the period of realism, related in spirit to 19th-century European literature, ended with the "May Fourth" era and that, in the future, "fiction will become 'more Chinese' and undoubtedly more popular" (p 404).

It is true that the books of the writers of the "May Fourth Movement" were not always accessible to the general reading public. The novels and stories of the "butterfly school," which are discussed by L. Link (Princeton) in his article and which were traditional in format, were more popular with the semieducated, and even some educated readers. But after all, it is not these that live on in the history of literature and the memory of the people, but the works of Lu Xin and Lao She, Mao Dun and Ba Jin. The introduction to the collection correctly points out: "The fact that the literature of this type, which came into being during the May Fourth period, was rejected after 1949 does not mean that it was alien. It was not rejected spontaneously, but by order of political authorities. And no one knows whether the prescribed literature of today reflects mass tastes to a greater degree than the 'May Fourth' literature" (p 14).

The best traditions of the literature of the 1920's and 1930's will indisputably live on and become the subject of further studies by the scholars of various nations.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Chinese Communist Literature," edited by C. Birch, New York, 1963.
2. M. Goldman, "Literary Dissent in Communist China," Cambridge, Mass., 1967, 343 pages.
3. "Modern Chinese Literature in the May Fourth Era," edited by Merle Goldman, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1977, 464 pages.

8588
CSO: 1805

CHINA IN THE STRATEGY OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 195-198

[Review by B. K. Otradnov of the book "Kitay v strategii amerikanskogo imperializma" by V. V. Kuz'min, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1978, 272 pages]

[Text] The foreign policy activity of the Beijing leadership in recent years, particularly the Chinese aggression in Vietnam, representing a practical expression of this activity, necessitates a closer look at some of Beijing's steps in the international arena and deeper analysis of its actions, which are aimed at an eventual open alliance with the most reactionary imperialist circles. Leaving the Maoist foreign policy line as a whole unchanged, the new Beijing leaders moved on, discarding even the previous revolutionary camouflage, and made a sharp turn to the right. The emphasis in Beijing's foreign policy is on the development of relations with the West. The focal point of these relations is, without any question, the relationship with the United States. The answer to the question of how the lengthy process, filled with undercurrents, of the normalization of Chinese-American relations took place can be found in fairly comprehensive form in V. V. Kuz'min's book "Kitay v strategii amerikanskogo imperializma" [China in the Strategy of American Imperialism].

The author has attempted to analyze relations between the United States and the PRC since the time of their birth, when they were established by representatives of the future PRC regime, to the time of their normalization under the post-Mao leadership. "In themselves, the renewal of contacts between the two states and the normalization of relations between them are quite natural events," said General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev in reference to the talks between U.S. and PRC leaders. "The Soviet Union has always opposed the imperialist policy of isolating the PRC and has favored the proper recognition of its role in the international arena. Our assessment of the present contacts between Beijing and Washington will depend, however, on the basis on which they are being conducted."[1]

According to the author, the United States and the PRC, guided by their own interests, realized all the futility of their previous policy toward

one another and made a great effort to reduce tension and develop mutual contact (p 252). During this process, certain circles in the United States insisted on rapprochement with the PRC merely on the strength of anti-Soviet views, believing that this would inflict a certain degree of harm on the USSR, and played up to the Chinese leadership, which is striving, "on the basis of 'common interests,' to urge the United States to fight 'tooth and nail' against the Soviet Union, taking every opportunity to provoke the deterioration of relations between the United States and USSR."[2] The Chinese leaders, pursuing their own political goals, are trying in vain to use the development of Sino-American relations as a means of compelling the United States to adhere to a tough line in relations with the Soviet Union, so as to stop the process of detente in the world and ruin the international climate. Recent events have shown, however, that the process of detente, despite enemy opposition, is continuing. This is attested to by the signing of the SALT II treaty on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons by the USSR and United States.

Returning to the question of Sino-American rapprochement, we must stress that these relations will affect important aspects of world politics, and, as we have already pointed out, are directly related to questions of peace and detente.

The United States is striving to influence Chinese policy in its own interest with consideration for the state of PRC relations with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and the world communist movement as a whole. Naturally, the course of Chinese policy has not been uniform throughout the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's.

The author of the book being reviewed makes use of his own work experience in the United States, where he had "an opportunity to keep an eye on the press, study research works published in the nation and make the personal acquaintance of several prominent American experts on China, so as to gain a fuller understanding of Washington policy toward Beijing" (p 6).

In the first chapter--"The Two Lines of the China Policy of the United States"--the author notes that the main feature of American policy toward China in the first years of the PRC's existence was hostility, despite the fact that official representatives were seeking an opportunity for cooperation with the Chinese leaders and were employing the tactic of flirting with them. This was also connected with the American support of Chiang Kai-shek. Washington was giving the Chiang Kai-shek regime considerable all-round assistance and did not want the Chinese People's Liberation Army to win a victory, fearing that the fall of the Chiang Kai-shek regime would cause it to lose its influence and its means of channeling the policy of China and of Asia as a whole in the necessary direction (p 7).

The declaration of the PRC dealt a blow to U.S. imperialist plans. During the civil war in China and the first decade of the PRC's existence, internationalist forces prevailed in the Chinese Communist Party. Their consolidation was also promoted by the important international factor of the Soviet Union's victory over fascist Germany and militaristic Japan.

Nationalist elements, rallying round Mao Zedong, had to take this into account at that time. The international position of the PRC grew stronger with each day. The conclusion of a treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union on 14 February 1950 was of particularly great value in strengthening the international prestige of the PRC.

During this period, U.S. policy toward the PRC evolved from hopes, connected with the possibility of taking advantage of the nationalist feelings of some CCP leaders, to hostility, to a policy later reflected in the anticommunist doctrines of "limited hostility," "deterrence," "the containment of communism," "isolation" and so forth. This hostility reached its peak at the time of the Korean War. At this same time, Washington continued the intensive reinforcement of Taiwan. On 2 December 1954, the United States concluded an "agreement on mutual defense" with Taiwan, providing legal authorization for their military, political and economic cooperation.

Along with the hostility, however, a second line was already apparent in the United States' China policy, characterized by a desire to establish contacts with CCP leaders, to exchange views on some matters and to discover common interests. In those years, the United States was guided in its treatment of the PRC mainly by the hope of retaining and strengthening its imperialist positions in the Far East, particularly in China.

The author recalls that, "judging by numerous reports, the United States was already displaying heightened interest in nationalist elements in the CCP during World War II" (p 16). The author cites testimony regarding Mao Zedong's contacts with American correspondents and journalists in Yanan. Despite the recommendation of some American politicians that attitudes toward the Chinese communists be reconsidered and revised, Washington leaders did not do this at that time. The result of this policy was the diplomatic and economic isolation of the PRC and its "military containment." Another line, which stayed in the background until the 1970's, when it was brought to the fore by Nixon, was developed only with consideration for past U.S. experience. According to American correspondent S. Karnow, expert on China, "the reconciliation between Nixon and the Chinese communists, although it represented a dramatic development, was actually only a renewal of the original relations that began to take shape an entire generation ago."[3] The first official contacts between Chinese and U.S. leaders in the postwar years commenced soon after the end of the Korean War. They were occasioned by the two sides' interest in preventing direct military confrontation in Asia. They were later continued in Geneva and Warsaw. Beijing informed the Americans quite clearly that, even in spite of the hostile U.S. course, it intended to seek contacts and the healthy exchange of views with American leaders.

Summarizing the contents of the first chapter, V. V. Kuz'min explains why the Kennedy and Johnson administrations did not take it upon themselves to change the political line in regard to China. As one of the important reasons, he mentions the U.S. adherence to the old political

concepts on which all Asian policy had been built since the war. Besides this, Sino-American normalization was objectively impeded by conflicts between the two countries: the war in Vietnam, the Taiwan issue, the question of PRC representation in the United Nations, the U.S. military presence near the Chinese border, the rivalry over influence in Asia and so forth. A new stage in U.S.-Chinese relations began with the arrival of the Nixon Administration, when "the gradual expansion of multilateral ties between the two countries" became "one of the main areas of Washington's foreign policy strategy" (p 41).

The second and third chapters--"In Search of a New Approach" and "Debate and Study"--contain materials that are little-known to the reading public as yet. Here the author analyzes the reasons for the revision of U.S. policy toward the PRC and examines the more characteristic foreign policy steps taken by China, which affected, to one degree or another, the direction and speed of U.S.-PRC rapprochement.

It is indicative that the author does not overestimate the influence of the PRC's anti-Soviet policy on the process of U.S.-PRC rapprochement. "It would be wise to note," he says, "that we should not oversimplify the influence of certain anti-Soviet actions by Beijing on the progress of the process of rapprochement with Washington. After all, it is no secret that the fierce attacks on the USSR and on the Soviet policy of detente in the world in particular, made by Mao Zedong and his closest associates after the 10th CCP Congress, did not lead automatically to the acceleration of U.S.-Chinese normalization. On the contrary, relations between the two countries entered a period of unique 'stagnation' at this time, and even began to 'cool off.' And the reasons for this, in our opinion, consist in more than the profound conflicts between the two countries. Washington apparently also realized that the Chinese leadership wanted to use the United States as a kind of 'auxiliary lever' in the fight against the Soviet Union" (pp 46-47).

Embarking on the course of cooperation with China, American foreign policy strategists hoped to create favorable opportunities for themselves, which would give them the use of a lever of "balance" within the bounds of the "triangle" (United States--USSR--PRC) and influence the nature of Soviet-Chinese relations. At the same time, there are many politicians in the United States who recognize the futility of political speculation on difficulties in Soviet-Chinese relations. "Taking a realistic view of the situation, they realize that the anti-Sovietism of the Maoists will not automatically bring the United States advantages in the international arena and that the attempts to make use of the existing situation in Soviet-Chinese relations would only confuse and complicate the development of constructive aspects of Soviet-American bilateral relations" (p 56).

Revealing the motives for the revision of Washington's foreign policy line toward the PRC, the author points out the objective prerequisites for bilateral regulation: the changes in PRC policy toward the capitalist

world, China's obvious intention to converge with the Western countries and with Japan, the increased tendency in the capitalist world toward recognition of the PRC, including the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and all principal members of the NATO bloc, and significant advances in U.S. public opinion in favor of the normalization of relations with the PRC. One section of the third chapter is totally devoted to the evolution of public opinion; the author stresses the leading role of the National Committee on American-Chinese Relations, which came into being in 1966, with representatives of the business community and an influential group of experts on China setting the tone from the beginning. The committee's main objective was to exert pressure on the government for the purpose of creating a favorable political climate for new decisions on ways of normalizing U.S.-Chinese relations. This activity was promoted by extensive studies of matters related to China. Between 1958 and 1970, more than 40 million dollars was allocated for this purpose from various sources (p 120).

A detailed analysis of the reversal in U.S.-PRC relations is presented in the fourth chapter, with the characteristic title "The New China Policy of the United States." The Republican Nixon Administration, which took office in January 1969, made a substantial adjustment in policy toward the PRC by firmly adhering to the line of rapprochement. Steps were taken to relax and subsequently lift the trade embargo and to expand the exchange of citizens between the two countries. Liaison missions, performing the role of embassies, were opened in both capitals.

The Shanghai communique, adopted as a result of President Nixon's trip to China in February 1972, marked the beginning of a specific stage in the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations. The two sides stipulated their views on the question of bilateral relations and on several international issues. They adhered to their previous views on some issues. For example, the Taiwan problem was still a serious obstacle. Descriptions of the Chinese stand in regard to Indochina did not attest to Beijing's previously declared determination to defend its line on this matter. Nixon's visit began the process of "building bridges" over the "abyss" that had developed between the two countries over a period of many years.

The section entitled "Two Chinas and the United Nations" contains an analysis of the circumstances of the PRC's "arrival" in this organization and the stand taken by the United States on this issue.

The fifth chapter--"Conflicts Remain"--describes the development of U.S.-Chinese relations after the first official visit by a U.S. President to China. Despite the contacts that had been established, it became obvious that unsolved problems and obstacles were still blocking the normalization of relations between the two countries, and the main obstacle among them was the question of Taiwan's future. It is indicative that both countries then "quite openly continued to maneuver, trying to use their mutual interest in the improvement of relations to gain exclusive political and strategic advantages in the international arena" (p 193).

Between 1973 and 1978, Chinese and American leaders repeatedly declared their fidelity to the agreement reached at the time of the summit meetings, their interest in improving relations and expanding contacts and ties with one another, and their willingness to complete the normalization process. Certain practical steps were taken in this direction. At the end of 1974, H. Kissinger took a trip to China. American President G. Ford made several promises to confirm the invariability of Washington's course in Chinese affairs. For the same purpose, several senators went to the PRC. In December 1975, G. Ford visited Beijing. The main negotiations were held with Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping of the State Council. The PRC tried to use this meeting to undermine the process of detente and, above all, to deteriorate U.S.-Soviet relations. In particular, in a speech at a banquet honoring the American President, Deng Xiaoping, discussing the inevitability of mounting tension in the world, called upon the United States to "shatter the illusion of peace." The Maoists tried to convince their American guest that their anti-Sovietism was not a temporary phenomenon, but the basis of their policy. But Washington had to display caution. The Chinese, the author writes, were not able to convince the President of the need to renounce the course toward detente (p 209).

The birth of the so-called Pacific Doctrine of President Ford was closely connected with Ford's trip to China and the nature of U.S.-Chinese relations. The doctrine put an end to all talk about U.S. "departure" from Asia and "corrected" some of the undesirable--from the standpoint of U.S. relations with its Asian allies--consequences of the "Nixon Doctrine," in which the provision concerning Asian self-reliance led to the definite "impairment" of American military obligations to several Asian countries. But the main feature of this doctrine is its reflection of Washington's new approach to China, which, just as Japan, has been assigned the role of a key element in the notorious "balance of power" in the Pacific and in Asia as a whole.

A considerable portion of the fifth chapter is devoted to the Beijing visits of C. Vance and Z. Brzezinski. At the time of these visits, a broad group of international issues was discussed and joint policy on these issues was elaborated. At the same time, the two sides admitted the existence of serious and difficult conflicts in their relationship. These conflicts are of a global and regional nature and are connected with the conflicting hegemonistic aims of the two sides.

China's ability to challenge the United States will increase along with its power, although it is now relatively weak in the military and economic sense. Its influence on different continents is also limited--for example, in Latin America. In Europe, China is strengthening its ties with NATO and the Common Market. This is where U.S.-Chinese conflicts are particularly fully revealed. The conflicts between the United States and China, the author notes, are also making themselves known in Africa and other parts of the world. After the United States was defeated in Southeast Asia, China noticeably increased its own activity in this region. It is

now using every possible means for this purpose. Beijing even resorted to armed aggression against sovereign socialist Vietnam.

To some extent, U.S. leaders realize the purpose of Beijing's political aspirations and fear the future China with its increased military and economic potential and great-power ambitions, which will unavoidably affect U.S. interests. It is quite evident that this nation with a population of millions is engaged in a race for nuclear weapons, uncontrolled by anyone and unrestricted by any treaty obligations, and is refusing to negotiate disarmament. This is extremely dangerous for the United States, and it will certainly affect the U.S. attitude toward China. Many people in the United States are aware of the danger of Maoist policy, which is aimed at the instigation of military conflicts and the provocation of thermonuclear world war, a policy hostile to the Soviet Union and the course toward detente.

Developments in international relations in recent years prove that bilateral relations between countries can only evolve successfully if they do not affect the interests of third countries, particularly when questions of peace and detente are closely related to these interests.

The monograph, on the whole, has been written on a high scientific and political level. Raising the vast and important question of U.S. policy toward China, it has occupied a fitting place among Soviet scholarly works.

FOOTNOTES

1. L. I. Brezhnev, "O vneshney politike KPSS i sovetskogo gosudarstva" [On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet State], Moscow, 1973, p 432.

2. KOMMUNIST, 1977, No 12, p 117.

3. WASHINGTON POST, 22 July 1972.

8588
CSO: 1805

DUAL STAND

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 199-201

[Review by A. M. Malukhin, candidate of historical sciences, of the book "The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949-1964" by G. Ginsburgs and C. Pinkele, Praeger, New York, 1978, 145 pages]

[Text] A book called "The Sino-Soviet Territorial Dispute, 1949-1964" has been published in New York. The authors, George Ginsburgs and Carl Pinkele, American experts on international law, wanted to determine whether there are any serious grounds for this "dispute" or whether, on the contrary, it is serving "mainly as an artificial device for the attainment of totally different goals."

There is no need to underscore the topical importance of this kind of study for an objective disclosure of the great-power chauvinist aims of the Chinese leadership, which has made border claims and territorial demands on neighboring states, particularly the Soviet Union. It is known that Beijing, while refusing to engage in concrete negotiations on border issues with the Soviet Union, has been using nationalist claims to Soviet land for many years to stir up anti-Soviet feeling and avoid the normalization of relations between the two states on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The book consists of four chapters, in which the authors attempt to present a chronological description of the political background at the time of the "dispute's" origination, the efforts of the Soviet side to settle the "dispute," the appearance of a stalemate in the "dispute" and the Beijing talks of 1964 to clarify the exact location of the Soviet-Chinese border, which were never concluded. The reader has the right to expect an answer to the main question the American legal experts set for themselves when they began their study of the "Sino-Soviet territorial dispute." But the book will not give the reader a complete answer. The fact is that the authors focus their attention not on the subject of the dispute, but only on the behavior of the sides involved.

The authors' plan to remain at an "objective distance" from the disputing sides is made easy by their obvious lack of affection for either side,

but they nonetheless sometimes display the symptoms of overt anti-Soviet feeling.

With sufficient grounds, the authors state that the "dispute" originated in the early 1960's, when ideological and theoretical differences between the CCP and the world communist movement occurred and became evident. The authors make an illogical excursion into an earlier period to cast suspicions on the independence of the MPR, a matter settled long ago by history. By denying the right of nations to the kind of self-determination that was exercised by the Mongolian people in the 1920's and recognized by the Central Government of China in 1946, the American legal experts are indulging the nationalist claims to "Outer Mongolia," bequeathed to Beijing by the solicitations and calculated remarks of Mao Zedong in 1949, 1954, 1957 and 1964. This is the reason for the implication that the "Mongolian question" still exists.

Among the biased and evasive opinions expressed, facts and statements are cited in the chapters of this book which testify that the position of the Soviet side is sound. In the chapter called "Background," the authors state that Beijing did not at first plan to make serious claims on several regions included among the legal possessions of the USSR (p 20). In another section, they point out the positive significance of the principle of "historically determined boundaries" (p 78), to which the Soviet side adheres. They stress that the terms of the first Soviet-Chinese treaty of 31 May 1924 did not make any changes in existing model boundaries (p 50). The border did not change with the rise and fall of Manchukuo (p 2) and not only did the border question not come up when the PRC was founded, but both sides repeatedly agreed and promised to respect the territorial integrity of states (pp 5, 8-9).

The authors state that the Chinese leadership secretly programmed the border question and has advanced it by means of escalation, beginning with Zhou Enlai's interview in Katmandu at a press conference on 28 April 1960. A large part of the book is devoted to the Beijing consultations of 1964 on the clarification of the Soviet-Chinese boundary, as a result of which "only a slight distance separated the sides" from mutual agreement (p 101). The agreement was not reached because "the stumbling block lies in the procedural sphere, and not in the subject matter" (p 103). Beijing is in no hurry to settle the border question. "The Chinese side is certainly guilty of constantly keeping the territorial dispute alive" (p 130).

There are tendentious phrases in the book, which could convey the impression that the Soviet side is more involved in "verbal battles over the territorial dispute" than it actually is. An unobjective examination of the Soviet role in the "dispute," with obvious leanings toward anti-Soviet sentiment, takes up an entire chapter, called "The Soviet Advance."

This false version of the story is based on the Chinese leadership's legend of the "unfair treaties," which was seemingly invented in response to Soviet criticism of the Chinese position in regard to Hongkong and

Macao. The "unfair treaties" were first mentioned in a RENMIN RIBAO article of 8 March 1963, which, as the authors of the book admit, was deliberately demagogic in tone. They allege that it was only after this time that Beijing officials realized the appeal of this topic to Chinese apologists for the "heroic past of the nation," who were cultivating "love for the fatherland."

G. Ginsburgs and C. Pinkele conclude their study with an explanation of the reasons for the long duration of this "territorial dispute"--they blame it completely on "the political and diplomatic agenda of the Chinese leadership." In brief, the authors' theses are the following.

In the first place, border discussion is seen by the Chinese leadership as the best way of cultivating a spirit of total hostility between the PRC and USSR (p 130).

In the second place, under the conditions of internal political struggle, confrontation with the Soviet Union is used in China to preserve "national unity" and to suppress opposition forces by accusing them, both falsely and correctly, of sympathizing with the USSR (pp 130-131).

In the third place, confrontation with the USSR serves the diplomatic speculations of the Chinese leadership and makes it possible to escalate tension between these countries by exacerbating the border question to the point of "games in the spectrum of war." This variety of Beijing diplomacy is aimed at rapprochement with the United States (p 131).

Finally, Beijing sees the "territorial dispute" as a "chance to win the sympathy of other countries" by stimulating their own border claims for the purpose of creating a "club" of these nations and making use of their support in confrontations with the Soviet Union (Ibid.).

The final conclusion is that this policy toward the USSR has been planned for the long range by the Chinese leadership, that the territorial dispute will not be settled in the near future, that the Chinese can be expected to "play on the nerves of the Soviet Union" even more, right up to the point of war, and that the "play" of Beijing is only cautious in this last respect.

The authors of the book have nearsightedly overlooked a symptomatic and dangerous feature of the Maoist leadership's policy in regard to the boundaries of neighboring states. The great-Han idea of national supremacy and the desire for expansionism and hegemony, inherited by Maoism from feudal Sinocentrism, constitute a real threat to neighboring countries, and this threat could become stronger as China's military potential is augmented, as long as fanatical devotees of Maoism and great-power chauvinism are in power in Beijing. The authors remark that Beijing's chavinistic system of "cartographic aggression" is underrated to some degree; it supposedly serves only inoffensive purposes and is certainly not a sinister portent of the future "return of territories taken away from the motherland."

The authors are often led astray by their chosen objective approach to the assessment of the behavior of the two sides. They strive to assign pluses and minuses to both sides, and this eventually leads to misinterpretations and contradictions.

For example, first they present the Chinese version of the story, in accordance with which Beijing supposedly insisted on "sitting down at the negotiation table" (p 48), but then they say that the two sides were equally eager for the talks of 1964 (p 68). Moreover, the Soviet side repeated, nine times in the space of a few months, its proposal to conduct talks to clarify the line of the boundary in individual sections, and this initiative is also mentioned, although in passing, in the chapter "Stalemate" (p 76).

Naturally, the USSR's desire to negotiate the "dispute" should not be interpreted as the search for "new artillery" for the exacerbation of the conflict. On the contrary, it was the PRC leadership, which deliberately avoided the consultations and then refused to continue them, that did not want to settle the question and continued its political and diplomatic advance on the Soviet side with "artillery accompaniment" in the form of mass provocations on the border--violations of the border by Chinese border guards and agitated civilians.

In the chapter entitled "The Conference of 1964," the authors note that the Chinese side did not want to clarify the boundary line in certain sections, assuming that settlement would "perpetuate the status quo." Here the status-quo policy is given a broad interpretation, in the context of Zhou Enlai's statement at the Bandung Conference in 1954 that China did not consider the border to have been finally determined in all sections and would establish it, together with neighboring countries, using only peaceful means.

In this chapter, the authors comment on the vagueness and uncertainty of PRC claims to "disputed sections" of the border. Prior to the consultations, a tactic was employed involving the migration of Chinese citizens to river islands (belonging to the USSR--A. M.) on the pretext that this situation had supposedly always existed in these sections of the border. Later, this argument was replaced in Chinese documents by the charge that the USSR had allegedly "sunk its teeth" into China. Since the Chinese side has never had sufficient evidence to back up this charge, the authors do not consider this matter worthy of investigation.

Some facts are elucidated incorrectly in the book. The authors stress, for example, that the clarification of the boundary line in rivers along the channel (or fairway) was insisted upon at the consultations by the Chinese delegation. In fact, the "fairway principle" was immediately set forth by the Soviet delegation as one corresponding to the legal provisions of a 1960 ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. The possibility of satisfying PRC claims to "disputed sections," which, in the

authors' view, consist only of the river islands, is just as erroneously underscored. It is true that the authors were misled by a Chinese government announcement of 24 May 1969, in which specific mention was made of lines of demarcation only in rivers.

The consultations and subsequent relations between the sides in regard to the border question are described in light of the "initiative that passed to the Chinese communists." The purpose of what was now a Chinese "advance" was defined by Mao Zedong when he was interviewed by a group of Japanese socialists on 10 July 1964. By calling Mao's expansionist claim to Soviet lands all the way to Kamchatka a "watershed" and "milestone," the authors inconsistently camouflage the nature of this claim. Actually, "the bill was never submitted" and the interview of Mao Zedong was not even published in the Chinese press.

The authors' numerous references to Beijing's policy of claims on Soviet land also compound the contradictions. On the one hand, the policy is interpreted as a mild request for payment for the purpose of demonstrating the generosity and magnanimity of the giver, but, on the other, this request, based on the "idea of unfair treaties," is called another means of "arousing serious insecurity."

The very "idea of unfair treaties" is examined in the same kind of dual manner. It "is not used in its entirety" by the Chinese leadership, as these leaders have refrained from taking "the next logical step--the declaration of their automatic annulment and invalidation." In various parts of the book, the authors argue that the Chinese leadership will not take this step, but it will always have a "strong card up its sleeve" in the "big game." The very discussion of the "unfair treaties" indicates a desire to inspire "psychological shock," but the authors nonetheless do not see any indication that China intends to "use force to change the configuration of existing boundaries" in Siberia and Central Asia.

The authors speculate about the future. They do not depict the future of the "Sino-Soviet territorial dispute" as fatal, since China is incapable of competing with its "northern neighbor" in terms of strength. It can only wait for the improbable "chance," an unimaginable situation, for "the actual partition of Russia's Asian lands." In a spirit of pure conjecture they say that the "dispute" is a two-edged sword and that the Soviet side could also wait for the right opportunity to regain lands lost as a result of the "unfair Nerchinsk Treaty." The general import of this kind of idle talk is that the position of the Chinese leadership in the "territorial dispute" is extremely weak and essentially hopeless.

In their attempt to determine the political causes of the origination and development of the "territorial dispute," the American legal experts have given little attention to the lack of legal grounds for the Chinese side's position. In essence, they only repeat the recommendation that legal criteria, the standards and precedents of international law, be applied in this case.

They unjustifiably imply that both sides are avoiding the use of legal criteria in the dispute, although this applies only to China. Is it possible that the Soviet Union's demonstrated serious desire to resolve issues by means of negotiation on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence cannot be called reliance on international legal institutions?! The "fairway principle," in accordance with which the Soviet side proposed that river boundaries be clarified, is also, as the authors state, a "valuable formula" of this law.

The authors correctly point out that the Chinese side does not even back up its claims with archives, preferring to rely on political means.

The authors' tendency to draw contrasts between international law and socialist internationalism is absolutely futile and erroneous. Socialist internationalism is the most powerful expression of the right of people and genuine people's governments to consolidate and protect their interests against imperialist aggression and colonial exploitation. The authors make a futile attempt to repudiate "socialist international law," which has been regulating relations between the countries of the socialist community for many years and has been successfully applied in Soviet-Chinese relations, particularly in the 1950's. Naturally, this repudiation is not backed up by a single convincing argument.

On the whole, however, despite the limited framework and a certain degree of tendentiousness, the attempt made by G. Ginsburgs and C. Pinkele to analyze the phenomenon of the "Sino-Soviet territorial dispute" deserves recognition. Their book is the first to reflect the views of a third side on this serious problem in Soviet-Chinese relations. An abundance of factual material is cited and categorized in the book. The inquisitive reader who takes a discerning approach to this material will arrive at his own conclusions in spite of the arguments set forth by the authors when they depart from their objective position.

8588
CSO: 1805

MONOGRAPH ON PROBLEMS IN CULTURAL TRADITION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 202-204

[Review by Ye. A. Serebryakov, doctor of philological sciences (Leningrad), of the book "Drevniye pamyatniki kitayskoy literatury" by N. T. Fedorenko, Moscow, Nauka, 1978, 320 pages]

[Text] The author of this new book--prominent Soviet sinologist N. T. Fedorenko--has been engaged in tireless scholarly investigation for many years, and his research is distinguished by a combination of broad and sound theoretical generalizations with a precise analysis of specific cultural phenomena. The work being reviewed is significant and interesting primarily by virtue of the author's reflections on methodological and general questions in sinological literary studies. The scientific investigation of cultural tradition from a Marxist standpoint is now acquiring particular topical importance and political significance in sinological studies. On the basis of abundant factual material, N. T. Fedorenko shows how Maoism in China is "conducting a frontal assault on historical and spiritual tradition, particularly the more positive and original folk traditions, which are aimed against the 'Thought of the Helmsman' and which can be used by Maoism's opponents either now or in the future" (p 22). Rejecting the best and most progressive in past culture, Maoism is also trying to utilize historical tradition "in its own political interest, resorting to flagrant utilitarianism and vulgarization," the author writes. "The concept of 'gu wei jing yong'--'using antiquity for the sake of the present,' which was invented by Maoism in 1972 and is being applied extremely inventively--is significant. It essentially involves the revision and utilitarian interpretation of historical facts" (p 29). The Maoist position in regard to world culture and national heritage is contrasted by the scholar to the Marxist-Leninist view of artistic tradition and the significance of past spiritual values in the socialist culture.

The author's theoretical statements and literary analysis of specific developments in the art of ancient China demonstrate his precise and strict system of views on the relationship between international and national factors in Oriental literature, which has attracted so much attention from Orientologists in recent years. Under present conditions, now that various

methods are being used to interpret the Asian literatures, N. T. Fedorenko feels it is necessary to stress the dialectical unity and interaction of worldwide, international principles and national traditions. In his opinion, the most important methodological principle is the unity of the worldwide literary process, the impossibility of examining the literature of any particular nation as something separate, isolated and devoid of connections and typological similarities to other literatures. This thesis reflects only one side of the complex problem and, for this reason, he stresses the importance of concrete analysis and observance of the historical principle in the interpretation of the national peculiarities of Chinese literature. If no consideration is given to the distinctive features of the artistic development of national literature and the peculiarities of its ideological and social bases and metaphorical system, any assessment of its place and role in the world literary process will be extremely general and superficial. "In spite of connections with other literatures and the worldwide literary process, the most important factor is still the national uniqueness of literature. The literature of each nationality preserves its national features. And this cannot be lost. Otherwise, national literatures will not be interesting. They will all be alike and will fade, like flowers ripped out of their native soil. Flowers need an undamaged root system to preserve their color and aroma" (pp 19-20).

In the study of past Chinese culture, according to N. T. Fedorenko's justified conclusion, it is necessary to remember that ideas about the very subject and concept of "literature" and about the particular works making up literature underwent considerable changes over a period of centuries in China. Disregard for this fact led to a situation in which the authors of general works on Chinese literature presented far from a complete picture of the literary life of past eras in their surveys, ignoring several important and interesting works. Works like the "Ode to Elegant Speech" of Lu Ji (261-303), "The Carved Dragon of Literary Thought" of Liu Xie (5th-6th centuries), "The Category of Poetry" of Zhong Rong (6th century) and the "Poem of the Poet" of Sikong Tu (837-908) give us an opportunity to discern the views of the Chinese of a particular historical period on the responsibilities and nature of literature and aid the researcher to delineate the sphere of artistic developments. It is not always easy to single out the particular works that must be included in an analysis of the literary process in ancient China. Fedorenko proposes that the question of the possibility of including a particular text in the sphere of literary analysis be settled by employing the aesthetic criterion, which makes it possible to determine the place of the work in the development of Chinese literary thought. The researcher notes that the concept "wen" ("literature") was "established in its historical progression as a specific form of social awareness, as one way of perceiving the external world through the categories of metaphorical depiction, giving concrete form to the essence, visible features and perceptible aspects of real objects and events" (p 281). Fedorenko tries to reveal the significance of the famous ancient works "Shujing," "Shijing" and "Yijing" in the establishment of the literary art and artistic perception of reality.

In the section entitled "An Enquiry Into the Genesis of Chinese Literature (18th-13th Centuries B.C.)," N. T. Fedorenko examines characteristic attitudes toward folklore in China. These include, first of all, the imititative copying of folkloric poetic images, a kind of unoriginal writing that adds nothing new to the literary experience. The second tendency is the invention of pseudo-folklore, which distorts the very nature of the folkloric art. The third tendency is characterized by the respectful treatment of folklore and a desire to assimilate the artistic experience of the common people. "This tendency pursues the goal of the creative assimilation of the best examples of folk art and the further development of everything achieved in the past" (p 14). The representatives of this creative trend included, for example, the poets Qu Yuan, Cao Zhi, Tao Yuanming, Li Bo, Du Fu and Bo Juyi.

The folklore of the period between the 11th and 7th centuries B.C. can be judged from the "Shijing," in which the researcher finds the same tendency, which was characteristic of ancient literature: a desire to recreate the most diverse aspects of human life. The songs of the "Shijing" portray the labor of people and the customs related to it. Epic works, combining realistic elements with mythology and fantasy, indicate Chinese beliefs about the past history of the nation and attitudes toward rulers. Anger is expressed in songs about persons close to the ruler who have forgotten their duty and honor (the "Ode to the Unjust Advisers," "Great Art Thou, the Vault of Heaven" and "Ode to the Emperor's Dishonest Advisers"). Folk works tell of forced labor ("The Song of the Seventh Moon") and state that the rulers, living in luxury, were growing rich at the expense of farmers ("Blows Can Be Heard From Afar, From Afar"). A prominent position is occupied by the song "The Great Mouse," which is probably the first allegory in Chinese poetry, the author of the monograph points out. Forces hated by the people, their brutal enslavers, are allegorically depicted as a huge mouse, greedily devouring all of the fruits of the farmers' labor. The underlying motif of the song, filled with optimistic faith in the triumph of folk justice, is the laborers' dream about a "happy land" with no "greedy mice" (p 179).

War is portrayed with great artistic cogency in the "Shijing." We see either the warriors themselves, on a far-off campaign ("Even If I Climb the Highest Mountain" and "Geese") or the lonely women thinking about their husbands ("Waiting for a Husband Off on a Campaign" and "Yearning for a Husband Sent on a Campaign"). The author says the following about the work "Only the Big Drum Was Heard": "It is remarkable for its sentiment and profoundly poetic melody, conveying the interminable longing of a tiller of the soil who has been driven off to war. The composers of these folk songs and poems were able to give the simplest facts of life great significance and profound meaning and combine wisdom with naive ingenuousness and the lyricism of emotions with the bleak reality of life" (p 181). This observation correctly describes the earliest poetic works in which the people express negative feelings about war. The author correctly notes that the humanism of folk songs is displayed with remarkable

thoroughness in the lyrical works that occupy such an important place in the "Shijing." Songs about love are filled with joy and springtime and they glorify youth. They display respect for women and the right of people to freely express their feelings and achieve personal happiness. Sometimes the psychological accuracy and veracity of these songs are amazing.

An analysis of the artistic peculiarities of the songs in the "Shijing" is given special attention by the author. In the sections entitled the "Poetry of the 'Shijing'" and the "Musical Aspect of the 'Shijing,'" the author examines several theoretical and aesthetic problems, important for an understanding of not only the ancient work itself, but also the nature of the Chinese literary process in subsequent centuries. The author makes interesting comments on the system of artistic images in ancient Chinese verse, which influenced the poetic aspect of ancient and medieval Chinese literature. The researcher states that the songs of the "Shijing" are "distinguished by maximum conciseness of expressive means and maximum linguistic ingenuity" (p 186). Fedorenko writes that poetic symbols, conveying a hidden or double meaning and connected with historical facts and real events, are already present in the ancient work. The researcher discusses the "three categories" ("fu," "bi" and "xing"), which were defined in antiquity and indicated the special descriptive means used in the songs of the "Shijing." In view of the fact that various interpretations of these concepts exist, the author points out the need to take the historical factor into account in their examination. He substantiates his thesis that the ancient songs "reflect the primitive system of beauty, as it took shape during the early stages of aesthetic development in China, beauty as the meaning of human existence" (p 14). In a section entitled "The Influence of the 'Shijing,'" the author reveals the productive effect of the work on Chinese literature of later eras.

In the section on the "Yijing," the author discusses the artistic nature of the work, which is ritualistic and philosophical in character. "The text of the 'Yijing,' as it has come down to us, clearly reveals the folkloric character of its origins. There is no question that it reflects a unique group of folk beliefs, creative aspirations and poetic visions of the world" (p 251). The author examines the way in which the specific beliefs of the ancient Chinese about the world and man's interrelations with it took literary form. Since this work conveys the idea of the inconstancy of the universe and the interdependence of all events in it, the aphoristic form here depicts the various states the world passes through in its constant motion.

The intuitive metaphorical method of contemplation, which is reflected in the aphorisms of the "Yijing," played a significant role in the formation of Chinese aesthetic views and the principles of literary textual organization. The author notes that the aphoristic symbols were based on images found in nature. A sense of the continuity of human life with nature compelled the folk artist to use verbal forms to simultaneously depict

concrete natural phenomena and the mysteries of the universe. "This is not a matter of naked thought or form. It is more like thought which evolves into feeling, into sensation, and form--the realized meaning--is embodied in the work itself, in its final essence" (p 258). This statement reveals the nature of the literary artistry of the "Yijing" and helps to elucidate the role of the work in the Chinese literary process.

The oldest chronicle, the "Shujing," attracted the attention of the researcher because the moral and ethical views it expresses and the descriptive methods it employs had a great deal of influence on later writers. In his description of its system of ethical views, the author singles out the sources in which Confucianism later found a basis for its teachings about the golden age and about the rule of the emperors who were ascribed absolute wisdom. Fedorenko sees the basic idea of the chapter "The Great Plan" as the establishment of the ideal ruler and the principles of intelligent rule. The idea of the "heavenly mandate" bestowed upon the ruler, giving him the right to head the state, was expressed in this work. At the same time, under the conditions of the obsession with heaven in the Zhou era, beliefs also originated and took shape concerning the importance of the moral qualities of the ruler, his advisers and individuals appointed to serve the state. "The concept 'de' ('virtue' and 'respect for virtue') represents a further development in the spiritual and ideological life of Zhou society. The appearance of the category 'de' indicates the heightened moral d mands of Zhou society. This certainly testifies that the theme of man's moral nature and his destiny were given primary consideration" (p 127).

For the researcher, the "Shujing" is both a chronicle and a work of literature. Fedorenko writes: "The 'Shujing,' in our opinion, has such indisputable merits as a literary work that many of its texts should primarily be regarded as creative literature" (p 157). The researcher is convinced that the chapters "The Great Plan," "The Code of Yao," "The Code of Shun" and others are distinguished by the skillful choice of expressive words, harmonious composition, original rhetorical devices and the artistic use of monologs and dialogs. The work has preserved mythological and heroic legends and examples of oral rhetoric, chronicles and official documents. The appearance of fragments with no logical connection in the work is explained in the following way by N. T. Fedorenko: "In addition to the possibility that some parts of the text were destroyed or lost during the process of recopying or prolonged storage, this also reflects, in our opinion, the methods and devices of literary style: Elements already existing in the oral form of the genre have been selected, set down in characters and immortalized in this form, without any kind of changes or reworking of the folkloric art" (p 164).

An analysis of the work convinces us that the author is correct when he states that the best historical compositions "have always been regarded in China precisely as the art of perception and metaphorical thought" (p 165). On the basis of abundant factual material, N. T. Fedorenko has been able to prove that historical and philosophical works in ancient

China, in addition to performing a descriptive function, had a metaphorical nature and lay at the source of Chinese literature. The researcher says that the literary art in ancient China "displays a continuation of oral poetic traditions and the mythology of primitive society, as well as the development of realistic and metaphorical elements" (p 77).

In this work, Fedorenko has attempted to reveal all of the characteristics of ancient Chinese rhetoric. It is true that we can only regret that the author, while giving so much attention to the analysis of mythological beliefs and their expression in literary works, did not feel the need to devote a special section or chapter in his monograph to the examination of these topics.

This new book by N. T. Fedorenko will not only make new material available to scholars and present them with interesting conclusions and generalizations, but will also stimulate further work on unanswered questions, the study of which will aid in the creation of a scholarly Marxist history of Chinese literature.

8588
CSO: 1805

TENTH SCIENCE CONFERENCE ON HISTORIOGRAPHY AND SOURCE STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 p 205

[Article by B. N. Mel'nichenko]

[Text] Since 1961, historiography conferences have been held regularly twice a year in the School of Oriental Studies of the Leningrad State University imeni A. A. Zhdanov. The conferences are organized by a standing organizational committee chaired by Professor G. V. Yefimov. The tenth conference was held on 20-23 March 1979. It was attended by Orientologists from the universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Saransk and Odessa, the pedagogical institutes of Moscow, Leningrad and Pskov, and the institutes of Oriental Studies, the Far East, Ethnography and Scientific Information on the Social Sciences of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Five reports were presented at plenary sessions, fifteen in the section on the Far East, eleven in the section on South and Southeast Asia, twelve in the section on the Middle East and five in the section on Africa. Problems in Sinology were discussed in 15 reports.

At the first plenary session, Professor L. A. Bereznyy (LGU [Leningrad State University]) reported on "The Treatment of the Chinese Revolution of 1925-1927 in the Literature of Recent Years." He commented on the unremitting interest of researchers in the events of the mid-1920's in China and said that it was no longer possible to speak of a single methodological approach in Western historical works on the Chinese revolution. But the productivity of the attempts of some scholars to conduct analyses from the standpoint of the materialistic interpretation of history is considerably diminished by insufficient mastery of the materialistic historical method and the undiscerning repetition of several erroneous conclusions expressed by PRC historians under the influence of Maoism.

Professor G. V. Yefimov (LGU) presented a report on "The Struggle of Ideas in Soviet Orientology (1920's and 1930's)" at the final plenary session. In this report, the author made use of documents from the Leningrad Party Archives and the oblast and city CPSU committees, which provide a fuller understanding of the history of the organization of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies in 1930, disputes over organizational principles, questions connected with the interrelations between

scholars of the older generation and young scholars, some mistakes in the resolution of these problems, the development of correct relations between scholars of different generations, the establishment of business-like relations on the basis of principled party policy and the development of a creative atmosphere in the collective.

Professor G. Ya. Smolin (LGU) summarized the main results of the Soviet study of the history of Song China and neighboring countries in the 10th-13th centuries in his report. The speaker focused his attention on Soviet participation with foreign colleagues in the work on the "Song Project," initiated a quarter of a century ago by prominent French Sinologist E. Balache. Professor Smolin mentions some of the trends and problems in further investigations in this area of Soviet studies on medieval China and stresses the need for the effective coordination of Soviet research projects dealing with various aspects of the economic, social, political and cultural life of the Song empire and its neighboring countries and peoples.

The study of the history of the communist movement in China has always been the main field in Soviet Sinology. The report by A. S. Ipatova and I. B. Volkova (Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences) contained an analysis of a little-known source work on CCP history in 1948 and 1949--the journal DANGDI GONGZUO ("Party Work"). The extraordinary value of this source work, according to the speakers, consists in the fact that it did not only contain documents of a directive nature, but also reports, speeches, articles and other materials reflecting the state of affairs in the communist party as a whole and in individual regions, provinces, cities and districts.

Other Orientologists from Moscow, Leningrad and Pskov also spoke at the conference.

The conference took place in an atmosphere of scientific exactingness and benevolence. Most of the reports were extensively discussed.

8588
CSO: 1805

INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE SYMPOSIUM

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 p 206

[Text] A science symposium, organized by the Institute of Oriental Studies of the MPR Academy of Sciences, was held in Ulaanbataar from 30 May to 2 June of this year to discuss the topic "Maoism and the National Question." It was attended by leading Sinologists from scientific research institutes in Bulgaria, Hungary, the SRV, the GDR, Cuba, the MPR, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR, as well as research associates on the staffs of the central committees of fraternal parties.

The symposium opened with an introductory speech by President B. Shirendeb of the MPR Academy of Sciences. The symposium was attended by Secretary Adjaa of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee, and Deputy Section Heads S. Dagva and O. Lhagva of the MPRP Central Committee.

Reports were presented by S. Bira, vice president of the MPR Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, on "Maoism and the National Question in China"; M. I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of the Far East, on "The Great-Han Doctrine of the Single Chinese Nationality"; Dr M. Matous, deputy director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, on "Great-Han Chauvinism--The Enemy of World Progress"; Ngo Thanh Dong, head of the Department of Philosophy of the Higher Party School of the Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee, on "The Expansionist Great-Power Hegemonistic Nationalism of Beijing Reactionary Circles in Relations with Vietnam," and others.

Some 25 reports and speeches were presented at the symposium; they conclusively demonstrated that Chinese ruling circles are still approaching the non-Han people of the PRC from the standpoint of the great-power chauvinist policy of the compulsory Sinization of ethnic minorities. The Maoists are trying to substantiate this policy with the "theory" that there is only one unified Chinese nationality in the PRC.

Speakers at the symposium stressed that the non-Han people in China are still being deprived of their right of self-determination.

The formally declared system of regional national autonomy has been made fictitious by the top rulers of China.

Speakers noted that economic policy in China's national regions is perpetuating the economic backwardness of these regions and preventing their development. The economic policy of the Beijing leaders in the national regions of the PRC is mainly subordinated to the objectives of militarization. Regions inhabited by non-Han ethnic groups have virtually become raw material annexes of China's internal provinces. Attention was focused on the fact that the Beijing leaders are turning the PRC's national border regions into military strategic bases for the escalation of tension and provocations in relations with the MPR, the USSR, the SRV and other neighboring countries. The Chinese aggression against socialist Vietnam and the flagrant provocations against Laos and Kampuchea proved how dangerous the great-Han policy of the Chinese leaders could be in the border regions, which they have turned into beachheads for aggression against neighboring countries.

Great-Han chauvinism has become one of the most characteristic features of Maoist foreign policy. The Maoists have not only departed from the principles of proletarian internationalism, but have also begun to work toward direct confrontation with the nations of the socialist community. Declaring territorial claims on almost all neighboring states, the present leaders of China are trying to attain their hegemonistic goals by allying themselves with the most reactionary forces: racists, militarists, revanchists and neofascists, posing a real threat to peace throughout the world.

The Sinologists of the socialist countries agreed with the need for continued study of the history, economics and culture of the non-Han people in China and the exposure of the great-Han chauvinist policy in national regions, the policy of expansionism and the territorial claims made by China on neighboring countries.

8588
CSO: 1805

ELEVENTH YOUTH CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 3, 1979 pp 206-207

[Article by A. V. Ostrovskiy]

[Text] The 11th youth conference on current affairs in the Far East was held in the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences on 7 June 1979. More than 30 reports were presented at the conference by young research associates and post-graduate students. It provided them with an excellent opportunity to exchange information, broaden their professional outlook and acquire experience in public speaking and debating.

A welcoming speech was presented at the plenary session by M.I. Sladkovskiy, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences and director of the Institute of the Far East of the USSR Academy of Sciences. In this speech, he expressed the hope that the conference participants would carry on the glorious traditions of Soviet Orientology and give more time to the investigation of matters that have not been sufficiently studied as yet. When he listed these topics, the speaker said that the most important were the socioeconomic structure of the PRC, interaction between the basis and the superstructure, and the essence of the socioeconomic and political processes now taking place in China. He concluded by encouraging the young scholars to take a more active part in the study of phenomena providing a key to the interpretation and comprehension of the essence of political and economic changes taking place in the nations of the Far East.

The report by Professor Ye. F. Kovalev, doctor of historical sciences, contained a brief survey of all preceding conferences of young research associates and post-graduate students at the IDV [Institute of the Far East] of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The speaker demonstrated that the ideological, theoretical and professional level of conference reports rose with each year.

The main report--"Some Aspects of the Youth Policy of the CCP During the Current Stage"--was presented by Komsomol Central Committee Secretary V. A. Guseynov. He remarked that the Chinese leadership is now trying

to use youth to carry out the program of the "four modernizations," which is intended to militarize the country. It was for this purpose that the Young Communist League of China was founded. It now serves the Maoist leadership as a means of exerting ideological and political influence on broad segments of Chinese youth. At the same time, the Chinese leadership is making use of pro-Maoist youth organizations abroad to conduct energetic subversive activity, intended to split up the international youth movement. On the whole, the speaker noted, the youth policy of the CCP during the current stage is not improving the status of the younger generation in the PRC. It has only intensified and exacerbated conflicts between Chinese youth and the present military-bureaucratic regime.

In a report entitled "The Political Struggle in China and the Trade Unions (1973-1976)," Candidate of Historical Sciences A. P. Davydov (Higher School of the Trade-Union Movement of the AUCCTU) discussed the activity of PRC trade unions in the system of sociopolitical relations under the rule of the "gang of four." He presented conclusive proof that the trade unions founded in these years were controlled by the "gang of four," who were encouraging workers to take an active part in various political campaigns in the nation to the detriment of production. As the speaker pointed out, the trade-union policy of the Maoist leadership led to a situation in which the Chinese working class was ultimately left out of the political struggle for power that broke out after Mao Zedong's death, and cannot perform its leading role in the political development of the society.

After this, the conference split up into three discussion groups: on economics, history and ideology, and international relations. A report by Candidate of Economic Sciences V. Remygi (IDV), "An Inquiry Into the Reorganization of the System of National Economic Management in the PRC," aroused the greatest interest in the section on economics. In particular, the speaker noted that the present adaptation of the system of economic management to the goals of national militarization is considerably limiting its effectiveness and could result in more failures in the PRC's economic development. The reports by N. Trofimenko (Higher Party School), "An Inquiry Into the Definition of the Place and Role of the Working Class in the Development of Japanese Society Under the Conditions of Technological Revolution," and V. Oklyanskiy (Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences), "Ways of Strengthening the Fuel and Energy Base of the MPR," which dealt with various problems in the socio-economic development of nations in the Far East, also aroused interest.

A timely report, "The Struggle Between Confucianism and Legalism (As Exemplified by the Treatise 'Yan tie lun') During the Period of Criticism of Lin Biao and Confucius," was presented by A. Krasnov (IDV) in the section on history and ideology. In the report, this campaign was used as an example to prove that when the Chinese leaders engage in political struggle, they often use ideas dating back to ancient China to propagandize their views among the popular masses. The reports by O. Tolstykh (IDV) and S. Grigor'yev (IDV), on the anti-Maoist demonstrations of Chinese workers during the period of "Cultural Revolution" in the Xinjiang-Uygur autonomous region and Northeast China, aroused great interest.

Participants in the section on international relations were most interested in a report by Candidate of Economic Sciences S. Manezhev (IDV) on "Some Aspects of China's Foreign Economic Ties at the Beginning of the 20th Century," in which he demonstrated the influence of foreign trade in the 1920's on the economic development of China at that time. The reports by O. Ivanov (IDV) and L. Gamza (Moscow State University) on the PRC's economic relations with the socialist countries and the Common Market countries contained interesting information. In his report, N. Lutsenko (IDV) described Japan's relations with the Latin American countries and presented a critical analysis of works on this topic by representatives of contemporary Japanese bourgeois historiography.

On the whole, it should be noted that many questions of great import for the nations of the Far East were discussed at the conference. All of the reports reflected the desire of their authors to understand the problems facing these nations and to contribute in their study. Conferences of this type considerably broaden the outlook of young scholars and serve as a genuine school for the training and professional indoctrination of experts on the nations of the Far East.

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